Christina Marie Sorrells, Born Richard v. Steven Ray Sorrells

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

15-500

CHRISTINA MARIE RICHARD SORRELLS

VERSUS

STEVEN RAY SORRELLS

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTY-EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CAMERON, NO. 10-19164
HONORABLE PENELOPE RICHARD, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

PHYLLIS M. KEATY
JUDGE

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Court composed of James T. Genovese, Shannon J. Gremillion, and Phyllis M.
Keaty, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

John Green, Jr.
Attorney at Law
1135 Hodges Street
Lake Charles, Louisiana 70601
(337) 990-0060
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant:
Christina Marie Richard Sorrells

Jonathan L. Johnson
Johnson & Vercher L.L.C.
Post Office Box 849
Lake Charles, Louisiana 70602
(337) 433-1414
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee:
Steven Ray Sorrells

KEATY, Judge.

Plaintiff/Appellant, Christina Marie Richard Sorrells, appeals the trial

court’s custody judgment. For the following reasons, the trial court’s judgment is

affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This matter involves a child custody dispute between Christina and

Defendant/Appellee, Steven Ray Sorrells, regarding their minor children: sixteen-

year-old Hunter Sorrells (male); fourteen-year-old Chelsea Sorrells (female); and,

eight-year-old Konner Sorrells (male). On March 26, 2013, Christina filed a

Petition for Divorce. On April 4, 2013, Steven also filed a Petition for Divorce

pursuant to La.Civ.Code art. 103(2),1 alleging that Christina was having an affair

with Vernon O’Quinn. Following a hearing on April 17, 2013, the trial court

orally granted Steven’s divorce. In open court, the parties also stipulated to

temporary joint custody whereby Hunter would primarily live with Steven, who

was designated as his domiciliary parent. Chelsea and Konner would primarily

live with Christina, who was designated as their domiciliary parent. A temporary

visitation schedule was also agreed upon, and everything was reduced to writing

pursuant to the trial court’s signed Judgment dated July 10, 2013.

On October 25, 2013, Steven filed a Rule for Custody or In the Alternative

to Modify Custody. He alleged that a material change in circumstances occurred

since the temporary custody order such that it was in their children’s best interest

to have him designated as their domiciliary parent. He further asked for joint

custody with Christina having reasonable visitation rights. Christina filed an

1
Louisiana Civil Code Article 103(2) provides that a divorce judgment will be granted
when “[t]he other spouse has committed adultery.”

Answer and Reconventional Demand on December 13, 2013, stating that Chelsea

and Konner should remain living with her and that she be designated as the

domiciliary parent of all three children with Steven having supervised visitation

rights. After a hearing on January 22, 2014, the trial court dismissed their previous

custody modifications and made the temporary joint custody order rendered on

July 10, 2013, a permanent order. This was reduced to writing pursuant to the trial

court’s Judgment signed on August 20, 2014.

On September 11, 2014, Steven filed a Petition for Change of Custody,

alleging that a material change in circumstances occurred such that he should be

designated as Chelsea and Konner’s domiciliary parent. Following trial on

December 2, 2014, and December 30, 2014, the trial court made the following

ruling in its written Judgment signed on March 9, 2015. The parties were awarded

shared custody of their minor children, Chelsea and Konner,2 with Steven being

designated as their domiciliary parent, subject to Christina’s visitation rights

pursuant to an attached shared custody plan. Steven remained Hunter’s “custodial

parent.” The minor children were to live with Steven from Monday through

Thursday and with Christina from Thursday until Sunday evening or Monday

morning. The only exception was that one weekend a month, Steven would have

access from Friday through Sunday. It was ordered that all three children were to

have “no access or contact” with Vernon O’Quinn, who was now Christina’s

boyfriend. Christina and the children were ordered to attend counseling, and the

trial court determined child support awards. Christina appealed.

On appeal, Christina asserts the following four assignments of error:

2
At the time of trial, Hunter had turned eighteen years old, so he was no longer a minor.

2

(1) The trial court erred by allowing an internal affairs report (IA
Report) from the Lake Charles Police Department (LCPD) regarding
its former employee, Vernon, to be introduced into evidence and used
when cross-examining witnesses;

(2) The trial court erred by conducting an in-chambers interview
with Chelsea and Konner, both minors, without having a court
reporter present to make a record of the proceedings;

(3) The trial court erred by allowing Defendant’s counsel to use
profanity and abusive language, inappropriately comment on witness
testimony, and ask questions with the intent to embarrass the
witnesses;

(4) The trial court improperly conditioned Christina’s visitation
rights by ordering that the minor children were to have no contact
with Vernon, her then fiancé and now husband, and with whom she
was residing.3

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review regarding modification of child custody was

discussed by this court in McManus v. McManus, 13-699, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir.

12/11/13), 127 So.3d 1093, 1095, as follows:

In reviewing child custody determinations, the trial court’s
decision “‘is to be afforded great deference on appeal and will not be
disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion.’” Martin v. Martin, 11-
1496, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/16/12), 89 So.3d 526, 528 (quoting
Franklin v. Franklin, 99-1738 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/24/00), 763 So.2d
759). Louisiana Civil Code Article 131 directs that “[i]n a proceeding
for divorce or thereafter, the court shall award custody of a child in
accordance with the best interest of the child.” As such, custody cases
are to be decided upon their “own particular facts and circumstances,”
keeping in mind that “the paramount goal is to do what is in the best
interest of the minor children.” Hebert v. Blanchard, 97-550, p. 4
(La.App. 3 Cir. 10/29/97), 702 So.2d 1102, 1105.

We will, therefore, use the abuse of discretion standard of review.

3
The record indicates that Vernon and Christina were only living together and not
married at the time of trial. According to Christina’s brief, however, they were subsequently
married following trial.

3

DISCUSSION

I. Internal Affairs Report

In her first assignment of error, Christina contends that the trial court erred

by allowing the introduction of the LCPD’s IA Report since it was inadmissible

hearsay. “‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while

testifying at the present trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of

the matter asserted.” La.Code Evid. art. 801(C). Public records and reports are an

exception to and are not excluded by the hearsay rule pursuant to La.Code Evid. art.

803(8)(a). Christina alleges, however, that the IA Report is excluded from the

exception to the hearsay rule pursuant to La.Code Evid. art. 803(8)(b), which

provides:

Except as specifically provided otherwise by legislation, the
following are excluded from this exception to the hearsay rule:

(i) Investigative reports by police and other law enforcement
personnel . . . .

....

(iv) Factual findings resulting from investigation of a
particular complaint, case, or incident, including an investigation into
the facts and circumstances on which the present proceeding is based
or an investigation into a similar occurrence or occurrences.

Christina further contends that the trial court erred in allowing Steven’s

counsel to use the IA Report during the cross-examination of her and Vernon since

police reports and medical testing are inadmissible without proper authentication

and foundation. In support, she cites Bandy v. Bandy, 07-849, pp. 9-10 (La.App. 3

Cir. 12/5/07), 971 So.2d 456, 461-62, wherein this court held:

More specifically, without authentication and a proper
foundation, the drug test results should have been excluded as hearsay
under Article 803(6) of the Code of Evidence, and the police reports
should have been excluded under Article 803(b)([i]). . . .

4

....

In the present case, Patrick represented himself and introduced
the drug test results into evidence without calling a single witness to
testify as to their authenticity and to the practices under which the
information was gathered.

In opposition, Steven contends that the IA Report was introduced as

impeachment evidence after Vernon was untruthful as to the reason why he was no

longer employed by the LCPD. Steven alleges that it was properly admitted as

extrinsic evidence pursuant to La.Code Evid. art. 613 which provides:

Except as the interests of justice otherwise require, extrinsic
evidence of bias, interest, or corruption, prior inconsistent statements,
conviction of crime, or defects of capacity is admissible after the
proponent has first fairly directed the witness’ attention to the
statement, act, or matter alleged, and the witness has been given the
opportunity to admit the fact and has failed distinctly to do so.

The IA Report is a compilation of photographs, statements, correspondence,

police reports, DNA and polygraph test results, LCPD case notes, and settlement

documents surrounding an administrative investigation arising from sexual assault

allegations made by Judy Bellard against Vernon while he was employed by the

LCPD. The police report shows that Bellard accused Vernon of forcing her to

perform oral sex on him on November 25, 2005, while he was on duty. She

alleged that this occurred inside of a vacant house located in Lake Charles. She

stated that after Vernon ejaculated in her mouth and left, she placed his semen into

a plastic bag and brought it to the police station. In his statement, Vernon agreed

that his semen could be found at the vacant house although his version of events

differed. He stated that after entering the vacant house, he found a pornographic

magazine. He said that he assumed that he was alone and, therefore, masturbated,

ejaculated on the floor, and left. The DNA analysis revealed that a DNA swab

taken from Vernon matched the DNA found in the semen that Bellard brought to

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the police station. The polygraph test shows that Vernon was not being truthful

about Bellard performing oral sex on him. Correspondence from the City of Lake

Charles reveals that Vernon was placed on paid administrative leave on December

1, 2005, pending an investigation into Bellard’s allegations. Following the

investigation, the LCPD case notes dated December 23, 2005, reveal that Vernon

was found to have violated the following LCPD rules: (1) conduct unbecoming of

an officer; (2) neglect of duty; (3) false or inaccurate reports, and; (4) truthfulness.

The settlement documents contain a Receipt and Release dated July 25, 2006,

wherein Bellard was paid $90,000 to dismiss her federal civil lawsuit with

prejudice against the City of Lake Charles, Vernon, and Donald Dixon, the LCPD

Police Chief. Of this $90,000, the City of Lake Charles paid $83,200 and Vernon

paid $6,800. The parties agreed that the settlement constituted a compromise of

the disputed claims and that the $90,000 payment was not to be construed as any

admissions of fault or liability on the part of Vernon or his co-defendants.

Based on the IA Report, Vernon’s departure from the LCPD arose from

Bellard’s allegations and subsequent investigation. Vernon, however, was

untruthful as to the reasons surrounding his departure as shown in his trial

testimony taken on December 30, 2014. The transcript shows that Steven’s

counsel questioned him multiple times as to the reason for departure. Steven’s

counsel asked Vernon about the length of time he was employed by the LCPD.

Vernon testified that he was employed from 2004 through 2006 until he “went

from [the] LCPD back to running a crane.” His testimony indicates that he left the

LCPD because he was paid more as a crane operator. This is shown when

Steven’s counsel asked Vernon if “cranes pay better” and he responded, “[y]eah,

about $38 an hour.” Steven’s counsel then asked: “So after two years of civil

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service work, you decided to go make more money somewhere else?” In response,

Vernon replied, “[r]ight.” Steven’s counsel asked Vernon whether he left the

LCPD “for a better opportunity in [20]06,” and he replied, “[y]eah.”

Steven’s counsel asked Vernon whether he was “ever fired from any job[,]”

and he replied: “No. Well -- no, I don’t think. Not that I can remember.” Vernon

continued denying that he was ever fired or forced to leave any job. Vernon

testified that it was always his “own decision” to leave a job and that he has

“always been able to decide whether or not [he] want[ed] to stay or leave.”

Steven’s counsel asked whether the LCPD was dissatisfied with him when he left,

and his response was, “[w]hen I left [the] LCPD, it was for financial reasons.”

Vernon’s testimony changed when he was subsequently confronted with the

IA Report at trial. When Steven’s counsel asked Vernon to identify the IA Report,

he responded: “It’s an Internal Affairs case report . . .[, and] I was given

instructions that this was never to be spoke[n] about again . . . [and] that it was a

sealed document that I would never have to discuss again.” The foregoing

response shows that he knew about the IA Report at trial and that he was less than

truthful regarding his departure from the LCPD.

Vernon’s untruthfulness impacted the trial court’s decision to allow the IA

Report into evidence in order to attack his credibility. This is evident when the

trial court said, “I wrote it down. [Vernon] said, ‘I always had a choice to stay or

leave a job[,]’” and that allowing it into evidence “goes to his character and it goes

to his credibility.” In its oral ruling following the December 30, 2014 trial, the trial

court stated: “I didn’t find [Vernon] credible at all. I’m concerned about

[Christina’s] denial about the allegations and the things her children are saying

about [Vernon]. That’s a real big concern that I have.”

7

Based on the above testimony and evidence, the trial court correctly allowed

the IA Report into evidence since it was used extrinsically to impeach Vernon’s

credibility and not to prove the truth of the facts contained within. The transcript

shows that it was admitted only after Steven’s counsel directed Vernon’s attention

to the circumstances surrounding his departure from the LCPD. He was given

multiple opportunities to admit the truth concerning his departure which he failed

to do.

The use of hearsay documents used as extrinsic evidence to impeach a

witness was discussed in Evangelista v. U.S. Welding Service, Inc., 03-2824

(La.App. 1 Cir. 12/30/04), 898 So.2d 438. Therein, the defendant in the initial trial

denied having filed a police report against the plaintiff. In ruling against the

plaintiff, the trial court stated that its holding was based upon which side it

believed. The plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for a new trial, attaching to it a

police report that the defendant previously filed against the plaintiff and which the

defendant lied about during the initial trial. The trial court denied the motion for a

new trial, and the plaintiff appealed. On appeal, defense counsel stated that the

trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion and that police reports

are inadmissible hearsay. In reversing and remanding the matter, the appellate

court stated:

Our examination of the facts and circumstances of this case convinces
us that the trial court’s denial of a new trial was a clear abuse of its
discretion resulting in a miscarriage of justice, given the existence of
the evidence raised in plaintiff’s motion that impacted directed [sic]
on the credibility of Mr. Porche, a key witness in this matter. As
noted, a review of the witness statement he gave to the police reveals
that it contains several statements inconsistent with his trial testimony.
Moreover, these inconsistencies relate to issues that go directly to the
core of plaintiff’s claims. As the trial court specifically recognized in
rendering judgment for defendant, this case turned largely on the
court’s credibility determinations. Under these circumstances, we

8

conclude the trial court’s denial of a new trial was a manifest abuse of
its discretion.

Id. at 442.

The IA Report in this case directly impacted Vernon’s credibility just as in

Evangelista, 898 So.2d 438. A review of Vernon’s trial court testimony is

inconsistent with the IA Report regarding the events surrounding his departure

from the LCPD. These inconsistencies relate to issues that go directly to the core

of Steven’s child custody claims.

The trial court found that the IA Report was an exception to the hearsay rule.

We also observe that evidentiary rules are somewhat relaxed in child custody

matters. See La.Code Evid. art. 1101(B)(2). Accordingly, we find that the trial

court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the introduction of the IA Report as it

was extrinsic evidence used to attack Vernon’s credibility.

II. Cross-Examination & In-Chambers Interview

In her second assignment of error, Christina contends that the trial court

erred by having an in-chambers interview with Chelsea and Konner, both minors,

without having a court reporter present to make a record of the proceedings.

“[T]he law in this circuit requires that an ‘in chambers’ interview of a child in a

child custody case ‘must be conducted with a reporter present and a record made of

the questioning by the court and the answers of the witnesses.’” Hicks v. Hicks,

98-1527, p. 9 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/19/99), 733 So.2d 1261, 1267 (quoting Dykes v.

Dykes, 488 So.2d 368, 371 (La.App. 3 Cir.), writ denied, 489 So.2d 1278

(La.1986)). Christina alleges that the trial court inappropriately allowed Steven’s

counsel to use Chelsea and Konner’s unrecorded answers during her cross-

9

examination. She further contends that the trial court’s ruling was partially based

on information obtained from the in-chambers interview.

The transcript refutes her assertion by showing that the trial court knew that

it could not consider information obtained from the unrecorded in-chambers

interview. Jurisprudence also shows that the trial court had authority to proceed.

In Watermeier v. Watermeier, 462 So.2d 1272 (La.App. 5 Cir.), writ denied, 464

So.2d 301 (La.1985), the issue was whether, during a custody hearing and over the

objection of counsel for one of the parties, the trial court could conduct an

unrecorded, in-chambers interview of the minor children. The fifth circuit held

that since there was an objection, the trial court should not have conducted the in-

chambers interview. It further held that had there been no objection, however, the

trial court could have proceeded with the unrecorded, in-chambers interview.

Specifically, it stated:

We do not intend or direct that the above procedure is ordained
or is mandatory when there is no objection from either side regarding
the examination of any child by the judge. In such case, the trial
judge may examine any child or witness in chambers, on or off the
record, and with or without parents and/or counsel being present—
provided all agree on the procedure.

Id. at 1275.

Christina contends that the trial court erred by letting Steven’s counsel

question her during cross-examination with information obtained from Chelsea’s

in-chambers interview. Christina alleges that during the in-chambers interview,

Chelsea said that she would rather attend school in Hackberry than Sulphur.

Steven’s counsel’s use of that information during her cross-examination was,

therefore, inappropriate according to Christina. The record refutes her contention

by showing that Chelsea actually testified to the same thing at trial, i.e., that she

10

wants to attend school in Hackberry rather than Sulphur. Since Chelsea’s trial

testimony and the information obtained from her in-chambers interview is

consistent, Steven’s use of that information during Christina’s cross-examination

was not inappropriate.

Christina further contends that the trial court erred by relying on information

obtained from Konner’s in-chambers interview since he never testified at trial.

Once again, the record refutes her assertion. The trial court’s oral ruling is void of

any reference to the children’s, much less Konner’s, in-chambers interview.

Additionally, Konner’s name is only mentioned in the oral ruling when the trial

court orders counseling for all of the children. This is in contrast to the majority of

the oral ruling wherein the trial court specifically mentions Chelsea’s and Hunter’s

names when referencing their trial testimony. The oral ruling further states that the

trial court did not like how the kids were split up. This supports Hunter’s trial

testimony that if Chelsea and Konner lived in Hackberry with their father, it would

have a positive effect on the entire family and that Chelsea and Konner “would like

that a lot.” The trial court, therefore, did not base its custody determination on the

children’s in-chamber interviews.

Although a trial court may improperly interview a child in chambers, it is

not necessarily reversible error if the trial court did not rely on the exchange, and

there was sufficient evidence in the record for the trial court’s ruling. Accordingly,

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this regard.

III. Courtroom Decorum

In her third assignment of error, Christina contends that the trial court erred

by allowing Steven’s counsel to disrespect her and Vernon by using profanity and

abusive language, inappropriately comment on their testimony, and ask questions

11

with the intent to embarrass them. Christina asserts that the foregoing violates

Louisiana’s Rules of Professional Conduct, including Rule 4.4(a), which provides

that “a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to

embarrass, delay, or burden a third person[.]” In support, Christina provides pages

of trial testimony wherein Vernon was questioned about the oral sex incident,

attempting to show that it was abusive, insulting, and embarrassing. We find that

although Steven’s use of the IA Report may have been embarrassing given the

subject matter contained therein, it was not submitted for the purpose of

embarrassing him.

The admissibility of a witness’s arrest records in order to attack credibility is

generally prohibited under La.Code Evid. art. 609(F) although there are some

exceptions. Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 1101(B)(2) provides for the

limited applicability of the rules concerning the admissibility of evidence in child

custody cases. “The specific exclusionary rules and other provisions, however,

shall be applied only to the extent that they tend to promote the purposes of the

proceeding.” Id. “All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise

provided by the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of Louisiana,

this Code of Evidence, or other legislation.” La.Code Evid. art. 402. “‘Relevant

evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact

that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less

probable than it would be without the evidence.” La.Code Evid. art. 401.

The admissibility of testimony in a child custody case regarding a parent’s

arrest was discussed by this court in L.E.P.S. v. R.G.P., 08-1349 (La.App. 3 Cir.

6/3/09), 11 So.3d 633, writ denied, 09-1429 (La. 7/1/09), 11 So.3d 498, a case that

is factually similar to this case. In L.E.P.S., the plaintiff mother appealed the trial

12

court’s judgment in favor of the defendant father, who was named primary

domiciliary custodial parent of their triplet daughters. This court reversed and

remanded the matter based upon the trial court’s failure to allow the testimony

provided by a deputy and the father regarding the father’s arrest for carnal

knowledge of a juvenile. We held:

Appellate courts have held that a parent’s arrests are relevant to
their moral fitness to parent a child. . . .

....

Accordingly, we find the testimony and records concerning
R.G.P.’s arrest in March 2008, for carnal knowledge of a juvenile
(Tensas Parish) and contributing to the delinquency of a juvenile
(Franklin Parish) should have been properly admitted. The fact that
R.G.P. was arrested for having sex with a fifteen-year-old girl
following a night of mud-riding at his camp, is highly relevant to his
moral fitness to parent the triplets. Additionally, his citation in May
2008, for possession of drug paraphernalia was also relevant to his
moral fitness.

Id. at 641-42.

In this case, the record contains Vernon’s trial testimony that the children

would be in his presence when they were at Christina’s house. He also testified

that he was charged with a crime and arrested following Bellard’s accusations. His

testimony indicates that after a federal civil suit was instituted by Bellard, he paid

her $6,800 and the City of Lake Charles paid her $83,200 to sign an affidavit of

non-prosecution. Vernon testified that as a result of the settlement, the suit was

dismissed.

Chelsea’s trial testimony indicates that Vernon made her feel uncomfortable

at home. She testified that he would “randomly . . . come in [her] room and try to

have a conversation with [her], but . . . he just stares[,] and it’s . . . uncomfortable

to [her].” She further testified that he would enter her room at night and stand by

13

her bed. She testified that he often observed her coming in and out of the

bathroom.

In addition to both Vernon’s and Chelsea’s testimonies, the fact that he was

arrested for forcing Bellard to perform oral sex on him while he was on duty as a

police officer, a position of control and authority, is relevant to his moral fitness to

parent the children. Additionally, any relevant evidence bearing on someone who

might possibly be the children’s future step-father should be considered in making

a determination as to which custody arrangement would be in the children’s best

interest. See Drewett v. Drewett, 524 So.2d 893 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1988). Any

evidence leading to the best interest of the children is admissible according to

La.Code Evid. art. 1101(B)(2) where the Rules of Evidence are relaxed in matters

of custody. The information contained therein is relevant, and both Christina and

Vernon were properly questioned with respect to it.

Accordingly, the trial court did not err in this regard.

IV. Forbidden Contact With Children

In her fourth assignment of error, Christina contends that the trial court

improperly conditioned visitation by ordering that the minor children were not to

have contact with Vernon, her then fiancé and now husband, and with whom she

was residing. In support, she cites Becnel v. Becnel, 98-593, p. 5 (La.App. 5 Cir.

3/25/99), 732 So.2d 589, 592, writ denied, 99-1165 (La. 6/4/99), 744 So.2d 630,

which provides:

“A parent not granted custody or joint custody of a child is
entitled to reasonable visitation rights unless the court finds, after a
hearing, that visitation would not be in the best interest of the child.”
La. Civ.Code Art. 136(A). The law recognizes the non-custodial
parent’s entitlement to reasonable visitation unless it is shown it
would seriously endanger the child’s mental, moral or emotional
health. Maxwell v. LeBlanc, 434 So.2d 375, 377 (La.1983). The

14

rights of any parent, however, are always subservient to the best
interests of the child. Maxwell v. LeBlanc, 434 So.2d at 377.

We find that Becnel, 732 So.2d 589, is distinguishable from the facts in the

instant case since in Becnel, there was no evidence showing that the step-mother

was a threat to the children. In this case, the IA Report itself shows that Vernon’s

moral fitness could possibly be a threat to the children, especially Chelsea. Even if

the IA Report was not admissible, there is trial testimony showing that Vernon’s

history casts doubt on his character and reputation. This includes Chelsea’s

testimony that she is uncomfortable around him and that she heard him curse at her

younger brother. She also testified that Christina “puts Vernon before me and

Konner.”

Hunter’s trial testimony corroborates Chelsea’s testimony in that he also

voiced concerns regarding Vernon to Christina. Hunter testified that his siblings

do not like Vernon because “he screams, yells at them, cusses at them, [and] treats

them horribl[y].” Hunter stated that Vernon is “disrespectful and hateful” to his

siblings and that he disliked Vernon because he broke up his parents’ marriage.

Vernon’s testimony further indicates that he lied under oath regarding his

reason for departure from the LCPD because he believed that his personnel records

were sealed. The trial court, therefore, probably gave more weight to the

children’s testimony regarding incidents occurring in the home rather than

Vernon’s. Also, and as previously mentioned, the trial court stated that it was very

concerned regarding Christina’s denial about the things her children told her about

Vernon.

15

Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in conditioning

Christina’s visitation by prohibiting the minor children from having contact with

Vernon.

DECREE

The trial court’s custody judgment is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are

assessed to Plaintiff/Appellant, Christina Marie Richard Sorrells.

AFFIRMED.

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