Dr. Carlton L. Winbery v. Dr. Leon Hyatt, Jr.

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

13-339

DR. CARLTON L. WINBERY,
DR. FREDERICK L. DOWNING,
DR. JAMES R. HEATH, AND
DR. CONNIE R. DOUGLAS

VERSUS

LOUISIANA COLLEGE,
LEON HYATT, JR.,
JOE AGUILLARD, KENT AGUILLARD,
ALAN SHOEMAKER, AMY RUSSELL, AND
LOUISIANA INERRANCY FELLOWSHIP

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APPEAL FROM THE
NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF RAPIDES, DOCKET NO. 184,363, DIV. C
HONORABLE MARY LAUVE DOGGETT, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

JAMES T. GENOVESE
JUDGE

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Court composed of James T. Genovese, Shannon J. Gremillion, and John E.
Conery, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Victor H. Sooter
Sooter & Associates
A Limited Liability Company
Post Office Box 1671
Alexandria, Louisiana 71309
(318) 448-8301
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES:
Dr. Carlton L. Winbery, Dr. Frederick L. Downing,
Dr. James R. Heath, and Dr. Connie R. Douglas

Frederic Theodore Le Clercq
Joseph L. McReynolds
Kelly L. Covington
Deutsch, Kerrigan & Stiles, L.L.P.
755 Magazine Street
New Orleans, Louisiana 70130
(504) 581-5141
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS:
Louisiana College, Leon Hyatt, Jr., Joe Aguillard,
Kent Aguillard, Alan Shoemaker, and Amy Roussell

GENOVESE, Judge.

Plaintiffs, Dr. Carlton L. Winbery, Dr. Frederick L. Downing, Dr. James

R. Heath, and Dr. Connie R. Douglas, appeal the dismissal of their lawsuit against

Defendants, Louisiana College, Leon Hyatt, Jr., Joe Aguillard, Kent Aguillard,

Alan Shoemaker, and Amy Roussell, pursuant to the trial court‟s grant of

Defendants‟ declinatory exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial

court reasoned that to resolve Plaintiffs‟ claims would require an unconstitutional

entanglement in a religious dispute under the First Amendment‟s Establishment

Clause. Defendants filed a cross-appeal, challenging the trial court‟s ruling that

the ministerial exception of the First Amendment‟s Free Exercise Clause did not

also apply herein. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 1996, Plaintiffs, then faculty members at Louisiana College, filed suit

against Leon Hyatt, Jr., the Louisiana Inerrancy Fellowship, and the Louisiana

Conservative Resurgency, alleging defamation and intentional infliction of

emotional distress. That lawsuit was ultimately settled.

In December 2005, Plaintiffs, now former professors1 of Louisiana College,

filed another lawsuit alleging that efforts were made by Defendants herein to

defame, preclude advancement, violate long-held academic freedom, violate

Louisiana College‟s Faculty Handbook provisions, and to breach the

aforementioned settlement contract. Defendants filed a declinatory exception of

lack of subject matter jurisdiction seeking a dismissal of Plaintiffs‟ claims on the

basis that the lawsuit is barred by the United States Constitution and the Louisiana

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Since the filing of the current lawsuit, Plaintiffs have either retired or resigned from
Louisiana College.

Constitution. Invoking what is known as the ministerial exception, Defendants

argued that Plaintiffs‟ suit was barred by the First Amendment‟s Free Exercise

Clause because the claims at issue concerned the employment relationship between

a religious institution, or church, and one of its ministers. Defendants rely upon

the Supreme Court‟s holding in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church &

School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, ___ U.S. ___, 132

S.Ct. 694 (2012), to support their contention that Louisiana College is a church and

Plaintiffs are ministers. Additionally, Defendants contend that determining the

validity of Plaintiffs‟ claims would require a court to determine the truth or falsity

of certain religious beliefs and Baptist ecclesiastical disagreements over inerrancy

or literal truth of the Bible as scripture, thereby violating the constitutional

protections against government entanglement with religion found in the First

Amendment‟s Establishment Clause.

Plaintiffs argue that Defendants were not entitled to the protection of the

ministerial exception because Louisiana College is non-hierarchical religious

college where Plaintiffs were not ministers, and the college was not a church.

Plaintiffs rely upon Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Mississippi

College, 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912, 101 S.Ct. 3143

(1981), asserting that it is analogous and instructive herein. According to

Plaintiffs, the Supreme Court‟s holding in Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S.Ct. 694, is not

helpful to Defendants‟ position relative to the applicability of the ministerial

exception. Instead, Plaintiffs contend that it bolsters their assertion that the

ministerial exception is not a jurisdictional bar, but rather an affirmative defense to

be asserted at trial and that Defendants‟ presentation of this matter as a declinatory

exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction is unsupported. Plaintiffs further

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argue that their claims present neutral principles of law, not religious doctrine or

practice; therefore, determinations of defamation, retaliation, and contractual

matters would not entail an impermissible venture, or government entanglement,

into ecclesiastical matters.

A hearing on Defendants‟ declinatory exception was held on February 6,

2012, after which the trial court issued Reasons for Judgment on March 28, 2012,

finding in favor of Defendants and dismissing Plaintiffs‟ claims. In sustaining

Defendants‟ declinatory exception, the trial court held that it was not precluded

from exercising jurisdiction over claims asserted pursuant to the ministerial

exception of the Free Exercise Clause, but that it was precluded from exercising

jurisdiction over Plaintiffs‟ claims on the basis that resolving those claims would

necessitate an unconstitutional entanglement in a religious dispute. Judgment

dismissing Plaintiffs‟ demands against Defendants was signed on May 4, 2012.2

Plaintiffs sought a new trial, which was denied on September 13, 2012. Both

Plaintiffs and Defendants appeal.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Plaintiffs/Appellants/Cross-Appellees

Plaintiffs appeal the trial court‟s ruling that it did not possess subject matter

jurisdiction over their claims pursuant to the Establishment Clause. Specifically,

Plaintiffs assert that the trial court “erroneously granted the Peremptory Exception

of Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction[,]” and “denied [their] Motion for New

Trial.”

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Plaintiffs‟ claims against the Louisiana Inerrancy Fellowship were not dismissed
pursuant to this judgment.

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Defendants/Appellees/Cross-Appellants

Defendants have cross-appealed that portion of the trial court‟s ruling that

held that the court did not possess subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs‟ claims

under the Free Exercise Clause. Specifically, Defendants assert that the trial court

erred in: (1) “finding that Louisiana College is not a „church‟ or „religious group‟

for purposes of the Free Exercise Clause[,]” and (2) “holding that the Free Exercise

Clause did not bar the court from having jurisdiction over this action.”

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The issue of subject matter jurisdiction presented . . . on appeal
involves a question of law. Questions of law are reviewed under the
de novo standard of review. La. Mun. Ass’n v. State, 04-227
(La. 1/9/05), 893 So.2d 809. Therefore, we must determine whether
the court below was legally correct. City of New Orleans v. Bd. of
Comm’r of Orleans Levee Dist., 93-690 (La. 7/5/94), 640 So.2d 237.

Chavers v. Bright Truck Leasing, 06-1011, p. 10 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/6/06), 945

So.2d 838, 844 n.4, writ denied, 07-304 (La. 4/5/07), 954 So.2d 141.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

“Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the legal power and authority of a

court to hear and determine a particular class of actions or proceedings, based upon

the object of the demand, the amount in dispute, or the value of the right asserted.”

La.Code Civ.P. art. 2. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution

provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,

or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” A similar provision is contained in

Article 1, Section 8 of the Louisiana Constitution, which provides, “No law shall

be enacted respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise

thereof.”

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Plaintiffs‟ appeal presents the issue of whether the trial court was correct in

ruling that it was precluded from exercising its subject matter jurisdiction pursuant

to the First Amendment‟s Establishment Clause. Defendants‟ appeal presents the

issue of whether the trial court was correct in ruling that Defendants were not

entitled to the protection afforded by the ministerial exception grounded in the

First Amendment‟s Free Exercise Clause.

Defendants’ Cross-Appeal—The Free Exercise Clause

The Free Exercise Clause of the United States Constitution restricts the

government‟s ability to intrude into ecclesiastical matters or to interfere with a

church‟s governance of its own affairs. “[M]atters touching the relationship

between a church and its ministers, including the selection of a minister,

determination of salary, and assignment of duties and location, are „matters of

church administration and government and thus, purely of ecclesiastical

cognizance.‟” Mississippi College, 626 F.2d at 485 (quoting McClure v. Salvation

Army, 460 F.2d 553, 559-60 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896, 93 S.Ct. 132

(1972)). Thus, in order for Defendants to garner the protection of the ministerial

exception, two findings are required: (1) that the institution in question is a church;

and (2) that the plaintiffs are ministers of that church. Id.

In Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S.Ct. 694, a teacher filed a complaint with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging that she was fired in

retaliation for threatening to file an Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)

lawsuit. In the United States Supreme Court‟s first decision relative to the

application of the ministerial exception in an employment discrimination lawsuit,

Chief Justice John Roberts wrote:

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Until today, we have not had occasion to consider whether this
freedom of a religious organization to select its ministers is implicated
by a suit alleging discrimination in employment. The Courts of
Appeals, in contrast, have had extensive experience with this issue.
Since the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and other employment discrimination laws,
the Courts of Appeals have uniformly recognized the existence of a
“ministerial exception,” grounded in the First Amendment, that
precludes application of such legislation to claims concerning the
employment relationship between a religious institution and its
ministers.

We agree that there is such a ministerial exception. The
members of a religious group put their faith in the hands of their
ministers. Requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted
minister, or punishing a church for failing to do so, intrudes upon
more than a mere employment decision. Such action interferes with
the internal governance of the church, depriving the church of control
over the selection of those who will personify its beliefs. By
imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise
Clause, which protects a religious group‟s right to shape its own faith
and mission through its appointments. According the state the power
to determine which individuals will minister to the faithful also
violates the Establishment Clause, which prohibits government
involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions.

Id. at 705-06 (footnote omitted).

In this case, the trial court rejected Defendants‟ contention that

Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S.Ct. 694, is controlling herein, explaining in its Reasons for

Judgment:

[I]ts application to the instant case is limited. While Hosanna-Tabor
does provide an excellen[t] analysis of the second prong of the
ministerial exception, [i.e.,] the minister requirement, it does not
provide any guidance on the first prong of the exception[,] i.e., the
“church requirement.”

The plaintiff in Hosanna-Tabor, was a teacher at a Lutheran
school. The school was directly affiliated with the Lutheran Church
by the same name. Hosanna-Tabor’s status as a “church” was
established and was not at issue on appeal. The only issue before the
Court was whether or not the plaintiff teacher could be considered a
“minister” of that church.

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The trial court, following the holding of Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477, and

determining from the evidence presented that “Louisiana College is structurally

similar to Mississippi College[,]” held that Louisiana College is not a church, nor

were Plaintiffs ministers; therefore, the ministerial exception does not apply in this

case. We agree.

In Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477, an employee filed a complaint with the

EEOC, alleging gender discrimination. The EEOC investigated the charge and

issued a subpoena. The college, relying upon McClure, 460 F.2d 553, resisted the

subpoena, arguing that the employment relationship between a religious education

institution and its faculty was exempt from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964. The Fifth Circuit distinguished this matter from McClure, 460 F.2d 553, and

held that the relationship between a religious educational institution and its faculty

was not exempt from coverage under Title VII, the college was not a church, and

its faculty and staff did not function as ministers.

In our de novo review of the evidence in the record, we find the trial court‟s

reliance on Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477, and its resultant holding to be

correct. The trial court was correct in noting the clear similarities between

Louisiana College and Mississippi College.

Both colleges are co-educational liberal arts institutions that have

undergraduate curricula which require all students to take certain religious courses.

Mississippi College was owned and operated by the Mississippi Baptist

Convention, an organization composed of Mississippi‟s Southern Baptist

Churches. Louisiana College is governed by a Board of Trustees, elected by the

Louisiana Baptist Convention, an organization composed of Louisiana‟s Southern

Baptist Churches. Noteworthy is the fact that three Plaintiffs herein, Dr. Winbery,

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Dr. Downing, and Dr. Heath, are ordained Baptist ministers, and all four Plaintiffs,

including Dr. Douglas, taught a required religious class. We find the holding in

Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477, to be instructive and the trial court‟s adherence

thereto to be correct. Of particular significance, to both the trial court and this

court, is the Fifth Circuit‟s explanation that:

The College is not a church. The College‟s faculty and staff do not
function as ministers. The faculty members are not intermediaries
between a church and its congregation. They neither attend to the
religious needs of the faithful nor instruct students in the whole of the
religious doctrine. That faculty members are expected to serve as
exemplars of practicing Christians does not serve to make the terms
and conditions of their employment matters of church administration
and thus purely of ecclesiastical concern.

Id. at 485.

Finally, while Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S.Ct. 694, is significant for the Supreme

Court‟s recognition of the ministerial exception in an employment discrimination

lawsuit, we find Defendants reliance upon it wholly unpersuasive. In

Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S.Ct. 694, there was no question that the Evangelical

Lutheran Church and School was a church. Instead, the court considered only

whether or not Cheryl Perich, a called teacher,3 was a minister of said church.

Additionally, Chief Justice Roberts opined: “Today we hold only that the

ministerial exception bars such a suit. We express no view on whether the

exception bars other types of suits, including actions by employees alleging breach

of contract or tortious conduct by their religious employees.” Id. at 710.

In further addressing Defendants‟ cross-appeal, and more particularly, we

note that Defendants have listed the following two assignments of error:

3
“„Called‟ teachers are regarded as having been called to their vocation by God through a
congregation. To be eligible to receive a call from a congregation, a teacher must satisfy certain
academic requirements.” Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S.Ct. at 699.

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1. The [trial court] erred in finding that Louisiana College is not a
“church” or “religious group” for purposes of the Free Exercise
Clause.

2. As a result, the [trial court] erred in holding that the Free
Exercise Clause did not bar the court from having jurisdiction
over this action.

The judgment appealed from granted Defendants‟ Peremptory Exception of

Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. Defendants‟ two assignments of error do not

address the granting of their exception, but take issue with the trial court‟s reasons

for judgment. “Appeals are taken from the judgment, not the reasons for

judgment.” Wooley v. Lucksinger, 09-571, 09-584, 09-585, 09-586, p. 77

(La. 4/1/11), 61 So.3d 507, 572. “„The written reasons for judgment are merely an

explication of the trial court‟s determinations. They do not alter, amend, or affect

the final judgment being appealed . . . .‟ State in the Interest of Mason, 356 So.2d

530, 532 (La.App. 1 Cir.1977).” Id. Appellate courts review judgments, not

reasons for judgment. Defendants‟ cross-appeal is actually an appeal of the trial

court‟s written reasons for judgment and not the judgment itself. Therefore,

Defendants‟ cross-appeal challenging the trial court‟s ruling is without merit. We

find no error in the trial court‟s determination that the ministerial exception of the

First Amendment‟s Free Exercise Clause is inapplicable herein.

Plaintiffs’ Appeal—The Establishment Clause

The Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution restricts the

government from making any law “respecting an establishment of religion.”

Article 1, Section 8 of the Louisiana Constitution echoes this provision. “These

constitutional provisions forbid governmental interference with religious freedom.

„Civil courts are prohibited from interfering in the ecclesiastical matters of a

religious group, that is, in matters concerning religious discipline, faith, rule,

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custom or law.‟ LeBlanc v. Davis, 432 So.2d 239, 241 (La.1983).” Ambush

v. Mount Zion Baptist Church, Inc., 11-1028, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/22/12),

88 So.3d 1077, 1081.

In its Reasons for Judgment, the trial court opined:

Under the Establishment Clause, the consideration is whether
the issues which the court will have to resolve will necessarily turn
upon competing interpretations of religion, thus resulting in the court
becoming “entangled” in an ecclesiastical dispute. Michael Hartwig
v. Albertus Magnus College and Julia McNamara, 93 F. Supp. 2d 200
(D. Conn. 2000). The “Entanglement Doctrine” provides that a court
must decline jurisdiction over a lawsuit when the dispute is so
intertwined with matters of religion that a proper resolution cannot be
made without interpreting or choosing between competing religious
principles or doctrines.

Plaintiffs argue that their claims, sounding in contract and tort, can be

decided upon neutral principles of law and without excessive entanglements.

Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in finding that their claims were outside

the scope of judicial review under the First Amendment.

It is Defendants‟ contention that this is not a secular dispute; rather, it is a

dispute within Louisiana College‟s Theology Department about Baptist faith.

Defendants argue that this matter is so intertwined with matters of religion that a

proper resolution cannot be made with interpreting or choosing between competing

religious principles or doctrines.

Relative to the issue of defamation, the trial court reasoned that to determine

whether the accusations that professors were teaching errant views, the court

would have to “delve deeply into the Baptist theology.” The remaining issues also

require an examination and interpretation of dogma.

The trial court was correct in holding that the dispute between Plaintiffs and

Defendants centers on the nature of Baptist theology and church governance over

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how theology is taught at Louisiana College and would, thus, require the court to

impermissibly entangle itself in deciding ecclesiastical matters. Defendants‟

declinatory exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction was correctly sustained

by the trial court.

DECREE

Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court sustaining Defendants‟

declinatory exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction is hereby affirmed. The

ruling of the trial court declaring that the ministerial exception of the First

Amendment‟s Free Exercise Clause is inapplicable is also affirmed. Costs of this

appeal are to be divided by the parties.

AFFIRMED.

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