Heather Miley Cloud v. Tom Schedler in His Official Capacity as Secretary of State for the State of Louisiana, and Bert Keith Campbell

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

CA 14-1223

HEATHER MILEY CLOUD
VERSUS
TOM SCHEDLER IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR THE STATE OF LOUISIANA, AND
BERT KEITH CAMPBELL

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APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF EVANGELINE, NO. 75137-A
HONORABLE JOEL GERARD DAVIS, DISTRICT JUDGE

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ELIZABETH A. PICKETT

JUDGE

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Court composed of Marc T. Amy, Elizabeth A. Pickett, and John E. Conery,
Judges.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Joffre Wendel Fusilier
Attorney at Law
Post Office Box 528
Ville Platte, LA 70586
(337) 363-6661
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Bert Keith Campbell

Kenneth Ray Rush
Attorney at Law
Post Office Box 704
Oakdale, LA 71463
(318) 335-2759
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Bert Keith Campbell

Anne Elizabeth Watson
Dupre & Watson
232 N. Liberty St.
Opelousas, LA 70570
(337) 942-9790
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:
Heather Miley Cloud

Elbert Lee Guillory
Attorney at Law
633 E. Landry St.
Opelousas, LA 70570
(337) 942-6328
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:
Heather Miley Cloud

Stephen D. Hawkland
Attorney at Law
Post Office Box 94125
Baton Rouge, LA 70804
(225) 287-7475
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Secretary of State, State of Louisiana

PICKETT, Judge.

The plaintiff, Heather Miley Cloud, appeals the trial court’s judgment

granting the exception of no cause of action filed by the defendant, Bert Keith

Campbell. Finding that the trial court erred in granting the exception, we reverse

the judgment and remand for further proceedings.

I.

ISSUES

We must decide whether the trial court erred in finding that Ms.

Cloud’s petition failed to state a cause of action for relief under the Election Code.

II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Ms. Cloud filed a petition to contest the election held on November 4,

2014, resulting in Mr. Campbell’s election to the office of Mayor of the Village of

Turkey Creek. The named defendants are Mr. Campbell and Secretary of State

Tom Schedler. Ms. Cloud’s petition asserts that in the election, she, as the

incumbent candidate, received 106 votes (49%), and Mr. Campbell received 110

votes (51%).

The petition asserts that four individuals were given money to vote for

Mr. Campbell, which constitutes bribery under the Election Code at La.R.S.

18:1461. Ms. Cloud’s petition asks the trial court to find that the four votes were

illegal and fraudulent and, pursuant to La.R.S. 18:1431, should be subtracted from

Mr. Campbell’s total votes and added to Ms. Cloud’s total votes. The petition

asks the court to determine the results of the election and declare Ms. Cloud the

winning candidate. The petition alleges that three additional individuals provided

affidavits that they were approached with offers and that those offers did not result

in actual votes cast.

Mr. Campbell filed an answer and a motion to strike the paragraphs in

Ms. Cloud’s petition pertaining to the three individuals who did not cast votes.

The hearing on the petition to contest the election was held on

November 17, 2014. At the beginning of the hearing, Mr. Campbell orally moved

for a peremptory exception of no cause of action, which the trial court granted.

Ms. Cloud has appealed the matter to this court urging that we remand

the case for a hearing on the evidence so that the trial court can subtract the illegal

votes, declare a tie, and order a new election.

For the reasons that follow, we reverse the exception of no cause of

action and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings.

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

An appellate court conducts a de novo review of a trial court’s ruling

granting an exception of no cause of action because such exception raises a

question of law. Fink v. Bryant, 01-987 (La. 11/28/01), 801 So.2d 346.

IV.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

In her first two assignments of error, Ms. Cloud contends that the trial

court erred in granting the defendant’s exception based upon Savage v. Edwards,

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98-1762 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/23/98), 728 So.2d 428, affirmed, 98-2929 (La.

12/18/98), 722 So.2d 1004, which we will discuss together.1

“The function of the peremptory exception of no cause of action is to

question whether the law extends a remedy to anyone under the factual allegations

of the petition.” Fink, 801 So.2d at 348 (citing Louisiana Paddlewheels v.

Louisiana Riverboat Gaming Commission, 94-2015 (La. 11/30/94), 646 So.2d

885). “The exception is triable on the face of the papers and for the purposes of

determining the issues raised by the exception, the well-pleaded facts in the

petition must be accepted as true.” Id. at 349 (citing City of New Orleans v. Bd. of

Comm’rs, 93-0690 (La. 7/5/94), 640 So.2d 237). “[A] petition should not be

dismissed for failure to state a cause of action unless it appears beyond doubt that

the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of any claim which would entitle

him to relief.” Id. (citing Haskins v. Clary, 346 So.2d 193 (La.1977)).

Relevant to our findings, Ms. Cloud’s petition asserts with specificity

in the following paragraphs:

4.

Plaintiff, HEATHER MILEY CLOUD, hereby
contests the election results due to fraud in the election
and, if not for the fraud committed, Plaintiff would have
been re-elected as the Mayor for the Village of Turkey
Creek.
5.

Plaintiff, HEATHER MILEY CLOUD, attaches
hereto, four (4) Affidavits as Exhibits 1-4 of voters who
were bribed, as defined and set forth in Louisiana
Revised Statute 18:1461 A(1). The Affiants were given
1
Because we are reversing the judgment and remanding the matter for further
proceedings, we pretermit discussion of the third assignment of error regarding whether the trial
court erred in not hearing evidence on the exception.

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money to influence the casting of their votes.
Specifically, Affiants, Grace Ann Carpenter, Ricky Shaw
Haviland, Michelle Lyne Haviland, and Todd William
Tomerlin, were given $15.00 per vote and were given a
piece of paper with the number 169 to vote for
Defendant, BERT KEITH CAMPBELL, by
Defendant’s agents and with Defendant’s knowledge and
consent. Affiants attest that they intended to vote for
Plaintiff, HEATHER MILEY CLOUD.
In addition to the bribe of $15.00 each to vote,
Grace Ann Carpenter was also promised by Defendant,
BERT KEITH CAMPBELL, and his agent, Stanley
Leger, that she would lead the annual Turkey Creek
Christmas parade and receive a trophy; and Todd
William Tomerlin was promised a bicycle by Defendant,
BERT KEITH CAMPBELL, for voting for Defendant.

....
8.

Since the Plaintiff herein lost the election by four
(4) votes, Plaintiff, HEATHER MILEY CLOUD,
respectfully requests that this Honorable Court find that
four (4) of the votes were illegal and fraudulent and,
pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statute 18:1431, Plaintiff,
HEATHER MILEY CLOUD, requests that this
Honorable Court subtract said four (4) votes from the
total votes cast for Defendant, BERT KEITH
CAMPBELL, and add those four (4) votes to Plaintiff’s
total, and thereafter determine the results of the election
and declare Plaintiff, HEATHER MILEY CLOUD, the
winner of the election for position of Mayor for the
Village of Turkey Creek.

In the affidavits attached to the petition, the subject voters stated that they did in

fact vote in favor of the plaintiff’s opponent.

The Election Code at La.R.S. 18:1461 defines bribery and provides

the penalties and terms of imprisonment applicable to violators. It also provides

the circumstances for immunity from prosecution. Pertinent to this appeal, the

statute provides the following definition:

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Bribery of voters is the giving or offering to give,
directly or indirectly, any money, or anything of apparent
present or prospective value to any voter at any general,
primary, or special election, or at any convention of a
recognized political party, with the intent to influence the
voter in the casting of his ballot. The acceptance of, or
the offer to accept, directly or indirectly, any money, or
anything of apparent present or prospective value, by any
such voters under such circumstances shall also
constitute bribery of voters.

La.R.S. 18:1461(A)(1).

Thus, bribery of voters is illegal under the codal provisions governing

elections in Louisiana. Contrary to the defendants’ assertions, La.R.S. 18:1431,

entitled, “Fraudulent or illegal votes; uncounted votes; determination of election

result,” provides authority for the trial court to subtract illegal votes from the

recipient’s total votes cast, and thereafter determine the result of the election.

Here, the applicable language appears in the first and last sentences of that statute:

When the court finds that one or more of the votes
cast in a contested election are illegal or fraudulent, the
judge shall subtract such vote or votes from the total
votes cast for the candidate who received them if the
contest involves election to office, from the total vote for
or against a proposition if the contest is of an election
upon a proposition, or from the total vote for or against
the recall of a public officer if the contest involves an
election for the recall of a public officer. If the court
determines that legal votes cast in the election were
excluded in the total votes cast on a candidate,
proposition, or recall, then these excluded legal votes
shall be added to the total votes on the candidate,
proposition, or recall to which they are attributable.
Thereafter, and after considering all the evidence, the
court shall determine the result of the election.

La.R.S. 18:1431 (emphasis added).

Accordingly, Ms. Cloud’s petition and its attached affidavits state a

cause of action under the first and last sentences of La.R.S. 18:1431 where it

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asserts specific facts regarding specific individuals who offered and accepted

money and items of value in exchange for votes cast, rendering those votes illegal

as the product of bribery under La.R.S. 18:1461.

Both defendants, Mr. Campbell and Secretary of State Tom Schedler,

have filed appellee briefs arguing that Ms. Cloud has failed to state a cause of

action pursuant to the holdings in Savage v. Edwards, 728 So.2d 428, and its

predecessor, Davis v. McGlothin, 524 So.2d 1320 (La.App. 3 Cir.), writ denied,

525 So.2d 1046 (La.1988). Both of those cases, however, are factually

distinguishable, and neither holding turned upon the application of La.R.S.

18:1431.

In Savage, the trial court found it impossible to determine the true

election results because of pervasive irregularities and declared the election null

and void. This court reversed, finding that the result was determinable and that the

plaintiff failed to satisfy the second prong of the two-prong test under La.R.S.

18:1432. More specifically, under La.R.S. 18:1432, the plaintiff must prove, that

(1) fraud or irregularities were present; and (2) that the fraud or irregularities were

sufficient in number to change the outcome of the election. There, the defendant

won by 74 votes. In the final analysis, this court found that the plaintiff had only

proved that 28 votes should be stricken from the defendant’s total, which number

was insufficient to change the outcome of the election. Therefore, the election

should not have been declared null and void.

Savage followed the 1988 case of Davis v. McGlothin, 524 So.2d

1320. Davis also held that the number of viable challenges to the opponent’s votes

was insufficient to vary the outcome of the election. After analyzing all categories

of irregularities, the trial court found no authority to challenge votes on the ground

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that “four voters received or were promised compensation for their vote and two

persons were intimidated by individuals other than election officials.” Davis, 524

So.2d at 1323. This court affirmed, finding, somewhat broadly, that while La.R.S.

18:1461 and R.S. 14:119 made such behavior a crime, thereby lumping

compensated votes, promised compensation, and intimidation all together within

six challenges, it found no authority to disqualify the votes from the election.

Without addressing La.R.S. 18:1431, the Davis court then explained that, even if

the trial court was wrong in striking those six challenges, this would not have

affected the outcome of the election under La.R.S. 18:1432.

Accordingly, we find that Savage and Davis are factually

distinguishable and that the petition in this case alleges facts sufficient to state a

cause of action under the first and last sentences of La.R.S. 18:1431.

V.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, we reverse the trial court’s judgment

granting Mr. Campbell’s exception of no cause of action, and we remand the

matter to the trial court for further proceedings. Costs of this appeal are assessed

to the defendants, Bert Keith Campbell and Secretary of State Tom Schedler, in the

amount of $1,500.00.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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