CA-0015-1019 Nonprecedential Affirmed and remanded Processed

William Mathews v. Louisiana State University Health Systems

Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit · Filed March 2, 2016

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Opinion text

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

15-1019

WILLIAM MATHEWS, HUSBAND AND WIDOWER OF DECEDENT,
GERANDA MATHEWS

VERSUS

LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY HEALTH SYSTEMS, d/b/a W. O.
MOSS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER

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APPEAL FROM THE
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 2015-41
HONORABLE CLAYTON DAVIS, DISTRICT JUDGE

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ELIZABETH A. PICKETT
JUDGE

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Court composed of Elizabeth A. Pickett, James T. Genovese, and Shannon J.
Gremillion, Judges.

AFIRMED AND REMANDED.

Sera Hearn Russell, III
Attorney at Law
P. O. Box 53866
Lafayette, LA 70505-3866
(337) 237-7171
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE:
William Mathews

Robert Lewis Bussey
Bussey & Lauve
P. O. Box 8778
Alexandria, LA 71306-1778
(318) 449-1937
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT:
Louisiana State University HealthSystems

PICKETT, Judge.

In this medical malpractice case, Louisiana State University Health Systems

d/b/a W. O. Moss Regional Medical Center (Moss Regional) appeals the judgment

of the trial court granting a summary judgment on the issues of liability and

causation in the treatment of Geranda Mathews, the deceased wife of the plaintiff,

William Mathews.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Mrs. Mathews presented to Moss Regional on July 13, 2009, with

complaints of pain. Tests revealed a mass in the right upper lobe of her right lung.

Her treating physicians, Dr. Arnold Kent Seale and Dr. Ping Kok Lie, suspected

she may have had cancer, and ordered a biopsy. The biopsy, performed on July 15,

2009, failed to obtain enough tissue for the pathologist to make a diagnosis. A

second biopsy was attempted at Moss Regional in October 2009, but again there

was insufficient tissue to enable diagnosis. Mrs. Mathews was never diagnosed

with or treated for cancer at any time by the physicians at Moss Regional.

In April 2010, Mrs. Mathews was admitted to Our Lady of Lourdes

Hospital, where she was suffering from paraplegia. A biopsy of the mass in her

lung was positive for cancer. The tumor in her lung had grown and attached itself

to her spinal column, causing pain and paraplegia. Mrs. Mathews was treated, but

ultimately died as a result of the cancer.

Mr. Mathews filed a medical malpractice against Moss Regional, alleging

the failure of the doctors at Moss Regional to diagnose Mrs. Mathews’ cancer

caused her paraplegia and pain and decreased her chances of receiving treatment

that may have been successful. The matter was referred to a Medical Review

Panel (MRP). The MRP issued an opinion that Moss Regional, Dr. Seale, and Dr.

Lie failed to comply with the appropriate standard of care, and that their conduct

was “a factor” in the damages to Mrs. Mathews. In their Reasons for Opinion, the

MRP stated that Mrs. Mathews was not diagnosed timely by Moss Regional and its

affiliated doctors.

Mr. Mathews filed this lawsuit. He filed a motion for summary judgment on

the issues of liability and damages, and introduced the opinion of the MRP and the

affidavit of Dr. Andrew Harwood, the oncologist who treated Mrs. Mathews at Our

Lady of Lourdes. Mr. Mathews alleged that the damages suffered by Mrs.

Mathews were obviously greater than the $500,000.00 cap on damages for medical

malpractice and, therefore, summary judgment was appropriate. Moss Regional

denied that summary judgment was appropriate, but presented no evidence to

support its position.

The trial court granted Mr. Mathews motion for summary judgment on the

issue of liability and causation, but reserved the determination of damages for trial.

Moss Regional filed an application for supervisory writs with this court, which was

converted to the instant appeal because the trial court’s judgment was an

appealable judgment pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art. 1915(A)(5).

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Moss Regional asserts three assignments of error:

1. The trial court committed legal error by granting summary
judgment in favor of the plaintiff on the issue of causation when the
Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the plaintiff only sought a
summary judgment on the issues of liability and damages.

2. The trial court committed legal error by granting summary
judgment in favor of the plaintiff on the issue of causation when there
remains a genuine issue of material fact as to what degree the
deceased’s pre-existing cancer caused or contributed to her damages.

3. To the extent the trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment on the basis that the defendant did not provide a
countervailing affidavit the trial court’s judgment was error.

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DISCUSSION

An appellate court reviews summary judgments de novo, using the same

criteria as the trial court. Gray v. Am. Nat’l Prop. & Cas. Co., 07-1670 (La.

2/26/08), 977 So.2d 839. In order to prevail on a motion for summary judgment,

the moving party must show that there are no genuine issues of material fact and

that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(B)(2);

Duncan v. U.S.A.A. Ins. Co., 06-363 (La. 11/29/06), 950 So.2d 544.

Actions for medical malpractice claims filed against state health care

providers are governed by La.R.S. 40:1299.39, et seq. The plaintiff’s burden of

proof in a medical malpractice claim against the state is defined in La.R.S.

40:1299.39(B)(1) as the standard set forth in La.R.S. 9:2724(A):

[T]he plaintiff shall have the burden of proving:

(1) The degree of knowledge or skill possessed or
the degree of care ordinarily exercised by physicians,
dentists, optometrists, or chiropractic physicians licensed
to practice in the state of Louisiana and actively
practicing in a similar community or locale and under
similar circumstances; and where the defendant practices
in a particular specialty and where the alleged acts of
medical negligence raise issues peculiar to the particular
medical specialty involved, then the plaintiff has the
burden of proving the degree of care ordinarily practiced
by physicians, dentists, optometrists, or chiropractic
physicians within the involved medical specialty.

(2) That the defendant either lacked this degree of
knowledge or skill or failed to use reasonable care and
diligence, along with his best judgment in the application
of that skill.

(3) That as a proximate result of this lack of
knowledge or skill or the failure to exercise this degree of
care the plaintiff suffered injuries that would not
otherwise have been incurred.

Thus, Mr. Mathews bears the burden of proving (1) the requisite standard of care

required of Moss Regional and the physicians in its employ, (2) that the physicians

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at Moss Regional lacked this requisite knowledge or skill or failed to use

reasonable care or diligence in the treatment of Mrs. Mathews, and (3) that the

malpractice of Moss Regional and its physicians caused Mrs. Mathews to suffer

damages. Mr. Mathews also has the burden of proving the quantum of damages

suffered as a result of the medical malpractice.

The evidence submitted by Mr. Mathews included the report of the medical

review panel. It stated that Moss Regional and its physicians fell below the

standard of care required of them, and that the failure to diagnose Mrs. Mathews

cancer in a timely manner was a factor in her worsening condition. Mr. Mathews

also submitted the affidavit of Dr. Harwood, who declared:

In my expert medical opinion as a radiation oncologist with 40
years experience treating lung cancer, the doctors at Moss Regional
who saw Ms. Matthews in July 2009 fell below the appropriate
standard of care by failing to diagnose Ms. Mathews obvious lung
cancer at that point in time. If she had been diagnosed in July 2009,
more treatment options would have been available to her with a better
chance of cure and a much lower chance of being paralyzed and in
pain for the remainder of her life. Thus the duration and quality of
Geranda Mathews life would have been much better if she had been
diagnosed in July 2009, and failure to diagnose then resulted in
catastrophic problems for the patient.

Dr. Harwood’s affidavit clearly finds that Moss Regional and its physicians

breached the standard of care, and their failure to diagnose Mrs. Mathews’

“obvious lung cancer” limited her treatment options, likely resulted in her

paralysis, and caused her to be in more pain than she would have been in if she had

been diagnosed and treated sooner. Moss Regional submitted no evidence to refute

the evidence submitted by Mr. Mathews.

In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we find this evidence is

sufficient to prove the required elements of the applicable standard of care, a

breach of that standard of care, and damage to Mrs. Mathews because of that

breach. We find the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment.
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On appeal, Moss Regional argues that the trial court’s grant of summary was

improper because Mrs. Mathews’ cancer would have progressed as it did even if it

had been found in July 2009. There is no evidence in the record before us to

support that argument. In fact, the evidence of record supports just the opposite

conclusion.

Moss Regional also asserts that the trial court’s ruling on causation

precludes its ability to mount a defense on this issue of damages. However, at the

trial to prove damages, Mr. Mathews bears the burden of proving the damages

suffered by his wife as a result of Moss Regional’s malpractice. Nothing in the

judgment of the trial court or this court precludes Moss Regional from mounting a

defense to counter his proof of damages.

Finally, we find no merit in Moss Regional’s third assignment of error. Mr.

Mathew did not prevail on summary judgment because Moss Regional failed to

introduce a countervailing affidavit. Mr. Mathews prevailed because the evidence

he presented showed that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that he

was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed

to the Louisiana State University Health Systems in the amount of $886.50. The

case is remanded for further proceedings.

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.

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