Garland Miller v. Desoto Regional Health System

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

13-639

GARLAND MILLER

VERSUS

DESOTO REGIONAL HEALTH SYSTEM, ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
ELEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF SABINE, NO. 64,651
HONORABLE STEPHEN B. BEASLEY, DISTRICT JUDGE

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PHYLLIS M. KEATY
JUDGE

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Court composed of John D. Saunders, Shannon J. Gremillion, and Phyllis M.
Keaty, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Pamela N. Breedlove
Breedlove Law Firm
Post Office Box 8667
Bossier City, Louisiana 71112
(318) 423-0845
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee:
Desoto Regional Health System

Charles D. Soileau
Charles D. Soileau, APLC
730 San Antonio Avenue
Many, Louisiana 71449
(318) 256-0076
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee:
Don Burkett

Lisa V. Johnson
Corkern, Crews & Guillet, L.L.C.
Post Office Box 1036
Natchitoches, Louisiana 71458-1036
(318) 352-2302
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee:
Guffy Lynn Pattinson

Garland Miller
In Proper Person
Post Office Box 547
Natchitoches, Louisiana 71458
(318) 461-3582
Plaintiff/Appellant

KEATY, Judge.

Plaintiff appeals the trial court‟s judgment granting exceptions in favor of

Defendants. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant, Desoto Regional Health Systems, and Plaintiff, Dr. Garland

Miller, entered into an employment contract and office management arrangement.

Plaintiff alleges that after his contract terminated, Desoto Regional, Sabine Parish

Sheriff‟s Deputies, and others illegally entered Plaintiff‟s office with the intention

of seizing records and information to be used in a criminal case against Plaintiff.

Miller was arrested and charged with state felony theft and other criminal offenses

on September 29, 2005.

In 2007, Plaintiff was indicted on federal charges, and, in 2008, Plaintiff was

convicted of two counts of tax evasion by failing to timely file tax returns, failing

to pay tax on income, converting payments to himself and his wife to cash and

money orders, and embezzling payments due to Desoto Regional which he then

converted to cash and money orders. Failing to report as income and pay taxes on

money he embezzled from Desoto Regional were the subjects of the state law theft

charges. The U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Plaintiff‟s conviction.

As part of the sentence, Plaintiff was ordered to pay Desoto Regional restitution in

the amount of $55,470.94.

In the federal case, Plaintiff filed a motion to suppress, alleging that

evidence had been seized without a search warrant, that Desoto Regional

employees seized records with the implicit authorization of law enforcement

officials, and that patient records and computer records were accessed and removed

without his consent. The magistrate judge held that the evidence established

Desoto Regional employees were not acting as government agents, they entered

the clinic which they leased and had a right to enter, and they searched and

removed property Desoto Regional owned pursuant to the contracts between the

parties. The magistrate judge determined that neither the district attorney nor any

other governmental official had a hand in Desoto Regional‟s decision to search the

clinic but were present only to keep the peace. The magistrate judge concluded

that Desoto Regional‟s “employees simply entered a building that Desoto owned”

and recommended denial of his motion to suppress evidence. The federal district

court reviewed the report and recommendations and the record, concurred with the

findings of the magistrate judge, and denied the motion to suppress.

After his conviction, but prior to his appeal, Plaintiff filed a Motion for

Judgment of Acquittal or, Alternatively, for a New Trial. The federal district court

denied the motion. The Fifth Circuit affirmed Plaintiff‟s conviction. Plaintiff

subsequently filed a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence. The federal

district court denied the motion. Thereafter, the federal district court denied

Miller‟s writ where he argued that he was forced to make restitution for

embezzlement.

The state criminal case, which was instituted in 2005, was dismissed in 2011

after Plaintiff was released from prison on federal charges. Plaintiff subsequently

filed a petition in the state trial court naming as Defendants Desoto Regional,

Sabine Parish District Attorney Don Burkett, Sheriff Guffey Lynn Pattison, Ron

Wolfe, and unknown defendants A-Z. Plaintiff alleged Defendants were liable to

him for malicious prosecution, false arrest, unlawful search and seizure,

defamation, interference with a contract, and breach of contract. Desoto Regional

and Sheriff Pattison filed exceptions of prescription and no cause of action.

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Burkett filed an exception of no cause of action. The trial court denied Desoto

Regional‟s and Sheriff Pattison‟s exceptions of prescription but granted the

exceptions of no cause of action as to all Defendants. The trial court granted

Plaintiff leave to cure his petition by amendment to include factually based

allegations that, when assumed true, establish at law a cause of action for the

offense(s) pled.

Plaintiff thereafter filed an amended petition. Defendants, Desoto Regional

and Sheriff Pattison, again filed exceptions of no cause of action and added

exceptions of res judicata/issue preclusion. Burkett also again filed an exception of

no cause of action. The trial court granted Defendants‟ exceptions of no cause of

action and res judicata/issue preclusion and dismissed Plaintiff‟s claims against

those Defendants. The trial court also found that Plaintiff failed to state a cause of

action for malicious prosecution on the face of his original and amended petition

against Burkett and dismissed Plaintiff‟s claims against him. It is from these

rulings that Plaintiff has appealed.

Plaintiff is now before this court asserting that: (1) the trial court erred in

ruling that there was no cause of action because there was no bona fide termination

of the proceedings since no trial was held; (2) the trial court erred in granting the

exception of prescription and dismissing the claims for defamation, slander, and

libel; and (3) the trial court erred in granting a motion for no cause of action as it

relates to breach of contract and interference with a contract.1

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Plaintiff‟s Assignments of Error and Issues for Review appear to limit his appeal to the
exceptions of no cause of action sustained as to his claims for malicious prosecution, breach of
contract, and interference with a contract and an exception of prescription alleged to have been
sustained as to his claims for defamation, slander, and libel. However, in his Statement of the
Case, Plaintiff argues matters related to his search and seizure claim that were dismissed in
response to the exceptions of res judicata and issue preclusion due to his federal conviction of tax
evasion. “However, the courts of this State have considered briefs in improper form when filed

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LAW

“In reviewing the judgment of the district court relating to an exception of

no cause of action, appellate courts should conduct a de novo review because the

exception raises a question of law and the lower court‟s decision is based solely on

the sufficiency of the petition.” Ramey v. DeCaire, 03-1299, pp. 7-8 (La. 3/19/04),

869 So.2d 114, 119.

DISCUSSION

I. Exception of No Cause of Action

As mentioned above, Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in ruling

that there was no cause of action because there was no bona fide termination of the

proceedings since no trial was held. In opposition, Defendants contend that

Plaintiff failed to state a cause of action for malicious prosecution, false arrest,

unlawful search and seizure, defamation, interference with a contract, and breach

of contract/indemnity claims.

“„The function of the peremptory exception of no cause of action is to

question whether the law extends a remedy against the defendant to anyone under

the factual allegations of the petition.‟” Washington Mut. Bank v. Monticello, 07-

1018, p. 7 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/6/08), 976 So.2d 251, 256 (quoting Cleco Corp. v.

Johnson, 01-175 (La. 9/18/01), 795 So.2d 302), writ denied, 08-530 (La. 4/25/08),

978 So.2d 369. “A „cause of action,‟ when used in the context of the peremptory

exception of no cause of action, refers to the operative facts that give rise to the

plaintiff‟s right to judicially assert the action against the defendant.” Bogues v.

Louisiana Energy Consultants, Inc., 46,434, p. 3 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/10/11), 71

by pro se claimants.” Washington v. First Choice Trucking, 06-1479, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir.
3/7/07), 953 So.2d 107, 110. Thus, we will address all issues.

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So.3d 1128, 1130 (citing White v. St. Elizabeth B.C. Bd. of Dirs., 45,213 (La.App.

2 Cir. 6/2/10), 37 So.3d 1139). “„The petition must set forth the material facts

upon which a cause of action is based; the allegations must be ultimate facts;

conclusions of law [or] fact, and evidentiary facts will not be considered.‟” Sparks

v. Donovan, 04-388, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/04), 884 So.2d 1276, 1279 (quoting

Parish of Jefferson v. City of Kenner, 95-266 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/31/95), 663 So.2d

880).

A. False Arrest

Wrongful arrest, or the tort of false imprisonment, occurs when one arrests

and restrains another against his will and without statutory authority. Kyle v. City

of New Orleans, 353 So.2d 969 (La.1977). “The tort of false imprisonment

consists of the following two essential elements: (1) detention of the person; and

(2) the unlawfulness of the detention.” Kennedy v. Sheriff of E. Baton Rouge, 05-

1418, p. 32 (La. 7/10/06), 935 So.2d 669, 690. Arrests made with probable cause

are not unlawful and therefore plaintiffs cannot recover damages for false arrest or

false detention. Tabora v. City of Kenner, 94-613 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/18/95), 650

So.2d 319, writ denied, 95-402 (La. 3/30/95), 651 So.2d 843.

In the present case, there were no allegations in Plaintiff‟s original and

amended petitions that Defendants actually arrested Plaintiff, restrained Plaintiff,

or otherwise prevented Plaintiff‟s movement or ability to leave any location.2 Thus,

the petitions failed to allege any cause of action for false arrest and this claim was

properly dismissed.

2
See Kennedy, 935 So.2d at 690, wherein the court held that there lacked any allegation
that an employee restrained plaintiff “or prevented him from leaving.” Plaintiff “was detained
only when . . . he was handcuffed and transported to a nearby substation. There is thus no
factual support for an essential element of plaintiff‟s cause of action.” Id.

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B. Malicious Prosecution

Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in ruling that there was no cause

of action because there was no bona fide termination of the proceedings since no

state criminal trial was held.

In LeBlanc v. Pynes, 46,393, p. 6 (La.App. 2 Cir. 7/13/11), 69 So.3d 1273,

1279, writ denied, 11-1792 (La. 10/14/11), 74 So.3d 213, the court noted that the

following six elements are required to assert a claim for malicious prosecution:

1) the commencement or continuance of an original criminal or civil
judicial proceeding; 2) its legal causation by the present defendant
against plaintiff who was defendant in the original proceeding; 3) its
bona fide termination in favor of the present plaintiff; 4) the absence
of probable cause for such proceeding; 5) the presence of malice
therein; and 6) damages conforming to legal standards resulting to
plaintiff.

The “purpose of the „bona fide termination‟ requirement in malicious

prosecution cases is that the underlying litigation should be brought to a conclusion

on the merits before a malicious prosecution suit based on the underlying litigation

is allowed to proceed.” Savoie v. Rubin, 01-3275, 01-3276, p. 4 (La. 6/21/02), 820

So.2d 486, 488. When the merits of the underlying proceeding have not been

reached, this requirement is not satisfied. Id. In Terro v. Chamblee, 95-70, pp. 4-5

(La.App. 3 Cir. 7/19/95), 663 So.2d 75, 77-78, this court explained:

[A] bona fide termination must reflect the merits of the underlying
action. This would be true where, for example, a criminal proceeding
is dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence of guilt following a
preliminary examination. On the other hand, a merely procedural
victory, such as a dismissal on an exception of prescription or for
failure to allow discovery, as in the case sub judice, does not relate to
the merits of the suit and thus is not a bona fide termination for
purposes of a subsequent action for malicious prosecution.

Proceedings terminate in favor of the accused only when they affirmatively

indicate the accused is not guilty. Taylor v. Gregg, 36 F.3d 453 (5th Cir. 1994).

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In the present case, the petitions failed to allege that there was a bona fide

termination of the criminal prosecution in favor of Plaintiff. Although the district

attorney dismissed the state criminal proceeding, there were no allegations that the

dismissal determined that Plaintiff was not guilty as charged. There were no

allegations of any preliminary examination or other findings in the state criminal

case in which the trial court, the prosecutor, or any other person ever determined

that Plaintiff was not guilty or that there was a lack of probable cause for the

prosecution. The petitions never even alleged that Plaintiff did not embezzle

money from Desoto Regional.

Moreover, Plaintiff‟s federal conviction for failing to report or pay taxes on

money embezzled from Desoto Regional bars such a finding and meets any burden

of showing the Defendants acted on probable cause and without malice. Thus, the

petitions failed to state a cause of action for malicious prosecution, and this claim

was properly dismissed.

C. Defamation

Plaintiff contends that following the search of his office, both Desoto

Regional and the Sabine Parish Sheriff‟s Deputies made defamatory statements

which were published in the newspaper. Specifically, Plaintiff contends Desoto

Regional fired him publicly in the newspaper for theft and wrongdoing.

In order to establish a claim for defamation, the following four elements

must be met: “(1) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (2) an

unprivileged publication to a third party; (3) fault (negligence or greater) on the

part of the publisher; and (4) resulting injury.” Kennedy, 935 So.2d at 674. In

jurisprudence, the fault requirement is sometimes referred to as malice, actual or

implied. Id. “[T]o plead material facts, a petitioner alleging a cause of action for

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defamation must set forth in the petition with reasonable specificity the defamatory

statements allegedly published by the defendant.” Badeaux v. Sw. Computer

Bureau, Inc., 05-612, 05-719, p. 10 (La. 3/17/06), 929 So.2d 1211, 1218. The

court further explained:

The allegations that the letter contained “libelous and/or
fraudulent statements and/or intentionally misleading statements” are
conclusory, and the alleged defamatory statements are not set forth
with reasonable specificity. The petition does not describe the nature
of the defamatory statements contained in the anonymous letter. Thus,
we find that these allegations, liberally construed, are insufficient to
state a cause of action for defamation.

Id. at 1219.

In the present case, the petitions contained no allegations of any false or

unprivileged statement made by Defendants or any of their representatives. The

original petition only makes conclusory allegations of being defamed without any

factual allegations. The amended petition merely contains arguments and general

legal principles. However, these conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a

cause of action for defamation. Although the amended petition references a

newspaper article, there were no allegations that the statements in the paper were

false. Thus, the petitions failed to state a cause of action for defamation, and this

claim was properly dismissed.

D. Search and Seizure under Federal and State Law

In State v. Lavergne, 08-44, p. 4 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/2/08), 991 So.2d 86, 89,

writ denied, 08-1459 (La. 2/20/09), 1 So.3d 494, the court noted:

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
protects against unreasonable searches and seizures by the
government. It provides, “[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .” A search and/or
seizure by a private citizen, acting in his capacity as a private citizen,

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is not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment because the amendment
only protects against actions by government agents.

In State v. Clark, 454 So.2d 232, 234 (La.App. 3 Cir.), writ denied, 456

So.2d 1012 (La.1984) (quoting State v. Reeves, 427 So.2d 403 (La.1982)

(dissenting opinion of Justice Dennis)), the court noted:

“The universal interpretation of provisions similar to Article 1,
Section 5 and the Fourth Amendment . . . has been that government
intrusion upon any of the elements of personal security specifically
listed therein by a search or seizure conducted outside of the judicial
process, without prior approval of a judge or magistrate, is prohibited
as unreasonable per se.”

In the present case, there were no allegations in the petitions that Desoto

Regional is an agency of a federal, state, or local political subdivision or otherwise

acted under color of law. There were no allegations of any factual or legal basis

for liability against Desoto Regional for purported violations of Louisiana law or

the Fourth Amendment for search and seizure.

Additionally, the Sabine Parish Sheriff‟s Office was only present during the

2003 search and seizure to provide security. After an evidentiary hearing in the

federal case, which included testimony and documents, the magistrate judge

determined that the search and seizure that occurred was legal. The magistrate

judge determined that neither the district attorney nor any other governmental

official had a hand in Desoto Regional‟s decision to search the clinic but were only

there to keep the peace. Thus, the petitions failed to state a cause of action for

illegal search or seizure, and this claim was properly dismissed.

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E. Interference With A Contract

In 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spurney, 538 So.2d 228, 234 (La.1989), the court

noted:

For purposes of analysis, the action against a corporate officer
for intentional and unjustified interference with contractual relations
may be divided into separate elements: (1) the existence of a contract
or a legally protected interest between the plaintiff and the corporation;
(2) the corporate officer‟s knowledge of the contract; (3) the officer‟s
intentional inducement or causation of the corporation to breach the
contract or his intentional rendition of its performance impossible or
more burdensome; (4) absence of justification on the part of the
officer; (5) causation of damages to the plaintiff by the breach of
contract or difficulty of its performance brought about by the officer.

“The tort of intentional interference with a contract, as limited by the

Supreme Court, applies to a corporate officer interfering with his employer‟s

contractual relations with third persons.” White v. White, 93-1389, p. 7 (La.App. 3

Cir. 6/15/94), 641 So.2d 538, 542, writs denied, 94-2456, 94-2467 (La. 12/19/94),

648 So.2d 402. “To state a cause of action for intentional interference with a

contract, the plaintiff must allege and prove a breach of contract.” Sun Drilling

Prods. Corp. v. Rayborn, 00-1884, p. 21 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/3/01), 798 So.2d 1141,

1155, writ denied, 01-2939 (La. 1/25/02), 807 So.2d 840.

In the present case, the petitions failed to allege any facts that meet the

standards for a claim of intentional interference with a contract. There were no

allegations of any fiduciary or other duty that would create a cause of action for

tortuous interference with a contract. Plaintiff‟s petitions also failed to allege that

any contract between Plaintiff and Sheriff Pattison, oral or written, existed.

Consequently, the petitions failed to state a cause of action for interference with a

contract, and this claim was properly dismissed.

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F. Indemnity Claims

In Home Insurance Co. of Illinois v. National Tea Co., 588 So.2d 361, 364

(La.1991) (quoting Polozola v. Garlock, Inc., 343 So.2d 1000 (La.1977)), the court

noted:

A contract of indemnity whereby the indemnitee is indemnified
against the consequences of his own negligence is strictly construed,
and such a contract will not be construed to indemnify an indemnitee
against losses resulting to him through his own negligent act, unless
such an intention was expressed in unequivocal terms.

Additionally, the general rules that govern the interpretation of other contracts

apply in interpreting indemnity contracts. Jessop v. City of Alexandria, 03-1500

(La.App. 3 Cir. 3/31/04), 871 So.2d 1140, writ denied, 04-1529 (La. 10/1/04), 883

So.2d 991. “[A]n indemnity agreement does not render the indemnitor liable until

the indemnitee actually makes payment or sustains loss.” Meloy v. Conoco, Inc.,

504 So.2d 833, 839 (La.1987).

In the present case, the petitions alleged some oral contract that the parties

would indemnify each other and hold each other harmless. There are no

allegations, however, as to what specific actions this alleged agreement applied.

Without a specific written agreement to indemnify for one‟s own wrong doing,

there is no cause of action. Furthermore, the petitions fail to allege any liability or

judgment that was rendered against him to form the basis of any indemnity claim.

Thus, the petitions failed to allege any cause of action for indemnity, and this claim

was properly dismissed.

G. Burkett has Prosecutorial Immunity

Even if the petitions stated a cause of action and assuming that the issues

alleged were not precluded by the findings of the federal court, which is discussed

below, Burkett is immune from suit. In Knapper v. Connick, 96-434 (La.

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10/15/96), 681 So.2d 944, the supreme court made it clear that prosecutors have

absolute immunity from claims of prosecutorial misconduct that is intimately

associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. Prosecutors also have

immunity from their acts in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the state‟s

case, i.e., conduct falling within the course and scope of their prosecutorial

functions. Id. The supreme court held also that such immunity extends even to

prosecutorial actions taken in bad faith or with malice. Id.

The record in this case is devoid of any evidence that Burkett acted with

malice. The record shows that all actions were taken in the normal course of a

criminal investigation and prosecution. The charge of theft was warranted since he

was found guilty of failing to pay taxes on the funds that were diverted from

Desoto Regional. It was only after the lengthy incarceration of Miller that the local

theft charge was dismissed by Burkett in his official capacity as district attorney.

Although Plaintiff‟s petitions name Burkett as a Defendant in his individual

capacity, it is clear that Plaintiff‟s allegations deal with Burkett‟s conduct which

falls squarely within his role as a prosecutor. Under Knapper, he is absolutely

immune from suit for any of the alleged causes of action.

Finally, this immunity defense defeats any alleged claim at the outset and is,

therefore, properly raised by the exception of no cause of action. Hayes v. Parish

of Orleans, 98-2388 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/16/99), 737 So.2d 959.

II. Exception of Prescription

As mentioned above, Plaintiff claims in his second assignment of error that

the trial court erred in granting the exception of prescription and dismissing the

claims for defamation, slander, and libel. A review of the record indicates that the

Defendants‟ exception of prescription filed in response to Plaintiff‟s original

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petition was denied without prejudice. Plaintiff thereafter filed an amended

petition. Defendants again filed exceptions of no cause of action and added

exceptions of res judicata/issue preclusion. Defendants, however, did not re-urge

their exception of prescription. Thus, the trial court never ruled on, much less

granted, Defendants‟ alleged exception of prescription in response to Plaintiff‟s

amended petition. As such, there is not a prescription issue as alleged by Plaintiff.

We have addressed, however, the issues of defamation, slander, and libel above.

III. Exception of Res Judicata and Issue Preclusion

“Issue preclusion is a subset of res judicata, such that the granting of an

exception of issue preclusion is technically the granting of a peremptory exception

of res judicata.” Richards v. Bd. of Comm’rs of the Port of New Orleans, 10-1171,

p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/2/11), 57 So.3d 1135, 1139. Res Judicata may be raised

through a peremptory exception, and evidence may be introduced to support the

peremptory exception pleaded at or prior to the trial of the case. La.Code Civ.P.

art. 927(A)(3); La.Code Civ.P. art. 931.

In Paradise Village Children’s Home, Inc. v. Liggins, 38,926, p. 7 (La.App.

2 Cir. 10/13/04), 886 So.2d 562, 568, writ denied, 05-118 (La. 2/4/05), 893 So.2d

884, the court noted:

The preclusive effect of a prior federal court judgment is
controlled by federal res judicata rules. Ellis v. Amex Life Ins., Co.,
211 F.3d 935 (5th Cir.2000). Under federal law, res judicata is
appropriate if: 1) the parties to both actions are identical (or at least in
privity); 2) the judgment in the first action is rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction; 3) the first action concluded with a final
judgment on the merits; and 4) the same claim or cause of action is
involved in both suits.

“The federal common law on res judicata, issue preclusion or collateral

estoppel operates to bar one convicted in a criminal proceeding from re-litigating

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„questions distinctly put in issue and directly determined‟ in the criminal

prosecution.” McCollough v. Dauzat, 98-1293, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/3/99), 736

So.2d 914, 916 (quoting Emich Motors Corp. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558,

71 S.Ct. 408 (1951)). A final criminal conviction “is therefore conclusive in this

civil litigation as to issues that were litigated and adjudicated in that prosecution.”

U.S. v. One 1976 Mercedes 450 SLC, 667 F.2d 1171, 1174, fn. 2

(5th Cir. 1982).

In the present case, Plaintiff‟s claims are barred by issue preclusion and res

judicata due to his federal conviction, the rulings on his motion to suppress, and

the factual findings necessary for his conviction. Plaintiff had multiple

opportunities to litigate these issues in the federal courts.

After an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate judge determined that the search

on January 24, 2003, which Plaintiff complained of in the petitions in this matter,

was legal. As previously mentioned, the magistrate judge determined that Desoto

Regional had a legal right to enter the premises it was leasing and obtain patient

records and billing records that it owned. Prior to his criminal trial, the federal

district court agreed. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The federal district court again

confirmed these rulings in post-conviction motions. Thus, Plaintiff is barred from

re-litigating the issues of the legality of the search, the legality of Desoto

Regional‟s seizure of records it owned, and the existence of a valid lease on

January 24, 2003.

The federal courts further held that Desoto Regional was not acting on

behalf of the Sheriff‟s Office, the Internal Revenue Service, or any other state actor.

Therefore, Plaintiff is barred from re-litigating whether there was any state action

involved in the search and seizure or any alleged private party search.

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Plaintiff is barred from re-litigating whether he embezzled money from

Desoto Regional, as his embezzlement from Desoto Regional formed a basis of his

conviction. It was specifically referenced in the indictment, and the federal courts

affirmed his convictions based on the evidence admitted at trial regarding his

embezzlement. Plaintiff even admitted during his federal prosecution that the

issues were the same. Plaintiff cannot seek recovery for any alleged false arrest or

malicious prosecution for felony theft or defamation related to such charges, as he

was convicted of not paying taxes on the money he embezzled from Desoto

Regional.

Furthermore, Plaintiff is barred from challenging the federal court order of

restitution in a state court proceeding or seeking damages for having paid the

restitution order. The federal court has ruled on this matter multiple times.

Accordingly, all of Plaintiff‟s claims against all Defendants are barred by res

judicata and issue preclusion. The trial court properly dismissed these claims.

DECREE

The judgment rendered by the trial court is affirmed. All costs of this appeal

are assessed against Dr. Garland Miller.

AFFIRMED.

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