Larry Tolliver v. Bob Broussard

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

14-738

LARRY TOLLIVER

VERSUS

BOB BROUSSARD, ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. C-2013-6250B
HONORABLE JULES DAVIS EDWARDS, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX
CHIEF JUDGE

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Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Sylvia R. Cooks, and J.
David Painter, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Gracella Gail Simmons
Keogh, Cox & Wilson, Ltd.
P. O. Box 1151
Baton Rouge, LA 70821
Telephone: (225) 383-3796
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendant/Appellee - Continental Casualty Company

James Huey Gibson
Allen & Gooch
P. O. Box 81129
Lafayette, LA 70598-1129
Telephone: (337) 291-1300
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendants/Appellees - Bob Broussard and Bob Broussard, APLC

D. Patrick Daniel, Jr.
The Daniel Law Firm
P. O. Drawer 51709
Lafayette, LA 70505-1709
Telephone: (337) 232-7516
COUNSEL FOR:
Intervenors/Appellants – Patrick Daniel and D. Patrick Daniel, LLC

Jennifer A. Rodriguez
615 Brown Avenue
Harvey, LA 70058
Telephone: (504) 296-7660
COUNSEL FOR:
Plaintiff/Appellant - Larry Tolliver

Larry Tolliver
In Proper Person
2404 Davis Court
Lake Charles, LA 70601
Plaintiff/Appellant

THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge.

The intervenors, Patrick Daniel and D. Patrick Daniel, LLC (Daniel),

appeal the trial court’s granting of the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the

defendants, Bob Broussard, Bob Broussard APLC, and Continental Casualty

Company (collectively, “Broussard”), in this action for legal malpractice and

tortious interference with contract. Finding no error on the part of the trial court,

we affirm.

I.

ISSUE

We must decide whether the trial court erred in granting summary

judgment to Broussard and in dismissing all claims.

II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Underlying U-Haul Suit in Federal Court

Daniel and Broussard are attorneys who at different times represented

Larry Tolliver in Tolliver’s personal injury suit against U-Haul Company of

Texas.1 The accident, involving the negligent installation of a towing kit, occurred

in 2008. Daniel was the attorney who filed Tolliver’s U-Haul suit in federal court

in 2009. In 2010 Tolliver fired Daniel. Broussard enrolled as counsel of record in

the U-Haul suit in September, 2010. In January, 2011, Daniel filed a petition for

intervention, naming Tolliver and U-Haul as defendants, to recover his expenses

and fees from any settlement or judgment proceeds obtained by Tolliver in the suit.

1
“Tolliver v. U-Haul Company of Texas,” Docket No. 2:09-CV-313, was filed in Lake
Charles in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana.

Tolliver answered the intervention and reconvened against Daniel, asserting

damages for Daniel’s failure to communicate, for Daniels’ dismissal of Tolliver’s

cause of action for past lost wages without his consent, and for financing medical

and living expenses with third parties at an onerous rate of interest without

Tolliver’s informed consent.

In August, 2011, during Broussard’s representation of the U-Haul

matter, the lawsuit settled for $75,000.00. The settlement was finalized in October,

2011. The amount was insufficient to cover Broussard’s litigation expenses and

was a fraction of the third party financing that Daniel had arranged during his

representation of the matter. In November, 2011, Daniel amended his intervention

to add Broussard as a defendant and to assert claims against him for legal

malpractice and interference with contract.

Daniel’s 2012 State Court Suit Against Broussard

Daniel filed suit against Broussard and his malpractice insurer in state

court in Lafayette in February, 2012.2 Daniel’s initial and supplemental petitions

asserted that, in the federal U-Haul suit, Broussard had negligently represented

Tolliver, had failed to retain experts timely, obtained an inadequate settlement, and

interfered with Daniel’s contract with Tolliver. Broussard filed special motions to

strike Daniel’s claims under La.Code Civ.P. art. 971. The trial judge found Article

971 inapplicable, but indicated that he would consider Broussard’s arguments if

brought by a motion for summary judgment.

Broussard filed a writ application with this court, and the trial court

stayed discovery pending our ruling. In January 2013, in Patrick Daniel v. Bob

2
“Patrick Daniel v. Bob Broussard, Esquire, et al,” Docket No. 2012-0981E, was filed on
February 16, 2012, in the Fifteenth Judicial District Court, Lafayette Parish, Louisiana.

2

Broussard, et al, Writ No. 12-974, a five-judge panel of this court granted

Broussard’s writ application in part, finding that Daniel had no right of action

against Broussard for negligent representation, which was essentially a malpractice

claim that only Tolliver could raise.

Five months after this court’s ruling that Daniel did not have a right of

action against Broussard for malpractice, Daniel, as Tolliver’s attorney again, filed

a third superseding petition in Daniel’s own suit, attempting to join Tolliver as an

additional malpractice plaintiff. Because Daniel still had a pending claim in

federal court against Tolliver for litigation expenses in the U-Haul suit, the trial

court found that Daniel had a conflict of interest, disqualified Daniel as Tolliver’s

attorney, and found the joinder of Tolliver improper. The trial court struck the

third superseding petition that attempted to add Tolliver as a plaintiff and

instructed Tolliver to file a separate suit.

Tolliver’s 2013 State Court Suit against Broussard

On December 6, 2013, Tolliver, as a pro se plaintiff, filed a petition

for damages against Broussard and his malpractice insurer in Lafayette Parish.

The suit was improperly captioned “Patrick Daniel v. Bob Broussard, Esquire, et

al;” and it was filed with Daniel’s suit number, 2012-0981E, typed in the caption.

The suit was assigned to Division B. The docket number was hand-corrected to

read 2013-6250B, though it is not clear from the record whether or when the

caption was corrected. This suit is the subject of the current appeal.

After service of the Tolliver petition, Broussard filed exceptions of

peremption and res judicata, a motion for summary judgment, and a motion for

Article 863 sanctions. The hearing on Broussard’s motions was set for March 10,

3

2014. On February 27, Jennifer Rodriguez filed a motion to enroll as Tolliver’s

attorney3 and to continue the hearing.4 Broussard objected to the continuance. The

trial judge ordered counsel and Tolliver to appear for a March 10 conference, at

which time the judge granted the requested continuance to April 14, 2014, but

made it clear, addressing Tolliver directly, that no more continuances would be

granted for another enrolling attorney.

On April 7, Rodriguez fax-filed on Tolliver’s behalf a twenty-eight-

page “consolidated” pleading entitled, “Opposition To Defendant’s Exceptions Of

Peremption And Res Judicata, Motion For Sanctions, Motion For Summary

Judgment And Motion For 967 Continuance, Compel, Sanctions And Disqualify

Counsel.” It was accompanied by a Motion For Leave and Order. The exhibits

ostensibly attached to the opposition were not received by the trial court until April

16, 2014, which was two days after the hearing on April 14, 2014.

Broussard did not receive all of the exhibits until April 8. He objected

to the opposition as untimely because it was not filed at least eight days before the

hearing as required by the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, the Rules for

Louisiana District Courts, and the interpreting jurisprudence. He asserted that the

opposition documents should not be considered at the hearing on the motion for

summary judgment.

On April 8, 2014, Daniel filed a petition for intervention in Tolliver’s

suit and adopted Tolliver’s opposition to Broussard’s motion for summary

judgment. At the hearing on April 14, 2014, the trial judge briefly reviewed the

3
On February 26, an associate attorney on Daniel’s letterhead allegedly attempted to
enroll as Tolliver’s attorney.
4
The February 27 motion to continue the March 10 hearing referenced a “February 28”
hearing in the title and the body; and the attached order referenced a “January 15” hearing.

4

procedural status of the case and announced the exceptions and motions filed by

the defendant and scheduled to be heard that day. He then stated:

All of those were filed by the defendant. And the
plaintiff did not file a memorandum in opposition on a
timely basis. Thus, plaintiff forfeits the right for oral
arguments.

Plaintiff did file something that was requesting
permission to file the opposition as well as a motion for
sanctions and to disqualify defense counsel, but there was
no explanation of what the good cause would be for that
late filing. So again, I am denying that permission to file
that. So that’s where we are now.

After Tolliver’s attorney, Ms. Rodriguez, received clarification on the

court’s ruling, Broussard’s attorney introduced exhibits and argued the motion for

summary judgment, which the trial court granted. Ms. Rodriguez did not proffer

the opposition or the exhibits that the trial court had stricken from the hearing.

Daniel spoke as intervenor, attempting to argue assertions from the opposition,

including charges against Broussard’s attorney, James Gibson. Mr. Gibson

responded briefly, and the trial court announced that summary judgment was

granted “regarding all claims filed.”

Ms. Rodriguez filed a motion to withdraw her representation of

Tolliver in open court at the end of the hearing. Tolliver did not appeal. Daniel

alone, as intervenor, appeals the trial court’s judgment granting Broussard’s

motion for summary judgment on peremption and res judicata.

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When an appellate court reviews a district court judgment on a motion

for summary judgment, it applies the de novo standard of review, “using the same

5

criteria that govern the trial court’s consideration of whether summary judgment is

appropriate.” Gray v. American Nat. Property & Cas. Co., 07-1670, p. 6 (La.

2/26/08), 977 So.2d 839, 844 (quoting Supreme Serv. & Specialty Co., Inc. v.

Sonny Greer, 06-1827, p. 4 (La. 5/22/07), 958 So.2d 634, 638). The motion for

summary judgment shall be granted if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine

issue of material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(B). The de novo review of questions of law means that

the judgment is rendered on the record without deference to the legal conclusions

of the trial court. See Wooley v. Lucksinger, 09-571 (La. 4/1/11), 61 So.3d 507.

IV.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

In addition to reiterating Daniel’s malpractice claims, Tolliver’s suit

alleged that Broussard solicited Tolliver’s business, resulting in Tolliver’s firing

Daniel; and that Broussard interfered with Daniel’s contract with Tolliver.

Broussard’s motion for summary judgment asserted that Tolliver’s malpractice

claim against Broussard was perempted under La.R.S. 9:56055 because it was not

filed within one year of discovery of the alleged malpractice.6 Broussard further

asserted that Tolliver’s malpractice claim was barred by res judicata because the

parties had compromised and settled the malpractice claim, and because a

5
The malpractice statute provides in pertinent part that any action against an attorney or
firm arising from an engagement to provide legal services, “whether based upon tort, or breach
of contract, or otherwise” must be brought within one year from the date that the alleged
malpractice was “discovered or should have been discovered.” La.R.S. 9:5605(A).
6
Broussard provided the court with three viable discovery dates, the last of which was the
settlement of the malpractice claim on February 8, 2012, a year and ten months before suit was
filed on December 6, 2013. The document entitled “Mutual Consent and Release Agreement By
Affidavit,” was detailed, comprehensive, and it satisfied the codal articles on Compromise.

6

compromise has the efficacy of a judgment on the issues.7 These assertions were

well-supported by jurisprudence, and by records and rulings from the U-Haul suit,

and affidavits and agreements of the parties, all of which were attached to the

summary judgment motion and properly introduced at the hearing in the Lafayette

Parish court.8 Last, Broussard’s motion for summary judgment refuted Tolliver’s

claims that Broussard had solicited Tolliver’s business and interfered with

Tolliver’s attorney-client relationship with Daniel. Broussard introduced a third

affidavit by Tolliver directly negating the claims of solicitation and interference

that he alleged in his petition.9

However, we need not discuss or rule upon the parties’ burdens of

proof as to these issues because these issues are not before us. Tolliver did not

appeal the trial court’s judgment finding that the malpractice claims were

preempted and barred by res judicata, and we have already found that Daniel, the

intervenor, does not have a right to bring a malpractice action against Broussard.

See Patrick Daniel v. Bob Broussard, et al, Writ No. 12-974. Because Tolliver

7
“[C]ompromises have the legal efficacy of the thing adjudged.” Ortego v. State, Dept. of
Transp. and Development, 96-1322 (La. 2/25/97), 689 So.2d 1358, 1363 (citations omitted). A
“valid compromise may form the basis of a plea of res judicata.” Rivett v. State Farm Fire and
Cas. Co., 508 So.2d 1356, 1359 (La.1987). See La.R.S. 13:4231 on Res Judicata; and see
La.Civ.Code arts. 3071-3080 on Compromise.
8
Broussard introduced the federal court’s August, 2011 memorandum discussing the
attorney’s inadvertent neglect and willfulness; Tolliver’s November, 2011 affidavit averring that
he read and discussed the memorandum; Broussard’s own affidavit averring that Daniel talked to
Tolliver about suing Broussard for malpractice in November 2011, and the February, 2012
release agreement.
9
Tolliver’s July, 2012 affidavit averred that Tolliver first approached Broussard who
declined the representation in the U-Haul suit; that Tolliver then hired Daniel who filed the suit
in 2009; that Tolliver fired Daniel for cause; that Tolliver approached Broussard again, but not
until after he had fired Daniel; that Broussard enrolled in the U-Haul suit in September 2010; and
that Broussard never solicited Tolliver to secure the representation. Tolliver’s affidavit also
contained considerable detail regarding the federal court’s rulings on the evidence for trial which
led to the settlement, Broussard’s motion for reconsideration, the two-day settlement discussions,
the settlement amount, Tolliver’s reasons for settlement, and Tolliver’s instructions to Broussard
to settle the case.

7

failed to appeal the dismissal of his own action, Daniel’s appeal can only bring up

the portions of the judgment that were adverse to Daniel. He cannot appeal the

portions of the judgment that were only adverse to Tolliver. See Grimes v.

Louisiana Medical Mut. Ins. Co., 10-39 (La. 5/28/10), 36 So.3d 215. If Daniel

never had a right of action for malpractice, the judgment dismissing the

malpractice claim cannot be adverse to him. Additionally, an intervenor is limited

to the assertion of his own rights and cannot raise issues that are personal to

another party. See Devant v. Pecou, 13 La.App. 594, 128 So. 700 (La.App. 1 Cir.

1930), and Galloway v. Levitt, 135 So.2d 798 (La. App. 2 Cir.1961).10 Thus, the

dismissal of the malpractice claim is final.

The Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment

As indicated in the factual section above, the trial court found that the

opposition filed by Tolliver’s attorney, and adopted by Daniel as intervenor, was

untimely. The trial court then declined to hear oral argument on the opposition and

ultimately denied Tolliver’s request for leave to file it. Thus, neither the

opposition nor its attached exhibits were considered by the trial court in the

summary judgment hearing. While Tolliver did not appeal the trial court’s

judgment, Daniel did file an appeal. Daniel asserts that the trial court erred in

refusing to consider the opposition. We disagree.

La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(B)(1) provides that the affidavits and

memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment “shall be served pursuant

to Article 1313 within the time limits provided in District Court Rule 9.9.”

10
Because the intervenor has a remedy in filing a separate action, the intervenor’s rights
are limited to the protection of his own interest; he cannot object to the mode of procedure or
jurisdiction of the court; and he cannot retard the principal suit. Suites at New Orleans, L.L.C. v.
Lloyd’s London, 09-562 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/27/09), 13 So.3d 241.

8

La.Code Civ.P. art. 1313 provides for service by mail, delivery, or electronic

means. Under La.Dist.Ct.R. 9.9(c), “[a] party who opposes an exception or motion

shall concurrently furnish the trial judge and serve on all other parties an

opposition memorandum at least eight calendar days before the scheduled

hearing[;]” and, it “shall be served on all other parties so that it is received by the

other parties at least eight calendar days before the hearing, unless the court sets a

shorter time.”11 Under La.Dist.Ct.R. 9.9(e), parties who fail to comply with 9.9(c)

“may forfeit the privilege of oral argument.”12

In computing any period of time specified in these rules, La.Dist.Ct.R.

1.5 governs the calculation. The first day that begins the period––the hearing date,

Monday, April 14, 2014––is excluded from the computation under 1.5(a).

Counting backward beginning with April 13, the eighth day was April 6, 2014,

which was a Sunday. Under 1.5(c), April 6 is counted as the last day in the period,

i.e., the opposition due date, “unless the last day is a legal holiday, in which case

the period runs until the end of the next day that is not a legal holiday.” As a

Sunday, April 6, 2014, was a legal holiday; likewise April 5, 2014, was a Saturday

and also a legal holiday. Thus, Sunday and Saturday, April 6 and April 5, are not

11
In this case the trial court did not set a shorter time, and the court stated that the motion
for leave to file the opposition late did not provide any good-cause reasons for allowing the late
filing.
12
Further, La.Dist.Ct.R. 9.10 provides that the memorandum in opposition to the motion
for summary judgment “shall contain” (1) a list of material facts in dispute, and (2) a “reference
to the document proving that each such fact is genuinely disputed, with the pertinent part
designated.” La.Dist.Ct.R. 9.10(c). Here, the opposition documents did not satisfy the second
prong of Rule 9.10(c). The attached exhibits were in large part the very same exhibits used by
Bob Broussard to support his motion for summary judgment. They were Broussard’s affidavits,
three of Tolliver’s affidavits in support of Broussard’s assertions, and a written agreement
compromise/settlement made between Broussard and Tolliver, all supporting Broussard’s
position and proving his assertions. Tolliver did not attach a single affidavit that supported his,
and Daniel’s, opposition, or that proved their disputed facts. The opposition merely used
Broussard’s documents as a platform for making conclusory and unsupported allegations that
every affidavit and agreement was coerced or bribed. Thus, even if the trial court had admitted
the opposition documents, they would not have shown genuine issues of material fact for trial.

9

counted in the eight-day period; and we back up to the end of the next day that is

not a legal holiday, which in this case was Friday, April 4, 2014.13 The opposition

was faxed to the trial court on April 7, except for the exhibits, and was not fully

faxed to Broussard until April 8, 2014. Thus, the documents were clearly late.

Buggage v. Volks Constructors, 06-175 (La. 5/5/06), 928 So.2d 536

held that the trial court’s decision not to consider late-filed opposition documents

was not an abuse of discretion, given that the time limitation for serving such

documents is mandatory. While use of the language shall in the above provisions

implies a mandatory obligation to timely file, following Buggage courts have

overwhelmingly found that the trial court’s decision to strike untimely filed

oppositions is discretionary. Smith v. Rapides Healthcare System, L.L.C., 13-1172

(La.App. 3 Cir. 3/5/14), 134 So.3d 122.

A survey of the cases indicates that the trial court does not abuse its

discretion in choosing to follow the mandatory eight-day limit; nor is there abuse in

choosing to allow late-filed opposition materials if there is no prejudice to the

mover. Id. (citing Mahoney v. E. Carroll Parish Police Jury, 47,494 (La.App. 2

Cir. 9/26/12), 105 So.3d 144, writ denied, 12-2684 (La. 2/8/13), 108 So.3d 88).

Here, because the opposition documents were late, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in striking the documents. We find no merit in Daniels’ arguments on

this issue.

Daniel’s Petition of Intervention

Daniel’s petition of intervention, filed on April 8 prior to the hearing

on April 14, reiterates the previously filed petitions and interventions asserting

13
This computation comports with La.Dist.Ct.R. 1.5(a), (c), (c)(i), and Comment (c) to
Rule 1.5.

10

malpractice against Broussard. In fact, almost all of Daniel’s allegations pertain to

Broussard’s representation of Tolliver and Broussard’s interactions and

transactions with Tolliver before, during, and after settlement. He also includes

naked assertions of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. These claims all arise

“from an engagement to provide legal services,” and “whether based upon tort, or

breach of contract, or otherwise,” they belong to Tolliver alone under La.R.S.

9:5605. See Patrick Daniel v. Bob Broussard, et al, Writ No. 12-974.

Similarly, Broussard did not owe a fiduciary duty to Daniel. “The

defining characteristic of a fiduciary relationship . . . is the special relationship of

confidence or trust imposed by one in another who undertakes to act primarily for

the benefit of the principal in a particular endeavor.” Scheffler v. Adams and

Reese, LLP, 06-1774, p. 7 (La. 2/22/07), 950 So.2d 641, 648. In Scheffler, the

court found no fiduciary relationship between two attorneys hired separately by a

corporation that would require one to protect the other’s interest in earning

attorney fees. The pleadings failed to state a cause of action because no facts were

pled to establish a legal relationship giving rise to a fiduciary duty. There was no

allegation of a contract between the attorneys or a co-ownership interest in the

endeavor, such as a partnership or joint venture agreement. And there was no

allegation regarding the existence of a mandate or agency relationship.

The Scheffler court went further to find that public policy dictates

against recognizing a fiduciary duty among co-counsel to protect one another’s

interest in prospective fees. This is because of the potential conflict with each

attorney’s undivided duty of loyalty to his client, which is paramount. The duty is

to pursue the case based upon the client’s best interest, even if it means foregoing a

potential contingency fee. Scheffler, 950 So.2d 649 (citing Mazon v. Krafchick,

11

158 Wash.2d 440, 144 P.3d 1168 (2006), which adopted a bright line rule that no

duties exist between co-counsel that would allow recovery for lost or reduced

prospective fees). Thus, the Scheffler court found that allowing an amendment to

the petition would not remove the legal impediments to the attorney’s pursuit of an

action based on allegations of breach of fiduciary duty.

This is particularly true in this case involving two attorneys who were

not co-counsel. Rather, this case involves intervention by Daniel, an attorney who,

by Tolliver’s own affidavit, caused him damages during Daniel’s prior

representation of the U-Haul matter, causing Tolliver to fire Daniel for cause.

Broussard, as Tolliver’s new attorney, was put in the position of defending

Tolliver’s interests against Daniel’s intervention and filing a reconventional

demand on behalf of Tolliver against Daniel. Accordingly, pursuant to La.Code

Civ.P. art. 927(B),14 we raise on our own motion the exception of no cause of

action because the naked allegations in Daniel’s petition did not assert facts to

support a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty. Further, under Scheffler, the

petition is not subject to amendment on this cause of action because the legal

impediments cannot be cured. We also raise on our own motion the exception of

no right of action because, in this case, while Tolliver might have pled a cause of

action for breach of fiduciary duty against Broussard, just as Tolliver asserted

malpractice, the same legal impediments in Scheffler show that Daniel cannot

bring a breach of fiduciary duty action against Broussard. Simply put, Daniel is

not the proper party to assert the action for breach of fiduciary duty.

14
Under La.Code Civ.P. art. 927(B), the court cannot supply the exception of prescription
because it must be specially pleaded. However, “[t]he nonjoinder of a party, peremption, res
judicata, the failure to disclose a cause of action or a right or interest in the plaintiff to institute
the suit, or discharge in bankruptcy, may be noticed by either the trial or appellate court on its
own motion.”

12

Daniel’s petition alleges solicitation and intentional interference with

Daniel’s contract with Tolliver. As to the intentional interference with contract

claim, we raise on our own motion the peremptory exception of no cause of action.

In 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spurney, 538 So.2d 228, 234 (La.1989), the

Louisiana Supreme Court announced an end to Louisiana’s absolute bar to an

action based on tortious interference with a contract. However, the court was very

specific in recognizing “only a corporate officer’s duty to refrain from intentional

and unjustified interference with the contractual relation between his employer and

a third person.” Id. at 234. The court then set forth five elements:

(1) the existence of a contract or a legally protected
interest between the plaintiff and the corporation; (2) the
corporate officer’s knowledge of the contract; (3) the
officer’s intentional inducement or causation of the
corporation to breach the contract or his intentional
rendition of its performance impossible or more
burdensome; (4) absence of justification on the part of
the officer; (5) causation of damages to the plaintiff by
the breach of contract or difficulty of its performance
brought about by the officer.

Id.

Daniel’s petition has not pled, and cannot amend to plead, any facts to

support any of the above elements because Broussard is not a corporate official

whose employer has a contract with Daniel. Thus, Daniel’s intervention does not

state a cause of action under the 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. criteria.

Accordingly, we find no error by the trial court in dismissing all

claims filed by Tolliver and Daniel.

13

V.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s granting of the

motion for summary judgment. Pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art. 927(B), we raise

and grant on our own motions the peremptory exceptions of no cause of action and

the peremptory exception of no right of action. All costs of this appeal are

assessed to Patrick Daniel and D. Patrick Daniel, LLC.

AFFIRMED.

14