Dominique Floyd v. City of Carenco

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

14-268

DOMINIQUE FLOYD, ET AL.

VERSUS

CITY OF CARENCRO, ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. C-20122075
HONORABLE THOMAS R. DUPLANTIER, DISTRICT JUDGE

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JOHN E. CONERY
JUDGE

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Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, Jimmie C. Peters, and John E. Conery, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Harold Dewey Register, Jr.
A professional Law Corporation
Post Office Box 80214
Lafayette, Louisiana 70598-0214
(337) 981-6644
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:
Dominique Floyd
K.F.
N.F.

John Fayne Wilkes, III
Joy C. Rabakaus
Tonya R. Smith
Ray R. Lucas
Kathy L. Smith
Brenda L. Mistrot
David C. Clarke
Borne & Wilkes, L.L.C.
Post Office Box 4305
Lafayette, Louisiana 70502-4305
(337) 232-1604
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
City of Carencro
Chief Carlos Stout, in his Official Capacity as Chief of Police of the City
of Carencro

CONERY, Judge.

In this case, the plaintiff, Dominique Floyd (Mr. Floyd), seeks individual

damages and damages on behalf of his minor children K.F. and N.F. resulting from

an incident whereby Mr. Floyd was detained by officers from the Carencro Police

Department who were responding to a “domestic in progress” call. After a trial on

the merits, the trial court found in favor of the defendants, the City of Carencro and

Chief Carlos Stout, in his Official Capacity as Chief of Police of the City of

Carencro, and dismissed plaintiffs’ case with prejudice. For the following reasons,

we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 3, 2011, Corporal Gregory Domingue and Officer Kaylon Begnaud,

officers employed by the City of Carencro Police Department, responded to a 911

call from Anastasia Zenon (Ms. Zenon) seeking assistance for a “domestic in

progress.”

Upon arrival at the Zenon home, the two officers questioned Ms. Zenon,

who reported a dispute in which she was shoved by her ex-boyfriend, James

Coleman. According to Ms. Zenon, Mr. Coleman was driving a green Tahoe with

a paper license plate on his previous visit to her apartment, and Mr. Coleman’s

residence was right down the street in another part of the apartment complex. Both

officers testified that upon reaching the scene of the alleged domestic incident, “Ms.

Zenon pointed to a dark SUV passing on the street directly in front of them.” Ms.

Zenon indicated that the individual driving the vehicle was James Coleman, the

alleged perpetrator.

Although Ms. Zenon initially testified at trial she did not identify the dark

SUV to the officers as the vehicle of the alleged perpetrator, Ms. Zenon’s

identification of the dark SUV to the officers is documented in her May 3, 2011

written statement. Ms. Zenon’s identification of the dark SUV as the vehicle

owned by Mr. Coleman is further supported by the trial testimony of Ms. Zenon’s

mother, Tabatha Zenon. Tabatha Zenon testified that she heard her daughter

identify the dark SUV to the officers as the vehicle belonging to her ex-boyfriend,

James Coleman.

Corporal Domingue immediately got into his police unit and followed the

SUV to a parking space in the parking lot of an adjacent apartment building and

parked his unit behind the SUV. Corporal Domingue approached the driver’s side

window and repeatedly asked the driver, Mr. Floyd, to hang up his cell phone, exit

the vehicle, and provide identification. All of Corporal Domingue’s requests were

refused. At this point, Corporal Domingue radioed for back-up from Officer

Begnaud and other officers in the vicinity.

At trial, Mr. Floyd testified that he had his four children in the vehicle,

including his two-year old twins, R.F. and N.F., as well as two older minor

children he supports financially. He was unaware of why he was stopped. He

allegedly asked the officers to speak with his father on his cell phone. His father

was an officer with the Lafayette Police Department.

When Mr. Floyd finally exited the vehicle, he was handcuffed. The

witnesses at the scene, in particular Ms. Melissa Gotch and Ms. Brenda Bernard,

testified they could hear Mr. Floyd shouting at the officers. A video of the incident

confirms the officers’ testimony that, while still handcuffed, Mr. Floyd attempted

to walk away from the officers. In response, the officers immediately placed him

in the police unit.

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Mr. Floyd claimed that the officers slammed him against the hood of the

police unit and kneed him in the back, injuring his back, shoulder, and wrist. None

of the witnesses who testified at trial saw the officers knee Mr. Floyd in the back.

There is nothing on the video to support such a claim.

Mr. Floyd also denied that he was trying to resist arrest or walk away from

the officers while handcuffed. Yet, the video shows that he did try to walk away.

Ms. Bernard, a resident of the apartment complex identified by Mr. Floyd as a

witness to the incident, testified that she did not see the officers either kick or knee

Mr. Floyd in the back. She only witnessed their attempts to detain him and then

place him in the police unit.

Ms. Zenon was later summoned to the scene and informed officer Begnaud

that Mr. Floyd was not Mr. Coleman, and therefore not the individual who was a

part of the domestic dispute. Mr. Floyd was detained for only eleven minutes by

the officers before he was released. No arrest was made and no charges were filed

against Mr. Floyd for resisting the officers.

Subsequent to the incident, Mr. Floyd went to the Emergency Room of

Lafayette General Medical Center (“LGMC”). The record reflects that Mr. Floyd

told the personnel at LGMC the following:

[Patient] states the police “mistaked” him for someone else and threw
him on the ground and kicked him in the back and handcuffed him,
then realized he was the wrong person and let him go. No marks seen
to lower back. [Complains of] lower back pain and right wrist pain.
Comment: Small amount of swelling and small abrasion noted to
right wrist, [patient) is able to move right wrist but states that it hurts,
[also] [complains of] pain with palpation.

All of the tests conducted on Mr. Floyd were normal. Based on his

complaints of pain, he was prescribed Lortab and muscle relaxers. Mr. Floyd

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subsequently treated with Dr. Maureen Brennan, a psychologist, and claimed the

two younger children, K.F. and N.F., have suffered nightmares since the incident.

On April 11, 2012, Mr. Floyd filed suit individually and on behalf of the two

minor children, K.F. and N.F., against the City of Carencro and Chief Carlos Stout,

in his Official Capacity as Chief of Police of the City of Carencro, claiming that he

“was the victim of police harassment and brutality and deliberate physical and

mental abuse and humiliation caused by negligence.”

A bench trial on the merits was held on November 18 and 19, 2013. On

December 5, 2013, the trial court issued its “Reasons For Ruling” (Reasons)

finding that “the officers did not use excessive or unreasonable force in restraining

Floyd, considering the exigency of the situation in which they were placed.” The

trial court found that the officers acted in “good faith” pursuant to La.R.S. 46:2142

and, pursuant to the provisions of the statute, found “this statute provides immunity

to these officers while responding to a domestic abuse situation.” The trial court

further stated, “There is no evidence that the officers failed to exercise good faith

or due care in their handling of the situation or in their detention of Floyd.”

The trial court also found that no evidence had been presented pursuant to

the allegations in plaintiffs’ petition for “negligent hiring, training and /or

supervision of the officers,” and thus those claims were dismissed. The trial court

also dismissed Mr. Floyd’s claims of violation of his Miranda rights based on the

lack of evidence presented that “Floyd was ever interrogated or placed under

arrest.”1

1
No appeal was lodged based on the dismissal of the claims of negligent hiring and a
violation of Mr.Floyd’s Miranda rights, and hence, we will not address those claims in this
opinion.

4

On December 27, 2013, a judgment dismissing with prejudice all of

plaintiffs’ claims and taxing all costs to plaintiffs was signed by the trial court,

from which the plaintiffs have lodged a timely appeal.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Plaintiffs assert the following assignments of error on appeal:

I. The trial court erred in its determination that Officer Kalen
Begnaud and Officer Greg Domingue provided credible
testimony although there were several blaring internal
contradictions and irreconcilable conflicts within their
respective testimonies.

II. The trial court erred in its determination that the initial stop of
Dominique Floyd did not transform into a full blown arrest and
that Dominique Floyd did not have the right to resist the
unlawful arrest when he was apprehended and approached by
officers when Floyd did not commit or was not about to commit
a criminal offense.

III. The trial court erred in its determination that officers of the
Carencro Police Department utilized reasonable measures when
performing an alleged Terry Stop because Officer Dominigue
[sic] failed to ascertain any identifying information of
Dominique Floyd.

IV. The trial court erred in its determination that excessive force
was not utilized by officers of the Carencro Police Department
when performing an alleged Terry Stop of Dominique Floyd
when Dominique Floyd was merely the victim of a false arrest
and was simply inquiring into the validity of his arrest.

V. The trial court erred in dismissing the physical and mental
injuries incurred as a result of the Officers' negligent actions as
to Dominique Floyd and his children.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Standard of Review

“[A]ppellate jurisdiction of a court of appeal extends to law and facts.”

La.Const. art. 5, § 10(B). The appellate court must determine whether the trial

court committed an error of law or made a factual finding that was manifestly

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erroneous or clearly wrong. Gibson v. State, 99-1730 (La. 4/11/00), 758 So.2d 782,

cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1052, 121 S.Ct. 656 (2000). The reviewing court must

review the record in its entirety to make this determination. Stobart v. State, Dep’t

of Transp. and Dev., 617 So.2d 880 (La.1993). “Consequently, when there are two

permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be

manifestly erroneous.” Ardoin v. Firestone Polymers, L.L.C., p. 6, 10-245 (La.

1/19/11), 56 So.3d. 215, 219; see also Harvey v. City of Eunice Police Dep’t, 10-

1228 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/6/11), 62 So.3d 290.

However, statutory interpretations are questions of law. Shell v. Wal-Mart

Stores, Inc., 00-997 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/21/01), 782 So.2d 1155, writ denied, 01-

1149 (La. 6/15/01), 793 So.2d 1244. Although a reviewing court defers to a trial

court’s reasonable decision on a question or matter properly within the trial court’s

discretion, if the trial court’s decision is based on an erroneous interpretation or

application of the law, such an incorrect decision is not entitled to deference. Kem

Search, Inc. v. Sheffield, 434 So.2d 1067 (La.1983).

Law Enforcement Officers’ Right to Effect a Terry Stop

In its Reasons, the trial court correctly cited both federal and state

jurisprudence recognizing the right of law enforcement officers to “temporarily

detain and interrogate a person whom he reasonably suspects is committing, has

committed, or is about to commit a crime.” Terry v. Ohio, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968);

State v. Belton, 441 So.2d 1195, 1198 (La.1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 2158

(1984).

In addition, La.Code Crim P. art. 215.1(A) defines the limits of an officer’s

actions in effecting a Terry stop as, “A law enforcement officer may stop a person

in a public place whom he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed, or is

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about to commit an offense and may demand of him his name, address and an

explanation of his actions.”

The trial court also addressed in its Reasons the definition of “reasonable

suspicion,” as defined by the supreme court and stated, “Reasonable cause for an

investigatory detention is something less than probable cause and must be

determined under the facts of each case by whether the officer had sufficient

knowledge of facts and circumstances to justify an infringement on the individual’s

right to be free from governmental interference.” Belton, 441 So.2d at 1198.

In this case, the trial court specifically found, “that the identification by the

victim of Floyd as her abuser in a domestic dispute was sufficient and reasonable

grounds for the officers to temporarily detain Floyd.” The trial court’s findings are

supported by the testimony of the officers, Ms. Zenon’s mother, Tabatha and Ms.

Zenon’s May 5, 2013 statement taken on the same day as the incident.

The evidence clearly showed that the officers were responding to a domestic

dispute call and were questioning Ms. Zenon, the complainant, when a dark SUV

passed by with a driver speaking on a cell phone. Ms. Zenon identified the vehicle

as one belonging to the perpetrator, James Coleman. Her identification of the

vehicle resulted in Corporal Domingue returning to his unit, pursuing, and parking

his unit directly behind the identified SUV in a neighboring apartment complex in

order to determine the identity of the driver and his possible involvement in the

domestic dispute. Thus, we find that the trial court’s factual findings were not

manifestly erroneous and that the necessary “reasonable suspicion” existed to

support Corporal Domingue’s actions in instigating a Terry stop.

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Duty Imposed on Officers Under “The Protection from Family Violence Act”

The Louisiana Legislature addressed the issue of domestic violence in a

series of statutes entitled “The Protection from Family Violence Act.” Louisiana

Revised Statutes 46:2131 states in pertinent part:

The purpose of this Part is to recognize and address the
complex legal and social problems created by domestic violence . . .
The legislature further finds that previous societal attitudes have been
reflected in the policies and practices of law enforcement agencies and
prosecutors which have resulted in different treatment of crimes
occurring between family or household members and those occurring
between strangers. It is the intent of the legislature to provide a civil
remedy for domestic violence which will afford the victim immediate
and easily accessible protection. Furthermore, it is the intent of the
legislature that the official response of law enforcement agencies to
cases of domestic violence shall stress the enforcement of laws to
protect the victim and shall communicate the attitude that violent
behavior is not excused or tolerated.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 46:2140 states with particularity the duty of a

police officer when dealing with a domestic abuse situation and states in pertinent

part:

A. Whenever a law enforcement officer has reason to believe that a
family or household member or dating partner has been abused, the
officer shall immediately use all reasonable means to prevent further
abuse, including:

(1) Arresting the abusive party with a warrant or without a warrant
pursuant to Code of Criminal Procedure Article 213, if probable cause
exists to believe that a felony has been committed by that person,
whether or not the offense occurred in the officer's presence.

(2) Arresting the abusive party in case of any misdemeanor crime
which endangers the physical safety of the abused person whether or
not the offense occurred in the presence of the officer. If there is no
cause to believe there is impending danger, arresting the abusive party
is at the officer's discretion.

(3) Assisting the abused person in obtaining medical treatment
necessitated by the battery; arranging for, or providing, or assisting in
the procurement of transportation for the abused person to a place of
shelter or safety.

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The two officers of the Carencro Police Department were acting in response

to a “domestic in progress” call. In other words, this was an ongoing domestic

abuse complaint based on a 911 call by Ms. Zenon. Considering the duties

imposed on the officers by virtue of “The Protection from Family Violence Act[,]”

the legislature has also provided for specific qualified immunity in situations such

as the one before this court for review. Louisiana Revised Statutes 46:2142 states:

Any law enforcement officer reporting in good faith, exercising
due care in the making of an arrest or providing assistance pursuant
to the provisions of R.S. 46:2140 and 2141[2] shall have immunity
from any civil liability that otherwise might be incurred or imposed
because of the report, arrest, or assistance provided.

Does the “Good Faith” Exception of La.R.S. 46:2142 Apply to the
Excessive Force Claim of Mr. Floyd?

In its Reasons, the trial court cited La.Code Crim.P. art. 220, which provides,

“A person shall submit peaceably to a lawful arrest. The person making a lawful

arrest may use reasonable force to effect the arrest and detention, and also to

overcome any resistance or threatened resistance of the person being arrested or

detained.”

This court in Smith v. Guidroz, 12-1232, p. 11 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/30/13),

125 So.3d 1268, 1275, quoted Harvey v. City of Eunice Police Department, 10-228,

pp. 3-4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/6/11), 62 So.3d 290, 293, for the standard for an analysis

of a claim of excessive force:

Generally, excessive force claims fall under the
duty/risk analysis for negligence claims. Stroik v.
Ponseti ,96-2897 (La. 9/9/97), 699 So. 2d 1072. Under
that standard, the plaintiff must prove, “(1) the conduct in

2
Whenever a law enforcement officer investigates an allegation of domestic abuse,
whether or not an arrest is made, the officer shall make a written report of the alleged incident,
including a statement of the complainant, and the disposition of the case.

9

question was the cause-in-fact of the resulting harm; (2)
[the] defendant owed a duty of care to plaintiff; (3) the
requisite duty was breached by the defendant; [and] (4)
the risk of harm was within the scope of protection
afforded by the duty breached.” Id. at 1077. In
determining whether there was a breach of duty, the court
should apply the factors enumerated in Kyle v.
City of New City of New Orleans, 353 So. 2d 969 (La.
1977).

In Kyle, 353 So.2d 969, the supreme court
specifically addressed analysis of excessive force claims,
stating:

The use of force when necessary to
make an arrest is a legitimate police function.
But if the officers use unreasonable or
excessive force, they and their employer are
liable for any injuries which result.

Whether the force used is reasonable
depends on the totality of the facts and
circumstances in each case. A court must
evaluate the officers' actions against those of
ordinary, prudent and reasonable men placed
in the same position as the officers and with
the same knowledge as the officers. The
degree of force is a factual issue. As such,
the trial court's finding is entitled to great
weight.

Several factors to be considered in
making this determination are the known
character of the arrestee, the risks and
dangers faced by the officers, the nature of
the offense involved, the chance of the
arrestee's escape if the particular means are
not employed, the existence of alternative
methods of arrest, the physical size, strength,
and weaponry of the officers as compared to
the arrestee, and the exigencies of the
moment.

Id. at 972-73. (Citations Omitted.)

Once Corporal Domingue reached the passenger side of Mr. Floyd’s vehicle,

he found Mr. Floyd talking on a cell phone. The officer testified at trial:

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I asked him to please, politely, because he was on the phone, to hang
up the phone and speak with me, step out the vehicle to speak with me.
Immediately, he advised that he’s not hanging up the phone, that he
did nothing wrong. At that point in time, I must have told him
probably about 15 times to hang up the phone, please step out the
vehicle, hang up the phone, please step out the vehicle.

During this exchange with Mr. Floyd, Corporal Domingue called for backup

units, including Officer Begnaud, based on Mr. Floyd’s refusal to comply with his

requests to hang up the phone, exit the vehicle, and speak with Corporal Domingue.

During his testimony, Corporal Domingue expressed to the trial court, “I’ve always

been taught that it’s not safe to keep a suspect in a vehicle. I can’t see all their

hands, and it’s just not safe for me. I’d much prefer having the subject standing

outside the vehicle to where I can speak with him.”

Moreover, in State v. Landry, 588 So.2d 345 (La.1991), and reaffirmed in

State v. Duhe, 12-2677 (La. 12/10/13), 130 So.3d 880, the supreme court affirmed

an officer’s reasonable request after a stop is initiated to order all of the occupants

out of the vehicle in order to ensure the officer’s safety. “Since police officers

should not be required to take unnecessary risks in performing their duties, they are

‘authorized to take such steps as [are] reasonably necessary to protect their

personal safety and maintain the status quo during the course of [a Terry] stop.’”

Id. (quoting United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235, 105 S.Ct. 675, 683-84

(1985). Thus, Corporal Domingue was following both the required procedure and

the law when he sought to have Mr. Floyd exit the vehicle. The number of

requests and Mr. Floyd’s refusal to obey the commands of the officer caused

Corporal Domingue to ask for backup in light of the requirements of officers in an

ongoing domestic-dispute investigation.

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Once Mr. Floyd finally exited the vehicle, he continued to argue with the

officers. Corporal Domingue testified that once again, Mr. Floyd refused his

command to turn around so that he could be placed in handcuffs. Based on Mr.

Floyd’s previous behavior in resisting the prior commands, Corporal Domingue

testified, “I wanted to make sure he didn’t hurt me or anybody else.” Mr. Floyd

was then placed in handcuffs for officer safety.

In State v. Turner, 13-0180, p. 3 (La. 3/1/13), 108 So.3d 753, 754-55

(quoting State v. Porche, 06-312, p. 8 (La. 11/29/06), 943 So.2d 335, 339), the

supreme court stated “the use of handcuffs during a putative Terry stop is

reasonable if the State can ‘point to some specific fact or circumstance that could

have supported a reasonable belief that the use of such restraints was necessary to

carry out the legitimate purposes of the stop without exposing law enforcement

officers, the public, or the suspect himself to an undue risk of harm.’”

Corporal Domingue testified at trial that, based on the training he received at

the academy, the repeated refusal of a suspect to respond to a request is considered

resisting arrest. The officers were instructed to treat such a suspect with more

caution, thus the need for the handcuffs.

The decision to place Mr. Floyd in handcuffs is further supported by Mr.

Floyd’s attempt to evade detention by walking away from the officers subsequent

to the placement of the handcuffs. The video of the incident was recorded by the

camera located on Corporal Domingue’s police unit. After a review of the video

recording, the trial court specifically found:

It is clear from the police video that Floyd attempted to evade
the police after being handcuffed. While the Court understands
Floyd’s agitation at being detained by the police when he in fact was
innocent, he still had an obligation to submit peacefully. The officers

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did not use excessive or unreasonable force in restraining Floyd,
considering the exigency of the situation in which they were placed.

The video as well as the testimony of the eye-witnesses supports the

officers’ version of events wherein they handcuffed Mr. Floyd and placed him in

the police unit. There is no evidence in the record to support Mr. Floyd’s version

of events wherein he claims he was thrown upon the hood of the police unit and

kneed in the back by the officers. His statement to the medical staff at LGMC

indicates the officers “threw him on the ground and kicked him in the back and

handcuffed him,” none of which is supported by the video, the eyewitnesses or the

officers’ testimony.

Ms. Melinda Gotch, a neighbor of Mr. Floyd, stepped outside and witnessed

Mr. Floyd in handcuffs in front of the officer’s vehicle. She did not see the

officers kick him, slam him against the vehicle, or knee him in the back, but only

saw them “pushing him around.” She did not see the officers place Mr. Floyd in

the police unit.

Ms. Barbara Jean Bernard was identified in Mr. Floyd’s deposition

testimony as a witness to the incident. She testified at trial that Mr. Floyd was

attempting to speak with his father on the cell phone after he exited the vehicle and

was being handcuffed by the officers. At that point in time, Ms. Gotch took the

phone from Mr. Floyd and also took the minor children out of the Floyd vehicle

and brought them to her apartment. Ms. Bernard testified that she saw the officers

move Mr. Floyd up against the front of the police unit, and begin to push him

toward the door of the police unit and put him in the vehicle. However, she did not

witness the officers kick Mr. Floyd or any officer knee him in the back during this

maneuver.

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After he was released, Mr. Floyd testified that he went to the Emergency

Room at LGMC. The evidence in the record does not support Mr. Floyd’s

statements made to LGMC personnel that he was kicked or kneed in the back and

thrown to the ground by the officers. The medical reports of the Emergency Room

personnel at LGMC, as previously indicated, do not reflect any discernable injury

to Mr. Floyd’s back and only a slight abrasion on his wrist from the handcuffs.

The record also reflects that the officers released Mr. Floyd from detention

within approximately eleven minutes of his initial detention, and shortly after Ms.

Zenon confirmed that he was not the aggressor in the domestic dispute. The

officers chose not to arrest Mr. Floyd or press charges for resisting an officer.

We agree with the trial court that Mr. Floyd had an obligation to submit

peacefully and respond to Corporal Domingue’s questions. To have done so would

have obviated the need for the entire incident and allowed the officers to pursue

Ms. Zenon’s ex-boyfriend, Mr. Coleman.

We also agree with the trial court’s ruling that the officers were entitled to

statutory qualified immunity, based on a finding of good faith. In its Reasons, the

trial court specifically found:

Additionally, La.R.S. 46:2142 provides immunity from civil
liability to “any law enforcement officer reporting in good faith,
exercising due care in the making of an arrest or providing assistance”
involving domestic disputes. This Court finds that this statute provides
immunity to these officers while responding to a domestic abuse
situation. There is no evidence that the officers failed to exercise
good faith or due care in their handling of the situation or in their
detention of Floyd.

Finding no manifest error in the trial court’s determination of the facts and

its application of the law, we hereby affirm the dismissal with prejudice of all of

plaintiffs’ claims.

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Trial Court’s Dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Additional Claims

The trial court dismissed plaintiffs’ claims for negligent hiring, training,

and/or supervision of the officers based on lack of evidence. It also dismissed the

plaintiffs’ alleged violation of Mr. Floyd’s Miranda Rights on the basis that no

evidence was presented that Mr. Floyd “was ever interrogated or placed under

arrest.” No error was raised by the plaintiffs based on the trial court’s dismissal of

these two claims and, therefore, they are not before us on appeal.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court

dismissing with prejudice all claims of Dominique Floyd individually and on

behalf of his minor children K.F. and N.F. against the City of Carencro and Chief

Carlos Stout, in his Official Capacity as Chief of Police of the City of Carencro.

All costs of this appeal are assessed against Dominique Floyd.

AFFIRMED.

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