Kwan Anderson v. Wanda Bailey

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

15-304

KWAN ANDERSON

VERSUS

WANDA BAILEY, ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF EVANGELINE, NO. 74,217
HONORABLE CHUCK R. WEST, DISTRICT JUDGE

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PHYLLIS M. KEATY
JUDGE

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Court composed of Elizabeth A. Pickett, Phyllis M. Keaty, and David Kent Savoie,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Guy O. Mitchell
Mitchell Law Offices
225 Court Street
Ville Platte, Louisiana 70586-4492
(337) 363-0400
Counsel For Plaintiff/Appellant:
Kwan Anderson

Joseph T. Puhekker
Leah B. Guilbeau & Associates
Caffery Plaza, Suite 100
4023 Ambassador Caffery Pkwy.
Lafayette, Louisiana 70503
(337) 988-7240
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees:
Wanda Ardoin-Bailey
State Farm Fire & Casualty Company

KEATY, Judge.

Plaintiff, Kwan Anderson, appeals the trial court’s granting of summary

judgment in favor of Defendants, Wanda Ardoin-Bailey and State Farm Fire &

Casualty Company. For the following reasons, the trial court’s judgment is

affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This personal injury lawsuit arose when Anderson sustained injuries on

September 7, 2012, after falling through the floor of a home rented by his

girlfriend and mother of his child, Meagan Thomas. The portion of the floor that

Anderson fell through was weak, which was noted in the lease executed

approximately three months earlier on June 9, 2012 between Thomas and the

home’s owner, Ardoin-Bailey. The lease provided that Thomas was responsible

for the home’s condition and stated that Thomas agreed to repair the floor in

question in exchange for a reduction in monthly rent. The floor was never repaired.

As a result of Anderson’s fall and injuries, he filed a Petition for Damages

against Ardoin-Bailey and her insurer, State Farm. Defendants answered and

asserted a third-party demand therein against Thomas, requesting enforcement of

the applicable lease provisions and indemnification for any damages should the

trial court assess same against Defendants. Defendants also filed a Motion for

Summary Judgment. At the hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment,

Defendants presented their legal arguments and admitted into evidence the lease,

Ardoin-Bailey’s affidavit, and portions of Thomas’ deposition testimony. After

the trial court considered Defendants’ argument and memoranda, along with

Plaintiff’s brief since his counsel waived oral argument, it granted summary

judgment in open court. Plaintiff’s counsel subsequently appeared after the trial

court’s oral ruling and, despite Defendants’ counsel’s objection, Plaintiff’s counsel

was allowed to present oral argument. Thereafter, the trial court again granted

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed Plaintiff’s suit at his

cost pursuant to its Judgment dated January 21, 2015.

On appeal, Plaintiff’s sole assignment of error is that the trial court erred in

granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Summary judgments are reviewed de novo, applying the same standard to

the matter as that applied by the trial court.” Southpark Cmty. Hosp., LLC v.

Southpark Acquisition Co., LLC, 13-59, p. 13 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/30/13), 126 So.3d

805, 814, writ denied, 13-2794 (La. 2/28/14), 134 So.3d 1175. Judgment is

rendered “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions,

together with the affidavits, if any, admitted for purposes of the motion for

summary judgment, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact, and that

mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(B)(2).

A fact is material when its existence or nonexistence may be
essential to a plaintiff’s cause of action under the applicable theory of
recovery. “[F]acts are material if they potentially insure or preclude
recovery, affect a litigant’s ultimate success, or determine the
outcome of the legal dispute.” In other words, a material fact is one
that would matter on the trial on the merits. “Any doubt as to a
dispute regarding a material issue of fact must be resolved against
granting the motion and in favor of a trial on the merits.”

Southpark Cmty. Hosp., LLC, 126 So.3d at 815 (citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s sole assignment of error is that the trial court erred in granting

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment although he frames the issue as

whether the lease released the lessor, Ardoin-Bailey, from liability arising from

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injuries sustained by an alleged third-person visitor, Anderson. We first consider

the substantive law governing the litigation in order to determine whether a

material fact exists. Id.

A lease is a synallagmatic contract requiring both the lessor and the lessee to

perform certain obligations. Id. The lessor’s obligations include delivering the

thing that is the subject of the lease to the lessee, maintaining it in suitable

condition, and ensuring the lessee’s peaceful possession during its duration. Id.

and La.Civ.Code art. 2682. The lessee’s obligations include paying rent pursuant

to the lease’s terms, prudently administering the lease according to its terms, and

delivering the thing to the lessor at the lease’s end. Southpark Cmty. Hosp., LLC,

126 So.3d 805 and La.Civ.Code art. 2683.

Utilizing the foregoing law, we will review the evidence to determine

whether Ardoin-Bailey and Thomas performed their obligations. The lease was

entered into by and between Ardoin-Bailey as the “Owner” and Thomas as the

“Tenant” for rental of the house at issue. Ardoin-Bailey signed the lease on June 3,

2012, and Thomas signed it on June 9, 2012. The lease provides: “As the rental

payment is $300 per month instead of $400 per month, the Tenant agrees and is

fully responsible for ALL repairs and upkeep to the residence. Tenant also agrees

to repair floor, paint walls, and add flooring and will do so in a timely manner.”

Thomas, therefore, received a rental reduction in exchange for her promise to

timely repair the floor at issue.

In her deposition testimony, Thomas testified that she signed the lease. Her

testimony reveals that she negotiated with Ardoin-Bailey for a rental reduction in

exchange for Thomas’ promise to fix the floor. Thomas testified that she told

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Ardoin-Bailey that her paw paw, who was a carpenter, would repair the floor. Her

testimony reveals that Anderson lived with her as soon as she moved in.

Another lease provision provides, in pertinent part: “A pre-rental walk-

through was conducted on June 2, 2012 by the tenant and owner representative. I[,

Thomas,] acknowledge the property is in good condition, and I[, Thomas,] accept

the responsibility of the property.” Thomas, therefore, viewed the property, agreed

that it was in good condition, and accepted responsibility for same. Since the lease

provides that Thomas agreed “to be bound by the terms and conditions of” the

lease, her responsibility included fixing the floor as she promised, which promise

Ardoin-Bailey relied upon in reducing the rent. Thomas’ deposition testimony

reveals that her paw paw never repaired the floor and that the area of the floor he

was supposed to repair is the same area through which Anderson fell.

Thomas’ testimony is confirmed by Ardoin-Bailey’s affidavit wherein she

attested to the execution of the lease and the pre-rental walkthrough. During this

pre-rental walkthrough, Ardoin-Bailey indicated that Thomas acknowledged the

home’s good condition and accepted responsibility for same in accordance with the

terms of the lease. Ardoin-Bailey swore that she reduced the monthly rent by $100

in exchange for Thomas’ “promise to add flooring and repair floors.” Despite the

foregoing, Ardoin-Bailey indicated that after Thomas moved into the house, she

“did not receive any complaints regarding the condition of the [p]remise’s floors,

nor did anyone inform [her] that Ms. Thomas failed to make the flooring repairs

required by the Lease.”

Based on the above evidence, Ardoin-Bailey fulfilled her obligations as a

lessor. On the other hand, the evidence shows that Thomas failed to fulfill her

obligations as a lessee. Pursuant to the lease’s terms, Thomas assumed the

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responsibility for the condition of the house, including the responsibility to repair

the floor at issue. This assumption of responsibility relieves Ardoin-Bailey from

liability pursuant to La.R.S. 9:3221, which provides:

Notwithstanding the provisions of Louisiana Civil Code Article
2699, the owner of premises leased under a contract whereby the
lessee assumes responsibility for their condition is not liable for injury
caused by any defect therein to the lessee or anyone on the premises
who derives his right to be thereon from the lessee, unless the owner
knew or should have known of the defect or had received notice
thereof and failed to remedy it within a reasonable time.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:3221 was discussed by this court in O’Neill v.

Thibodeaux, 97-1065, p. 23 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/6/98), 709 So.2d 962, 974, writs

denied, 98-741, 98-870 (La. 5/1/98), 718 So.2d 416, 420 (citations omitted), as

follows:

[I]n order for an owner-lessor to escape liability under a lease
pursuant to La.R.S. 9:3221, he must prove that the lessee assumed
responsibility for the condition of the premises under the contract of
lease, that the injury must have occurred either to the lessee or anyone
on the premises with the permission of the lessee, and that he did not
know nor should have known of the defect.

In the instant matter, Ardoin-Bailey initially knew of the weak floor. Her

responsibility for its condition, however, ceased when they executed the lease

pursuant to its terms and conditions, that is, a reduction in monthly rent in

exchange for Thomas’ promise to fix the floor. There is no evidence indicating

that Ardoin-Bailey was told that the floor had never been fixed following the

execution of the lease and prior to Anderson’s fall. We, therefore, agree with the

trial court’s oral ruling that “there is no genuine issue of material facts in this

particular case.”

Anderson also contends that since he was a third-person visitor rather than a

resident, Ardoin-Bailey is liable for his injuries. Thomas’ deposition testimony

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that Anderson lived with her as soon as she moved in directly contradicts his

allegation. The trial court granted summary judgment based upon her deposition

testimony and the absence of any evidence submitted by Plaintiff in contravention

of Defendants’ summary judgment evidence. We find that the trial court was

correct in this regard.

DECREE

The trial court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of Defendants,

Wanda Ardoin-Bailey and State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, is affirmed. All

costs of this appeal are assessed to Plaintiff, Kwan Anderson.

AFFIRMED.

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