St. Landry Homestead Federal Savings Bank v. Hubert Vidrine

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

CA 15-220

ST. LANDRY HOMESTEAD FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK

VERSUS

HUBERT VIDRINE, ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
TWENTY-SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ST. LANDRY, NO. 11-C-5310-A
HONORABLE JAMES PAUL DOHERTY, JR., DISTRICT JUDGE

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PHYLLIS M. KEATY

JUDGE

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Court composed of Judges Marc T. Amy, Phyllis M. Keaty, and D. Kent Savoie.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Savoie, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

David J. Ayo
James Huey Gibson
Allen & Gooch
Post Office Box 81129
Lafayette, LA 70598-1129
(337) 291-1450
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
St. Landry Homestead FederalSavings Bank

H. Kent Aguillard
Post Office Drawer 391
Eunice, LA 70535-0391
(337) 457-9331
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
St. Landry Homestead FederalSavings Bank

Cliffe Edward Laborde, III
Mathook & LaFleur
600 Jefferson St., 10th Floor
Post Office Box 3009
Lafayette, LA 70501
(337) 266-2303
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS:
Vidrine Estates, LLC
Hubert Vidrine
Tammy Vidrine

Gary T. Cornwell
The Cornwell Law Firm
12314 Hawthorne Drive
Montgomery, TX 77356
(936) 448-7789
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS:
Vidrine Estates, LLC
Hubert Vidrine
Tammy Vidrine

KEATY, Judge.

The appellee, St. Landry Homestead Federal Savings Bank, filed a Motion

to Dismiss Devolutive Appeal, asserting therein that the appeal should be

dismissed as having been taken from a non-appealable judgment. For the reasons

below, we hereby dismiss the appeal.

The appellee filed exceptions of no cause of action, prescription, and no

right of action. On November 13, 2014, the trial court sustained the appellee’s

exception of no cause of action as to the appellants’ claims of fraud and breach of

contract and sustained the exception of prescription as to the appellants’ duress

claim, dismissing these claims with prejudice. The trial court, however, overruled

the appellee’s exception of no cause of action as to appellants’ claim of tortious

interference with business relations. Notice of judgment was issued on November

19, 2014.

On January 20, 2015, the appellants motioned the trial court for a devolutive

appeal, which was granted. The record was subsequently received and lodged in

this court. A Motion Dismiss Devolutive Appeal was received from the appellee

on March 23, 2015. The appellee states therein that the appeal should be dismissed

because the judgment is not a final judgment as defined by La.Code Civ.P. art.

1915(B).

The judgment appealed does not dispose of all the claims and rights of the

parties. Further, the trial court did not designate the judgment as immediately

appealable after an express determination that there is no just reason for delay; thus,

the judgment is not appealable. La.Code Civ.P. art. 1915(B). Accordingly, we

grant the motion and dismiss the appeal at appellants’ cost, without prejudice.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION.

Rule 2-16.3 Uniform Rules, Court of Appeal.

2

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

15-220

ST. LANDRY HOMESTEAD
FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK

VERSUS

HUBERT VIDRINE, ET AL.

SAVOIE, Judge, dissenting:

I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision. In the interest of

judicial efficiency, I would set the matter for hearing to give the appellant time to

obtain an order certifying the judgment at issue as final in accordance with

La.Code Civ. P. art. 1915(B). Otherwise, this matter may end up before us again if

such certification is later obtained, or, the matter may go to trial without any

evidence being admitted on the claims that were dismissed. If the matter is then

appealed following trial, and we later conclude that dismissal of those claims was

improper, the matter may be remanded for another trial. One trial seems more

efficient.

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

15-220

ST. LANDRY HOMESTEAD
FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK

VERSUS

HUBERT VIDRINE, ET.AL.

SAVOIE, Judge, dissenting:

I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision. In the interest of

judicial efficiency, I would set the matter for hearing to give the Appellant time to

obtain an order certifying the judgment at issue as final in accordance with

La.Code Civ. P. art. 1915(B). Otherwise, this matter may end up before us again if

such certification is later obtained, or, the matter may go to trial without any

evidence being admitted on the claims that were dismissed. If the matter is then

appealed following trial, and we later conclude that dismissal of those claims was

improper, the matter may be remanded for another trial. One trial seems more

efficient.