Darren Dugas v. Bayou Teche Water Works, Inc.

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

13-890

DARREN DUGAS, ET AL.

VERSUS

BAYOU TECHE WATER WORKS, INC., ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF IBERIA, NO. 110321-H
HONORABLE LORI A. LANDRY, DISTRICT JUDGE

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MARC T. AMY
JUDGE

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Court composed of Marc T. Amy, Billy Howard Ezell, and John E. Conery, Judges.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Samuel Rosamond, III
Taylor, Wellons, Politz & Duhe, APLC
1515 Poydras Street, Suite 1900
New Orleans, LA 70112
(504) 525-9888
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Pennsylvania General Insurance Company

Raymond Pajares
Pajares & Schexnaydre, LLC
68031 Capital Trace Row
Mandeville, LA 70471
(985) 292-2000
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Bayou Teche Water Works, Inc.

Joshua G. Keller
Deutsch, Kerrigan & Stiles, LLP
755 Magazine Street
New Orleans, LA 70130
(504) 581-5141
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Bayou Teche Water Works, Inc.

Erin Fury Parkinson
McGlinchey Stafford, PLLC
601 Poydras Street, 12th Floor
New Orleans, LA 70130
(504) 596-2814
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Granite State Insurance Company

Rachel S. Kellogg
Schafer & Schafer
328 Lafayette Street
New Orleans, LA 70130
(504) 522-0011
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
American Alternative Insurance Company

Theodore M. “Trey” Haik, III
Haik, Minvielle & Grubbs
Post Office Box 11040
Iberia, LA 70562-1040
(337) 365-5486
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS:
Darren Dugas
Glenward Dugas
Cheryl Dugas

AMY, Judge.

The plaintiffs alleged damage to their land and farming practices due to the

defendant water facility‟s discharge of brine into a canal adjacent to the plaintiffs‟

property. The water facility and its insurer filed an initial exception of prescription

pursuant to the time limitations of La.R.S. 9:5624, which provides a two-year

period of limitation for damage to private property damaged for public purposes.

Initially sustained by the trial court, a panel of this court reversed the ruling due to

an inadequate factual basis provided in the record on appeal. On remand, the

defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, supplementing the record

regarding the question of whether it qualified as an entity offered the prescriptive

limit of La.R.S. 9:5624. The trial court construed the motion as an exception of

prescription and sustained the exception. The plaintiffs appeal. For the following

reasons, we reverse and remand.

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs, Darren Dugas, Glenward Dugas, and Cheryl Dugas, instituted

this matter with an August 7, 2007 petition, alleging that land owned and or leased

by them and used for rice and crawfishing farming purposes, was damaged due to

the practices of the defendant, Bayou Teche Water Works, Inc. In particular, the

plaintiffs alleged that Bayou Teche discharged brine-containing wastewater from

its treatment plant into a coulee1 that traveled adjacent to the plaintiffs‟ farmland.

The plaintiffs alleged that Bayou Teche did not have the appropriate permit for

such a discharge from the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality.

1
The coulee is referred to variously in the record as a drainage ditch, irrigation ditch, and
as a coulee.

The plaintiffs asserted that, in turn, they used water from that coulee for

irrigation purposes on their farmland. The result, the plaintiffs contended, was

approximately twenty years of inadequate yield from their farm. Despite the long-

term low yield, and in an amended petition, the plaintiffs asserted that they only

became aware of the alleged salinity issue in September 2006 and that, upon

notification to Bayou Teche, the discharges were terminated in November 2007.

In their petition, the plaintiffs prayed for various damages, including

remediation costs and past, present, and future lost profits. In addition to Bayou

Teche, the plaintiffs named Bayou Teche‟s insurer, American Alternative

Insurance Company, as a defendant.

Bayou Teche filed an initial exception of prescription in October 2009 and

argued that the matter was prescribed by operation of La.R.S. 9:5624, a statute

providing for a two-year prescriptive period in the event that “private property is

damaged for public purposes[.]” On appeal, a panel of this court found that the

factual findings underlying the trial court‟s ruling were not supported by the

record. Dugas v. Bayou Teche Water Works 10-1211 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/6/11), 61

So.3d 826. The panel observed that, although the hearing transcript indicated that

the parties anticipated entering additional exhibits into the record, that action had

apparently not been completed. Id. Accordingly, the panel reversed the trial

court‟s judgment and remanded for further proceedings. Id.

On remand, Bayou Teche filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging

that “there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute as to whether plaintiffs‟

claims are prescribed pursuant to La.R.S. 9:5624.” In its memorandum, Bayou

Teche explained that it was attempting to “satisfy the evidentiary issues identified

by the appellate court” by attaching corporate documentation such as its Articles of

2

Incorporation, By-Laws, and a non-exclusive franchise agreement from Iberia

Parish. Bayou Teche also attached deposition testimony and bills of sale

associated with the plaintiffs‟ property in an attempt to establish that the plaintiffs

failed to file suit within two years of the damages being sustained. The plaintiffs

opposed the motion, alleging that they filed the suit within one year of learning of

the discharge of the wastewater. They further contested whether Bayou Teche, as

a non-profit corporation, is a legal entity entitled to the protections of La.R.S.

9:5624. The plaintiffs attached their petitions and deposition excerpts regarding

their alleged point of discovery and also regarding what they contend is the non-

public nature of Bayou Teche‟s actions in this case.

At the hearing, the trial court addressed the initial appellate panel‟s

observation that the record on appeal was deficient and observed that, although the

documentation had not been included in the appellate record, it was available for

the trial court‟s review at that time. Accordingly, the trial court again considered

the parties‟ evidence and construed Bayou Teche‟s prayer in its motion for

summary judgment to be a re-submission of its exception of prescription. In

ruling, the trial court concluded that La.R.S. 9:5624 was, in fact, applicable and

that the plaintiffs failed to file suit timely given the twenty-year period of damages

alleged. In its resulting judgment, the trial court sustained an exception of

prescription.2

2
In reasons for ruling, the trial court determined that:

After carefully considering the evidence (now part of the record), arguments of
counsel, and the Third Circuit opinion, this court is satisfied with the evidence submitted.
In its previous Reasons for Judgment, this court stated, “this court finds the activity of
supplying potable water to residents is clearly a „public work‟ and the discharge of the
waste water [sic] a „necessary consequence‟ of that public service; thus subjecting these
claims to the two year prescriptive period.” The evidence, now properly submitted,
supports this conclusion. Therefore, the Defendants have met their burden of proof in

3

The plaintiffs appeal.

Discussion

Exception of Prescription

The trial court construed Bayou Teche‟s filing as a re-urging of its initial

exception of prescription. Bayou Teche has not contested that interpretation on

appeal. Accordingly, we review the trial court‟s judgment pursuant to the standard

of review applicable to a trial court‟s ruling on an exception of prescription. In

Milbert v. Answering Bureau, Inc., 13-22 (La. 6/28/13), 120 So.3d 678, the

supreme court considered prescription within the context of a motion for summary

judgment, noting that the party urging prescription bears the burden of proof.

However, in the event that prescription is apparent from the face of the pleadings,

the burden of proof shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the matter is not

prescribed. Id.

Further, in the event that evidence is introduced at the hearing on the

exception, an appellate court considers the ruling on the exception of prescription

under the manifest error—clearly wrong standard of review. Rando v. Anco

Insulations, Inc., 08-1163 (La. 5/22/09), 16 So.3d 1065. If those findings are

reasonable in light of the record reviewed in its entirety, an appellate court will not

reverse the trial court‟s ruling, even if convinced that it would have weighed the

evidence differently had it been the trier of fact. Id.

Having reviewed the trial court‟s ruling under this standard, we conclude

that the trial court was manifestly erroneous in its determination.

showing that the defendant falls within the purview of La.R.S. 9:5624; that the defendant
is performing a public work; that the discharge of water is a necessary consequence of
that public work; and that the matter has prescribed.

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Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5624

Bayou Teche urged prescription in this case and alleged solely that there “is

no genuine issue of material fact in dispute as to whether plaintiffs‟ claims are

prescribed pursuant to La.R.S. 9:5624.” The plaintiffs again contested whether

Bayou Teche can be afforded the protections of that statute.

Entitled “Actions for damages to property damaged for public purposes[,]”

La.R.S. 9:5624 provides that:

When private property is damaged for public purposes any and
all actions for such damages are prescribed by the prescription of two
years, which shall begin to run after the completion and acceptance of
the public works.3

In remarking upon La.R.S. 9:5624, the Louisiana Supreme Court has

explained that the purpose of the statute “is to limit the exposure of the State and

its political subdivisions to liability in connection with a public work to a

reasonable period of time.” Avenal v. State, 03-3521, p. 33 (La. 10/19/04), 886

So.2d 1085, 1108. Despite this purpose, La.R.S. 9:5624 does not encompass all

lawsuits for damages caused by a public entity or those involving public works

projects. Id. Instead, in order to fall within the protections of the statute, the

damage must be incurred for a public purpose. Id. “Damage is incurred „for

public purposes‟ when the damaging is „intentional or occurs as a necessary

consequence of the public undertaking‟.” Id. at 1108-09.

In light of this description it is apparent that the record does not support the

trial court‟s application of the statute. Rather, the parties‟ submissions, in support
3
This quotation reflects the current version of La.R.S. 9:5624, as amended in 1987. Prior
to that amendment, the statute provided that the prescriptive period began to run when the
damages were sustained. Although the defendants contend that the earlier version of La.R.S.
9:5624 should apply since the plaintiffs‟ claims allegedly commenced prior to that time, we do
not resolve the question of which version of the statute is applicable in this case. Rather, we find
the statute otherwise inapplicable as the evidence does not indicate that the private property was
“damaged for public purposes[.]”

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of and in opposition to their respective positions, reveal the absence of evidence

supporting La.R.S. 9:5624‟s fundamental requirement that damages be sustained

for a public purpose. Certainly there is no evidence that application of the statute

in this case would satisfy its purpose “to limit the exposure of the State and its

political subdivisions to liability in connection with a public work to a reasonable

period of time.” Avenal, 886 So.2d at 1108. As addressed below, Bayou Teche is

not a political subdivision, but is a non-profit corporation. Neither is there

evidence that the discharge was performed in connection with a public work.

Simply, the record indicates that Bayou Teche is a non-profit corporation

serving, not the public, but its membership. 4 Its Articles of Incorporation, in

Article II, reflect that “[t]he nature of the business of the corporation and the

objects and purposes for which it is formed are:”

a. To associate its members together for their mutual benefit and
to that end to construct, maintain and operate a private water system
for the supplying of water to its members, and to engage in any
activity related thereto.

Additionally, the Articles reflect that the corporation is self-governed insofar as

Article V, as amended in 1992, provides that:

Subject to the terms and conditions prescribed in the by-laws,
this corporation shall admit as members persons (which word as used
therein includes any legal entity) who are owners or part owners or
have a substantial possessory interest in properties desired to be
served by the corporation‟s water system.

The voting power of each member whose fees are fully paid
and who is in good standing shall be equal and each member shall be
entitled to one (1) vote only regardless of the number of membership
certificates he might hold.

The property rights and interest of each member in earnings and
assets of the corporation shall be unequal and are to be determined by

4
The General Manager of Bayou Teche explained in his deposition that Bayou Teche has
approximately 2900 meters, equating to a population of approximately 8700 using its services.

6

each member‟s cumulative patronage of the corporation‟s services; all
as more fully set forth in accordance with the provisions of the by-
laws of the corporation.

Neither do the By-Laws convey a public affiliation beyond the Iberia Parish

non-exclusive franchise. Instead, the By-Laws provide for the election of the

Board of Directors by the members of the corporation and provide that the Board

of Directors be divided into three classes: 1) three member-residents of St. Landry

Parish; 2) three member-residents of St. Martin Parish; and 3) three members “of

whom one shall be a resident of Iberia Parish and of whom two shall be residents

of St. Martin Parish.”

While Bayou Teche notes that it is a franchisee of Iberia Parish, the

ordinance granting that non-exclusive franchise again indicates only Bayou

Teche‟s corporate structure and its purpose to provide water to its customers and

membership. Section 1 of the 1972 ordinance provides, in part, that:

[T]he Iberia Parish Police Jury, the governing authority of Iberia
Parish, Louisiana, does hereby grant unto BAYOU TECHE
WATERWORKS CORPORATION, a non-profit corporation duly
organized under the laws of the State of Louisiana, doing business in
Iberia Parish, Louisiana, its successors and assigns, hereinafter called
“Grantee”, the right, privilege and authority to construct, maintain and
operate within Iberia Parish a water system to sell and service its
customers, users and members.

In its brief to this court, Bayou Teche refers to Crooks v. Placid Refining

Co., 05-119 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/1/05), 903 So.2d 1154, writ denied, 05-1756 (La.

1/13/06), 920 So.2d 242, for the proposition that corporations may expropriate

property in the event that the project serves a public interest/public purpose.

Certainly, the panel of this court resolving Crooks found a public purpose or

benefit from the use of a pipeline for the transport of oil to refineries throughout

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the State. Notwithstanding the expropriation context in which it arose, however,

the panel did so after observing supreme court jurisprudence explaining that:

„No general definition of what degree of public good will meet
the constitutional requirements for a „public use‟ can be framed, as it
is in every case a question of public policy. The meaning of the term
is flexible and is not confined to what may constitute a public use at
any given time, but in general it may be said to cover a use affecting
the public generally, or any number thereof, as distinguished from
particular individuals. Some courts have gone so far in the direction
of a liberal construction as to hold that „public use‟ is synonymous
with „public benefit,‟ „public utility‟ or „public advantage,‟ and to
authorize the exercise of the power of eminent domain to promote
such public benefit, etc., especially where the interests involved are of
considerable magnitude, and it is sought to use the power in order that
the natural resources and advantages of a locality may receive the
fullest development in view of the general welfare.‟

Id. at 1165-66 (quoting City of New Orleans v. New Orleans Land Co., 173 La. 71,

136 So. 91 (1931)) (emphasis added). After consideration of that type of

jurisprudence regarding public purpose, the panel in Crooks found that “despite

any competitive advantage to [the defendant refining company], use of the pipeline

to efficiently and economically transport oil to various refineries in the State

benefits the public by increasing the availability of the oil and reducing costs to the

consumer.” Id. at 1166.

Unlike the situation in Crooks, however, it cannot be said that Bayou

Teche‟s wastewater discharge served the public. Rather, the corporate

documentation indicates only that Bayou Teche, as a cooperative, non-profit

corporation, operated for the benefit of particular individuals, i.e., its members and

customers, not the public generally. See Crooks, 903 So.2d 1154 (quoting New

Orleans Land Co., 136 So. 91).

Given the record‟s absence of evidence regarding a public purpose causing

the complained of damages, we find that the trial court was manifestly erroneous in

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concluding otherwise. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court‟s judgment and

remand for further proceedings. On remand, we reiterate that this court‟s ruling

has been limited strictly to the applicability of La.R.S. 9:5624 since the defendants‟

exception of prescription and motion for summary judgment were limited to its

claim of prescription thereunder. The defendants have not raised, nor have we

addressed, any other prescriptive provisions.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court‟s judgment sustaining

the exception of prescription under La.R.S. 9:5624 and remand for further

proceedings. All costs of this proceeding are assigned to the appellees, Bayou

Teche Waterworks, Inc. and American Alternative Insurance Company.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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