Gary Morgan v. Craig Stephen Pardue

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

15-149

GARY N. MORGAN

VERSUS

CRAIG STEPHEN PARDUE, ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CONCORDIA, NO. 47,733
HONORABLE LEO BOOTHE, DISTRICT JUDGE

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MARC T. AMY
JUDGE

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Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, John D. Saunders, and
Marc T. Amy, Judges.

APPEAL DISMISSED. REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

J. W. Seibert, III
Madaline Cross Gibbs
Seibert and Gibbs, PA
Post Office Box 2038
Vidalia, LA 71373
(318) 336-9676
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
Gary N. Morgan

Stephen Babcock
Chase Tettleton
Babcock Partners, LLC
10101 Siegen Lane, Suite 3C
Baton Rouge, LA 70810
(225) 344-0911
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS:
Craig Stephen Pardue
Leslie Pardue
CLS Hunting Club, LLC

Brandy McClure
Post Office Box 665
Jonesville, LA 71343
(318) 339-7337
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Amanda Smith Pardue

AMY, Judge.

The defendants in this matter are the purchasers, or successors-in-interest to

the purchasers, of a certain parcel of immovable property. The credit sale deed

provided for payment in the form of a cash payment, a promissory note, and ten

years of payments which were expected pursuant to a federal contract on the

property. The plaintiff subsequently filed suit seeking dissolution of the sale for

nonpayment of the purchase price. After a trial, the trial court ordered dissolution

of the sale. One of the defendants appeals. However, for the reasons that follow,

we find that the trial court’s judgment does not satisfy the requirements of a final

judgment and that this court does not have jurisdiction in this matter. Accordingly,

we do not reach any assignments of error, nor do we address the motion to strike

filed by the appellant. We dismiss the appeal and remand the matter to the trial

court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, Gary Morgan, was the owner of a parcel of immovable

property in Concordia Parish. According to the record, Mr. Morgan placed the

property into the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) through the Farm Service

Agency (FSA). The record suggests that Mr. Morgan entered into a CRP contract

whereby he agreed to abide by the rules and regulations of the CRP program and in

return would receive a certain number of annual rental payments.

After Mr. Morgan entered into the CRP contract, he began negotiations with

one of the defendants, Craig Stephen Pardue, to sell the property. The result of

those negotiations was that, in 2009, Mr. Morgan sold the property by credit sale

deed to Amanda Smith Pardue, Craig’s then-wife, and their two children, Leslie

Cristine Pardue and Stafford Weston Pardue. The credit sale deed provided for

payment in the form of a $74,000 cash payment; a $36,000 promissory note,

payable at 5% interest and maturing in five years; and reservation to Mr. Morgan

of ten years of CRP payments in the amount of $5,480 per year. The credit sale

deed noted that the purchasers could satisfy the CRP reservation by making a lump

sum payment equal to any remaining CRP payments. The $36,000 promissory

note was attached and paraphed “ne varietur” to identify it with the credit deed.

Craig and Amanda have since divorced, and the record contains a

community property settlement and amended community property settlement that

transfers Amanda’s 40% interest in the property to Craig and provides that Craig

will hold Amanda harmless for any debt associated with the property. Craig,

Stafford, and Leslie subsequently transferred their interest in the property to CLS

Hunting Club, LLC. Documents filed into evidence indicate that Craig, Stafford,

and Leslie were all managers of that limited liability company. Further, the record

indicates that Stafford died after that transfer was made and that his interest was

split between Craig and Leslie.

Whether annual payments were required by the promissory note is disputed

by the parties. According to Mr. Morgan, the credit sale deed contemplates annual

payments. Craig’s position is that the promissory note itself does not require

annual payments. Mr. Morgan testified that Craig was unable to make an annual

payment in 2010, and that he and Craig agreed to forego that payment and

recalculate the remaining payment schedule. The record indicates that Craig made

a payment of $10,027.45 in 2011. Although Craig attempted a payment of $1,500

in 2012, Mr. Morgan refused to accept that payment. Craig also attempted a

payment of $34,048.52 after the institution of this action; according to Craig, that

payment was made on the maturity date of the promissory note and was sufficient

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to satisfy the outstanding balance. The record indicates that Mr. Morgan refused

acceptance of that payment as well and that those monies were deposited in the

registry of the court.

In 2012, the FSA learned that Mr. Morgan was no longer the owner of the

property. Whether the defendants had an obligation to transfer the CRP contract to

their names and whether they had missed the window of opportunity to do so was

hotly contested at trial. In any event, the FSA cancelled the CRP contract and

required Mr. Morgan to repay the annual rental payments he had received, a “cost

share” payment plus interest, and liquidated damages.

After the CRP contract was cancelled, Mr. Morgan filed the instant

litigation, seeking dissolution of the sale pursuant to La.Civ.Code art. 2561 for

nonpayment of the price. In addition to alleging that the defendants did not abide

by the rules and regulations of the CRP program, which allowed the CRP contract

to lapse and deprived him of the annual payments he was entitled to receive, Mr.

Morgan alleged that the defendants failed to make annual payments as required by

the promissory note.

After a trial, the trial court found in favor of Mr. Morgan and entered

judgment:

dissolving the sale of the property described in Paragraph 2 of
Plaintiff’s petition subject to a return of all consideration paid by the
Defendants, Craig Stephen Pardue, Amanda Smith Pardue, Leslie
Cristine Pardue, and the Unopened Succession of Stafford Weston
Pardue, to the Plaintiff, Gary N. Morgan, less and except the
following setoffs and credits:

a) The repayment to FSA of $16,915.66 ($16,452.00 in
principal and $463.66 in interest) which is the amount of the three (3)
CRP payments which Plaintiff actually received subsequent to the sale
plus interest;

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b) The balance of the retained and reserved CRP payments,
and which amounts to $38,388.00;

c) The cost share due by Plaintiff to FSA in the amount of
$5,751.88;

d) The liquidated damages due to FSA in the amount of
$1,370.94;

e) Lost hunting lease rentals in the amount of $1,500.00 for
four (4) years, totaling $6,000.00.

The total setoffs and credits applicable to the required return of
the purchase price paid by Defendants to Plaintiff presently totals
$68,426.48.

Craig now appeals, asserting that the trial court erred in dissolving the sale.

Additionally, although she has not filed an answer to the appeal, Amanda requests

in her appellate brief that she be dismissed from this suit. Finally, Craig has filed a

motion to strike Mr. Morgan’s appellate brief and its exhibits.1

Discussion

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

An appeal can be dismissed at any time for lack of jurisdiction. Goal

Props., Inc. v. Prestridge, 14-422 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/5/14), 150 So.3d 610;

La.Code Civ.P. art. 2162. Even when the parties do not raise the issue, appellate

courts have the duty to examine sua sponte whether they have subject matter

jurisdiction. Frank v. City of Eunice, 13-1118 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/5/14), 134 So.3d

222. Significantly, the appellate court’s jurisdiction is not properly invoked in the

absence of a valid final judgment. Input/Output Marine Sys., Inc. v. Wilson

Greatbatch, Tech., Inc., 10-477 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/29/10), 52 So.3d 909. See also

La.Code Civ.P. art. 2083. A final judgment is one that determines the merits of a

1
While Craig’s motion to strike does not specify whether he objects to Mr. Morgan’s
brief or Amanda’s brief, the timing of the filing and the context therein make it apparent that he
is referring to Mr. Morgan’s brief and exhibits.

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controversy in whole or in part, and must be identified as such by appropriate

language. Brooks v. Sibille, 12-1093, 12-1094 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/30/13), 107 So.3d

826. See also La.Code Civ.P. arts. 1841 and 1918. Thus, a “final appealable

judgment must contain decretal language, and it must name the party in favor of

whom the ruling is ordered, the party against whom the ruling is ordered, and the

relief that is granted or denied.” Gaten v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Sys., 11-1133,

p. 3 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/23/12), 91 So.3d 1073, 1047.

A final judgment must also be precise, definite, and certain. Kimsey v. Nat’l

Auto. Ins. Co., 13-856 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/14), 153 So.3d 1035. Where a final

judgment is rendered upon a money demand, the amount of recovery must be

indicated with certainty and precision. Id. Further, a final judgment must not

include amounts to be determined by a future contingency. Id. Similarly, “[t]hese

requirements should be evident without reference to other documents in the

record.” Goal Properties, 130 So.3d at 613.

The judgment herein dissolves the sale of the subject property:

subject to a return of all consideration paid by the Defendants, Craig
Stephen Pardue, Amanda Smith Pardue, Leslie Cristine Pardue, and
the Unopened Succession of Stafford Weston Pardue, to the Plaintiff,
Gary N. Morgan, less and except the following setoffs and credits[.]

Although the amounts of the setoffs and credits are defined in the judgment,

the amount actually paid by the defendants to Mr. Morgan is not indicated.

Certainly, that amount is not indicated with certainty and precision. Further, there

is no way to determine what was paid by the defendants to Mr. Morgan without

reference to other documents in the record. See Goal Properties, 150 So.3d 610.

Thus, the amount of recovery due, and whether it is due to either Mr. Morgan or

the defendants, is not apparent from the judgment. Accordingly, we find that the

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judgment of the trial court, as constructed, is indeterminate and is therefore not a

valid, appealable final judgment.

We additionally note that, when a final judgment concerns the title to

immovable property, La.Code Civ.P. art. 1919 requires that the judgment “describe

the immovable property affected with particularity.”2 The trial court’s judgment in

this matter fails to do so, instead referring to “the property described in Paragraph

2 of Plaintiff’s petition[.]”

Accordingly, having found that the trial court’s judgment is not a valid and

appealable final judgment, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, we do

not reach either Craig’s assignments of error or Amanda’s in-brief request. Nor do

we reach Craig’s motion to strike. We dismiss the present appeal and remand for

further proceedings.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we find that the trial court’s judgment dated

November 13, 2014, is not a valid and appealable final judgment. We dismiss the

appeal and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs of

this appeal are assessed to the appellant, Craig Stephen Pardue.

APPEAL DISMISSED. REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

2
As discussed in Goal Properties, 150 So.3d 610, in some cases where the judgment
rendered has failed to describe the immovable property affected with particularity, and the record
is sufficient such that the property’s description is apparent from the record on appeal, the
appellate court has addressed the merits of the matter and amended the judgment to include the
description. See, e.g., Fields v. Etheridge, 487 So.2d 551 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1986). In other cases,
the appellate court has determined the merits of the case and remanded for reformation of the
judgment to comply with La.Code Civ.P. art. 1919. See, e.g., Young v. Tolintino, 44,631
(La.App. 2 Cir. 12/2/09), 26 So.3d 835, writ denied, 10-5 (La. 4/9/10), 31 So.3d 391. However,
we have determined above that the judgment in this matter is not a valid and appealable final
judgment and thus need not address this issue.

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