Hazel Richard Savoie v. Alice T. Richard

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

CA 13-1370 consolidated with CW 13-1422

HAZEL RICHARD SAVOIE, ET AL.

VERSUS

ALICE T. RICHARD, ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTY-EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CAMERON, NO. 10-18078
HONORABLE PENELOPE QUINN RICHARD, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

BILLY HOWARD EZELL
JUDGE

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Court composed of Jimmie C. Peters, Billy Howard Ezell, and Phyllis M. Keaty,
Judges.

AFFIRMED AS AMENDED.

Donald T. Carmouche
Victor L. Marcello
Diane Adele Owen
John Hogarth Carmouche
William R. Coenen, III
Brian T. Carmouche
Ross J. Donnes
Todd J. Wimberley
Talbot, Carmouche & Marcello
17405 Perkins Road
Baton Rouge, LA 70810
(225) 400-9991
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS/APPELLEES:
Hazel Richard Savoie
Richard Michael Savoie
Kevin Troy Savoie

Thomas E. Balhoff
Judith R.E. Atkinson
Carlton Jones, III
Roedel Parsons Koch Blache Balhoff & McCollister
8440 Jefferson Hwy., Ste. 301
Baton Rouge, LA 70809-7652
(225) 929-7033
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana, Department of Natural Resources

Patrick Wise Gray
Thomas Martin McNamara
Amy Allums Lee
Johnson Gray McNamara, LLC
P. O. Box 51165
Lafayette, LA 70505
(337) 412-6003
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS:
SWEPI LP
Shell Oil Company

Joe Barrelle Norman
Kelly B. Becker
Liskow & Lewis
701 Poydras St., Ste. 5000
New Orleans, LA 70139-5099
(504) 581-7979
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS:
Shell Oil Company
SWEPI LP

William T. McCall
Guillory & McCall
901 Lake Shore Drive, Ste. 1030
Lake Charles, LA 70601
(337) 433-9996
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS:
Shell Oil Company
SWEPI LP

Michael Keith Prudhomme
David Paul Bruchhaus
Chad Ellis Mudd
Mudd & Bruchhaus, LLC
410 E. College Street
Lake Charles, LA 70605
(337) 562-2327
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS/APPELLEES:
Richard Michael Savoie
Hazel Richard Savoie
Kevin Troy Savoie

Richard G. Duplantier, Jr.
Cheri Chestnut
Galloway Johnson Tompkins Burr & Smith
701 Poydras Street, 40th Floor
New Orleans, LA 70139
(504) 525-6802
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEE:
Pioneer Exploration, et al.

Michael J. Mazzone
Elizabeth E. Klingensmith
Haynes and Boone, LLP
1221 McKinney St., Ste. 2100
Houston, TX 77010-2007
(713) 547-2115
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS:
Shell Oil Company
SWEPI LP

EZELL, Judge.

Shell Oil Company and SWEPI LP (hereinafter collectively referred to as

―Shell‖) appeal the judgment of the trial court awarding Hazel, Kevin, and Richard

Savoie (the Savoies) $34 million in damages for remediation of their land to state

regulations and $18 million to remediate the property to comply with mineral

leases entered into by the parties. The Savoies answer, claiming the trial court

improperly awarded judicial interest from the date of judicial demand. For the

following reasons, we hereby affirm the decision of the trial court as amended.

This is an oilfield remediation case. The Savoies sued numerous defendants

for allegedly contaminating their property through mineral exploration and

production activities. After a month-long trial on the matter, a jury found that the

Savoies had suffered environmental damage to their property and that Shell was

responsible. The jury awarded the plaintiffs $34 million for restoration of the

property to state regulatory standards and awarded an additional $18 million for

remediation of the property to the standards set forth in the mineral leases.

After the jury’s verdict, the matter proceeded to the Louisiana Department of

Natural Resources (DNR) in accordance with the provisions of La.R.S. 30:29, also

known as Act 312. Pursuant to this statute, the DNR adopted a remediation plan

which would cost $3,963,003.00 to implement. The trial court approved the DNR

plan as the most feasible plan to remediate the land to state regulations when the

Savoies failed to contest the plan at a preponderance hearing. The trial court

entered judgment in favor of the Savoies for $34 million for remediation to state

standards but required Shell to pay $3,963,003.00 of that amount into the court’s

registry for the exclusive use in remediation under La.R.S. 30:29. The remaining

$30 million took the form of a personal judgment in favor of the Savoies. The trial

court further awarded the Savoies $18 million in damages to remediate the land to

the standards set forth by the contracts between the parties that exceeded the state

requirements. From this judgment, Shell appeals and the Savoies answer.

Shell asserts four assignments of error on appeal: that the trial court erred in

failing to advise the jury of La.R.S. 30:29 in its jury charges; that the trial court

erred in awarding the Savoies $30 million as a cash payment for regulatory cleanup;

that the award of that $30 million in addition to the performance of the cleanup

amounts to an impermissible double recovery; and that the trial court erred in

denying its motion for directed verdict. Because Shell’s second and third

assignments of error overlap, we will address them together. The Savoies answer

the appeal, claiming the trial court erred in awarding interest from the date of

judicial demand rather than from the date of the breach of the leases at issue.

Jury charges

Shell asserts as its first assignment of error that the trial court erred in

excluding reference to Act 312 during trial and in failing to inform the jury of the

post-trial process set forth by the Act. For this alleged error, Shell seeks remand

for a new trial. Shell alleges it was prejudiced by the Savoies’ claims to the jury

that they must be awarded as much as $35 million to insure remediation to state

standards when the framework of the Act guaranteed that remediation to those

standards would occur, regardless of cost, once findings of environmental damage

and liability were made by the jury.

Generally, ―the giving of an allegedly erroneous jury instruction
will not constitute grounds for reversal unless the instruction is
erroneous and the complaining party has been injured or prejudiced
thereby.‖ Rosell, 549 So.2d at 849. In fact, Louisiana jurisprudence is
well established that a reviewing court must exercise great restraint
before it reverses a jury verdict due to an erroneous jury instruction.
Adams, 2007-2110 p. 6, 983 So.2d at 804; Nicholas, 1999-2522 p.8,

2

765 So.2d at 1023. We have previously explained the following basis
for this rule of law:

[t]rial courts are given broad discretion in formulating
jury instructions and a trial court judgment should not be
reversed so long as the charge correctly states the
substance of the law. The rule of law requiring an
appellate court to exercise great restraint before upsetting
a jury verdict is based, in part, on respect for the jury
determination rendered by citizens chosen from the
community who serve a valuable role in the judicial
system. We assume a jury will not disregard its sworn
duty and be improperly motivated. We assume a jury will
render a decision based on the evidence and the totality
of the instructions provided by the judge.

....

In order to determine whether an erroneous jury instruction was
given, reviewing courts must assess the targeted portion of the
instruction in the context of the entire jury charge ―to determine if the
charges adequately provide the correct principles of law as applied to
the issues framed in the pleadings and the evidence and whether the
charges adequately guided the jury in its determination.‖ Adams,
2007-2110 p. 7, 983 So.2d at 804; Nicholas, 1999-2522 p. 8, 765
So.2d at 1023; Rosell, 549 So.2d at 849. The ultimate inquiry on
appeal is whether the jury instructions misled the jury to such an
extent that the jurors were prevented from dispensing justice. Adams,
2007-2110 p. 7, 983 So.2d at 804; Nicholas, 1999–2522 p.8, 765
So.2d at 1023.

Wooley v. Lucksinger, 09-571, 09-584, 09-585, 09-586, pp. 81-82 (La. 4/1/11), 61

So.3d 507, 574 (quoting Adams v. Rhodia, Inc., 07-2110, p. 6 (La. 5/21/08), 983

So.2d 798, 804)(alteration in original).

Shell did arguably suffer some prejudice in that the jury awarded such a

large amount while conceivably under the notion that remediation to state

requirements was not assured without a vast award, despite La.R.S. 30:29

guaranteeing cleanup to those levels if the jury found Shell responsible. However,

the trial court was also careful to craft a jury verdict form and instructions that

accomplished the goals of Act 312, even if the Act and the post-trial procedure

3

were not specifically mentioned. Most importantly for the case before us, the jury

verdict form differentiated between the awards for the costs of cleanup to state

regulatory standards and the costs of the private damages the Savoies suffered as a

result of Shell’s breach of its leases. We do not find that the jury was prevented

from dispensing justice because of the instructions from the trial court. Moreover,

judicial efficiency requires that we not remand this matter for another month-long

trial when we can address the main issue on appeal as discussed below.

The $34 million question

Shell’s second and third assignments of error will be addressed as one, as

they both deal with the main issue in this case—whether the Savoies are entitled to

a private judgment for the extra $30 million awarded to them by the trial court and

jury specifically for remediation of their land to state regulatory standards in

addition to the actual performance of that remediation at the roughly $4 million

cost of the remediation plan actually adopted by the court. We find that the

Savoies are not entitled to a private judgment for this additional $30 million.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 30:29 provides, in pertinent part:

A. The legislature hereby finds and declares that Article IX,
Section 1 of the Constitution of Louisiana mandates that the natural
resources and the environment of the state, including ground water,
are to be protected, conserved, and replenished insofar as possible and
consistent with the health, safety, and welfare of the people and
further mandates that the legislature enact laws to implement this
policy. It is the duty of the legislature to set forth procedures to ensure
that damage to the environment is remediated to a standard that
protects the public interest. To this end, this Section provides the
procedure for judicial resolution of claims for environmental damage
to property arising from activities subject to the jurisdiction of the
Department of Natural Resources, office of conservation. The
provisions of this Section shall be implemented upon receipt of timely
notice as required by Paragraph (B)(1) of this Section. The provisions
of this Section shall not be construed to impede or limit provisions
under private contracts imposing remediation obligations in excess of
the requirements of the department or limit the right of a party to a

4

private contract to enforce any contract provision in a court of proper
jurisdiction.

....

C. (1) If at any time during the proceeding . . . the finder of fact
determines that environmental damage exists and determines the party
or parties who caused the damage or who are otherwise legally
responsible therefore, the court shall order the party . . . whom the
court finds legally responsible for the damage to develop a plan or
submittal for the evaluation or remediation to applicable standards of
the contamination that resulted in the environmental damage. The
court shall order that the plan be developed and submitted to the
department and the court within a time that the court determines is
reasonable and shall allow the plaintiff or any other party at least
thirty days from the date each plan or submittal was made to the
department and the court to review the plan or submittal and provide
to the department and the court a plan, comment, or input in response
thereto. The department shall consider any plan, comment, or
response provided timely by any party. The department shall submit
to the court a schedule of estimated costs for review of the plans or
submittals of the parties by the department and the court shall require
the party admitting responsibility or the party found legally
responsible by the court to deposit in the registry of the court
sufficient funds to pay the cost of the department’s review of the plans
or submittals. Any plan or submittal shall include an estimation of
cost to implement the plan.

(2) Within sixty days from the last day on which any party may
provide the department with a plan, comment, or response to a plan as
provided in Paragraph (C)(1) of this Section, the department shall
conduct a public hearing on the plan or plans submitted. Within sixty
days of the conclusion of the hearing, the department shall approve or
structure a plan based on the evidence submitted which the
department determines to be the most feasible plan to evaluate or
remediate the environmental damage and protect the health, safety,
and welfare of the people. The department shall issue written reasons
for the plan it approves or structures. On motion of the department, for
good cause shown, the court may grant the department additional time,
not to exceed sixty days, within which to either conduct the hearing or
approve a plan with reasons.

(3) The department shall use and apply the applicable standards
in approving or structuring a plan that the department determines to be
the most feasible plan to evaluate or remediate the environmental
damage.

5

(4) The plan approved by the department for submission to the
court shall not be considered to be an adjudication subject to appellate
review pursuant to R.S. 49:964 or R.S. 30:12.

(5) The court shall adopt the plan approved by the department,
unless a party proves by a preponderance of the evidence that another
plan is a more feasible plan to adequately protect the environment and
the public health, safety, and welfare. The court shall enter a judgment
adopting a plan with written reasons assigned. Upon adoption of a
plan, the court shall order the party or parties admitting responsibility
or the party or parties found legally responsible by the court to fund
the implementation of the plan.

(6)(a) Any judgment adopting a plan of evaluation or
remediation pursuant to this Section and ordering the party or parties
admitting responsibility or the party or parties found legally
responsible by the court to deposit funds for the implementation
thereof into the registry of the court pursuant to this Section shall be
considered a final judgment pursuant to the Code of Civil Procedure
Article 2081 et seq., for purposes of appeal.

....

D. (1) Whether or not the department or the attorney general
intervenes, and except as provided in Subsection H of this Section, all
damages or payments in any civil action, including interest thereon,
awarded for the evaluation or remediation of environmental damage
shall be paid exclusively into the registry of the court in an interest-
bearing account with the interest accruing to the account for clean up.

(2) The court may allow any funds to be paid into the registry
of the court to be paid in increments as necessary to fund the
evaluation or remediation and implementation of any plan or
submittal adopted by the court. . . .

(3) The court shall issue such orders as may be necessary to
ensure that any such funds are actually expended in a manner
consistent with the adopted plan for the evaluation or remediation of
the environmental damage for which the award or payment is made.

(4) The court shall retain jurisdiction over the funds deposited
and the party or parties admitting responsibility or the party or parties
found legally responsible by the court until such time as the
evaluation or remediation is completed. If the court finds the amount
of the initial deposit insufficient to complete the evaluation or
remediation, the court shall, on the motion of any party or on its own
motion, order the party or parties admitting responsibility or found
legally responsible by the court to deposit additional funds into the
registry of the court. Upon completion of the evaluation or

6

remediation, the court shall order any funds remaining in the registry
of the court to be returned to the depositor. The department and the
parties shall notify the court of the completion of any evaluation or
remediation.

....

F. The court and the department shall retain oversight to ensure
compliance with the plan. The party or parties admitting responsibility
or the party or parties found legally responsible by the court shall file
progress reports periodically as the court or the department may
require.

....

H. This Section shall not preclude an owner of land from
pursuing a judicial remedy or receiving a judicial award for private
claims suffered as a result of environmental damage, except as
otherwise provided in this Section. Nor shall it preclude a judgment
ordering damages for or implementation of additional remediation in
excess of the requirements of the plan adopted by the court pursuant
to this Section as may be required in accordance with the terms of an
express contractual provision.

Shell argues that under La.R.S. 30:29, the jury was not entitled to hear or

determine the portion of any case dealing with remediation to state standards, as

the statute sets up a post-trial procedure for determining the most feasible plan and

its costs. While a straight reading of the statute would render this argument

superficially valid, it is clear from the supreme court’s decision in State v.

Louisiana Land and Exploration Co., 12-884 (La. 1/30/13), 110 So.3d 1038, this

argument must fall. There, the court noted1:

The procedure under the Act does not prohibit the award of remediation
damages for more than the amount necessary to fund the statutorily
mandated feasible plan, nor does the procedure described in the Act intrude
into the manner in which remediation damages are determined. The Act
1
It is clear from reading the entire Louisiana Land opinion that the amount of excess
―remediation damages‖ discussed in this paragraph refers to private claims in tort and under
contract as considered in La.R.S. 30:29(H), and not claims to remediation to state regulatory
levels that serve the public interest. The Savoies are not and have not been precluded from
seeking a judicial award for their private claims under the terms of their leases. The jury found
they were entitled to $18 million in damages for those private excess remediation claims. The
amount of that award is unchallenged and is not at issue here.

7

makes no changes to the normal trial procedures established by the Code
of Civil Procedure. The only change accomplished by Act 312 is how the
damages to remediate property are spent. Under Act 312, landowners do
not receive that portion of the remediation damages award needed to fund
the statutorily mandated feasible plan; these funds must be deposited into the
registry of the court.

Id. at 1049 (emphasis ours). Moreover, the court went on to say that

The matter proceeds to trial in the same manner as any other
proceeding; no provision of the Act changes normal trial procedures.
This means pre-trial discovery is conducted and the case proceeds in
accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure. Unless a defendant
admits responsibility or liability for ―environmental damage‖ as
defined by the Act, La. R.S. 30:29(I), all claims, including
contractual or private claims, are determined by the finder of fact at
trial.

Id. at 1051(emphasis ours)(footnote omitted).

While Shell argues that the procedure established by the Act removes the

power to determine the public interest remediation plan and cost therefor from a

jury, with this language the supreme court clearly mandates that ―all claims,‖

including claims as to remediation to state standards, go before the jury. That

language is clear, unambiguous, and controlling. Accordingly, the trial court did

not err in allowing the jury to hear these claims.

Nevertheless, under the clear language of the statute, the jury is not the

ultimate arbiter of the plan to remediate to state standards, the trial court itself is.

The trial court is to determine the most feasible plan for remediation to state

standards, for the public interest, after the DNR has submitted its plan. See La.R.S.

30:29(C)(1); La.R.S. 30:29(C)(5). Additionally, ―Act 312 changes the remedy

available to [plaintiffs] in [their] efforts to obtain surface restoration of [their]

immovable property.‖ M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 07-2371, p. 32 (La.

7/1/08), 998 So.2d 16, 37. The remedy for remediation to state regulatory

8

standards is no longer a private money award, but rather specific performance of

the remediation to those state standards that serve the public interest.

Here, the Savoies had the opportunity to submit their own plan to contest the

$3.9 million plan submitted by the DNR to the trial court at a preponderance

hearing, but ultimately chose not to do so. They probably would have been wise to

submit a plan for consideration by the trial court, as their estimation of the cost of

remediation to state standards was obviously approved by the jury by a

preponderance of the evidence. Since the Savoies waived that right completely of

their own volition, the trial court had no choice but to adopt the DNR’s plan as

submitted. Under La.R.S. 30:29(C)(5)(emphasis ours), ―[t]he court shall adopt the

plan approved by the department, unless a party proves by a preponderance of the

evidence that another plan is a more feasible plan to adequately protect the

environment and public health, safety, and welfare‖ than the plan approved by the

DNR. The DNR had not yet formulated its plan when the Savoies presented their

case to the jury. When the Savoies failed to challenge the DNR’s plan after the

trial, the trial court acted correctly in adopting that plan as the most feasible plan

for remediation to state standards under La.R.S. 30:29(C)(5).

However, ―the final decision as to the remediation plan adopted rests with

the court.‖ Louisiana Land, 110 So.3d at 1049.2 The DNR plan itself is not a final

decision, but basically evidence to be considered by the trial court in ultimately

determining the most feasible plan. The trial court is the final arbiter in

2
It is worth noting again for clarity’s sake that the ―remediation plan‖ discussed in this
quote refers to the plan for remediation to state standards only and not any excess remediation
plans that may be required under any contractual terms. Under La.R.S. 30:29, the jury remains
the final fact finder as to any plans necessary to remediate beyond state levels to conform with
private contracts and/or tort claims.

9

determining the most feasible plan for remediation to state standards as well as the

gatekeeper for overseeing its implementation. See La.R.S. 30:29(C)(5).

Despite the Savoies’ apparent tactical miscalculation, it seems that the trial

court ultimately agreed with the jury’s finding on the cost of returning the land to

state standards in its own determination of the final plan for remediation to those

specifications. The trial court accepted both the DNR plan and the jury’s award of

$34 million dollars. Here, the trial court, admittedly confused as to how to handle

the jury award, entered final judgment granting the $34 million awarded by the

jury for state standard remediation to the Savoies personally after subtracting the

$3.9 million amount required to fund the DNR plan to remediate to those same

state levels. It seems that while the trial court ―adopted‖ the DNR plan, the trial

court also gave credence to the jury’s award for remediation to state standards.

The award given by the jury was determined by the same preponderance of the

evidence standard the trial court would have applied in any post-trial hearing. As

awkward as the judgment may be, it is clear that the trial court paid respect to the

jury’s findings and ultimately believed that $34 million was the amount required to

remediate the land to state standards. Moreover, the amount of the jury’s award is

not challenged by Shell, but rather, only the jury’s ability to reach that award and

the trial court’s distribution of it.

The Savoies claim that the excess $30 million should be awarded to them in

a private judgment as if that money was awarded for private contract or tort claims.

However, it is perfectly clear from both the jury verdict form and the trial court’s

judgment that this money was awarded specifically for remediation to state

standards, to serve the public interest as identified by La.R.S. 30:29, and not for

their private ―excess‖ claims, for which they were awarded an additional $18

10

million by the jury and trial court. ―Under Act 312, landowners do not receive that

portion of the remediation damages award needed to fund the statutorily mandated

feasible plan; these funds must be deposited into the registry of the court.‖

Louisiana Land, 110 So.3d at 1049. In other words, landowners are not to recover

any award made specifically for remediation to state standards, i.e., that amount

required to return the land to a state that suits the public interest. It is clear that the

Savoies are not entitled to the additional $30 million awarded for remediation to

state standards at issue here as if it were part of a private judgment.

Distribution of Damages for Remediation to State Regulatory Standards

Subsection D of La.R.S. 30:29 provides how the ―most feasible plan‖ to

remediate the property to state requirements is to be implemented. As noted in

Louisiana Land, 110 So.3d at 1053-54 (emphasis ours):

Subsection (1) states:

D. (1) Whether or not the department or the
attorney general intervenes, and except as provided in
Subsection H of this Section, all damages or payments in
any civil action, including interest thereon, awarded for
the evaluation or remediation of environmental damage
shall be paid exclusively into the registry of the court in
an interest-bearing account with the interest accruing to
the account for clean up.

....

Subsection D(1) must be read with Subsection (H), which
provides:

H. This Section shall not preclude an owner of land from
pursuing a judicial remedy or receiving a judicial award
for private claims suffered as a result of environmental
damage, except as otherwise provided in this Section.
Nor shall it preclude a judgment ordering damages for or
implementation of additional remediation in excess of the
requirements of the plan adopted by the court pursuant to
this Section as may be required in accordance with the
terms of an express contractual provision. Any award

11

granted in connection with the judgment for additional
remediation is not required to be paid into the registry of
the court. This Section shall not be interpreted to create
any cause of action or to impose additional implied
obligations under the mineral code or arising out of a
mineral lease.

....

Reading the two subsections together, it is clear that when
Subsection D(1) provides: ―except as provided in Subsection H . . . all
damages . . . awarded for the evaluation or remediation of
environmental damage shall be paid exclusively into the registry of
the court . . . ,‖ that means the amount of remediation damages
necessary to fund the feasible plan adopted by the court, i.e. all
damages awarded for the evaluation or remediation of
environmental damage to a standard that protects the public interest.

We find that, because the trial court and jury specifically awarded the $34

million for remediation to state requirements, which is clearly for the public

interest and not the Savoies’ private interest, the entire $34 million judgment

should go into the registry of the court until the remediation is complete. We note

here again that ―[u]nder Act 312, landowners do not receive that portion of the

remediation damages award needed to fund the statutorily mandated feasible plan,‖

i.e., remediation to state standards and regulations. Louisiana Land, 110 So.3d at

1049. At the time the trial court is satisfied that its plan has been complied with,

any remaining money in the registry should be returned to Shell, as noted in the

trial court’s judgment. Accordingly, we hereby amend the judgment of the trial

court to place the entire $34 million award for the remediation of ―the Savoie

property to Louisiana standards and regulations‖ into the registry of the court to

fund the implementation of the cleanup plan adopted by the trial court.

Because we place that award into the registry of the court, where any unused

portion will be returned to Shell, we need not address Shell’s argument that the

distribution of the award would amount to a double recovery for the Savoies.

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Motion for Directed Verdict

Shell next claims the trial court erred in denying its motion for directed

verdict on the Savoies’ ―excess‖ remediation damages claims. These claims arose

out of the specific leases Shell had with the Savoies and involve cleanup beyond

the requirements of the state regulations to the requirements of these leases. Shell

claims that the ―only evidence on this issue was that the regulations and the

contracts required the same level of restoration.‖ We disagree.

This court, in Hebert v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 01-223, pp. 4-5

(La.App. 3 Cir. 6/6/01), 787 So.2d 614, 617, writ denied, 01-1943 (La. 10/26/01),

799 So.2d 1145, stated the following:

The applicable standard of review for [a motion for directed
verdict] is found in Busby v. St. Paul Insurance Co., 95-2128, pp. 16-
17 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/10/96); 673 So.2d 320, 331, writ denied, 96-1519
(La.9/20/96); 679 So.2d 443, which states:

A trial court has much discretion in determining
whether or not to grant a motion for directed verdict. New
Orleans Property Development, Ltd. v. Aetna Casualty
and Surety Company, 93-0692 (La.App. 1st Cir. 4/8/94);
642 So.2d 1312, 1315; Belle Pass Terminal, Inc. v. Jolin,
Inc., 92-1544 and 92-1545 (La.App. 1st Cir. 3/11/94);
634 So.2d 466, 478, writ denied, 94-0906 (La.6/17/94);
638 So.2d 1094; Barnes v. Thames, 578 So.2d 1155,
1162 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 577 So.2d 1009
(La.1991). A motion for directed verdict is appropriately
granted in a jury trial when, after considering all
evidentiary inferences in the light most favorable to the
movant’s opponent, it is clear that the facts and
inferences are so overwhelmingly in favor of the moving
party that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary
verdict. New Orleans Property Development, Ltd., 642
So.2d at 1315; Belle Pass Terminal, Inc., 634 So.2d at
478; Barnes, 578 So.2d at 1162. However, if there is
substantial evidence opposed to the motion, that is,
evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and
fair-minded jurors in the exercise of impartial judgment
might reach different conclusions, the motion should be
denied, and the case submitted to the jury. New Orleans

13

Property Development, Ltd., 642 So.2d at 1315; Belle
Pass Terminal, Inc., 634 So.2d at 478.

On appeal, the standard of review for directed
verdicts is whether, viewing the evidence submitted, the
appellate court concludes that reasonable people could
not reach a contrary verdict. New Orleans Property
Development, Ltd., 642 So.2d at 1315; Belle Pass
Terminal, Inc., 634 So.2d at 478.

Shell does not challenge the amount of jury’s $18 million award for

remediation to the requirements of the contract. Instead, Shell claims that the

requirements of the contract and the state regulations are the same, despite the

jury’s clear opinion on the matter. Of a voluminous record of over 17,000 pages,

Shell’s argument is based on two sentences from the testimony of the Savoies’

expert witnesses wherein the experts pronounce that the state regulations require a

―similar‖ cleanup standard as the lease provisions that required the land be cleaned

up to the ―background‖ condition that existed prior to the lease beginning.

However, Shell ignores testimony from those same experts that differentiates

between what was required to meet the rules and regulations that the State of

Louisiana has adopted and that which would be applicable to the Savoies’ lease,

including running the cleanup systems for longer times at a greater expense.

It is clear that the jury in this case heard and weighed evidence from

competing experts for over four weeks and came to the conclusion that there were,

indeed, requirements that arose from the leases that exceeded the state regulations

and that it would take $18 million to restore the property as required by the leases

beyond what was required by state regulations. We do not find that the facts and

inferences point so overwhelmingly in Shell’s favor that that determination of the

jury was impermissible. Accordingly, we do not find that the trial court abused its

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discretion in failing to grant Shell’s motion for directed verdict. This assignment

of error is devoid of merit.

Savoies’ Answer

Finally, the Savoies answer Shell’s appeal. The Savoies originally asserted

eight assignments of error in their answer. However, only one was briefed. ―All

specifications or assignments of error must be briefed. The court may consider as

abandoned any specification or assignment of error which has not been briefed.‖

Uniform Rules-Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-12.4; Grantt Guillory Enters., Inc. v.

Quebedeaux, 12-931, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/6/13), 110 So.3d 182, 186.

Accordingly, we will only consider the lone briefed assignment of error, the

allegation that the trial court erred in awarding interest on the judgment from the

date of judicial demand, rather than from the date of the breach of the leases.

While it is generally true that judicial interest should accumulate from
the date of breach in contract cases, as opposed to the date of judicial
demand, the supreme court in Trans-Global Alloy Limited v. First
National Bank of Jefferson Parish, 583 So.2d 443 (La.1991), has held
that in ―highly complicated‖ cases where the issues are whether a
breach has occurred and the appropriate damage amount, it is
appropriate to award interest from the date of judicial demand.

Ashy v. Trotter, 04-612, p. 21 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/10/04), 888 So.2d 344, 357, writs

denied, 05-180, 05-347 (La. 3/24/05), 896 So.2d 1045, 1047. The Savoies

correctly concede that this is the law. However, they claim that this case, which

involved a four-week trial and a roughly 17,000 page record of highly technical

evidence concerning several leases, dramatic environmental damage, and highly

contested fights over how the land should be cleaned and the appropriate cost

thereof, is not a ―complicated‖ case. We disagree. We find this case clearly falls

into the ―highly complicated‖ category. Thus, we find no error in the trial court’s

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award of legal interest from the date of judicial demand. This assignment of error

is without merit.

For the above reasons, we hereby amend the judgment of the trial court to

order the entire $34 million award for the remediation of ―the Savoie property to

Louisiana standards and regulations‖ to be paid into the registry of the trial court to

fund the implementation of the plan adopted to meet that end. We affirm the

remainder of the judgment of the trial court as amended. Costs of this appeal are

assessed to the defendants.

AFFIRMED AS AMENDED.

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