Steve H. Crooks, Et Ux. v. Louisiana Pacific Corp.

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

CA 14-724

STEVE H. CROOKS, ET UX.

VERSUS

LOUISIANA PACIFIC CORP., ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
TWENTY-EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF LASALLE, NO. 38355
HONORABLE J. CHRISTOPHER PETERS, DISTRICT JUDGE

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BILLY HOWARD EZELL
JUDGE

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Court composed of Marc T. Amy, Elizabeth A. Pickett, and Billy Howard Ezell,
Judges.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

James J. Davidson, III
Christopher Joseph Piasecki
Davidson, Meaux, Sonnier, McElligott, Fontenot, Gideon & Edwards
P. O. Drawer 2908
Lafayette, LA 70502
(337) 237-1660
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS:
Steve H. Crooks
Era Lea Henderson Crooks

Virgil Russell Purvis, Jr.
Smith, Taliaferro & Purvis
P.O. Box 298
Jonesville, LA 71343
(318) 339-8526
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS:
Steve H. Crooks
Era Lea Henderson Crooks

Richard Joseph Wilson
Wilson & Wilson
P. O. Box 1346
Jena, LA 71342
(318) 992-2104
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
L. P. Mineral Owners, LLC

Sarah Anne Kirkpatrick
Bradley Murchison Kelly & Shea
401 Edwards Street, Suite 1000
Shreveport, LA 71101-5529
(318) 227-1133
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Urania Minerals, LLC

EZELL, Judge.

This appeal presents the issue of whether a suit filed by the owner of land

against the mineral servitude owner for damages caused by drilling operations is

premature when oil and gas operations are ongoing. The trial court granted an

exception of prematurity filed by the owner of a mineral servitude and dismissed

the plaintiffs’ suit without prejudice. The plaintiffs seek reversal of this ruling on

appeal.

FACTS

The land involved in this case consists of approximately 200 acres in

LaSalle Parish. On July 26, 2000, Louisiana Pacific Corporation sold the land to

Temco Enterprises, Inc., while reserving a full mineral servitude over the property.

Subsequently, on August 10, 2000, Temco sold the property to Era and Steve

Crooks, subject to the mineral reservation in favor of Louisiana Pacific. In 1968 a

portion of the mineral rights was previously conveyed to Urania Lumber Company,

Ltd., now known as Urania Minerals, L.L.C. This mineral servitude remained in

effect when the Crooks purchased the property. On September 1, 2003, Louisiana

Pacific conveyed its mineral rights in the property to LP Mineral Owners, LLC

(LPMO).

In 2005, LPMO granted an oil and gas lease to Belle Exploration, Inc. No

drilling operations were conducted, so the lease expired by its own terms. In 2009,

LP granted an oil and gas lease to Drayco Exploration, LLC. Pursuant to this lease,

two wells were drilled and completed. In 2010, SR Acquisition I, LLC acquired

the Drayco Lease. This lease is presently an active lease and maintained by oil

production.

In 2012, the Crooks filed suit against Louisiana Pacific, LPMO, and Urania

for contamination to their property caused by the oil and gas operations. In

response, LPMO filed an exception of prematurity. A hearing on the exception

was held on May 12, 2014. The trial court sustained LPMO’s exception and

dismissed the Crooks’ claim against LPMO. In sustaining LPMO’s exception of

prematurity, the trial court held that suit could not be instituted until oil and gas

operations ceased on the property. The Crooks appealed this ruling.

PREMATURITY

The Crooks claim that the trial court erred in granting the exception of

prematurity. The Crooks argue that there is no law requiring them to wait until

completion of all mineral production before they can enforce the restoration

obligations and demand that the defendants clean up their land.

The relationship between a landowner and the owners of mineral rights is

specifically provided for in the Louisiana Mineral Code. The “[o]wnership of land

does not include the ownership of oil, gas, and other minerals occurring naturally

in liquid or gaseous form” and “[t]he landowner has the exclusive right to explore

and develop his property for the production of such minerals and to reduce them to

possession and ownership.” La.R.S. 31:6. “A landowner may convey, reserve, or

lease his right to explore and develop his land for production of minerals and to

reduce them to possession.” La.R.S. 31:15. A mineral right is an incorporeal

immovable that is alienable and heritable. La.R.S. 31:18; La.Civ.Code art. 470.

These mineral rights that may be conveyed by a landowner are (1) the mineral

servitude; (2) the mineral royalty; and (3) the mineral lease. La.R.S. 31:16.

“A mineral servitude is the right of enjoyment of land belonging to another

for the purpose of exploring for and producing minerals and reducing them to

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possession and ownership.” La.R.S. 31:21. Pursuant to La.R.S. 31:22, a mineral

servitude owner can “use only so much of the land as is reasonably necessary to

conduct his operations” and “[h]e is obligated, insofar as practicable, to restore the

surface to its original condition at the earliest reasonable time.” Furthermore, the

landowner and the owner of a mineral right “must exercise their respective rights

with reasonable regard for those of the other.” La.R.S. 31:11. Pursuant to these

mutual obligations between the landowner and the mineral rights’ owners, a

mineral servitude owner is liable to the surface owner for damages caused by its

lessee’s oil and gas operations on the leased property. Dupree v. Oil, Gas & Other

Minerals, 31,869 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/5/99), 731 So.2d 1067.

“The dilatory exception of prematurity provided in La.Code Civ. Proc. art.

926 questions whether the cause of action has matured to the point where it is ripe

for judicial determination, because an action will be deemed premature when it is

brought before the right to enforce it has accrued.” LaCoste v. Pendleton

Methodist Hosp., L.L.C., 07-8, 07-16, p. 5 (La. 9/5/07), 966 So.2d 519, 523. The

function of an exception of prematurity is to determine whether a judicial cause of

action is not available yet because of some unmet prerequisite condition. Rico v.

Cappaert Manufactured Hous., Inc., 05-141 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/1/05), 903 So.2d

1284. When the determination of whether an exception of prematurity should have

been granted involves a question of law, then the appellate court must determine

whether the trial court was legally correct or incorrect. Id. Interpretation of

statutes involves a question of law. Thibodeaux v. Donnell, 08-2436 (La. 5/5/09),

9 So.3d 120.

In Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 09-2368, 09-2371 (La. 10/19/10), 48 So.3d

234, the supreme court held that a lessor of his mineral interests need not wait until

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the end of a lease to sue a mineral lessee for soil and groundwater damage to his

property, because the legal obligations imposed on a lessee did not contain a

provision that the lessor had to wait until termination of the lease, aside from

La.Civ.Code art. 2683, which contains obligations that arise at the termination of

the lease. This court followed this ruling in Dietz v. Superior Oil Co., 13-657, p. 6

(La.App. 3 Cir. 12/11/13), 129 So.3d 836, 841, and held that “while the leases may

still be in effect, these claims are not premature because there is no language in the

mineral or civil codes to suggest these claims for damages only arise upon lease

termination.”

As indicated by LPMO, both Marin and Dietz dealt with claims against a

mineral lessee as opposed to a mineral servitude owner. However, we find nothing

in the mineral code that requires a landowner to wait until completion of all

mineral production before he can bring a suit to enforce the mineral servitude’s

restoration obligations. The only time limitation found in the mineral code is “at

the earliest reasonable time.” La.R.S. 31:22. Obviously the legislature recognized

that it would be better to remedy any damage sooner rather than later. As in Marin,

there is no requirement under the law that a landowner has to wait until the end of

a lease to sue the mineral servitude owner for damage to his property. There is no

reason that a landowner should have to wait to sue for damages to his land prior to

the termination of a lease when a lessor, who is also the landowner, does not have

to wait for termination of a lease before filing suit. It will be the trier of fact’s job

to determine whether there is contamination and damage on the land which can be

remedied now, just as a trier of fact would be required to do between a lessor and

lessee of mineral interests. Therefore, we find that the trial court erred in

maintaining LPMO’s exception of prematurity.

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The judgment of the trial court granting LP Mineral Owners’ exception of

prematurity and dismissing Era and Steve Crooks’ suit without prejudice is

reversed. This case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings. Costs

of this appeal are assessed to LP Mineral Owners.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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