Christy Wagoner Hatfield v. Christopher Cloud
Christy Wagoner Hatfield v. Christopher Cloud, No. CA-0013-1408 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. May 7, 2014).
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- Hall v. Folger Coffee Co. 874 So. 2d 90
Opinion text
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
CA 13-1408
CHRISTY WAGONER HATFIELD
VERSUS
CHRISTOPHER CLOUD
**********
APPEAL FROM THE
NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF RAPIDES, NO. 237,359
HONORABLE GEORGE CLARENCE METOYER JR, DISTRICT JUDGE
**********
BILLY HOWARD EZELL
JUDGE
**********
Court composed of John D. Saunders, Jimmie C. Peters, and Billy Howard Ezell,
Judges.
AFFIRMED.
David O. Walker
Neblett, Beard & Arsenault
P. O. Box 1190
Alexandria, LA 71309-1190
(318) 487-9874
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
Christy Wagoner Hatfield
S. Aaron Siebeneicher
Johnson & Siebeneicher & Ingram, Inc.
P. O. Box 648
Alexandria, LA 71309
(318) 484-3911
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Christopher Cloud
EZELL, Judge.
Christopher Cloud appeals a trial court judgment dismissing his petition to
annul a default judgment entered against him and in favor of Christy Hatfield. For
the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
FACTS
On May 30, 2009, Ms. Hatfield was bitten by Mr. Cloud’s dog while at his
house. As a result of the bite, she sustained permanent disfiguring injuries to her
cheek, nose, sinus cavity, and face. She filed suit against Mr. Cloud on February 1,
2010. Mr. Cloud never answered the suit, resulting in a default judgment on
March 11, 2010. A hearing to confirm the default judgment was held on February
21, 2013. The court confirmed the default judgment on March 4, 2013, entering
judgment in favor of Ms. Hatfield in the amount of $222,922.83, consisting of
$22,922.83 in medical damages and $200,000.00 in general damages.
After receiving notice of the judgment, Mr. Cloud filed a petition to annul
the default judgment. Mr. Cloud alleged that the default judgment was obtained by
fraud and ill practices because he never received service of process of the petition
for damages.
A hearing on the motion to annul the default judgment was held on August
19, 2013. The trial court dismissed the petition for annulment. Mr. Cloud
appealed this ruling.
ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT
Mr. Cloud argues that the default judgment entered against him was
inappropriate given the lack of proper service of the original petition on him. He
argues that the trial court should have annulled the default judgment.
Citation and service of process are essential in all civil actions, except those
types of cases in which the law provides it is not necessary, and all proceedings
conducted without them are absolutely null. La.Code Civ.P. art. 1201(A). ―A final
judgment shall be annulled if it is rendered . . . [a]gainst a defendant who has not
been served with process . . . and who has not waived objection to jurisdiction, or
against whom a valid default judgment has not been taken.‖ La.Code Civ.P. art.
2002(A)(2).
Louisiana Code Civil Procedure Article 1202 sets out the requirements for a
valid citation and service:
The citation must be signed by the clerk of the court issuing it
with an expression of his official capacity and under the seal of his
office; must be accompanied by a certified copy of the petition,
exclusive of exhibits, even if made a part thereof; and must contain
the following;
(1) The date of issuance;
(2) The title of the cause;
(3) The name of the person to whom it is addressed;
(4) The title and location of the court issuing it; and
(5) A statement that the person cited must either comply with
the demand contained in the petition or make an appearance,
either by filing a pleading or otherwise, in the court issuing the
citation within the delay provided in Article 1001 under penalty
of default.
In Hall v. Folger Coffee Co., 03-1734, pp. 6-7 (La. 4/14/04), 874 So.2d 90, 97
(citations omitted), the supreme court held:
Moreover, [T]he burden of persuasion that applies to a party seeking
to overcome the rebuttable presumption afforded a completed sheriff’s
return of service by La.Code Civ. Proc. Art. 1292 is preponderance of
the evidence. Accordingly, the party attacking service must prove that
more probably than not, proper service was not made.
2
When a record contains a completed sheriff’s return of service, the trial court
must draw the inference that the sheriff’s return of service is valid. Id. The party
attacking the validity of the sheriff’s return of service must present appropriate
evidence to controvert or overcome the presumption that the sheriff’s return of
service is valid. Id. The trial court must then determine if it is persuaded, by a
preponderance of the evidence, by the controverting evidence that service had not
been properly made. Id. An appellate court’s review of factual determinations
made by the trial court is under the manifest error/clearly wrong standard. Id.
The sheriff’s return introduced into evidence shows that it was issued on
February 2, 2010, in the matter of ―Christy Hatfield versus Christopher Cloud‖ in
the ninth judicial district court for Rapides Parish. It contained a petition for
damages in addition to interrogatory and requests for production of documents.
The return was signed by the clerk of court. The return also shows personal
service was made on Christopher Cloud at his residence on February 3, 2010, by a
Deputy Eubanks.
To controvert the presumption of the validity of the sheriff’s return, Mr.
Cloud testified that he was never served with the petition for damages by law
enforcement regarding the incident. He contended that he first received notice
about the lawsuit when he got the judgment. As further support that he was not
served with the petition, Mr. Cloud contends that the sheriff’s deputy, who testified
at trial, did not even recognize Mr. Cloud.
Brandon Eubanks, who was no longer with the Rapides Sheriff’s Office at
the time of trial, agreed that he had no independent recollection of Mr. Cloud. In
reviewing the cover sheet to the sheriff’s return, he explained that he did remember
that he first attempted service on Mr. Cloud at 9:46 a.m. Mr. Eubanks was unable
3
to reach the house, the gate was locked, and there was a big dog. He left a card.
Mr. Eubanks returned approximately twenty minutes later at 10:03 a.m. Mr.
Eubanks recalled making personal service on someone who identified himself as
Christopher Cloud, a gentleman fitting the build of Mr. Cloud in the courtroom.
Mr. Eubanks specifically recalled that there was a large fence surrounding the yard
and no vehicle at the house on his first attempt. When Mr. Eubanks returned, the
gate was open and there was a motorcycle in the driveway. Mr. Cloud testified
that he never saw Mr. Eubanks before.
Bridget Dunn, chief civil deputy with the Rapides Parish Sheriff’s Office,
testified that if the original documents had not been served, they would have been
returned, given to the clerk of court’s office, and filed in the suit record. The
original documents were not in the suit record.
Mr. Cloud points out that he advised his insurance agent about the incident
and also reported the incident to the sheriff’s department, reporting that Ms.
Hatfield trespassed on his property. Because he took these steps, Mr. Cloud claims
that he certainly would have reported that he had been sued to his insurance agent.
We note that Mr. Cloud only told his insurance agent about the incident because
the agent happened to be at his house taking some pictures needed to underwrite
the policy on Mr. Cloud’s house that had been missed. The policy only became
effective right before this incident on May 14, 2009.
Mr. Cloud also argues that the record is replete with instances where service
of additional pleadings were attempted upon him but never made. However, we
note that the returns on these items indicate they were not served. This does not
mean that the original petition was not served, especially since the return does
indicate that it was personally served.
4
We agree with the trial court’s decision that Mr. Cloud did not overcome the
presumption that he was personally served with the petition for damages. The
evidence and testimony clearly establish that Mr. Cloud was served with the
petition for damages. The trial court was correct in dismissing Mr. Cloud’s
petition for annulment of judgment.
For the above reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs of
this appeal are assessed to Christopher Cloud.
AFFIRMED.
This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION. Uniform
Rules—Courts of Appeal. Rule 2–16.3.
5