City of Lafayette v. Kevin Reco Tyler

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

14-663

CITY OF LAFAYETTE

VERSUS

KEVIN RECO TYLER

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APPEAL FROM THE
LAFAYETTE CITY COURT
LAFAYETTE PARISH, NO. CT201212571, 12572
HONORABLE DOUGLAS J. SALOOM, CITY COURT JUDGE

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JIMMIE C. PETERS
JUDGE

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Court composed of John D. Saunders, Jimmie C. Peters, and James T. Genovese,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Danny J. Louviere
134 West Bellevue Street
Opelousas, LA 70570
(337) 654-0594
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Zerangue’s Bail Bonds, Inc.

Gary J. Haynes
City Prosecutor
1013 West University Avenue
Lafayette, LA 70506
(337) 235-8640
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
City of Lafayette

PETERS, J.

Zerangue’s Bail Bonds, Inc., appeals a trial court judgment wherein the trial

court refused to set aside a judgment of bond forfeiture rendered against it because

of the failure of Kevin Reco Tyler to appear at his arraignment. For the following

reasons, we affirm the trial court judgment in all respects.

DISCUSSION OF THE RECORD

Kevin Reco Tyler first failed to appear in the Lafayette City Court for his

September 17, 2012 arraignment on multiple traffic-related offenses. Based on his

failure to appear, the trial court issued a warrant for his arrest. Thereafter, Tyler

was taken into custody on the warrant on November 1, 2013, and posted a $750.00

appearance bond to secure his release pending trial on the underlying offenses.

Zerangue’s Bail Bonds, Inc. (Zerangue) issued the appearance bond as agent for

Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. (Financial Casualty).

The trial court reset arraignment on the charges for December 16, 2013, and

Tyler failed to appear for that hearing. On December 27, 2013, the trial court

issued a bench warrant for his arrest and a judgment of bond forfeiture against

Financial Security.

On June 13, 2014, Zerangue filed a motion seeking to set aside the bond

forfeiture and to be discharged and released as surety based on the authority of

La.Code Crim.P. art. 345. As support for its motion, Zerangue attached a copy of a

St. Landry Parish Jail Sheet, which purports to reflect that Tyler had been booked

into that jail at 7:49 p.m. on February 25, 2014, and released at 11:38 a.m. the next
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day.

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The particulars of his release are not made clear from the Jail Sheet. At the top of the
form, the line entitled “Reason for Release” is followed by the notation “BO[,]” which we
interpret to mean that he made bail. However, at the bottom of the form under the notation
“Release Notes[,]” is the notation “TRANS TO EUNICE CITY”.

Following an April 14, 2013 hearing, the trial court rejected Zerangue’s

motion. After the trial court executed an order to that effect on May 5, 2014,

Zerangue perfected this appeal wherein it asserts one assignment of error:

The trial court erred when it denied Appellant’s motion for
discharge and release of surety, set aside judgment of bond forfeiture
and, [sic] relieve Appellant from liability as regards power of attorney
number FCS5-121194, naming Kevin Reco Tyler as principal.

OPINION

The facts are not at issue in this appeal, and the trial court denied Zerangue

relief based on its interpretation of La.Code Crim.P. art. 345. That being the case,

the issue on appeal is an issue of law, and we review questions of law de novo in

order to determine whether the trial court’s decision was legally correct. Johnson v.

Johnson, 13-719 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/11/13), 128 So.3d 627, writ denied, 14-76 (La.

3/14/14), 135 So.3d 605.

The general rule is that bond forfeitures are not favored[.] State
v. Bailey, 567 So.2d 721, 724 (La.App. 2 Cir.1990). A bond forfeiture
is basically a civil proceeding; however, it is subject to the special
rules as set forth in the Code of Criminal Procedure. State v. Likens,
577 So.2d 285, 289 (La.App. 3 Cir.1991), writ denied, 580 So.2d 386
(La.1991). In order to obtain a judgment of bond forfeiture against a
surety, the State must strictly comply with the terms of the statutory
provisions regulating bond forfeitures. Bankers Insurance Company v.
State, 37-080, p. 4 (La.App. 2 Cir. 4/11/03), 843 So.2d 641, 644, writ
denied, 2003-1240 (La.6/27/03), 847 So.2d 1268.

State v. Johnson, 13-133, pp. 3-4 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/1/13), 136 So.3d 15, 17-18.

Pursuant to the authority provided in La.Code Crim.P. art. 349.8(A)(1),

Zerangue had 180 days from the date of mailing of the notice of the judgment of

forfeiture in which to satisfy the judgment by surrendering the defendant, and

La.Code Crim.P. art. 345 sets forth the procedure for how a surrender is to be

effected as well as the consequences thereof. The situation where a defendant

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becomes incarcerated in another parish or foreign jurisdiction is provided for in

La.Code Crim.P. art. 345(D) which reads as follows:

If during the period allowed for the surrender of the defendant,
the defendant is found to be incarcerated in another parish of the state
of Louisiana or a foreign jurisdiction, the judgment of bond forfeiture
is deemed satisfied if all of the following conditions are met:

(1) The defendant or his sureties file a motion within the period
allowed for the surrender of the defendant. The motion shall be heard
summarily.

(2) The sureties of the defendant provide the court adequate
proof of incarceration of the defendant, or the officer originally
charged with his detention verifies his incarceration. A letter of
incarceration issued pursuant to this Article verifying that the
defendant was incarcerated within the period allowed for the
surrender of the defendant at the time the defendant or the surety files
the motion, shall be deemed adequate proof of the incarceration of the
defendant.

(3) The defendant’s sureties pay the officer originally charged
with the defendant’s detention, the reasonable cost of returning the
defendant to the officer originally charged with the defendant’s
detention prior to the defendant’s return.

(Emphasis added).

The consequences of compliance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 345(D) are set

forth in La.Code Crim.P. art. 345(F), which reads as follows:

When the defendant has been surrendered in conformity with
this Article or a letter of verification of incarceration has been issued
to the surety as provided for in this Article, the court shall, upon
presentation of the certificate of surrender or the letter of verification
of incarceration, order that the surety be exonerated from liability on
his bail undertaking and shall order any judgment of forfeiture set
aside.

In this case, sometime within the 180 day surrender window, Zerangue

learned that the defendant had been incarcerated for one day in the St. Landry

Parish jail, and informed the trial court of his incarceration within that 180 day

surrender window, but twenty-six days after his release. Zerangue argues to this

court, as it did to the trial court, that this notification satisfies the first two

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requirements of La.Code Crim.P. art. 345(D); and that it need not comply with the

third requirement because the defendant was no longer in the custody of the St.

Landry Parish facility. The trial court did not accept this interpretation of La.Code

Crim.P. art. 345(D), and neither do we.

We agree with the analysis of the compliance requirements of La.Code

Crim.P. art. 345(D) as set forth in State v. International Fidelity Insurance Co.,

32,837, 32,838, pp. 2-3 (La.App. 2 Cir. 3/1/00), 756 So.2d 565, 566, wherein the

court stated the following:

At all pertinent times, La.C.Cr.P. art. 345(D) provided that, if
within six months after a bond forfeiture judgment has been entered, a
defendant is found incarcerated, the judgment of bond forfeiture is
deemed satisfied if the surety meets three conditions. First, the filing
of summary proceedings; second, the submission of proof of the
defendant’s incarceration; and third, that “defendant’s sureties pay the
officer originally charged with the defendant’s detention, the
reasonable cost of returning the defendant to the officer originally
charged with the defendant’s detention.” This statute was amended in
1999 to add to the third requirement payment “prior to the
defendant’s return.” (Emphasis added). This 1999 amendment was
remedial and for clarification of the obvious.

A plain reading of the statute shows that a surety must meet all
three conditions before the surety’s obligation is satisfied and released.
The record shows that the surety did not tender payment of the cost of
transportation until approximately three weeks after [the defendant]
had been released. Thus, at the time the fax was sent and the motion
filed, the surety had not satisfied La.C.Cr.P. art. 345(D). Thereafter,
when the cost was tendered, the second condition of article 345(D),
that defendant be incarcerated, was not met. We find that the trial
court erred in releasing the surety from its bond obligations. We
therefore reverse the trial court’s judgment and reinstate both bond
forfeiture judgments against the surety.

The obvious purpose of compliance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 345(D) by the

surety is to place the officer who was originally charged with the defendant’s

detention in a position to take immediate action to assure the defendant’s return

from the parish of his incarceration. That never happened in this case as the

defendant had been released from the St. Landry Parish jail for twenty-six days

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before Zerangue notified the trial court of his incarceration, making it impossible

for the officer in Lafayette Parish charged with his original detention to regain

custody.

Based on the record before us, we find that the trial court correctly denied

Zerangue’s motion as Zerangue clearly failed to satisfy the requirements of

La.Code Crim.P. art. 345(D). We find no merit in Zerangue’s sole assignment of

error.

DISPOSITION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment rejecting the

request of Zerangue’s Bail Bonds, Inc. to set aside the bond forfeiture and to be

released from further liability under the surety bond. We assess all costs of this

appeal to Zerangue’s Bail Bonds, Inc.

AFFIRMED.

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