Robert Veroline, Jr. v. C.R.R. Enterprises, Inc.

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

CA 13-865

ROBERT VEROLINE, JR., ET AL.

VERSUS

PRIORITY ONE EMS, ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF VERNON, NO. 76,157, DIV. A
HONORABLE VERNON BRUCE CLARK, DISTRICT JUDGE

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JOHN E. CONERY
JUDGE

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Court composed of Marc T. Amy, Billy Howard Ezell, and John E. Conery, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Gregory Engelsman
Bolen, Parker, Brenner, Lee & Engelsman, LTD.
709 Verailles Boulevard
Post Office Box 11590
Alexandria, Louisiana 71315-1590
(318) 445-8236
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES:
C.R.R. Enterprises, Inc. d/b/a Priority One
Phillip Hutson
Stewart Coleman

Leslie R. Leavoy, Jr.
Leavoy Law Office
125 North Washington Avenue
Post Office Box 1055
DeRidder, Louisiana 70634
(377) 462-6051
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:
Robert Veroline, Jr.
Cindy Veroline
Joshua Paul Veroline

CONERY, Judge.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 4, 2005, Heather Veroline dislocated her knee while near the dam

on Toledo Bend Reservoir, Texas side. Paramedics Phillip Hutson and Stewart

Coleman arrived at the scene and, according to their testimony, Ms. Veroline was

in severe pain. While Mr. Hutson prepared the ambulance and retrieved supplies,

Mr. Coleman immobilized her knee, placed her on a gurney, and carried her about

1,000 yards to the ambulance. Both paramedics testified that Ms. Veroline and her

mother requested that they administer pain medication. Mr. Coleman then

administered morphine for the pain and phenergan to prevent the side effects of

morphine, both through an IV. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Veroline gasped as if she

was going to vomit. She then began shaking, gasping, and she went into

ventricular fibrillation. Mr. Coleman administered narcan to reverse the effects of

the morphine. He commenced chest compressions and Ms. Veroline projectile

vomited. Mr. Coleman performed CPR, administered epinephrine, manually

evacuated the vomit, and attempted to intubate and defibrillate her without success.

He continued to perform CPR and attempted to defibrillate her until they arrived at

the hospital, where she was pronounced dead shortly thereafter.

Ms. Veroline’s parents, Robert and Cindy Veroline, and brother, Joshua

Veroline, filed suit against C.R.R. Enterprises, Inc. d/b/a Priority One and the

paramedics, Phillip Hutson and Stewart Coleman, alleging negligence, as they

purportedly breached the standard of care. After a five-day jury trial and a short

jury deliberation, the jury returned a verdict for defendants. Plaintiffs timely filed

a motion for a new trial and a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which were

both denied by the trial court. The plaintiffs appeal, asserting two assignments of

error. For the following reasons, we affirm.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR1

I. The jury was manifestly erroneous by failing to find that the insertion of an
IV and administration of morphine with phenergan violated the defendants’
own written protocols and was therefore negligent or grossly negligent.

II. The jury was manifestly erroneous by failing to find that the defendants’
failure to follow their own written protocols to treat allergic reactions
immediately with epinephrine, not narcan was negligent or grossly negligent.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

“[A]ppellate jurisdiction of a court of appeal extends to law and facts.”

La.Const. art. 5, § 10(B). The appellate court must determine whether the trial

court committed an error of law or made a factual finding that was manifestly

erroneous or clearly wrong. Gibson v. State, 99-1730 (La. 4/11/00), 758 So.2d 782,

cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1052, 121 S.Ct. 656 (2000). The reviewing court must

review the record in its entirety to make this determination. Stobart v. State, Dep’t

of Transp. and Dev., 617 So.2d 880 (La.1993). “Even though an appellate court

may feel its own evaluations and inferences are more reasonable than the

factfinder’s, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact

should not be disturbed upon review where conflict exists in the testimony.” Id. at

882.

This court has stated, “where two permissible views of the evidence exist,

the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous or clearly

wrong.” Id. at 883. See Darbonne v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 00-551 (La.App. 3 Cir.

11/2/00), 774 So.2d 1022. Additionally, “When the district court has permitted

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Although mentioned, the issues of the denial of appellants’ post-verdict motions and the
allegedly “hurried” jury deliberation were not briefed. Thus, we will consider the issues
abandoned. Uniform Rules–Courts of Appeal, Rules 1–3 & 2–12.4.

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both parties to present their experts before making its factual determinations, the

fact finder’s choice of alternative permissible views cannot be considered to be

manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong.” Houssiere v. ASCO USA, 12-791, p. 12

(La.App. 3 Cir. 1/16/13), 108 So.3d 797, 805-6 (quoting Dumesnil v. Sw. La. Elec.

Membership Corp., 08-982, p. 6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/4/09), 2 So.3d 1254, 1258), writ

denied, 13-693 (La. 5/17/13), 118 So.3d 377. Furthermore, “[w]here the testimony

of expert witnesses differ, it is for the trier of fact to determine the most credible

evidence and a finding of fact in this regard will not be overturned absent manifest

error.” Smith v. Cappaert Manufactured Hous., Inc., 11-1464, p. 11 (La.App. 3 Cir.

4/10/12), 89 So.3d 1234, 1242-3 (quoting Opelousas Prod. Credit Ass’n v. B.B. &

H., Inc., 587 So.2d 812, 814 (La.App. 3 Cir.1991)), writs denied, 12-1418 (La.

10/8/12), 98 So.3d 857 and 12-1516 (La. 10/12/12), 98 So.3d 871. See also Revel v.

Snow, 95-462 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/2/95), 664 So.2d 655, writ denied, 95-2820 (La.

2/2/96), 666 So.2d 1084. “The only time [the trial court’s decision to accept the

opinion of one expert and to reject that of another] will be deemed manifestly

erroneous is when the court was clearly wrong in accepting the expert’s opinion on

which it relied.” Tullis v. Rapides Parish Police Jury, 95-905, p. 8 (La.App. 3 Cir.

1/17/96), 670 So.2d 245, 250.

In this case, the appellants assert two assignments of error, both alleging that

the jury was manifestly erroneous in its factual findings. Appellants do not

contend, nor is there evidence in the record to support, that the trial court was

erroneous in accepting the three experts and their opinions. The assignments of

error concern Mr. Coleman’s administration of morphine and phenergan, followed

by narcan, and eventually epinephrine. Each drug administration or the timing

thereof was allegedly in violation of appellee’s own written protocols. Because

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both assignments of error allege that the jury was manifestly erroneous in its

factual findings, they will be discussed together.

At trial, the jury heard the testimony of several fact witnesses and three

expert witnesses. Dr. John McMillan testified as plaintiff’s only expert witness.

He testified that, according to the defendants’ own protocols, Mr. Coleman should

not have administered morphine, should not have followed up with narcan, but

should have administered epinephrine immediately upon Ms. Veroline’s reaction.

He further testified that Ms. Veroline did not demonstrate all of the symptoms of

anaphylaxis, but that all of the symptoms and manifestations are not required for

an anaphylaxis determination. Dr. McMillan concluded that Ms. Veroline died

from morphine anaphylaxis. He further concluded that Mr. Coleman breached the

standard of care and his course of treatment was a direct causal relationship to the

morphine anaphylaxis and ultimately Ms. Veroline’s death.

The appellees presented the jury with two expert witness as trial, Dr. James

“Butch” Knoepp and Dr. Thomas Arnold. Dr. Knoepp testified that an

anaphylactic reaction to morphine is “unusual.” He further testified that he

“searched high and low for evidence of anaphylaxis,” but he could find none.

Disagreeing with Dr. McMillian, Dr. Knoepp testified that anaphylaxis is a

“cascade of events,” which means that he is of the opinion that a patient is “not

going to have just the trachea closing down without other parts of the body

swelling, redness, manifesting.” Dr. Knoepp acknowledged that the administration

of narcan was not in appellees’ protocol, but that “it was a thoughtful response.”

Dr. Knoepp concluded that he thinks that Ms. Veroline “died from ventricular

fibrillation and the inability to defibrillate her.” He testified that he does not

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believe that Mr. Coleman breached the standard of care and stated that “this poor

guy was a one-man band playing five instruments.”

Dr. Arnold testified that a dislocated knee would be “extremely

uncomfortable” and “quite painful.” He testified that he did not have a problem

with the administration of morphine. Regarding the narcan, he stated that he

“would have done the same thing.” He further testified that he did not think Ms.

Veroline had an anaphylactic reaction, as it was not systemic or an “anaphylaxis

picture.” Dr. Arnold opined that Ms. Veroline had an adverse reaction to one of

the medications given to her, but it was a reaction different from anaphylaxis. He

stated that Mr. Coleman did an “admirable job.” Dr. Arnold concluded that the

standard of care was upheld.

The fact finder in this case, the jury, was presented with several alternative

permissible views of what occurred on the day of Ms. Veroline’s death. The jury

found that the defendants had not breached the standard of care, apparently

adopting some or all of the defense’s expert’s views. The jury decided which

experts were credible and its adoption of those opinions cannot be considered

manifestly erroneous. Therefore, we affirm.

DISPOSITION

The jury was not manifestly erroneous in its conclusions, and for this reason,

we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

AFFIRMED.

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