Leslie Ann Schuller v. Robert William Schuller

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

14-1274

LESLIE ANN SCHULLER

VERSUS

ROBERT WILLIAM SCHULLER

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 2007-4215
HONORABLE LILYNN ANNETTE CUTRER, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

JOHN D. SAUNDERS
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of John D. Saunders, James T. Genovese, and Phyllis M. Keaty,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Robert Michael McHale Jr.
McHale Law Firm
631 Kirby Street
Lake Charles, LA 70601
(337) 990-0093
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:
Leslie Ann Schuller

Robert William Schuller
In Proper Person
7004 Tom Hebert Road
Lake Charles, LA 70607
DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:

SAUNDERS, Judge.

This is an appeal arising from a domiciliary parent’s proposition to relocate

his two minor children over the objections of the children’s mother. The trial court

found that the father could relocate his two minor children, but would have to pay

for travel expenses for the two minor children when the mother exercised her

visitation rights.

The mother appeals. We find no error by the trial court and affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

Robert Schuller and Leslie Ann McWard Schuller were married on April 3,

1993. Three children were born of the marriage: A. S., K. S., and X. S. 1 The

family made their home in Lake Charles.

On July 25, 2007, Leslie filed a petition for divorce and determination of

incidental matters seeking a divorce. On March 6, 2008, Robert and Leslie entered

into a stipulated judgment, which was filed on August 29, 2008. Joint custody was

agreed upon with Robert being designated as the domiciliary parent and Leslie

having reasonable visitation as per their joint custody plan. The divorce was

finalized on July 17, 2009.

Robert sent Leslie a notice of proposed relocation of minor children on May

31, 2013. Robert and the children desired to relocate from Lake Charles to

Pennsylvania. On June 28, 2013, Leslie filed an objection to proposed relocation

of minor children. Trial was held on all pending issues on March 26, 2014. At the

conclusion of the trial, the court issued an order for mental health assistance

appointment of a counselor to meet with the children and parents regarding the

proposed relocation.

1
The initials of the children and their parents are used to protect the identity of the minor
children. Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rules 5-1, 5-2.

At the time of the trial, and court- ordered counseling, A. S. was a major and

enrolled at McNeese State University. K. S. was in high school and X. S. was in

junior high school. All parties complied with the trial court’s order, and they were

given the opportunity to notify the trial court if they wanted the counselor to testify

in court. Through counsel, Leslie requested that the counselor testify in court, and

a hearing was set for July 31, 2014. After hearing the evidence presented, the trial

court took the matter under advisement. On August 8, 2014, the trial court issued a

judgment and written reasons that allowed Robert to relocate his minor children to

Pennsylvania. Leslie has appealed this judgment.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR:

1. The trial court committed manifest error in finding that Robert met his

burden of proof to show that his proposed relocation was made in good faith and,

more specifically, that it is in the best interest of the children.

2. The trial court committed manifest error in failing to require Robert to

provide reasonable security guaranteeing that the court ordered visitation with the

children would not be interrupted or inferred by Robert, the relocating party.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE:

Leslie asserts in her first assignment of error that the trial court committed

manifest error in finding that Robert met his burden of proof to show that his

proposed relocation was made in good faith and, more specifically, that it is in the

best interest of the children. We disagree.

A trial court’s determination in a relocation dispute is entitled to great
weight and will not be overturned absent a clear showing of abuse of
discretion. [Curole v. Curole, 02–1891 (La.10/15/02), 828 So.2d
1094]. Further, a reviewing court may not set aside a trial court’s
factual findings in the absence of manifest error or unless it is clearly
wrong. Stobart v. State, Through DOTD, 617 So.2d 880 (La.1993);
Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La.1989). A two-tiered test must be
applied in order to reverse the trial court’s findings: (1) the appellate
court must find from the record that a reasonable factual basis does
2

not exist for the trial court’s findings, and (2) the appellate court must
further determine that the record establishes that the finding is clearly
wrong (manifestly erroneous). Richardson v. Richardson, 09-609
(La.App. 3 Cir. 11/18/09), 25 So.3d 203, citing Mart v. Hill, 505
So.2d 1120 (La.1987). On review, if the trial court’s findings are
reasonable based upon the entire record, the reviewing court may not
reverse even if it is convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of
fact it would have weighed the evidence differently. Id.

Cass v. Cass, 10-327, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/17/10), 52 So.3d 215, 219, writ

denied, 11-178 (La. 2/25/11), 58 So.3d 460.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:355.14 states:

A. In reaching its decision regarding a proposed relocation, the court
shall consider all relevant factors in determining whether relocation is
in the best interest of the child, including the following:

(1) The nature, quality, extent of involvement, and duration
of the relationship of the child with the person proposing
relocation and with the non-relocating person, siblings,
and other significant persons in the child’s life.

(2) The age, developmental stage, needs of the child, and the
likely impact the relocation will have on the child’s
physical, educational, and emotional development.

(3) The feasibility of preserving a good relationship between
the non-relocating person and the child through suitable
physical custody or visitation arrangements, considering
the logistics and financial circumstances of the parties.

(4) The child’s views about the proposed relocation, taking
into consideration the age and maturity of the child.

(5) Whether there is an established pattern of conduct by
either the person seeking or the person opposing the
relocation, either to promote or thwart the relationship of
the child and the other party.

(6) How the relocation of the child will affect the general
quality of life for the child, including but not limited to
financial or emotional benefit and educational
opportunity.

(7) The reasons of each person for seeking or opposing the
relocation.

3

(8) The current employment and economic circumstances of
each person and how the proposed relocation may affect
the circumstances of the child.

(9) The extent to which the objecting person has fulfilled his
financial obligations to the person seeking relocation,
including child support, spousal support, and community
property, and alimentary obligations.

(10) The feasibility of a relocation by the objecting person.

(11) Any history of substance abuse, harassment, or violence
by either the person seeking or the person opposing
relocation, including a consideration of the severity of the
conduct and the failure or success of any attempts at
rehabilitation.

(12) Any other factors affecting the best interest of the child.

B. The court may not consider whether the person seeking relocation
of the child may relocate without the child if relocation is denied or
whether the person opposing relocation may also relocate if relocation
is allowed.

“The person proposing relocation has the burden of proof that the proposed

relocation is made in good faith and is in the best interest of the child.” La.R.S.

9:355.10.

Leslie’s first argument is that the trial court was manifestly erroneous in

finding Robert’s desire to relocate was in good faith and that relocation was in the

best interest of the children. Therefore, it is incumbent upon Leslie to show that

the trial court abused its discretion or was manifestly erroneous in a finding of fact.

We find that Leslie has failed to make any such showing.

The record has a plethora of evidence that supports a finding that Robert’s

desire to relocate was in good faith. Robert testified to research regarding

education, cost of living, and economic opportunity being far greater for his

children were they to relocate. Contrarily, Leslie offered no evidence that Robert’s

desire to relocate is in bad faith, nor do we find any in the record. Further, in the

case before us, the trial court appointed a counselor, Sara McDonald, to interview
4

Leslie, Robert, and the two minor children. Ms. McDonald had individual sessions

with Robert and Leslie and then jointly with K. S. and X. S. Thereafter, she met

individually with K. S. and X. S. as well as joint sessions with Leslie and the two

children and Robert and the two children. Ms. McDonald opined that Robert never

tried to interfere with the relationship between Leslie and their children stating, “I

didn’t get the impression at all that Mr. Schuller would do anything to kind of

prohibit [the children] from having a relationship with their mother at all. . . .” Ms.

McDonald also stated that the children had a greater connection to their father, and

both desired to relocate to Pennsylvania on their own accord, free from influence.

Additionally, Robert testified that he actually encouraged their children to

have a relationship with their mother. Despite Leslie’s contention that Robert

interferes with her relationship with her children, the evidence suggests that her

children, especially, K. S., chose to ignore phone calls or texts from her. Further,

the trial court found no evidence that Robert encouraged the children to not

communicate with Leslie, and we agree.

Accordingly, given the above, we find no merit to Leslie’s argument

regarding Robert’s desire to relocate being in bad faith. Likewise, we find no

merit to Leslie’s assertion that the trial court was manifestly erroneous in finding

that relocation was in the best interest of the children.

The trial court wrote extensive reasons and appropriately addressed each

factor in La.R.S. 9:355.14. Leslie, instead of pointing to a lack of evidence

supporting the trial court’s findings under any of those factors, simply makes

arguments that would necessitate this court to reweigh the evidence in order for her

to prevail. This is not how the standard of review is conducted. Further, any

factors with which the trial court had concern regarding relocation were adequately

addressed by it, and its reasons were supported by evidence in the record that can
5

reasonably be construed to weigh in favor of relocation. As such, we find that

Leslie’s assignment of error number one is without merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO:

In her final assignment of error, Leslie contends that the trial court

committed manifest error in failing to require Robert to provide reasonable security

guaranteeing that the court-ordered visitation with the children would not be

interrupted or inferred by Robert, the relocating party. We find no merit to this

assignment of error.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:355.18 (emphasis added) states, “If relocation

of a child is permitted, the court may require the person relocating the child to

provide reasonable security guaranteeing that the court-ordered physical custody or

visitation with the child will not be interrupted or interfered with by the relocating

party.” The legislature’s choice to use the word “may” versus “shall” indicates the

discretionary nature of choosing whether to require a relocating parent to provide

security. Thus, the applicable standard of review is whether the trial court abused

the discretion provided.

Here, there has been no indication that Robert has ever attempted to prevent

their children from seeing their mother. While there is testimony that Robert has

only been to Pennsylvania twice in the time that he has had children, twenty-one or

more years, and that a failure to do so was based on economics, Robert has

testified that he will do everything possible to make sure the children see their

mother, and he fully believes that his family’s relocation to Pennsylvania will

partially defray the children’s travel costs to see their mother. Accordingly, we

find no abuse of the discretion afforded the trial court in declining to require

Robert to provide security guaranteeing that Leslie’s court-ordered visitation with

the children would be exercised.
6

DISPOSITION:

Leslie Ann McWard Schuller raises two assignments of error. We find no

merit to either and affirm the trial court’s judgment. Costs of these proceedings are

assessed to Leslie Ann McWard Schuller.

AFFIRMED.

This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION.
Uniform Rules– Courts of Appeal, Rule 2–16.3.

7