Kim Doucet, Et Ux. v. Keith Alleman

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

15-61

KIM DOUCET, ET UX.

VERSUS

KEITH ALLEMAN, ET AL.

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. C-20111110
HONORABLE HERMAN C. CLAUSE, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

JOHN D. SAUNDERS
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of John D. Saunders, Elizabeth A. Pickett, and Phyllis M. Keaty,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Carol S. Hunter
Assistant Attorney General
556 Jefferson St., 4th Floor
Lafayette, LA 70501
(337) 262-1700
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Louisiana Department of Transportation & Development

Francis X. Neuner, Jr.
NeunerPate
P.O. Box 52828
Lafayette, LA 70505-2828
(337) 237-7000
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Louisiana Dept. of Pub. Saf. & Corr(Probation & Parole)

Andrew Blanchfield
Nancy B. Gilbert
Tori S. Bowling
Keogh, Cox & Wilson, Ltd.
P. O. Box 1151
Baton Rouge, LA 70821
(225) 383-3796
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES:
Continental Casualty Company
Harley Davidson Inc.

Ian Alexander Macdonald
Jones Walker
P. O. Drawer 3408
Lafayette, LA 70502-3408
(337) 593-7601
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Progressive Security Ins. Co.
Keith Alleman

Franklin Johnson Foil
Foil Law Firm
P. O. Box 4288
Baton Rouge, LA 70821-4288
(225) 382-3264
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Jerry Jones

Mark Reese Pharr, III
Galloway, Johnson, et al
328 Settlers Trace Blvd.
Lafayette, LA 70508
(337) 735-1760
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Barrett Moving and Storage Co.

Michael J. Remondet, Jr.
Jeansonne & Remondet
P.O Box 91530
Lafayette, LA 70509
(337) 237-4370
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
National Casualty Company
Cajun Cycles, Inc.

Scott A. Dartez
Perrin, Landry, deLauney, Dartez
251 La Rue France
Lafayette, LA 70508
(337) 237-8500
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS:
Gaston Doucet
Kim Doucet

Samuel Bryan Gabb
Plauche, Smith & Nieset
1123 Pithon Street
Lake Charles, LA 70601
(337) 436-0522
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Secon, Inc.

Joseph Richard Pousson, Jr.
Plauche', Smith & Nieset
P. O. Box 1705
Lake Charles, LA 70602
(337) 436-0522
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Secon, Inc.

Gerard Joseph Dragna
Perrier & Lacoste, LLC
365 Canal Street, #2550
New Orleans, LA 70130
(504) 212-8820
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Suddath Relocation Systems ofMinnestoa, Inc.

Jean Albert Ouellet
Perrin, Landry, deLaunay
251 La Rue Fance
Lafayette, LA 70508
(337) 237-8500
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:
Kim Doucet
Gaston Doucet

Jennie Porche Pellegrin
NeunerPate
1001 W. Pinhook, Suite 200
Lafayette, LA 70503
(337) 237-7000
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Louisiana Dept. of Pub. Saf. & Corr(Probation & Parole)

Gregory A. Koury
Andrew P. Hill
Koury & Hill, LLC
P. O. Box 52025
Lafayette, LA 70505-2025
(337) 993-1842
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS:
Kim Doucet
Gaston Doucet

Lindsay L. Meador
Galloway, Johnson, Tompkins
328 Settlers Trace Blvd
Lafayette, LA 70508
(337) 735-1760
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Barrett Moving and Storage Co.

Chaz H. Roberts
Attorney at Law
P. O. Box 53936
Lafayette, LA 70505
(337) 504-3202
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS:
Kim Doucet
Gaston Doucet

Eric Winder Sella
Perrier & Lacoste, LLC
365 Canal Street, Suite 2550
New Orleans, LA 70130
(504) 212-8820
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Suddath Relocation Systems ofMinnestoa, Inc.

Cajun Harley Davidson
Cajun Cycles, Inc.

SAUNDERS, Judge.

This is an automobile accident case wherein a motorcycle rider was fatally

injured when an oncoming vehicle lost control, crossed the center line, and struck

the rider. The accident occurred while the motorcycle rider was participating in a

demonstration ride. This case deals solely with the defendants that were the

organizers/hosts of the demonstration ride and whether they were entitled to a

summary judgment granted unto them by the trial court that dismissed them from

the case.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

On or about March 26, 2010, in Scott, Louisiana, Ralph Doucet was

participating in a promotional event, a “demo ride,” when he was fatally struck by

a vehicle driven by Keith Alleman. According to Alleman, he was distracted by

the motorcycle riders because he was interested in seeing the bikes they were

riding. Alleman stated that he was distracted, left the roadway, attempted to

reenter the roadway, overcorrected, crossed the center line, and struck Doucet,

fatally injuring him.

The demo ride was sponsored by Harley-Davidson and hosted by Cajun

Cycles, Inc. d/b/a Cajun Harley-Davidson in Scott, Louisiana (collectively, the

“Harley Appellees”). Kim Doucet and Gaston Doucet (collectively, the “Doucet

Appellants”) filed suit against various defendants, including the Harley Appellees.

The Harley Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment based on the

assertion that the Doucet Appellants could not carry their burden to prove at trial

that the Harley Appellees were negligent. The trial court granted the Harley

Appellees’ motion, and the Doucet Appellants have appealed, alleging six

assignments of error.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR:

1. The [t]rial [c]ourt erred by granting summary judgment in favor
of the Harley Appellees because the Harley Appellees did not
negate any elements of the Doucet Appellants’ claims[,] and the
record contains sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie
case of negligence against the Harley Appellees.

2. The [t]rial [c]ourt erred by granting summary judgment in favor
of the Harley Appellees because Harley-Davidson owed a duty
to take reasonable safety measures to protect [p]romotion
participants, as Harley-Davidson was intimately connected to
the dealer demo event and derived substantial benefits from
such promotions.

3. The [t]rial [c]ourt erred by granting summary judgment in favor
of the Harley Appellees because the [c]ollision was sufficiently
foreseeable to impose a duty on Harley-Davidson to implement
reasonable safety measures.

4. The [t]rial [c]ourt erred by granting summary judgment in favor
of the Harley Appellees because Harley-Davidson breached its
duty by failing to take reasonable, necessary safety precautions
to protect participants in its demo rides.

5. The [t]rial [c]ourt erred by granting summary judgment in favor
of the Harley Appellees because there are genuine disputes of
material fact regarding Alleman’s alleged intoxication.

6. The [t]rial [c]ourt erred by granting summary judgment in favor
of the Harley Appellees because policy favors articulated by the
Louisiana Supreme Court favor the imposition of liability under
these facts.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE:

In their first assignment of error, the Doucet Appellants contend that the trial

court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Harley Appellees

because they did not negate any elements of the Doucet Appellants’ negligence

claims and because the record contains sufficient evidence to establish that the

Doucet Appellants can make a prima facie showing of their negligence claims

against the Harley Appellees. We find no merit to this assignment of error.

Summary judgments are reviewed de novo. Thibodeaux v.
Lafayette Gen. Surgical Hosp., 09-1523 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/5/10), 38
So.3d 544. Summary judgment “is designed to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action.” La.Code Civ.P. art.
2

966(A)(2). “The procedure is favored and shall be construed to
accomplish these ends.” Id. A motion for summary judgment “shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact, and that mover
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(B).

The burden of proof remains with the movant. However,
if the movant will not bear the burden of proof at trial on
the matter that is before the court on the motion for
summary judgment, the movant’s burden on the motion
does not require him to negate all essential elements of
the adverse party's claim, action, or defense, but rather to
point out to the court that there is an absence of factual
support for one or more elements essential to the adverse
party's claim, action, or defense. Thereafter, if the
adverse party fails to produce factual support sufficient to
establish that he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary
burden of proof at trial, there is no genuine issue of
material fact.

La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(C)(2).

Matt v. Dual Trucking, Inc., 13-1403, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/4/14), 139 So.3d 1210,

1211.

At issue before us is the Doucet Appellants’ negligence claim against the

Harley Appellees. The Harley Appellees, as movants, have the initial burden of

proof on their motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal from the case.

However, the Doucet Appellants, as plaintiffs in a negligence claim, have the

burden of proof for their negligence claim against the Harley Appellees at trial.

Thus, under La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(C)(2), the Harley Appellees need only to

show that there is an absence of support for an essential element of the Doucet

Appellants’ negligence claim. Thereafter, the burden shifts to the Doucet

Appellants to produce support for that element of their claim.

“In order for liability to attach under a duty-risk analysis, a plaintiff must

prove five separate elements: (1) duty, (2) breach, (3) cause-in-fact, (4) scope of

duty/scope of risk, and (5) actual damages. Pinsonneault v. Merch. & Farmers
3

Bank & Trust Co., 01-2217 (La.4/3/02), 816 So.2d 270.” Ravey v. Rockworks,

LLC, 12-1305, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/10/13), 111 So.3d 1187, 1190.

The Harley Appellees contend, inter alia, that they had no duty to the

Doucet Appellants. Specifically, they allege that there is no legal requirement to

obtain a police escort for the demo riders. Further, they argue that there is no

evidence that any of their conduct breached any duty they have to the Doucet

Appellants. Finally, they argue that there is an absence of evidence that any

damages suffered by the Doucet Appellants fell within the scope of the duty of

their conduct, regardless of whether that conduct breached any duty.

The Doucet Appellants argue that the Harley Appellees’ negligent conduct

includes their failure to obtain a police escort for the demo ride and their failure to

require that the demo riders wear safety gear and use headlight modulators.

According to the Doucet Appellants, these failures by the Harley Appellees made

the riders less conspicuous to other drivers. Further, the Doucet Appellants

contend that the route selection by the Harley Appellees exacerbated their

negligence as the roadway had unforgiving shoulders, steep slopes, and sharp

curves.

First, we address whether the Harley Appellees had a duty to obtain a police

escort for the demo riders. The only evidence that the Doucet Appellants cite for

the proposition that the Harley Appellees have a duty to obtain a police escort for

the demo riders is SCOTT, LA., CODE § 30-56(a) (2013), which states:

Any procession, march, parade or trail ride of any kind or for
whatever purpose by any group, association or organization, on any
public sidewalk, street, highway, bridge, alley, road or other public
passageway of the city, is hereby prohibited unless there first has been
obtained a permit therefor, and in all cases the group, association or
organization to whom the permit is issued shall be liable for all
damage to property or persons which may arise out of or in
connection with any such procession, march, parade or trail ride for
4

which the permit is issued. Additionally, the group, association or
organization applying for the permit shall provide a certificate of
general liability and automobile liability insurance, insuring against
any damage to property or persons which may arise out of or in
connection with any such procession, march, parade or trail ride, such
general liability and automobile liability insurances each to contain
limits not less than $100,000.00 per person and $300,000.00 for each
occurrence with respect to bodily injury or death, and $100,000.00 for
each occurrence with respect to property damage. Automobile liability
insurance shall not be required for trail rides unless a vehicle
participates in the trail ride.

The plain language of this ordinance cannot reasonably be interpreted to

require that a police escort is necessary in order to receive a permit. Contrarily,

there is no mention of a police escort in the ordinance, and its requirements are

such more geared to reduce exposure to any liability and to generate funds via

granting a permit. Thus, regardless of whether the Harley Appellees were required

to obtain a permit for the demo ride, there is no requirement that they obtain a

police escort and failure to obtain a police escort does not fall within the Harley

Appellees’ duty imposed by the ordinance. Accordingly, we find that the Harley

Appellees had no duty to the Doucet Appellants to obtain a police escort.

Next, we address whether the Harley Appellees’ failure to require demo

riders to wear safety gear and use headlight modulators and whether the Doucet

Appellants can carry their burden to prove that this failure constitutes negligence.

The Doucet Appellants point to the affidavit of Michael J. Matthews as evidence

that they can do so.

Prior to discussing the merits of this affidavit, we must determine whether

this affidavit is entitled to any weight. Although the Doucet Appellants proposed

that Matthews was to be considered an expert, the trial court ruled on a motion in

limine that Matthews’ affidavit would be treated as lay opinion testimony. The

Doucet Appellants did not appeal this ruling.

5

If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in the
form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or
inferences which are:

(1) Rationally based on the perception of the witness; and

(2) Helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the
determination of a fact in issue.

La.Code Evid. Art. 701.

Here, Matthews did not observe any facts or personally have any knowledge

of what transpired to cause the accident. Thus, he has no first-hand perception of

the accident, and his opinion on what actions could or should have been taken by

the Harley Appellees in the context of negligence is not entitled to be considered as

evidence.

After giving Matthews’ affidavit its proper regard, we find no evidence in

the record that the Harley Appellees breached its duty to take reasonable safety

precautions to protect participants in demo rides by failing to require the demo

riders to wear safety gear and use headlight modulators. Matthews’ lay opinion

was that the actions of the Harley Appellees caused the riders to be less

conspicuous. Alleman, a motorcycle enthusiast, testified that his inattention to the

roadway was caused by him seeing the riders and his desire to see the bikes being

ridden. Accordingly, it is clear that Alleman’s distraction that caused him to leave

the roadway, overcorrect, and collide with Doucet would not have been lessened

by the demo riders becoming more conspicuous. Seemingly, the opposite is true.

Thus, even if Matthews’ affidavit was to be considered evidence, it would have

little weight.

Finally, the Doucet Appellants assert that the Harley Appellants’ route

selection constitutes negligence. The Doucet Appellants point to no evidence that

an alternate, safer route existed. Rather, they only point out that the route chosen
6

by the Harley Appellees was unreasonably dangerous because the roadway had

steep slopes, multiple sharp curves, and no shoulder.

As before, the Doucet Appellants point to no evidence that corroborates their

assertion that the route was unreasonably dangerous. They rely on the testimony

of Alleman that no shoulder exists at the crash site. It is clear from reading

Alleman’s testimony that his definition of a shoulder is a space next to the travel

lanes “that has enough room to[,] at least[,] whether it’s paved or grass, fit a car.”

Thus, Alleman’s testimony on whether a shoulder was present is unreliable as it is

dependent upon his personal definition of such. Further, the Doucet Appellants

cite no evidence whatsoever to support their assertion that the roadway chosen had

steep slopes or multiple sharp curves. Accordingly, we find that the Doucet

Appellants cannot carry their burden to prove at trial that the Harley Appellees

choice of route was negligent. Further, we note that the Doucet Appellants cite no

authority and point to no evidence that a vendor of motor vehicles is responsible, in

any fashion, for the conditions of roadways used by the motoring public when

potential customers take their vehicles for a test drive.

In summation, the Doucet Appellants produced no evidence that the Harley

Appellees had a duty to obtain a police escort for the demo ride, that the Harley

Appellees breached their duty to take reasonable safety precautions to protect

participants in demo rides by failing to require the demo riders to wear safety gear

and use headlight modulators, and that the route chosen by the Harley Appellees

constitutes negligence. Accordingly, the trial court correctly found that the Doucet

Appellants could not carry their burden of proof at trial for their negligence claim

against the Harley Appellees.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NUMBERS TWO THROUGH SIX:

7

Our findings in assignment of error number one render discussion and

analysis of the remaining assignments moot. As such, we will not address them.

DISPOSITION:

Kim Doucet and Gaston Doucet raise six assignments of error. We find no

merit in the first assignment of error. Our finding in that assignment of error, that

the Harley Appellees are entitled to summary judgment dismissing them from the

case, renders the remaining assignments of error moot and dictates that we affirm

the trial court’s judgment. Costs are assessed to Kim Doucet and Gaston Doucet.

AFFIRMED.

8