Era Helicopters, LLC v. Daniel Amegin

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

15-753

ERA HELICOPTERS, LLC

VERSUS

DANIEL AMEGIN

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APPEAL FROM THE
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 2015-280
HONORABLE RONALD F. WARE, DISTRICT JUDGE

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ELIZABETH A. PICKETT
JUDGE

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Court composed of Elizabeth A. Pickett, Billy Howard Ezell, and John E. Conery,
Judges.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Timothy O’Dowd
Attorney at Law
921 Ryan St., Suite D
Lake Charles, LA 70601
(337) 310-2304
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE:
Daniel Amegin

Russell J. Stutes, Jr.
Shelley B. Bouillion
Stutes & Lavergne, LLC
600 Broad Street
Lake Charles, LA 70601
(337) 433-0022
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT:
ERA Helicopters, LLC

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PICKETT, Judge.

Employer appeals the trial court‟s dismissal of its suit against a former

employee pursuant to the employee‟s exception of no cause of action. For the

following reasons, we reverse and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

FACTS

ERA Helicopters, L.L.C. filed this suit against its former employee, Daniel

Amegin, to collect $80,000 it paid for Mr. Amegin to receive AW139 helicopter

training during his employment with ERA. Mr. Amegin received the training

pursuant to a Pilot Training Agreement executed by him and ERA on September 4,

2013. Mr. Amegin acknowledged in the Pilot Training Agreement that he was a

full-time pilot with ERA when he executed it. There is no indication that the

AW139 helicopter training was a requirement of his continued employment with

ERA. Approximately six months after completing the training, Mr. Amegin

resigned his employment with ERA.

Under the terms of the Pilot Training Agreement, Mr. Amegin agreed to

reimburse ERA the $80,000 it expended on his AW139 training if he left its

employment within two years of completing the training. Mr. Amegin refused

ERA‟s demands for repayment of the $80,000, and ERA filed suit.

Mr. Amegin filed an exception of no right of action, asserting that the Pilot

Training Agreement violates the provisions of La.R.S. 23:921. The trial court

granted the exception and dismissed ERA‟s suit. ERA appealed.

DISCUSSION

In Scheffler v. Adams and Reese, LLP, 06–1774, pp. 4–5 (La. 2/22/07), 950

So.2d 641, 646-47 (case citations omitted), the supreme court reviewed the

exception of no cause of action, explaining:

As used in the context of the peremptory exception, a “cause of
action” refers to the operative facts which give rise to the plaintiff‟s
right to judicially assert the action against the defendant. The purpose
of the peremptory exception of no cause of action is to test the legal
sufficiency of the petition by determining whether the law affords a
remedy on the facts alleged in the petition. No evidence may be
introduced to support or controvert the exception of no cause of
action. LSA–C.C.P. art. 931. The exception is triable on the face of
the pleadings, and, for purposes of resolving the issues raised by the
exception, the well-pleaded facts in the petition must be accepted as
true. The issue at the trial of the exception is whether, on the face of
the petition, the plaintiff is legally entitled to the relief sought.

Louisiana retains a system of fact pleading, and mere
conclusions of the plaintiff unsupported by facts will not set forth a
cause or right of action.

The party who filed the exception disputing the existence of a cause of action bears

the burden of demonstrating that a petition fails to state a cause of action. Id.

Appellate courts review the trial court‟s ruling on an exception of no cause

of action de novo “[b]ecause the exception of no cause of action raises a question

of law and the district court‟s decision is based solely on the sufficiency of the

petition.” Scheffler, 950 So.2d at 647. Ultimately, the court must determine

“whether, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and with every doubt resolved

in the plaintiff‟s favor, the petition states any valid cause of action for relief.” Id.

The premise of Mr. Amegin‟s exception is that La.R.S 23:921(A)(1)

prohibits the Pilot Training Agreement provision that he repay ERA the $80,000 it

expended for his AW139 helicopter training. Hence, it is based on an affirmative

defense. In such cases, the exception of no cause of action must be overruled

“unless the allegations of the petition exclude every reasonable hypothesis other

than the premise upon which the defense is based.” Haskins v. Clary, 346 So.2d

193, 195 (La.1977).

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Louisiana Revised Statues 23:921(A)(1) states, in pertinent part: “Every

contract or agreement, or provision thereof, by which anyone is restrained from

exercising a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind, except as provided in

this Section shall be null and void.” Mr. Amegin argues that the Pilot Training

Agreement‟s requirement that he repay ERA $80,000 for his AW139 helicopter

training, if he left ERA‟s employment within two years of his completion of the

training, created a financial burden for him that had the effect of “restrain[ing] him

from exercising a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind.” We do not

agree. The Pilot Training Agreement does not restrain Mr. Amegin in any way

from seeking other employment as a helicopter pilot or in any other capacity in the

helicopter industry or in any other profession, business, or trade. Indeed, it is

likely that the AW139 helicopter training expanded Mr. Amegin‟s opportunities

for more lucrative employment as a helicopter pilot.

Mr. Amegin likens this case to earlier cases in which employment

agreements required the payment of liquidated damages. The agreements in those

cases required the employees to pay their employers liquidated damages if the

employees entered into the same field of business as the former employers within a

period of two years. Those agreements were held to violate the provisions of

La.R.S. 23:921. 1 See, e.g., McCray v. Cole, 259 La. 646, 251 So.2d 161 (1971).

Mr. Amegin argues that the courts‟ determinations in those cases that the

liquidated damages provision restrained the employees‟ competition with their

former employers apply here.

1
Mr. Amegin also cites cases decided by courts in Alabama and California that were
based on statutes similar to La.R.S. 23:921. See Walker Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. McDonald, 775
So.2d 169 (Ala. 2000); Chamberlain v. Augustine, 172 Cal. 285, 150 P. 479 (1916).

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In McCray v. Cole, 259 La. at 655, 251 So.2d at 164, the supreme court

determined: “„Liquidated damages‟ is a term which our courts have held to be

synonymous with the penal clause defined in Civil Code article 2117.” The

supreme court determined that because “the principal obligation supporting the

penal clause [was] the agreement not to engage in the practice of psychology in

Lafayette Parish for two years, a business which would compete with that of his

employer, R.S. 23:921 render[ed] the agreement null and unenforceable.”

McCray, 259 La. at 656, 251 So.2d at 164.

The substance of then Article 2011 is now found in Article 2005 of the Civil

Code, which provides, in pertinent part: “Parties may stipulate the damages to be

recovered in case of nonperformance . . . That stipulation gives rise to a secondary

obligation for the purpose of enforcing the principal one.” The Pilot Training

Agreement provides for ERA‟s recoupment of the $80,000 it expended on

Mr. Amegin‟s AW139 training, either through his employment for two years or by

reimbursement of the $80,000 if he decided to terminate his employment. If

Mr. Amegin remained employed with ERA for one year after he completed the

AW139 training, the $80,000 would have been reduced to $40,000. ERA‟s

recoupment of its $80,000 is the primary obligation of the Pilot Training

Agreement. It is not a secondary obligation imposed to enforce a principal

obligation of not competing with ERA.

ERA wants to recoup its $80,000 investment, and it does not care whether

that recoupment is through Mr. Amegin‟s employment with it as a helicopter pilot

or not. Therefore, the Pilot Training Agreement‟s provision for repayment of the

$80,000 is not a penal clause that restrained Mr. Amegin from “exercising a lawful

profession, trade, or business of any kind,” as prohibited by La.R.S. 23:921(A)(1).

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Mr. Amegin failed to carry his burden of proving that ERA‟s petition does not state

a cause of action.

DISPOSITION

For the reasons discussed herein, the trial court‟s judgment granting the

exception of no cause of action and dismissing ERA‟s petition is reversed, and the

matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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