Krista M. Stegall, Etc. v. Dawn Landry Laborde

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

15-306

KRISTA M. STEGALL

VERSUS

DAWN LANDRY LABORDE

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APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. 2012-1824
HONORABLE DURWOOD W. CONQUE, DISTRICT JUDGE

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PHYLLIS M. KEATY
JUDGE

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Court composed of Elizabeth A. Pickett, Phyllis M. Keaty, and David Kent Savoie,
Judges.

Pickett, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.

AFFIRMED.

Richard Ducote
Attorney at Law
4800 Liberty Avenue, Third Floor
Pittsburgh, PA 15224
(412) 687-2020
In Proper Person/Appellant

Anthony J. Fontana, Jr.
Attorney at Law
210 N. Washington St.
Abbeville, LA 70510
(337) 898-8332
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee:
Dawn Landry LaBorde

KEATY, Judge.

Plaintiff’s attorney, Richard Ducote, appeals a judgment of the trial court

sanctioning him under La.Code Civ.P. 863. For the following reasons, we affirm.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In October 2011, during a custody proceeding before Judge David Blanchet

between Krista Stegall and Brandon Mouret, their young daughter made an

allegation of abuse by the son of Dawn Laborde, Mr. Mouret’s girlfriend.

Subsequently, on March 30, 2012, Ms. Stegall filed a petition for damages against

Ms. Laborde, seeking damages as a result of the alleged abuse. Following a trial

on August 7-8, 2012, in the custody suit, Judge Blanchet found that Ms. Stegall

failed to prove the allegations of abuse; a judgment to that effect was signed on

October 24, 2012. Meanwhile, the civil suit was still pending. A trial by jury was

originally set for February 19, 2013, but was continued for additional discovery.

The trial was reset for September 23, 2013. Two weeks before trial, Ms. Stegall

filed a motion to dismiss the suit without prejudice because of the minor child’s

unwillingness to testify. Judge Durwood Conque denied the motion to dismiss

without prejudice, and ordered the trial continued to the next day. When

Ms. Stegall did not proceed with the trial on September 24, 2013, Judge Conque

dismissed the suit with prejudice. The dismissal was memorialized in a judgment

signed on October 7, 2013. No appeal was taken, and that judgment is now final.

On September 24, 2014, one year from the signing of the judgment

dismissing Ms. Stegall’s case, Ms. Laborde filed a Rule for Sanctions against

Mr. Ducote, claiming that the suit was filed in violation of La.Code Civ.P. arts.

863 and 864. Specifically, Ms. Laborde claimed that Mr. Ducote filed the civil

action without doing sufficient investigation of the claims, failed to investigate

through discovery after the suit was filed, refused to dismiss the case when Judge

Blanchet found a lack of proof in the custody case, sought a continuance for further

discovery and then failed to conduct such discovery, failed to subpoena any

witnesses for trial after having filed three witness lists, and refused to dismiss the

petition in the instant matter when he knew he would not proceed to trial.

Ms. Laborde further argued that:

[Mr. Ducote] never intended to try this case as he was only
proceeding with appearing to prepare for trial to harass mover and to
scare mover into paying money to protect the name and reputation of
her minor son who was guilty of nothing[,] . . . all of which is a
serious breach of respondent’s duty as an officer of the Court, a
violation of Article 863 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure and
Article 864 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure which has cost[]
mover thousands of dollars in attorney’s fees and costs much less
unjustified worry, anxiety[,] and grief for she and her son.

Following a December 8, 2014 hearing, Judge Conque awarded sanctions against

Mr. Ducote payable to Ms. Laborde in the amount of $21,210.56. Mr. Ducote now

appeals that judgment.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

On appeal, Mr. Ducote asserts one assignment of error: “ The trial court

erred and manifestly abused its discretion in awarding the Appellee La.Code Civ.P.

art. 863 sanctions in the amount of $21,210.56, plus costs, against Appellant

counsel.”

DISCUSSION

The trial court imposed sanctions pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art. 863, which

states:

A. Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be
signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose
address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney
shall sign his pleading and state his address.

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B. Pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit
or certificate, except as otherwise provided by law, but the signature
of an attorney or party shall constitute a certification by him that he
has read the pleading, and that to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry, he certifies all
of the following:

(1) The pleading is not being presented for any
improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary
delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation.

(2) Each claim, defense, or other legal assertion in
the pleading is warranted by existing law or by a
nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law.

(3) Each allegation or other factual assertion in the
pleading has evidentiary support or, for a specifically
identified allegation or factual assertion, is likely to have
evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for
further investigation or discovery.

(4) Each denial in the pleading of a factual
assertion is warranted by the evidence or, for a
specifically identified denial, is reasonably based on a
lack of information or belief.

C. If a pleading is not signed, it shall be stricken unless
promptly signed after the omission is called to the attention of the
pleader.

D. If, upon motion of any party or upon its own motion, the
court determines that a certification has been made in violation of the
provisions of this Article, the court shall impose upon the person who
made the certification or the represented party, or both, an appropriate
sanction which may include an order to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of
the pleading, including reasonable attorney fees.

E. A sanction authorized in Paragraph D shall be imposed only
after a hearing at which any party or his counsel may present any
evidence or argument relevant to the issue of imposition of the
sanction.

F. A sanction authorized in Paragraph D shall not be imposed
with respect to an original petition which is filed within sixty days of
an applicable prescriptive date and then voluntarily dismissed within
ninety days after its filing or on the date of a hearing on the pleading,
whichever is earlier.

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G. If the court imposes a sanction, it shall describe the conduct
determined to constitute a violation of the provisions of this Article
and explain the basis for the sanction imposed.

“An attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action for a wilful

violation of any provision of Article 863, or for the insertion of scandalous or

indecent matter in a pleading.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 864.

Pursuant to Section G of La.Code Civ.P. art. 863, the trial court explained

the basis for its imposition of sanctions against Mr. Ducote as follows:

What concerns me most about this case is that -- the filing of
the petition was one thing, but then the continued filing of pleadings,
the continued discovery, the -- or attempts at discovery, would
indicate to me that it should have been clear at the outset and at all
times during the proceeding that this claim had no basis in evidentiary
fact.

I’m going to grant the motion. I’m going to impose sanctions.
And this is based on everything that I heard on the previous motion to
dismiss without prejudice on which I ruled and on everything that I
have read in the pleadings during that time, at that time, and since, on
the arguments given today and the evidence presented today.

....

One other thing I wanted to note, just to address some of the
arguments made by counsel, while it was pointed out as to what the
attorney defending this lawsuit might have done, I would also point
out that there’s total absence, at least before me in the custody case
after Judge Blanchet’s ruling and after all of these issues that were
called into question by it, according to counsel, there was no motion
for re-hearing, there was no appeal, there was no action taken with
regard to Judge Blanchet’s order . . . .

The only response to Judge Blanchet’s ruling apparently was
the filing of this lawsuit or the continuation of this lawsuit.

We will not disturb the trial court’s factual findings in determining whether

there has been a violation of La.Code Civ.P. art. 863 unless they are manifestly

erroneous or clearly wrong. Gulf Coast Bank v. Robino, 634 So.2d 1190 (La.App.

3 Cir.), writ denied, 635 So.2d 1101 (La.1993). “Article 863 is intended for

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exceptional circumstances only and the slightest justification for the exercise of a

legal right precludes sanctions.” Collins v. Ferrellgas, Inc., 96-810, p. 4 (La.App.

3 Cir. 2/5/97), 689 So.2d 569, 571.

Mr. Ducote filed this lawsuit on behalf of Ms. Stegall in March 2012 after

her minor daughter made an allegation of abuse in an October 20, 2011 hearing in

the custody case before Judge Blanchet.1 The issue of this alleged abuse was a

contested matter in the custody case between Ms. Stegall and Mr. Mouret.

Ultimately, after a trial in August 2012, Judge Blanchet determined that the

allegations of abuse by Ms. Laborde’s son were not proven.

At the December 8, 2014 hearing on Ms. Laborde’s Rule for Sanctions, the

parties seemed to agree that the initial filing of this lawsuit was not a violation of

the statute. Ms. Laborde argued that the ruling by Judge Blanchet should have

ended this civil suit, because the issues were the same. Judge Conque noted that

the judgment in Judge Blanchet’s court had no binding effect, but he nonetheless

used that ruling as a basis for determining that any further pleadings in the civil

suit lacked substance. Judge Conque ultimately concluded that “it should have

been clear at the outset and at all times during the proceeding that this claim had no

basis in evidentiary fact.”

This court has previously recognized that “Article 863 . . . impose[s] upon

attorneys and litigants affirmative duties as of the date a document is certified. The

obligation imposed upon litigants and their counsel who signed a document is to

make an objectively reasonable inquiry into the facts and law.” Murphy v. Boeing

Petroleum Servs., Inc., 600 So.2d 823, 826 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1992). Louisiana Code

of Civil Procedure Article 863(D) directs that “[i]f . . . the court determines that a

1
Mr. Ducote was not the attorney for Ms. Stegall at the time the allegation was made.

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certification has been made in violation of the provisions of this Article, the court

shall impose upon the person who made the certification . . . an appropriate

sanction.” (Emphasis added.) On the other hand, La.Code Civ.P. art. 864

provides that an “attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action for

a wilful violation of any provision of Article 863.” (Emphasis added.) Judge

Conque made specific reference to this distinction at the hearing on the motion for

sanctions. More particularly, he noted that if Mr. Ducote’s violation of Article 863

“were found by me to be willful, then I would be obligated. . . . and every attorney

in this room who has heard it, to report you to the disciplinary commission.” Judge

Conque then stated, “I am not necessarily saying that it was willful, but I certainly

think that it was in violation of Article 863.” Finally, Judge Conque noted that

Mr. Ducote’s voluntary dismissal of the suit did not come “within 90 days of the

filing of the original petition or at any time provided for by Section F.” Given the

foregoing, we find no manifest error in the factual findings made by Judge Conque

in support of his decision to grant Ms. Laborde’s request for sanctions.

DECREE

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed

to Mr. Richard Ducote.

AFFIRMED.

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STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

15-306

KRISTA M. STEGALL

VERSUS

DAWN LANDRY LABORDE

Pickett, J., dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. I find the trial court committed manifest error in

finding no reasonable basis for this claim, and in awarding sanctions. The record

before us fails to show any pleading signed by Mr. Ducote that was proven to be

solely for the purpose of harassment or delay. I note that in a criminal case, the

victim’s testimony, if believed by the trier of fact and free from irreconcilable

contradictions, is sufficient to support a verdict of guilty. State v. Dorsey, 10-216

(La. 9/7/11), 74 So.3d 603, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 1859 (2012).

While ultimately unsuccessful, the fact that the issue of the alleged abuse

was fully litigated in the separate custody proceeding is at the very least sufficient

to support the pleadings in this suit. Further, the majority recognizes that the result

in that suit has no preclusive effect on the claims made in the instant suit.

Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court awarding sanctions.