Ben William Meaux v. Leonard Guidry

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

14-155

BEN WILLIAM MEAUX

VERSUS

LEONARD GUIDRY

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APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. C-20134400
HONORABLE GLENNON P. EVERETT, DISTRICT JUDGE

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SHANNON J. GREMILLION
JUDGE

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Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Billy Howard Ezell,
and Shannon J. Gremillion, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Ike Huval
Duhon Law Firm
P. O. Box 52566
Lafayette, LA 70505
(337) 237-9868
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Leonard Guidry

Ashley W. Phillips
The Phillips Law Firm LLC
1538 W. Pinhook, Suite 102
Lafayette, LA 70503
(337) 412-6248
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:
Ben William Meaux

GREMILLION, Judge.

Plaintiff, Ben William Meaux, appeals the trial court’s judgment granting

exceptions of preemption and no right of action in favor of defendant, Leonard

Guidry.1 For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Meaux, born August 25, 1980, filed a petition to establish paternity and

motion and order for paternity testing on September 3, 2013, seeking to establish

the paternity of Guidry. Meaux alleged that Guidry and his mother, Tammy

Broussard, consummated their relationship but never married. Meaux was later

adopted by Huey Meaux, who is deceased.

On September 19, 2013, Guidry filed an exception of peremption and no

right of action. Following an October 2013 hearing, the trial court granted

Guidry’s exceptions of peremption and no right of action and dismissed Meaux’s

action. Meaux now appeals.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

1. The trial court erred in sustaining the Defendant’s exception of
prematurity as the exception of prematurity was not pled and
evidence was not introduced in support of the exception.2

2. The trial court erred in sustaining the Defendant’s exception of no
right of action, as Defendant-Appellant did not carry his burden
and evidence was not introduced that warranted the granting of the
exception of no right of action.

1
Guidry notes in his brief that he erroneously used the word “prematurity” instead of
“peremption” when preparing the judgment for the trial court. He notes that all counsel and the
trial court understood that the issue was whether Meaux’s claim was perempted, not premature.
After review of the record, we agree and review the issue of peremption and not prematurity. We
further grant Guidry’s request to correct the typographical error in the judgment pursuant to our
authority under La.Code Civ.P. art. 2164.
2
We will not address this assignment of error as it is based on a typographical error as
noted above.

3. The trial court erred in sustaining the Defendant’s exception of
[peremption] and no right of action, as the court’s ruling directly
conflicts with La. C.C. art. 197, as the article is clear and
unambiguous as written and its application does not result in
absurd consequences, pursuant to La. C.C. art. 9.

4. The trial court erred in sustaining the Defendant’s exceptions of
[peremption] and no right of action, as the court’s ruling directly
conflicts with the legislative intent and public policy concerns
which led to the revision of former La.C.C. art. 209, as evidenced
by comment (e) of La. C.C. art. 197.

5. The trial court erred in apply La. C.C. art. 197 prospectively and
not retroactively.

DISCUSSION

The sum of Meaux’s assignments of error is that La.Civ.Code art. 197 grants

him a right of action against Guidry. Louisiana Civil Code Article 197 was

enacted in 2005, and replaced La.Civ.Code art. 209.

Louisiana Civil Code Article 197 states:

A child may institute an action to prove paternity even though
he is presumed to be the child of another man. If the action is
instituted after the death of the alleged father, a child shall prove
paternity by clear and convincing evidence.

For purposes of succession only, this action is subject to a
peremptive period of one year. This peremptive period commences to
run from the day of the death of the alleged father.

Louisiana Civil Code Article 209 required that a paternity action be brought

with nineteen years of the child’s birth, or within one year of the death of the

alleged parent, whichever comes first. Comment (e) to La.Civ.Code art. 197 states

that this “was a harsh result not justified by any policy consideration.” Louisiana

Civil Code Article 197 substantively changed the law, providing for no time limit

in filing a paternity action, except in the case of successions.

This court and others have addressed the retroactive application of La.Civ.

Code art. 197 to revive a paternity action that has prescribed. In sum, because the

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change in the law is a substantive change affecting a defendant’s right to plead

peremption that would defeat the plaintiff’s claim, La.Civ.Code art. 197 applies

prospectively only. Succession of McKay, Jr., 05-603 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/1/06), 921

So.2d 1219, writ denied, 06-504 (La. 6/2/06), 929 So.2d 1252; Thomas v. Roberts,

47,411 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/26/12), 106 So.3d 557. Louisiana Civil Code Article 209

was peremptive, meaning that once the time period has passed, a cause of action

has been extinguished and the party relying on the peremptive defense has a vested

right that is substantive in nature. Id.

In Succession of McKay, the plaintiffs, one who was fifty-four years old and

one who was thirty-six years old, filed an action to establish paternity for

succession purposes. A panel of this court stated:

The enactment of Article 197 obviously changes the law in that
a paternity action no longer has to be instituted within nineteen years
of the child’s birth or within one year from the parent’s death,
whichever occurred first. There is a time limit of one year from the
parent’s death for succession purposes. Now, regardless of age, the
child has one year from his father’s death to institute the action. See
comments (e) and (f) to Article 197. The effective date of [the
enactment of Article 197] was June 29, 2005.

....

Since [the plaintiff’s] claims have already prescribed, the issue
is whether the passage of Article 197 revived their prescribed claims.
The supreme court addressed the issues of revival of prescribed claims
by the legislature in Chance v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 93-
2582 (La. 4/11/94), 635 So.2d 177. Explaining the issue the supreme
court stated:

Although prescriptive statutes are generally procedural in
nature, the revival of an already prescribed claim presents
additional concerns. For while the defendant does not
acquire anything during the running of the prescriptive
period, once the time period has elapsed, the legislature
grants the defendant the right to plead the exception of
prescription in order to defeat the plaintiff’s claim.
La.Code Civ.P. arts. 927 & 934. Because the defendant
acquires the right to plead the exception of prescription, a

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change in that right constitutes a substantive change in
the law as applied to the defendant. See St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. v. Smith, 609 So.2d 809, 817 (La.
1992)(“Substantive laws either establish new rules, rights,
and duties or change existing ones.”); Thomassie v.
Savoie, 581 So.2d 1031, 1034 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1991),
(“[I]f a statute which is remedial or procedural also has
the effect of making a change in the substantive law, it
must be construed to operate prospectively only.”). Thus,
were we to interpret the amendment at issue to allow the
revival of prescribed causes of action, the substantive
rights of the defendant would be materially changed
because he would be stripped of this acquired defense.
Guided by the principles established in [La.Civ.Code]
article 6, we require, at the very least, a clear and
unequivocal expression of intent by the legislature for
such an “extreme exercise of legislative power.”

[], 2005 La.Acts No. 192 § 3, provides that “[t]he provisions
of this Act shall be applicable to all claims existing or actions pending
on its effective date and all claims arising or actions filed on and after
its effective date.” We find no “clear and unequivocal” expression by
the legislature that Article 197 revives filiation claims which have
already prescribed. It is clear that the intent of the legislature was to
ensure that the provisions of the Act applied to causes of actions that
had not prescribed but were existing or already in litigation on June 29,
2005, the effective date of the Act. We, therefore, find that Article
197 is not applicable to these already-prescribed claims.

McKay, 921 So.2d at 1222-23 (footnote omitted).

Meaux argues that this situation is different because Guidry is not deceased.

We disagree. The same result was reached in Thomas, 106 So.3d 557, where the

alleged father was not deceased. Meaux argues that Guidry failed to produce

evidence of Meaux’s date of birth at the hearing. However, Meaux’s own petition

admits his date of birth. While we agree with Meaux that the legislature clearly

intended to remove the nineteen-year peremptive period, that does not negate the

fact that the substantive rights of defendants under Article 209 were affected and,

therefore, the revision will not be retroactively applied. Under the former

La.Civ.Code art. 209, any claim that Meaux has to establish paternity against

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Guidry was perempted the day after he attained the age of nineteen, August 26,

1999.

CONCLUSION

The judgment in favor of the defendant, Leonard Guidry, granting his

exceptions of peremption and no right of action, is affirmed. All costs of this

appeal are assessed against the plaintiff, Ben William Meaux.

AFFIRMED.

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