Matthew Alan Hillman v. Timothy Wayne Griffin

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

13-648

MATTHEW ALAN HILLMAN

VERSUS

TIMOTHY WAYNE GRIFFIN

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APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. C-20126328
HONORABLE EDWARD D. RUBIN, DISTRICT JUDGE

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MARC T. AMY
JUDGE

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Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Marc T. Amy, and J.
David Painter, Judges.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Kenneth St. Pe’
Guilliot & St. Pe’, LLC
428 Jefferson Street
Lafayette, LA 70501
(337) 232-8177
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Timothy Wayne Griffin

Adam G. Young
Laura N. Buck
Young & Cotter, LLC
315 S. College Road, Suite 163
Lafayette, LA 70503
(337) 261-8800
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:
Matthew Alan Hillman

AMY, Judge.

This suit concerns allegedly defamatory statements concerning the plaintiff‟s

abilities as a pilot sent by the defendant to the Federal Aviation Administration.

After the plaintiff filed suit, the defendant filed an exception of lack of personal

jurisdiction. The trial court granted the exception and the plaintiff appeals. For the

following reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, Matthew Alan Hillman, was involved in the potential sale of

an aircraft to Jetstream Aviation, Inc. Jetstream is an Idaho corporation and the

defendant, Timothy Wayne Griffin, is the president of Jetstream. According to the

record, Mr. Griffin flew to Lafayette in order to meet Mr. Hillman and inspect the

aircraft. Mr. Hillman flew the aircraft to Houston, Texas, and Mr. Griffin

accompanied him as a passenger. The record indicates that, after the sale fell

through, Mr. Hillman and Mr. Griffin had a dispute about who was to bear the

costs of the flight.

Mr. Hillman asserts that, after he refused to pay the costs of the flight, Mr.

Griffin threatened him. Thereafter, Mr. Griffin sent a letter to the Flight Standards

Office of the FAA in Boise, Idaho. According to the record, the letter expresses

concern about several issues with Mr. Hillman‟s conduct during the flight from

Lafayette to Houston and with the maintenance of the aircraft. The record

indicates that a subsequent investigation by the Flight Standards Office in Baton

Rouge concluded that the majority of the accusations could not be substantiated.

However, the investigation also concluded that the aircraft‟s registration and

inspection were out of date, and the inspector issued a warning concerning those

violations.

Thereafter, Mr. Hillman filed suit, alleging that Mr. Griffin‟s letter contained

defamatory statements and that his reputation was damaged as a result. Mr. Griffin

filed an exception of lack of personal jurisdiction. After a hearing, the trial court

granted the exception and dismissed Mr. Hillman‟s claims. Mr. Hillman appeals,

asserting as error that:

1. The Trial Court erred by granting Defendant/Appellee‟s Exception
of Lack of Jurisdiction Ratione Personae because it failed to recognize
that constitutional due process requirements are met.

2. The Trial Court improperly granted Defendant/Appellee‟s
Exception of Lack of Jurisdiction Ratione Personae because it
erroneously relied on Defendant/Appellee‟s misinterpretation of the
holding in Dumachest v. Allen.

Discussion

Personal Jurisdiction

Both of the plaintiff‟s assignments of error concern the trial court‟s grant of

the defendant‟s exception of lack of personal jurisdiction.

Lack of jurisdiction over the person is a declinatory exception addressed in

La.Code Civ.P. art. 925. Jurisdiction over non-residents is governed by La.R.S.

13:3201, which states:

A. A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action
arising from any one of the following activities performed by the
nonresident:

(1) Transacting any business in this state.

(2) Contracting to supply services or things in this state.

(3) Causing injury or damage by an offense or quasi offense
committed through an act or omission in this state.

(4) Causing injury or damage in this state by an offense or quasi
offense committed through an act or omission outside of this state if
he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other

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persistent course of conduct, or derives revenue from goods used or
consumed or services rendered in this state.

(5) Having an interest in, using or possessing a real right on
immovable property in this state.

(6) Non-support of a child, parent, or spouse or a former spouse
domiciled in this state to whom an obligation of support is owed and
with whom the nonresident formerly resided in this state.

(7) Parentage and support of a child who was conceived by the
nonresident while he resided in or was in this state.

(8) Manufacturing of a product or component thereof which
caused damage or injury in this state, if at the time of placing the
product into the stream of commerce, the manufacturer could have
foreseen, realized, expected, or anticipated that the product may
eventually be found in this state by reason of its nature and the
manufacturer‟s marketing practices.

B. In addition to the provisions of Subsection A, a court of this
state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident on any
basis consistent with the constitution of this state and of the
Constitution of the United States.

“The limits of the Louisiana long-arm statute and of constitutional due

process are coextensive; the sole inquiry into jurisdiction over a nonresident is

whether it comports with constitutional due process requirements.” Peters v.

Alpharetta Spa, L.L.C., 04-979, p. 4 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/6/05), 915 So.2d 908, 910-

11. Personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific. Id. General

jurisdiction exists where the defendant “has engaged in „continuous and systematic

contacts‟ with the forum, but the contacts are not necessarily related to the

lawsuit.” Id. at 911. Specific jurisdiction exists where “the alleged cause of action

arises out of, or is related to the defendant‟s purposeful contacts with the forum

state.” Id. Under either theory, the determination of whether constitutional due

process standards have been satisfied requires a two-part analysis of 1) whether the

defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state and 2) whether the extension

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of jurisdiction is consistent with traditional notions of fair play and substantial

justice. Hensgens v. Pelican Beach Resort, 12-268 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/10/12), 100

So.3d 371 (citing de Reyes v. Marine Mgmt. & Consulting, Ltd., 586 So.2d 103

(La.1991)). See also Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154

(1945).

In determining whether minimum contacts exist, the court should focus on

the relationship between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation. Calder v.

Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 104 S.Ct. 1482 (1984). Thus, the defendant must have

“purposefully availed [him]self of the privilege of conducting activities within the

forum state such that it can be said [he] should have reasonably anticipated being

haled into court there.” Woodard v. Univ. of Utah, 00-789, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir.

11/2/00), 776 So.2d 528, 531 (quoting Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Cont’l W. Ins.

Co., 97-206 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/10/97), 704 So.2d 900, writ denied, 98-77 (La.

3/13/98), 712 So.2d 884), writ denied, 00-3199 (La. 1/26/01), 781 So.2d 1265.

The purpose of this requirement is to protect the defendant from having to defend

itself from suit in a foreign jurisdiction solely because of a “random, fortuitous, or

attenuated conduct, or by the unilateral activity of another party or a third person.”

Id. (citing de Reyes, 586 So.2d 103). However, if sufficiently purposeful and

egregious in its effects, a single contact may be sufficient to satisfy constitutional

due process requirements. First American First, Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Bank

Women, 802 F.2d 1511 (4 Cir. 1986).

In Calder, 465 U.S. 783, the Supreme Court addressed whether personal

jurisdiction exists over nonresident defendants where the alleged harm results from

the publication of an allegedly defamatory newspaper article. In that case, the

plaintiff, a California resident and entertainer, filed suit against a Florida

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newspaper publisher and its editor and reporter who were involved in the

publication of an allegedly defamatory story. The Supreme Court found that the

defendants‟ intentional and allegedly tortious actions were expressly aimed at

California and that the brunt of any injury would be felt in California. Id. In

determining that personal jurisdiction existed over all three defendants, the

Supreme Court stated that:

The allegedly libelous story concerned the California activities
of a California resident. It impugned the professionalism of an
entertainer whose television career was centered in California. The
article was drawn from California sources, and the brunt of the harm,
in terms of both respondent‟s emotional distress and the injury to her
professional reputation, was suffered in California. In sum, California
is the focal point of both the story and of the harm suffered.
Jurisdiction over petitioners is therefore proper in California based on
the “effects” of their Florida conduct in California.

Id. at 788-89 (footnote omitted).

Applying the Supreme Court‟s reasoning from Calder, the United States

Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals determined in First American First, 802 F.2d

1511, that personal jurisdiction existed where an Illinois non-profit professional

association mailed allegedly defamatory letters concerning a Virginia travel agent

to members of the association. The letters were mailed to members both in and out

of Virginia. The Fourth Circuit found that “[t]hough the allegedly libelous letters

were not directed only at the plaintiffs‟ actions in Virginia, there can be no doubt

that the primary and most devastating effects of the letters would be felt in Virginia

where [the plaintiff] lives and his business is principally located.” Id. at 1517.

In contrast, in Schnapp v. McBride, 64 F.Supp.2d 608 (E.D.La. 1998),

claiming that a Wisconsin newspaper published an allegedly defamatory story

about him, a Louisiana resident filed suit against the newspaper, its reporter, and

its insurance company. Analyzing the plaintiff‟s claims under the reasoning

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enunciated in Calder, 465 U.S. 783, the federal district court judge noted that the

plaintiff was not the focus of the article and that it was not purposefully targeted at

either the plaintiff or Louisiana residents. Schnapp, 64 F.Supp.2d 608. Thus,

finding that the article was not “calculated to cause injury” to the Louisiana

plaintiff, the federal district court judge found that the plaintiff had not met his

burden with regard to proving minimum contacts. Id. at 611.1

The burden of proof with regard to minimal contacts lies on the party

claiming jurisdiction to be proper. Hensgens, 100 So.3d 371. However, once such

minimal contacts have been established, there is a presumption that jurisdiction is

reasonable and the burden shifts to the party opposing jurisdiction to show that

jurisdiction would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Id.

Appellate review of the trial court‟s determination in an exception of personal

jurisdiction is de novo. Dumachest v. Allen, 06-1614 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/23/07), 957

So.2d 374, writ denied, 07-1306 (La. 10/5/07), 964 So.2d 939. However, the trial

court‟s factual findings which underlie that decision are reviewed under the

manifest error standard of review. Id.

Mr. Hillman concedes that general jurisdiction is not appropriate here.

However, Mr. Hillman argues that because the effects of Mr. Griffin‟s defamatory

statements were felt primarily in Louisiana, specific jurisdiction is appropriate. He

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Similarly, in Woodard, 776 So.2d 528, the plaintiff, a Louisiana resident, alleged that
the defendants, a university in Utah and one of its employees, sent defamatory letters concerning
his medical residency. The plaintiff‟s assertion of specific jurisdiction was based on an alleged
“contract” negotiated between the parties which addressed the content of letters concerning the
plaintiff‟s residency. Observing that the allegedly defamatory letters were not sent to any entity
in Louisiana, that the university only conducted recruitment and alumni activities in Louisiana,
and that the “contract” did not contemplate any activities in Louisiana, a panel of this court
found that the plaintiff failed to establish minimum contacts with Louisiana. Id. Further, the
court noted that “it is merely fortuitous that the Plaintiff . . . has relocated to Louisiana.” Id. at
532. However, we note that the court in Woodard focused on the contractual allegations and did
not address the “effects” test enunciated in Calder, 465 U.S. 783.

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contends that Mr. Griffin “should have foreseen that a defamatory letter about a

Louisiana pilot would cause injury to that pilot‟s reputation in Louisiana.”

Applying the Supreme Court‟s “effects” test as enunciated in Calder, 465 U.S.

783, to the circumstances of this case, we conclude that Mr. Griffin‟s contacts with

Louisiana are sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction.

The petition indicates that Mr. Griffin‟s contacts with Louisiana are limited

to his flight from Idaho to Lafayette to meet with Mr. Hillman and that he flew

from Lafayette to Houston with Mr. Hillman to inspect the aircraft. However, a

single contact may be sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. First American

First, 802 F.2d 1511. The allegations contained in the record indicate that

although Mr. Griffin authored the letter in Idaho and sent it to an Idaho office of

the FAA, the allegedly defamatory statements were focused on and were allegedly

calculated to cause injury primarily to Mr. Hillman. Compare with Schnapp, 64

F.Supp.2d 608. Additionally, the brunt of any damages and the primary effects of

any such defamatory statements would be in Louisiana where Mr. Hillman lives

and his business is principally located. First American First, 802 F.2d 1511.

Further, the fact that the investigation which allegedly damaged Mr. Hillman‟s

reputation was carried out by federal officials does not insulate Mr. Griffin from

responsibility for acts which resulted directly from any of his allegedly defamatory

statements. See Simon v. U.S., 644 F.2d 490 (1981) (finding personal jurisdiction

in Louisiana over an attorney who made negligent or misleading statements to a

federal judge in Georgia which ultimately resulted in a Louisiana resident being

arrested on a bench warrant for failure to appear).

Finally, with regard to whether jurisdiction would offend traditional notions

of fair play and substantial justice, because Mr. Hillman has established that

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minimum contacts exist, there is a presumption that jurisdiction is reasonable and

the burden of proof shifts to Mr. Griffin. Hensgens, 100 So.3d 371. We note that

Louisiana has a strong interest in providing effective means of redress for its

residents. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 105 S.Ct. 2174

(1985). Further, modern conveniences have reduced the burden on a party who has

to defend himself outside of his state of residence. Id. Additionally, based on the

limited information available in the record, Louisiana would be at least equally

efficient as a forum for this litigation as would Idaho. After reviewing the record,

we note only general statements by Mr. Griffin that jurisdiction would offend

traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. We conclude that these

statements do not meet his burden of proving that the Louisiana courts‟ exercise of

personal jurisdiction is fundamentally unfair.

Accordingly, having found merit in Mr. Hillmans‟ arguments, we reverse the

judgment of the trial court granting the exception of lack of personal jurisdiction

and remand for further proceedings.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court‟s judgment concerning

the exception of lack of personal jurisdiction and remand for further proceedings.

Costs of this appeal are assessed to the defendant, Timothy Wayne Griffin.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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