Carolyn Deal v. Hon. J. Phillip Haney, D.A

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

14-1232

CAROLYN D. DEAL

VERSUS

J. PHIL HANEY, ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF IBERIA, NO. 125370
HONORABLE KEITH R. J. COMEAUX, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

SHANNON J. GREMILLION
JUDGE

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Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Sylvia R. Cooks, John
D. Saunders, Jimmie C. Peters, Marc T. Amy, Elizabeth A. Pickett, Billy H. Ezell,
J. David Painter, James T. Genovese, Shannon J. Gremillion, Phyllis M. Keaty,
and John E. Conery, Judges, En Banc.

AFFIRMED AS AMENDED.

Peters, Ezell, Painter, Keaty, Conery, JJ., concur but would award additional
sanctions of $2,500.00 for the appeal.

Cooks, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with written reasons.

Carolyn D. Deal
Attorney at Law
116 Field Street
New Iberia, LA 70560-4487
(337) 414-0260
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:
Carolyn D. Deal

J. Phil Haney, District Attorney
16th Judicial District
Courthouse Building
300 Iberia Street, Suite 200
New Iberia, LA 70560
(337) 394-2220
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
District Attorney for the Sixteenth Judicial District of the State of
Louisiana

Chester R. Cedars, Assistant District Attorney
16th Judicial District
St. Martin Parish Courthouse, 1st Floor
415 South Main Street
St. Martinville, LA 70582
(337) 394-2220
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Assisstant District Attorney for the Sixteenth Judicial District of the
State of Louisiana

Carey T. Jones
Attorney at Law
1234 Del Este Avenue, Suite 803
Denham Springs, LA 70720
(225) 664-0077
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Tom Schedler, in his official capacity as Louisiana Secretary of State

Celia R. Cangelosi
Attorney at Law
5551 Corporate Blvd., Suite 101
Baton Rouge, LA 70808
(225) 387-0511
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Tom Schedler, in his official capacity as Louisiana Secretary of State

GREMILLION, Judge.

Carolyn D. Deal (Deal) appeals the dismissal of her suit against Defendants,

J. Phil Haney (Haney), in his capacity as District Attorney for the Sixteenth

Judicial District in and for the State of Louisiana; Chester R. Cedars (Cedars), in

his capacity as Assistant District Attorney for the Sixteenth Judicial District in and

for the State of Louisiana; and Tom Schedler (Schedler), in his official capacity as

Secretary of State in and for the State of Louisiana. For the following reasons, we

affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 21, 2014, Deal filed a Notice of Candidacy averring that she was

qualified to run for the seat of District Judge, Division H, Sixteenth Judicial

District, in Iberia Parish, Louisiana. On October 15, 2014, the District Attorney

for the Sixteenth Judicial District filed a petition on behalf of the State to

disqualify and enjoin Deal’s candidacy because she had not been admitted to

practice law in Louisiana for the requisite eight years mandated by the Louisiana

Constitution. The matter was heard on October 24, 2014. Both parties submitted

evidence and gave oral argument at the hearing. Deal stipulated in open court that

she had been admitted to the practice of law in Louisiana on October 29, 2007.

The trial court granted the State’s petition and signed a judgment ordering Deal to

withdraw her candidacy for the district judge’s seat in the upcoming primary

election set for November 4, 2014.

This court granted Deal’s writ application as well as her request for a stay of

the trial court’s order to withdraw her candidacy. Finding that the writ application

was timely taken from an appealable judgment, we converted the writ to an appeal,

ordered the record from the trial court, and set the matter for an en banc hearing on

an expedited basis. Because this court stayed the trial court’s order for Deal to

withdraw her candidacy due to her not meeting the requisite qualifications, the

election went forward with Deal’s name on the ballot as a viable candidate.

Following the election, we took judicial notice of the Secretary of State’s

election results in the November 4, 2014 election. Three candidates were on the

ballot, and Deal obtained only 9% of the votes. This court then dismissed Deal’s

appeal as moot, recalled the stay, and assessed costs to Deal; and the Louisiana

Supreme Court denied Deal’s writ application. State v. Deal, 14-1144 (La.App. 3

Cir. 11/5/14), ___ So.3d ___, writ denied, 14-2368 (La. 11/13/14), ___ So.3d ___1.

On November 13, 2014, Deal filed a “Petition Initiating Electin [sic] Contest,

Request for Injunctive Relief Regarding Due Processed [sic] Claim or in the

Alternative, a Temporary Stay Until Resolution by the Louisiana Supreme Court

on Writ of Certiorari.” Deal sought to have the election declared void and to have

a new election held. Haney and Cedars, in their official capacities as, respectively,

District Attorney and Assistant District Attorney for the Sixteenth Judicial District

of the State of Louisiana, filed an exception of no right of action alleging that the

relief sought by Deal did not fall with the ambit of La.R.S. 18:1463. Schedler, in

his official capacity as Louisiana Secretary of State, filed exceptions of vagueness,

no cause of action, and failure to join necessary parties. On November 18, 2014,

following a hearing on the exceptions, the trial court signed a judgment which

granted the exception of no cause of action filed by Schedler; granted the exception

of no right of action filed by Haney and Cedars; dismissed Deal’s claims in their

entirety; and granted Haney and Cedars’ motion for sanctions under La.Code Civ.P.

art. 863, ordering Deal to pay $2,500.00.

Deal now appeals.

1
Five Justices denied the writ, and two indicated that they would deny the writ as moot.
2

DISCUSSION

In Fink v. Bryant, 01-987, pp. 3-4 (La. 11/28/01), 801 So.2d 346, 348-49

(citations omitted), the Louisiana Supreme Court stated:

The function of the peremptory exception of no cause of action
is to question whether the law extends a remedy to anyone under the
factual allegations of the petition. The peremptory exception of no
cause of action is designed to test the legal sufficiency of the petition
by determining whether plaintiff is afforded a remedy in law based on
the facts alleged in the pleading. No evidence may be introduced to
support or controvert the objection that the petition fails to state a
cause of action. The exception is triable on the face of the papers and
for the purposes of determining the issues raised by the exception, the
well-pleaded facts in the petition must be accepted as true.

The standard of review for the exception of no cause of action is de novo,

and the well pleaded facts of the petition must be taken as true. Richard v. Apache

Corp., 12-441 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/20/13), 111 So.3d 1156, writs denied, 13-865, 13-

869 (La. 6/21/13), 118 So.3d 416.

Deal contends that the trial court erred in dismissing her suit and sanctioning

her. We disagree. As a threshold matter, we note that most paragraphs of Deal’s

petition are moot as they pertain to the District Attorney’s suit for injunctive relief

prior to the election.

In her petition, Deal makes the following allegations: (1) “except for

substantial irregularities or error, and except for fraud or other unlawful activities

in the conduct of an election, she would have qualified for a general election or

would have been elected;” (2) that “other unlawful activities that fall under”

La.R.S. 18:1461(A)(1)2 were committed against her by “fiduciaries in a position of

authority” two weeks prior to the election which “contaminat[ed] the information

provided to the public before voting causing the voters to be disenfranchised as to

choice of candidates” and prohibited her from “participating in the electoral

2
We note that La.R.S. 18:1461 is entitled “Bribery of Voters; penalties.” Bribery is not
alleged and need not be addressed in this opinion.
3

process” and denied her right to due process; and (3) that voters were confused as

to whether Deal was a valid candidate or if their vote would count if they voted for

her because of the information given to the public in various publications.

Haney and Cedars, in their official capacities, assert that the allegations set

forth by Deal do not state a right of action against them. Schedler, in his official

capacity, asserts that the allegations do not state a cause of action because under

La.R.S. 18:1406(B), there would have to be specific allegations that a specific

number of votes would reverse the outcome of the election or that the voters did

not have an opportunity to express their will in the election.

Defendants also note that even though the Louisiana Supreme Court denied

Deal’s writ application prior to the instant hearing on the exceptions, Deal did not

withdraw her request for injunctive relief or a stay of the proceedings pending

resolution by the Louisiana Supreme Court.

We again take judicial notice of the official election results by the Louisiana

Secretary of State. According to those results, Alisia Johnson Butler (Butler)

received 3,874 votes for 34% of the votes, Deal received 1,077 votes for 9% of the

votes, and the Honorable Lori A. Landry (Judge Landry) received 6,594 votes for

57% of the votes.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 18:1401(B) provides: “A candidate who alleges

that, except for substantial irregularities or error, or except for fraud or other

unlawful activities in the conduct of the election, he would have qualified for a

general election or would have been elected may bring an action contesting the

election.” In this case, the first part of the statute is not at issue. Deal was not

prevented from entering the race, and her name was not removed from the ballot.

Thus, she must prove the second part of the statute that she would have been

elected.
4

In order for Deal to show that she would have been elected, she would have

to allege sufficient facts, if proven true, that she would have received enough votes

to win or to enter a run-off election with the incumbent judge, Judge Landry. This

means that Deal and Butler would have to have received at least 5,773 votes, with

Deal receiving more votes than Butler.

There are no allegations in the petition which could be construed as showing

what number of votes Deal would have received. Therefore, we agree with the

trial court that Deal has failed to state a cause of action. Deal has made no

concrete allegations of fact tending to support the conclusion that the outcome of

the election would have been different. She alleges only that she received “a call”

from “a voter” who allegedly stated that “many people” were confused as to

whether she was a valid candidate or if their vote for her would count. This is

nothing more than mere speculation. “Proof which establishes only possibility,

speculation, or unsupported probability does not suffice to establish a claim.”

Todd v. State, Dept. of Social Servs., Office of Community Servs., 96-3090, p. 16

(La.9/9/97), 699 So.2d 35, 43 (citations omitted). Louisiana Code of Civil

Procedure “Article 934 does not require that the plaintiff be provided the

opportunity to speculate on unwarranted facts merely for the purpose of defeating

the exception.” Broussard v. F.A. Richard & Assocs., Inc., 99-10, p. 7 (La.App. 3

Cir. 5/5/99), 740 So.2d 156, 160, writ denied, 99-1048 (La.6/4/99), 744 So.2d 625

(citations omitted).

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 934 states that:

When the grounds of the objection pleaded by the peremptory
exception may be removed by amendment of the petition, the
judgment sustaining the exception shall order such amendment within
the delay allowed by the court. If the grounds of the objection raised
through the exception cannot be so removed, or if the plaintiff fails to
comply with the order to amend, the action, claim, demand, issue, or
theory shall be dismissed.
5

“The right to amend is not absolute.” Whitney Nat. Bank v. Jeffers, 573 So.2d

1262, 1265 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1991). A trial court has discretion in its decision

whether to allow amendment of the petition after the sustaining of an exception of

no cause of action; leave to amend is not required when it would constitute “a vain

and useless act.” Broussard, 740 So.2d at 160. “Thus, while the mandatory

nature of the right to amend is clear and unambiguous, it is notably qualified by the

restriction that the objections must be curable.” Whitney Nat. Bank, 573 So.2d at

1266, citing Suttles v. Gibson, 422 So.2d 1308 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1982).

In this instance, the trial court did not permit amendment of the pleadings by

Deal. We find, however, that even if allowed leave to amend, Deal would be

unable to cure the defects. The election was held with Deal’s name on the ballot,

and she has cited no viable irregularities under the Election Code. Assuming

arguendo that the public was confused, even Deal admits in brief that: “It cannot

be determined how many votes [Deal] would have obtained had the public not

been confused by the information supplied to the press by defendants.” A press

release does not constitute an irregularity for which the Election Code provides a

remedy. Furthermore, even if Deal were allowed leave to amend her petition, she

would be unable to state a cause of action because she cannot cure the fact that she

has not been admitted to practice law for at least eight years under the

constitutional mandate of La.Const. art. 5, § 243.

3
Louisiana Constitution Article 5, §24 reads as follows:

(A) A judge of the supreme court, a court of appeal, district court, family
court, parish court, or court having solely juvenile jurisdiction shall have been
domiciled in the respective district, circuit, or parish for one year preceding
election and shall have been admitted to the practice of law in the state for at least
the number of years specified as follows:

(1) For the supreme court or a court of appeals--ten years.

6

We find that the allowance of any amendment would be a vain and useless

act. We find no error in the trial court’s ruling even though it did not permit

amendment “because the right to amend is qualified by the restriction that the

objections to the petition must be curable and the decision to allow amendment is

within the discretion of the trial court.” Doe v. Entergy Servs., Inc., 608 So.2d 684

(La.App. 3 Cir. 1992), writ denied, 613 So.2d 978 (La.1993), cert. denied, 114

S.Ct. 66, 510 U.S. 816.

This court finds that Deal has failed to state a cause of action with respect to

all of the named defendants, including Haney and Cedars. Therefore, we affirm

the judgment dismissing all claims against Schedler for failure to state a cause of

action, and we amend the judgment to reflect that all claims are dismissed as to

Haney and Cedars for failure to state a cause of action. As such, we need not reach

the merits of the exception of no right action because it is moot. Furthermore, like

the trial court, we pretermit any finding on the additional exceptions filed by

Defendants.

In Acosta v. B.B. Oilfield Services, Inc., 12-122, p. 6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/6/12),

91 So.3d 1263, 1267, this court stated:

When considering the imposition of sanctions on appeal, an
appellate court must apply two standards of review which are
explained as follows:

A trial court’s determination regarding the
imposition of sanctions is subject to the manifest error or
clearly wrong standard of review. Once the trial court
finds a violation of La. [Code Civ.P.] art. 863 and
imposes sanctions, the determination of the type and/or
the amount of the sanction is reviewed on appeal utilizing

(2) For a district court, family court, parish court, or court having solely
juvenile jurisdiction--eight years.

(B) He shall not practice law.

7

the abuse of discretion standard. Stroscher v. Stroscher,
2001-2769 (La.App. 1st Cir.2/14/03), 845 So.2d 518, 526;
Connelly v. Lee, 96-1213 (La.App. 1st Cir.5/9/97), 699
So.2d 411, 414, writ denied, 97-2825 (La.1/30/98), 709
So.2d 710.

Slaughter v. Bd. of Sup’rs of S. Univ. and Agric. and Mech. Coll., 10-
1114, p. 6 (La.App. 1 Cir. 8/2/11), 76 So.3d 465, 469-70, writ denied,
11-2112 (La.1/13/12), 77 So.3d 970; Mor-Tem Risk Mgmt. Servs., Inc.
v. Shore, 43,169 (La.App. 2 Cir. 3/19/08), 978 So.2d 588.

Because we have upheld the dismissal of Deal’s suit and found that the

allowance of an amendment would be a vain and useless act, we find no manifest

error in the trial court’s award of sanctions against Deal and no abuse of discretion

in setting the amount at $2,500.00. We decline, however, to award additional

sanctions on appeal as requested by Haney and Cedars.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court

dismissing Deal’s claims in their entirety against Schedler for failure to state a

cause of action. Further, we amend the judgment to dismiss Deal’s claims in their

entirety against Haney and Cedars for failure to state a cause of action. We affirm

the award of sanctions in the amount of $2,500.00 against Deal. Costs of this

appeal are assessed to Plaintiff/Appellant, Carolyn D. Deal.

AFFIRMED AS AMENDED.

8