Andre Perkins v. Tricia N. Guidry, M.D.

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

15-1177

ANDRE PERKINS

VERSUS

TRICIA N. GUIDRY, M.D., ET AL.

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 2008-5162
HONORABLE RONALD F. WARE, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

SHANNON J. GREMILLION
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of John D. Saunders, James T. Genovese, and Shannon J.
Gremillion, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Roger Burgess
Erin McCall Alley
Baggett, McCall, Burgess, Watson & Gaughan, L.L.C.
3006 Country Club Road
Lake Charles, LA 70606
(337) 478-8888
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:
Andre Perkins

John L. Hammons
Cornell Flournoy
Nelson & Hammons
705 Milam Street, Suite A
Shreveport, LA 71101
(318) 227-2401
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:
Andre Perkins

J. Gregory Bergstedt
Elizabeth F. Shea
Fraser, Wheeler, & Bergstedt
4350 Nelson Road
Lake Charles, LA 70606
(337) 478-8595
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES:
Louisiana Medical Mutual Ins. Co.
Tricia N. Guidry, M.D.

GREMILLION, Judge.

The plaintiff, Andre Perkins, appeals the trial court‘s judgment in favor of

the defendant, Dr. Tricia N. Guidry, finding that she did not breach the standard of

care following the death of his wife, Eboni Perkins, and their unborn son (Hunter).

For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case involves the most tragic of circumstances. Andre and Eboni, who

was twenty-eight years old, were expecting their first child. At twenty-three weeks

gestation, Eboni was admitted by her obstetrician, Dr. Guidry, to Women and

Children‘s Hospital in Lake Charles on Friday, February 3, 2005, with a diagnosis

of idiopathic thrombocytopenia purpura (ITP). 1 In the early morning hours of

Monday, February 7, 2005, both Eboni and her unborn son died. Along with

cardiac arrest, the cause of death listed on Eboni‘s death certificate was

―Thromboembofic Thrombocytopenia Purpura‖ or TTP. 2

Andre, individually and on behalf of the estate of Eboni, filed a claim

pursuant to the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act on February 3, 2006. The

medical review panel rendered an opinion in favor of Dr. Guidry on July 23, 2008.

Andre filed a petition for damages on October 3, 2008. In November 2009, Dr.

Guidry filed a motion for summary judgment, which was denied. Following a jury

1
A person with ITP has unusually low count of platelets that often leads to bruising or
bleeding with an unknown cause.
2
TTP is thrombotic thrombocytopenic purpura, a condition in which the person also has
low blood platelets, but the blood clots due to spontaneous platelet aggregation, which interferes
with the proper flow of blood to the body‘s organs. DORLAND‘S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL
DICTIONARY, 1707 (W.B. Saunders Company 28th ed. 1994), defines thromboembolism as the
―obstruction of a blood vessel with thrombotic material carried by the blood stream from the site
of origin to plug another vessel.‖ Thromboembofic and thromboembolism mean the same thing.

trial, the trial court rendered judgment in May 2015, in favor of Dr. Guidry. Andre

now appeals and assigns as error:

1. The trial court committed legal error by refusing to grant
appellant‘s motion for directed verdict on the issue of whether
appellant had proved the applicable standard of care.

2. The trial court committed legal error by giving confusing and
legally insufficient jury instructions that stated that the plaintiff
was required to prove three elements, i.e., the applicable
standard of care, a breach of the standard of care, and a causal
relationship between the breach and the harm, while
simultaneously providing the jury with a verdict form which
omitted any reference to proof of the applicable standard of care.

3. The jury committed manifest error by failing to conclude that
appellee, Dr. Tricia Guidry, violated her duty to provide her
patient, Eboni Perkins, with informed consent regarding the
proposed medical and surgical management.

4. The jury committed manifest error by failing to conclude that
the appellee deviated from applicable standards of care with
regard to the decedent‘s medical and surgical management.

Directed Verdict

Perkins argues that the trial court legally erred in failing to grant his directed

verdict as to the first prong of La.R.S. 9:2794, because the appellee had judicially

confessed that Perkins had proved the applicable standard of care. The trial court

refused to grant the directed verdict on the grounds that it might mislead the jury as

to the evidence.

A trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to grant a motion for

directed verdict. Vallery v. All Am. Life Ins. Co., 429 So.2d 513 (La.App. 3 Cir.),

writ denied, 434 So.2d 1091 (La.1983). In Guidry v. Beauregard Electric

Cooperative, Inc., 14–1108, pp. 17–18 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/8/15), 164 So.3d 266, 279,

writs denied, 15–900, 15–903 (La.9/11/15), 176 So.3d 1038, we summarized the

standard for reviewing a trial court‘s grant of a motion for directed verdict:

2

In Melancon v. Lafayette Insurance Co., 05–762, p. 12 (La.App.
3 Cir. 3/29/06), 926 So.2d 693, writs denied, 06–974, 06–1006
(La.6/16/06), 929 So.2d 1291, 1293, this court noted that while
Article 1810 does not establish standards for the grant of a directed
verdict, such standards have been jurisprudentially established. These
standards were enumerated by this court in Carter v. Western Kraft
Paper Mill, 94–524, pp. 4–5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/2/94), 649 So.2d 541,
544 (citations omitted):

[A] directed verdict should only be granted when the
facts and inferences point so strongly in favor of one
party that the court believes reasonable people could not
reach a contrary verdict. It is appropriate, not when there
is a preponderance of evidence, but only when the
evidence overwhelmingly points to one conclusion. The
propriety of granting a directed verdict must be evaluated
in light of the substantive law underpinning the plaintiff‘s
claims.

Under the foregoing legal principles the question is
not whether in our view the plaintiff has proven his case
against defendants by a preponderance of the evidence,
but rather, whether, upon viewing the evidence submitted,
we conclude that reasonable people could not have
reached a verdict in favor of the plaintiff against the
defendants. . . .

Questions of credibility should not be resolved by a
directed verdict. Making credibility evaluations is one of
the primary duties of a jury and the trial court may not
take this duty from the jury unless the party opposing the
directed verdict has failed to produce sufficient evidence
upon which reasonable and fair-minded persons could
disagree. Evaluations of credibility play no part in
reaching a decision on a motion for directed verdict.

In medical malpractice cases, an appellate court reviews the factual

determinations of the trial court using the manifest error standard of review:

An appellate court, in reviewing a [factfinder‘s] factual
conclusions, must satisfy a two-step process based on the record as a
whole: there must be no reasonable factual basis for the trial court‘s
conclusion, and the finding must be clearly wrong. Kaiser v. Hardin,
06-2092, pp. 11-12 (La.4/11/07), 953 So.2d 802, 810; Guillory v.
Insurance Co. of North America, 96-1084, p. 5 (La. 4/8/97), 692
So.2d 1029, 1032. This test requires a reviewing court to do more
than simply review the record for some evidence, which supports or
controverts the trial court‘s finding. The court must review the entire

3

record to determine whether the trial court‘s finding was clearly
wrong or manifestly erroneous. Guillory, 09-0075 at p. 16, 16 So.3d
at 1118: Kaiser, 06-2092 at p. 12, 953 So.2d at 810. The issue to be
resolved on review is not whether the jury was right or wrong, but
whether the [factfinder‘s][] [] conclusion was a reasonable one.
Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 844 (La.1989); Canter v. Koehring
Co., 283 So.2d 716, 724 (La.1973).

McGlothin v. Christus St. Patrick Hosp., 10-2775, pp. 16-17 (La.7/1/11), 65 So.3d

1218, 1231.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2794 states in pertinent part:

A. In a malpractice action based on the negligence of a physician
licensed under R.S. 37:1261 et seq., a dentist licensed under R.S.
37:751 et seq., an optometrist licensed under R.S. 37:1041 et seq., or a
chiropractic physician licensed under R.S. 37:2801 et seq., the
plaintiff shall have the burden of proving:

(1) The degree of knowledge or skill possessed or the degree of care
ordinarily exercised by physicians, dentists, optometrists, or
chiropractic physicians licensed to practice in the state of Louisiana
and actively practicing in a similar community or locale and under
similar circumstances; and where the defendant practices in a
particular specialty and where the alleged acts of medical negligence
raise issues peculiar to the particular medical specialty involved, then
the plaintiff has the burden of proving the degree of care ordinarily
practiced by physicians, dentists, optometrists, or chiropractic
physicians within the involved medical specialty.

(2) That the defendant either lacked this degree of knowledge or skill
or failed to use reasonable care and diligence, along with his best
judgment in the application of that skill.

(3) That as a proximate result of this lack of knowledge or skill or the
failure to exercise this degree of care the plaintiff suffered injuries that
would not otherwise have been incurred.

Louisiana Revised Statute 9:2794(A) provides the basis for the three-

pronged test that the plaintiff must prove in a medical malpractice action. At the

conclusion of the trial the following colloquy occurred between the parties

pertaining to the directed verdict on the issue of the applicable standard of care:

4

PLAINTIFF‘S COUNSEL:

I believe it is undisputed that we have carried that burden of proof on
establishing the standard of care and that the jury should be instructed
that the plaintiff has carried the burden of proof on the issue of the
applicable standard of care and that that issue is no longer before the
jury for its consideration, that the jury must be instructed that we did
prove the applicable standard of care and that the only two remaining
issues for their determination would be: Was it a breach of that
standard? And if there was a breach did the breach cause or was it a
substantial contributing factor in the damage suffered by the plaintiff?

....

DEFENDANT‘S COUNSEL:

Your Honor, while I‘m not offering opposition to the fact that the
standard of care was established, it‘s not on the jury verdict form. So
I don‘t think the jury would be misled or – I think they need to
address that issue, and I think, you know, a directed verdict or a
further, you know, pointing it out to the jury would be confusing.

THE COURT:

I agree with the defense position. It would be confusing. . . .

...

[T]here has been no real dispute between counsel or the witnesses as
to the applicable standard of care, but it is – it‘s not on – the jury
hasn‘t – it‘s not on the verdict form.

To comment any further than I have already I think would
cause some confusion, and –

....

--I don‘t want it in any way - - give the jury the impression that
I am commenting on the evidence or the facts or interfering with their
duties or also get the impression - - the jury get the impression that
there is some kind of a concession of some sort that could lead to
some confusion. And therefore I‘m going to deny the motion for
directed verdict.

Given the above, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing

to grant a directed verdict on the first prong of the three requirements of proof of

medical malpractice. There was no dispute at trial regarding the applicable

5

standard of care, and we agree that a directed verdict on that issue would be

misleading and confusing to the jury. This would be akin to granting a directed

verdict on the issue of whether a defendant owed a duty to a plaintiff in a tort suit

without addressing breach, causation, and damages. To a lay person, this could

easily be construed as a ―win‖ in favor of the plaintiff without consideration of the

rest of the requirements. This is an improper use of a directed verdict.

Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.

Jury Instructions

Andre argues that the trial court‘s instructions to the jury compounded the

failure to grant the directed verdict because instructing the jury that the plaintiff

bore the burden of proving the applicable standard of care was erroneous since Dr.

Guidry had judicially confessed to the applicable standard of care, and it was no

longer at issue. Andre further complains that the trial court erred in instructing the

jury regarding the first prong in a medical malpractice action while failing to put

the question on the jury form. The first question on the jury form was ―Do you

find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant, Dr. Tricia Guidry,

breached the applicable standard of care in her treatment of Mrs. Eboni Perkins?‖

We recently summarized the applicable law pertaining to jury instructions in

Wedgeworth v. Mixon, 15-686 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/3/16), 184 So.3d 876. There we

stated:

Jury instructions are generally reviewed under the manifest
error standard of review. See Wooley v. Lucksinger, 09–571, 09–584,
09-585, 09-586 (La.4/1/11), 61 So.3d 507. An appellate court must
exercise great restraint before reversing a jury verdict based on
erroneous jury instructions. Adams v. Rhodia, Inc., 07–2110 (La.
5/21/08), 983 So.2d 798. ―Trial courts are given broad discretion in
formulating jury instructions and a trial court judgment should not be
reversed so long as the charge correctly states the substance of the
law.‖ Id. at 804. When a jury is erroneously instructed, however, ―and

6

the error probably contributed to the verdict, an appellate court must
set aside the verdict.‖ Id. An appellate court assesses an allegedly
erroneous jury instruction ―in light of the entire jury charge to
determine if the charges adequately provide the correct principles of
law as applied to the issues framed in the pleadings and the evidence
and whether the charges adequately guided the jury in its
deliberation.‖ Id. at 804. ―[T]he determinative question is whether the
jury instructions misled the jury to the extent that it was prevented
from dispensing justice.‖ Id. (quoting Nicholas v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
99–2522, p. 8 (La.8/31/00), 765 So.2d 1017, 1023).

Additionally, ―when small portions of the instructions are
isolated from the context and are erroneous, error is not necessarily
prejudicial.‖ Id. at 805. ―[T]he manifest error standard for appellate
review may not be ignored unless the jury charges were so incorrect
or so inadequate as to preclude the jury from reaching a verdict based
on the law and facts.‖ Id. Therefore, the mere discovery of an error in
the judge‘s instructions on appellate review of a jury trial does not
warrant the appellate court to conduct ―the equivalent of a trial de
novo, without first measuring the gravity or degree of error and
considering the instructions as a whole and the circumstances of the
case.‖ Id. In cases wherein supplemental charges are given by the
judge, ― ‗[t]he supplemental charge must be considered as an addition
to the original instruction rather than as an independent charge. As
long as the combined charges accurately cover the point of law at
issue, no reversible error exists.‘ ‖ Id. (quoting United States v.
L’Hoste, 609 F.2d 796, 805 (5th Cir.1980)).

Id. at 880-881.

We find no error in the trial court‘s jury instructions or in the jury form that

did not inquire about the first prong pertaining to proof of the applicable standard

of care. In fact, we find that leaving the first prong off of the form worked in favor

of the plaintiff by making it a non-issue in the jury‘s view. Further, we do not find

it was prejudicial or harmful to Andre‘s case, as there was more than sufficient

evidence to find that Dr. Guidry did not breach the standard of care. Moreover, as

noted by Dr. Guidry, the jury instructions and the jury verdict form were agreed to

by all the parties and the plaintiff did not object to the jury form. Accordingly, this

assignment of error is without merit.

7

Informed Consent

The substance of Andre‘s argument is that the jury erred in failing to find

that Dr. Guidry breached the standard of care because she did not get Eboni‘s

informed consent regarding the treatment proposed for Eboni‘s hematological

condition. This case did not center on issues of whether Eboni‘s informed consent

was obtained, but the plaintiff argues that Dr. Guidry ―withheld‖ information from

Eboni and Andre, ―information which was crucial to Eboni‘s well-being and

proper medical management.‖ The statute addressing informed consent that must

be obtained by a physician is found in La.R.S. 40:1157.1, which states in part:

D. In a suit against a physician or other health care provider involving
a health care liability or medical malpractice claim which is based on
the failure of the physician or other health care provider to disclose or
adequately to disclose the risks and hazards involved in the medical
care or surgical procedure rendered by the physician or other health
care provider, the only theory on which recovery may be obtained is
that of negligence in failing to disclose the risks or hazards that could
have influenced a reasonable person in making a decision to give or
withhold consent.

In Snider v. Louisiana Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 13-579 (La. 12/10/13), 130 So.3d

922, the supreme court thoroughly discussed the law pertaining to informed

consent, stating in part:

Louisiana jurisprudence requires that a plaintiff in an action based on
a failure to obtain informed consent prove the following four elements
in order to prevail: (1) a material risk existed that was unknown to the
patient; (2) the physician failed to disclose the risk; (3) the disclosure
of the risk would have led a reasonable patient in the patient‘s position
to reject the medical procedure or choose another course of treatment;
and (4) the patient suffered injury. See Brandt v. Engle, 2000–3416
(La.6/29/01), 791 So.2d 614, 619 n. 1.

The informed consent doctrine is based on the principle that
every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done to his or her own body. Surgeons and
other doctors are thus required to provide their patients with sufficient
information to permit the patient himself to make an informed and
intelligent decision on whether to submit to a proposed course of

8

treatment. Where circumstances permit, a patient should be told the
nature of the pertinent ailment or condition, the general nature of the
proposed treatment or procedure, the risks involved in the proposed
treatment or procedure, the prospects of success, the risks of failing to
undergo any treatment or procedure at all, and the risks of any
alternate methods of treatment. Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 553
So.2d 398, 411 (La.1988) (on rehearing).

Id. at 929-930.

Most issues relating to informed consent pertain to failure to warn of the

risks of certain procedures or of alternative procedures after the procedure has

already been performed. This case, on the other hand, centers around the alleged

failure of the non-specialist to inform her obstetric patient of the course of

treatment for her hematological condition and the hospital‘s lack of ability to meet

the later stages of treatment. The question of whether informed consent was

obtained is reviewed under the manifest error standard. Snider, 130 So.3d 922.

It was clear from the record that Eboni and her family emphatically refused

to consent to a splenectomy, against the advice of Dr. Leroy Fredericks, an

oncologist and hematologist, without first conferring with Dr. Michael Bergeron,

who had treated Eboni for ITP before. Eboni knew from past experience that the

treatment for ITP initially involved administering steroids and that it had resolved

her low platelets in the past. However, as noted below and as the jury reasonably

found, it is clear that the physician handling the hematological aspects of Eboni‘s

care, i.e. Dr. Fredericks, bore the burden of obtaining Eboni‘s informed consent

regarding the treatment plan for ITP and the need for a splenectomy, rather than Dr.

Guidry who was tasked with providing obstetric care to Eboni and her baby.

Even if we assumed that the applicable standard of care required that Dr.

Guidry discuss the specialized treatment issues relating to Eboni‘s hematological

condition, Dr. Guidry flatly stated that she told Eboni and her family that she

9

would defer to the specialist‘s opinion on the hematological issues. That Andre

denied ever hearing this statement is a credibility question.

[W]here the findings are based on determinations regarding the
credibility of witnesses, the manifest error standard demands great
deference to the findings of fact. Where the factfinder‘s
determination is based on its decision to credit the testimony of one of
two or more witnesses, that finding can virtually never be erroneous.
This rule applies equally to the evaluation of expert testimony,
including the evaluation and resolution of conflicts in expert
testimony[.]

Id. at 938.

Although we are mindful that in reality Eboni and her family obviously had

more trust in Dr. Guidry and probably looked to her for guidance, we cannot

impose upon physicians the duty of informing patients about medical conditions

and treatment options outside of their specialty and for which they have consulted

specialists particularly for their knowledge of the subject. Accordingly, this

assignment of error is without merit.

Manifest Error

Perkins argues that Dr. Guidry breached the standard of care by failing to

properly manage Eboni‘s care, specifically by failing to transfer Eboni to Baton

Rouge, where her complex case could be managed.

The medical review panel found the evidence did not support the conclusion

that Dr. Guidry breached the standard of care because:

Dr. Guidry recognized the serious medical condition of the patient,
appropriately consulted specialists for the management of her medical
condition, and correctly ascertained that the hospital was capable of
providing adequate obstetric and neo-natal care.

This case involves complex medical issues and ultimate questions over who

is responsible for the medical management of a patient who presents with multiple

issues that, if they were not occurring simultaneously, would be treated by

10

independent physician specialists, i.e., an obstetrician/gynecologist (ob/gyn) for

pregnancy and a hematologist for the blood disorder. Thus, the jury was tasked

with determining whether, under Louisiana law, Dr. Guidry, an ob/gyn, breached

the standard of care owed to Eboni and her unborn baby. Numerous witnesses

testified at trial.

Andre testified that he and Eboni grew up in the same neighborhood and

were high-school sweethearts. After graduating from high school, Andre attended

McNeese State University on a football scholarship, and Eboni also attended

McNeese. Both then went to Monroe to pursue master‘s degrees, and both became

educators. Andre and Eboni were married in 2002. In 2003, Eboni first met Dr.

Bergeron when he treated her ITP with steroids, which resolved her low platelet

count. In 2004, Eboni became pregnant after seeking the advice of Dr. Guidry,

who confirmed that she could proceed with a pregnancy even with the ITP. During

her pregnancy, Eboni noticed that she had unexplained bruises on her body. She

sought Dr. Bergeron‘s help in December 2004, knowing that the ITP would cause

the bruising. At that December 2004 visit, Eboni‘s platelet level was low—around

90,000—when a normal platelet level is around 150,000.

Dr. Bergeron treated Eboni with steroids for about six weeks, and her

platelet level returned to normal. In February 2005, Eboni visited Dr. Guidry for a

regular obstetric appointment. Following the administration of routine blood work,

Dr. Guidry admitted Eboni into the hospital because her platelet level was severely

depleted.

Andre testified that he and Eboni believed she would receive platelets like

she did the last time and be out of the hospital in a few days. Andre testified that

Dr. Guidry, the person who regularly came in and discussed Eboni‘s condition

11

with them, never indicated that the situation was life-threatening. Andre said that

they were never made aware that Dr. Bergeron had questioned Dr. Guidry as to

whether the hospital could handle Eboni‘s medical needs for both ITP and her

pregnancy, that Dr. Guidry reassured Dr. Bergeron that the hospital was equipped

to handle her medical management, and that gamma globulin would be the second-

line defense if the steroid treatment failed. He said they knew nothing about the

gamma globulin and whether it was available or that Dr. Bergeron had suggested

the need for a transfer to a specialized hospital. Andre further testified that Dr.

Guidry never mentioned that plasmapharesis (plasma exchange) might be needed if

the gamma globulin treatment was unsuccessful or that failure to obtain it could

threaten Eboni‘s life and that of her unborn son. Finally, Andre said that Dr.

Guidry never mentioned that a splenectomy might be necessary to save Eboni and

Hunter‘s lives.

Andre stated that he and Eboni were in shock when Dr. Fredericks brought

up the issue of splenectomy because it had not been mentioned before. Andre was

asked:

Q. Did Dr. Guidry explain to you and Eboni that Dr. Fredericks was
the expert for her condition and that if he felt that splenectomy was
the only thing that would save Eboni‘s life, that she, Dr. Guidry would
recommend it also?

A. No, sir.

Q. So she never even shared with you that she would agree with Dr.
Fredericks if he recommended splenectomy?

A. No, sir.

Q. Okay. Would that have been important to you and Eboni to know
the doctor that your wife had put that much trust in supported and
agreed with Dr. Fredericks? Would that have been important to you?

A. Extremely important. We – there was a lot of trust.

12

Q. A lot of trust?

A. In her, yes, sir.

....

Q. Did Dr. Guidry advise Eboni and her family, you, that she and Dr.
Fredericks discussed Eboni‘s care on the afternoon of February the 6 th,
a Saturday afternoon, at which time that both of them agreed that
splenectomy was necessary to save Eboni‘s life and Hunter‘s life?

A. No, sir.

Q. So she didn‘t come and tell you that she‘d actually had an
independent meeting with Dr. Fredericks and that she agreed with him
that splenectomy needed to be done?

A. We were not aware of that.

Q. And on that afternoon of February the 6th, were you aware that
your wife‘s life was in jeopardy?

A. No, sir I wasn‘t.

Andre said that if Dr. Guidry had made them aware of the hospital‘s

inability to treat Eboni, they would have had her transferred to an appropriate

hospital. He testified that Dr. Guidry never advised them of the treatment options

or that Women & Children‘s Hospital was not equipped for plasmapharesis or

splenectomy. Andre testified that if they had known, ―they wouldn‘t have been at

that hospital.‖ Andre was then asked:

Q. . . . Did Dr. Guidry reassure Eboni and you that she could handle
Eboni‘s medical management safely and appropriately at Women‘s
and Children‘s?

A. Yes, sir. I remember Dr. Fredericks talked about the splenectomy,
and then we talked to Dr. Guidry about it. And of course we were
concerned about the – the procedure. Dr. Guidry reassured us that it
wasn‘t needed, and I remember it was like a sigh of relief. You know,
we – we – we felt good knowing that we didn‘t need to have a
splenectomy.

13

On cross-examination, Andre said that no doctor, including any hematologist,

had explained the progression of the treatments for the worsening ITP.

Dr. Fredericks began his testimony describing ITP and TTP. Dr. Fredericks

said that ITP, low platelets that result in excessive bleeding and bruising, is much

more common than TTP, a condition where the patient is at increased risk for

bleeding and clotting. Dr. Fredericks said that the incidence of ITP is about 1 in

10,000 while the incidence of TTP in the general population is 3.7 in every one

million people and in a pregnant woman is about one in a million. Dr. Fredericks

described the progression of treatment levels in ITP: 1) steroids 2) gamma

globulin 3) plasmapharesis and 4) splenectomy.

Dr. Fredericks then discussed how he became involved in the care of Eboni.

Drs. Fredericks and Bergeron are in the same practice together. Dr. Bergeron was

leaving town from Friday through Tuesday (that Tuesday was Mardi Gras). Dr.

Bergeron informed Dr. Fredericks of Eboni‘s condition since Dr. Fredericks was

on call for the weekend. Dr. Fredericks said that he mentioned to Dr. Bergeron

that he was treating another patient with ITP at the same time, and that the gamma

globulin was in short supply. Dr. Fredericks said that he asked Dr. Bergeron ―to

call Dr. Guidry to see if we could possibly get this patient transferred out. I think

he did. Never heard anything back from that until all this came about.‖

The next day, Saturday, Dr. Fredericks arrived at the hospital to find that

Eboni had not been transferred. The first thing he did was call the pharmacy to see

if they had enough gamma globulin supply. They only had enough for half-a-day‘s

treatment. Dr. Fredericks asked the pharmacist to call another hospital to see if

they had any gamma globulin available, but there was none in the community, and

the pharmacist could not get any until Tuesday. Dr. Fredericks testified that this

14

concerned him because in the event the steroids did not work, Eboni would be left

without any treatment for her ITP.

Dr. Fredericks discussed meeting with the family. He testified:

So I went in, and they were eating lunch. And I went in there and expressed
my concerns that, you know, we‘re giving you steroids. That may or may
not work. You‘re pregnant now. It‘s not the same situation as it was a year
and a half ago, but my biggest concern was that we didn‘t have the gamma
globulin in case there was some type of emergent procedure that needed to
be performed that we could get this platelet count up quickly.

I also discussed with her that there may need to be considered a
splenectomy. And when she heard the word ―splenectomy,‖ she just
lost it. She told me she was a school teacher, that she could not afford
to lose her spleen because she needed it for that purpose, to fight
infection. That‘s the other reason we have a spleen. Became very
upset.

He also told Eboni that he was concerned that she had anemia. Dr.

Fredericks testified, ―she told me that she had had anemia a year and a half before

with the ITP at that time and that the steroids worked then, and she was convinced

the steroids was all that she needed.‖ Dr. Fredericks called Dr. Guidry later that

day and expressed his concern and belief that Eboni should be transferred. Dr.

Fredericks said that he, as a consulting physician, had no authority to transfer

Eboni out of the hospital. He testified that, in the eighteen years he had been

practicing medicine, he had never had an instance where the attending doctor failed

to act on his recommendation for transfer.

Dr. Fredericks returned Sunday morning not knowing if the transfer process

was in the works. He went to Eboni‘s room, where he told Eboni, in the presence

of her father, ―I think you need to be transferred.‖ Dr. Fredericks said he ―got a

cold shoulder from the two of them. They didn‘t really want to hear anything I had

to say. I was tuned out.‖ Dr. Fredericks exited the room at the same time Dr.

Guidry was entering the room. Dr. Fredericks overheard Eboni‘s father telling Dr.

15

Guidry that Eboni did not like Dr. Fredericks, and she was not having her spleen

taken out. Dr. Fredericks then reentered the room, and Eboni‘s father told Dr.

Fredericks that they did not want him on the case anymore.

Dr. Fredericks testified:

And Dr. Guidry confirmed that ―She‘s not going anywhere.
She‘s not going to have her spleen out.‖ At that point I burst into –
not burst but I opened the door, and I said, ―All right. I‘m done.‖

Dr. Fredericks said that afterward he and Dr. Guidry talked outside of

Eboni‘s room. Dr. Guidry assured Dr. Fredericks that she had a plan in place to

air-lift Eboni to Baton Rouge in the event things were to deteriorate and that the

family wished to wait for Dr. Bergeron to return. Dr. Fredericks made

arrangements for his other partner, Dr. Gahran, to take over Eboni‘s hematologic

management. However, Dr. Fredericks said that he remained concerned and called

Dr. Guidry back on Sunday afternoon to inform her that Eboni needed to be

transferred out to a tertiary care hospital. Dr. Fredericks testified that Dr. Guidry

reaffirmed to him that he was no longer on the case.

Dr. Fredericks said that there was no good reason why Eboni was not

transferred on Friday, Saturday, or Sunday unless there were no beds available. He

said that three of the four treatment options were not available at Women &

Children‘s Hospital (gamma globulin, plasmapharesis, or splenectomy). Dr.

Fredericks said that Dr. Guidry called him at about 6:00 a.m. on the morning that

Eboni began seizing and asked him what to do. He told her to give Eboni plasma,

but Dr. Guidry said that there were only two units. Dr. Fredericks replied that she

needed to be transferred out. Dr. Guidry said that was impossible because the

helicopters were grounded due to fog. Dr. Fredericks advised Dr. Guidry to call

the plasmapharesis team out of Beaumont, Texas, to come in, but, that it was just

16

too late to save Eboni and her baby. Dr. Fredericks testified that he tried to call Dr.

Guidry again and left a message at 10:00 a.m., but she never returned the call. Dr.

Fredericks said that following this event, he and his partners resigned from the

hospital staff at Women and Children‘s Hospital because ―we weren‘t going to let

this happen again in the future.‖

On cross-examination, Dr. Fredericks testified that Eboni did appear stable

up until the ―immediate acute crash‖ she experienced on February 7, 2005, but that

he knew there was the potential for this to happen. He also said that TTP is quite

lethal and that there is a significant mortality rate even with timely treatment. He

also described how the initial steroid treatment of ITP would be given time to work,

usually up to seventy-two hours before moving on to the gamma globulin

treatment, but the subsequent treatment should be available if needed.

Dr. Fredericks said that he felt Eboni was knowledgeable about her

condition, that the treatment pathways had been explained to her, and that she did

not want to go anywhere or have her spleen removed. He had advised Eboni and

the family on both Saturday and Sunday that she needed to be transferred. Dr.

Fredericks testified that Eboni‘s rapid deterioration was unpredictable, and there

were no signs or symptoms that she would rapidly deteriorate at 4:00 a.m. on

Monday. He further said that the mortality rate for a pregnant patient with TTP,

even with treatment, is very high. Dr. Fredericks was questioned:

Q. . . . Dr. Fredericks, in looking at the case, you would agree with me
that you don‘t fault Dr. Guidry because she had a plan to address the
treatment possibilities in light of the patient‘s refusal to act on your
recommendations?

A. Dr. Guidry had an acceptable plan in place in the event that, you
know, Eboni refused transfer or deteriorated.

17

Q. And you knew well from your own personal experience that the
family was pretty adamant about the patient not going anywhere,
correct?

A. Eboni was very adamant. Her husband didn‘t really say much.
Her father was very adamant. So, yeah.

Q. And then unfortunately even forces of nature kicked in at the end,
and the weather conditions prevented the implementation of the
emergency transfer plan on the morning of February 7th, correct?

A. Right.

Q. So in summary, of your dealing with Dr. Guidry, would it be fair to
say that the primary issue or concern and the lack of transfer was the
patient‘s adamant refusal to do it?

A. Right. She said she did not want to be transferred.

Dr. Bergeron, an oncologist and hematologist, testified that he initially

treated Eboni in July 2003 when she was admitted to the hospital by her primary

physician with a platelet count of 11,000. Dr. Bergeron diagnosed Eboni with ITP.

Eboni was treated with steroids and discharged four days after admission to the

hospital. Dr. Bergeron indicated that Eboni had a ―very good, timely response‖ to

the steroids. He discussed the usual treatment plan: treatment with IV steroids for

three to seven days, intravenous gamma globulin, and splenectomy or certain drugs

such as Rituxan. Dr. Bergeron said that ITP can be life-threatening because it puts

a patient at high risk for bleeding.

In January 2005, Dr. Bergeron again evaluated Eboni, and her platelet level

was in the normal range. Dr. Bergeron then became involved in Eboni‘s care on

February 3, 2005, when Dr. Guidry informed him via telephone that she was

admitting Eboni into the hospital. Dr. Bergeron said that he and Dr. Guidry agreed

that she was suffering from recurrent ITP, and intravenous steroid treatment was

instituted. Dr. Bergeron saw Eboni in person the following day, Friday, February 4,

18

2005. Dr. Bergeron said that Eboni was doing well that evening. He testified that

Dr. Guidry said that Women & Children‘s Hospital was adequate for treating a

high-risk pregnancy. He further testified that it was possible that the steroid

treatment alone could have resolved Eboni‘s low platelet count.

Dr. Bergeron discussed the autopsy results indicating TTP. He said that

gamma globulin would not have helped the TTP; the only treatment that could

have possibly helped would be the plasmapharesis. Dr. Bergeron said that the

mortality rate for the acute deterioration of TTP is very high, and the chances were

extremely low that Eboni would have survived. Dr. Bergeron said that he really

could not fault Dr. Guidry for anything that happened because ―unforeseen things

occurred.‖ He said that, unfortunately, the family did not take Dr. Frederick‘s

recommendations partially because they were used to seeing him (Dr. Bergeron).

Dr. Bergeron testified:

. . . And Dr. Fredericks was in a difficult situation, to be fair. And
you get really attached to your physician, and you really rely upon
your physician as far as their recommendations, and you place your
confidence in your physician. And I know Eboni had a lot of
confidence in me, and she had a lot of confidence in Dr. Guidry. And
Dr. Fredericks was a person who just appeared for the first time, and it
made it difficult for him to convey his recommendations and his
concerns because he did convey things differently than I did on that
Friday. He had different opinion in some areas that Saturday.

Dr. Bergeron said that once the acute crisis began on the morning of

February 7, 2005, the plasmapharesis ideally would have been initiated. Dr.

Bergeron testified that the hospital was woefully unprepared to handle a patient as

sick as Eboni. Further, he said that he was unaware on Friday that the gamma

globulin was not available.

The medical notes submitted into evidence generated by Dr. Bergeron and

Dr. Fredericks include the following information:

19

 Dr. Bergeron‘s February 4, 2005 note to Dr. Fredericks:

Acute Thrombocytopenia – I suspect it is [] to ITP. A less
likely cause is DIC. I do not strongly suspect HELLP
syndrome. There is no evidence of TTP or HUS.

Rec: Continue solumedrol at current dose for a total of 48-72
[hours] before converting to prednisone if the pt exhibits a
response. It the pt responds to the solumedrol, I would give the
pt prednisone[.]

 Dr. Frederick‘s February 5, 2005 notes, although very difficult to read, state

nothing about an immediate need to transfer but do indicate in part:

PT previously had ITP in 2003 + began seeing improvement w
platelet count at 48H. Usually see increase at 48-72H. Will
convert to [] prednisone.

....

Pharmacy only has 30 grams of 1016 [gamma globulin]. . . I
would like to try a[nd] not give gamma globulin until we know
PT not going to respond to steroids i.e. will not know if PT
responded to steroids or to gamma globulin. However, need to
have on hand if bleeding should occur. Pharmacy working on
obtaining gamma globulin.

 Dr. Frederick‘s February 6, 2005 notes again mention nothing about

transferring Eboni. They state in part:

Appears to have hemolytic . . . component to ITP. Will follow
LDH + [] count.

Hopefully will begin to see rise [in] platelet count tomorrow. If
no improvement by Tuesday, will need to administer gamma
globulin in anticipation of splenectomy. Will request
ultrasound [of spleen].

Dr. Guidry testified that she began caring for Eboni on a gynecological basis

beginning in 2003, and subsequently from an obstetric standpoint once she became

pregnant in 2004. Dr. Guidry admitted Eboni into the hospital on February 3, 2005,

with concerns that she may have preeclampsia and also because of markedly low

platelet counts. Dr. Guidry consulted with Dr. Bergeron the following day. She

20

then discussed Dr. Frederick‘s involvement beginning on Saturday. Dr. Guidry

testified that Dr. Fredericks did not tell her about the shortage of gamma globulin

at the pharmacy. She said that Dr. Fredericks relayed to her that Eboni might need

a splenectomy. Dr. Guidry inquired whether that needed to be done right away

because Eboni was so close to viability. She said Dr. Fredericks said he did not

know; that they would try some things first, but it may be needed.

Dr. Guidry said that Friday night she met Dr. Bergeron in the hall. Dr.

Guidry testified that she told Dr. Bergeron that they were a high-risk transfer

center and that as far as the pregnancy, they were equipped to handle Eboni‘s care.

She testified:

And I asked him, ―Do you think she needs to be transferred for her
ITP?‖ and he said, ―No, I don‘t think so. Oh, and by the way, I‘m
going out of town. I‘m going to let Dr. Fredericks know about her,
and he will see her for me while I‘m gone. I will be back on
Tuesday.‖

Dr. Guidry said that any surgeon at the hospital could have performed a

splenectomy. She said that, at the time, the issue of the splenectomy was not

emergent because Eboni was stable. Dr. Guidry testified that neither Dr. Bergeron

nor Dr. Fredericks mentioned anything about a transfer until Sunday. Dr. Guidry

said that, as of Sunday morning, Dr. Fredericks recommended a transfer. She

testified that on Sunday morning when she entered Eboni‘s room, Eboni and her

family were upset. Dr. Fredericks had ordered two units of blood, but Eboni did

not know why.

Dr. Guidry testified that she agreed with the statement that if a hematologist

said that the patient needed to be transferred, she had the responsibility to follow

what the specialist says. Dr. Guidry said Dr. Fredericks told her that Eboni needed

to be transferred by Thursday. She said she conveyed that information to Andre.

21

She disagreed with Andre‘s testimony that she told him and Eboni that she did not

believe that Eboni needed to be transferred.

Dr. Guidry also stated that she talked in the hallway with the pharmacist

who told her that she could have the gamma globulin at the hospital within twenty-

four hours. However, Dr. Guidry said that she never communicated this

information to Dr. Fredericks.

Dr. Guidry again discussed the recommendation of the transfer. She said

that Dr. Fredericks recommended that Eboni be transferred by Thursday for a

splenectomy. She said that she had no discussion with Eboni or Andre regarding

Dr. Fredericks recommendations on Saturday because she saw them before Dr.

Fredericks ever arrived, and she did not see them again until Sunday. Dr. Guidry

was questioned:

Q. So there was no real discussion that Dr. Fredericks had with you
concerning a more immediate need for gamma globulin because he
wanted to take the first step in the ITP treatment pathway and use the
IV steroids and see what her response was to that, correct?

A. Correct.

Q. And, in fact, the patient had responded to that very first step of IV
steroid administration on her previous episode of ITP?

A. She had.

Q. So the reason that the gamma globulin was going to be available on
Tuesday was because that‘s when Dr. Fredericks said he would need it?

A. Correct.

Dr. Guidry‘s February 6, 2005 notes in the medical chart state: ―PT aware

that if no response to steroids that splenectomy may be only choice. PT desires

that we try everything to avoid [] occupation.‖

22

Dr. Henry Prince, an ob/gyn, has testified as an expert in over four hundred

cases with over three hundred of those cases being in the doctor‘s favor. Dr.

Prince testified that Dr. Guidry‘s care of Eboni fell below the appropriate standard

of care. Dr. Prince opined that Eboni was a critically-ill patient who should have

been in a tertiary care center where twenty-four-hour care in all specialties would

be present as opposed to available by phone consult. He said that all the specialties

would look at the labs and determine the best route of care for this critically-ill

patient rather than the piecemeal care that was provided to Eboni. Dr. Prince said

that once Dr. Fredericks recommended transfer to a tertiary center, Dr. Guidry

should have immediately followed his instructions. He said that there was no

reasonable medical justification for failing to transfer Eboni before the Monday

morning episode and that Dr. Guidry committed medical malpractice in failing to

make that transfer. On cross-examination, Dr. Prince was presented with Dr.

Fredericks charting from Sunday February 6, 2005, and was questioned:

Q. But he also records that he is hoping for improvement in the
platelet count the next day, which would have been Monday, and if no
improvement by Tuesday, which would have been February 8 th, will
need to administer gamma globulin in anticipation of splenectomy,
correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. So his contemporaneous charting at that time does not make any
reference to a need for an emergent transfer or an emergent
administration of gamma globulin, does it?

A. No, sir.

Q. In fact, it times out – and which would be appropriate under an ITP
treatment pathway – to try and test out whether the IV administration
of steroids is going to work like it did the first time and then, only
failing that, do you go to the next step, correct?

A. Yes, sir.

23

Dr. Prince confirmed that in Dr. Fredericks charting of February 5, 2005 and

February 6, 2005, there was no recommendation that Eboni needed to be

transferred immediately. However, Dr. Prince testified that physicians routinely

discuss medical managmement issues with other physicians and that those

discussions do not get placed in the medical record. Dr. Prince opined that from

the start, Eboni‘s condition and possible diagnoses (HELLP syndrome and

preeclampsia) were of such a critical and complex nature that she should have been

in a tertiary care center. He testified:

Q. So if you lump all of those together, this patient was facing a
complex medical presentation of different disease processes any one
of which could take the life of both the patient and her baby?

A. Yes. Absolutely.

Q. And is that the reason that you feel so strongly that any obstetrician
with this patient should have known and used judgment to transfer
this patient to a tertiary care center immediately?

A. Certainly once there was evidence of hemolysis, yes.

Q. So by Saturday for sure?

A. By Saturday, yes, sir.

....

Q. And had that been done, then the patient would have been in a
position where she would have had a team of experts with the
equipment, the expertise, and the facility that was designed to care
and treat for patients who are exactly like Eboni, right?

A. Yes. She needed a team approach where people were all in the
same room talking, looking at the labs, and hands-on consultation.
Not over the phone.

Q. And she never got that at Women‘s & Children‘s, did she?

A. No, she did not.

24

Dr. Baha Sibai, an expert in maternal-fetal medicine, obstetrics and

gynecology, and the management of acute obstetric emergencies, also testified. Dr.

Sibai is a professor of obstetrics and gynecology at the University of Texas Health

Science Center and author of the textbook The Acute Management of Obstetric

Emergencies. Dr. Sibai concluded that Dr. Guidry satisfied the standard of care of

obstetrician/gynecologists because her diagnosis and management of Eboni‘s care

was well within the standard of care for an obstetrician. Dr. Sibai reviewed the

history of events and noted that Dr. Guidry correctly consulted with a hematologist

to treat Eboni‘s recurrence of ITP. Dr. Sibai testified that it was well within the

standard of care for an ob/gyn to rely on the knowledge and expertise of the

hematologist for the diagnosis, treatment, and recommendations concerning the

hematology issues. Dr. Sibai said that once the hematologist was consulted, the

hematologist assumed management of the hematology problem. He was asked:

Q. So, you would expect, if it was your patient, that you would
continue to follow, evaluate, and treat the patient‘s obstetric problems,
but you would expect to be able to rely on the expertise of the
hematologist in evaluating, diagnosing, and treating the hematologic
problem.

A. Absolutely. This is the whole concept of consultation.

Dr. Sibai discussed the standard ―step-wise type management‖ that Dr.

Bergeron employed with Eboni that began with intravenous steroids (Solumedrol)

which had previously resolved her ITP. Dr. Sibai testified that when Dr.

Fredericks took over on Saturday, February 5, 2005, he discontinued the

intravenous steroids and switched Eboni to oral steroids (Prednisone), even though

she had not begun responding to the Solumedrol. He noted Dr. Fredericks‘

indication that the next step of treatment would be the administration of gamma

globulin. Dr. Sibai stated that it was the hematologist‘s responsibility to ensure the

25

adequate supply of gamma globulin and the means of obtaining it. Dr. Sibai

testified that it was within Dr. Fredericks‘ ―power to refer the patient to another

center that has the treatment availability that he thinks the patient needs.‖ Dr.

Sibai said that Dr. Fredericks‘ plan, as clearly noted in his charting, was to monitor

the administration of steroids for forty-eight to seventy-two hours before moving

on to the next step.

Dr. Sibai said that Dr. Guidry met or exceeded the standard of care in

consulting the maternal fetal medicine specialist via telephone because there was

really nothing the maternal fetal medicine specialist could do other than suggest

that a hematologist be consulted. He testified that there was nothing that a

maternal fetal medicine specialist would have done in a hands-on evaluation. Dr.

Sibai said that ITP has no effect on pregnancy whatsoever.

Dr. Sibai opined that Dr. Fredericks‘ actions indicate that he suspected TTP

and that an elevated blood test indicating hemolysis—whose results were reported

to Dr. Fredericks by a nurse on Sunday, February 6, 2015—would have indicated

the need for plasmapharesis or at least the administration of fresh frozen plasma

until the plasmapharesis could be administered. Dr. Sibai opined that Eboni would

have had an eighty to ninety percent chance of survival had that occurred on

Sunday, but by Monday her chances were less than twenty percent. Dr. Sibai said

that by the time the fresh frozen plasma was administered to Eboni it was too late.

However, Dr. Sibai ultimately said that there was not much that could have

been done to prevent the outcome that occurred because Eboni was still being

treated based on her history of ITP and was still in the first-step of treatment when

she ―crashed.‖ Dr. Sibai essentially said that the TTP developed overnight from

February 6, 2005 to February 7, 2005. Dr. Sibai testified that in examining

26

Eboni‘s peripheral smear results, she did not have the changes consistent with TTP

until that morning. He testified that mortality in pregnant and postpartum patients

with TTP is higher and that you must know of the diagnosis and be prepared in

order to have a good outcome. Dr. Sibai said ―everything was consistent with ITP,

then it changed‖ overnight on February 6, 2005.

Again, Dr. Sibai stated that consultation with a maternal-fetal medicine

specialist would have made no difference; the step treatment would have been

exactly the same with any ITP patient. He said that if Eboni would not have had

the previous diagnosis of ITP, ―most likely, the hematologist [would] immediately

have thought of TTP.‖ Dr. Sibai concluded that Dr. Guidry did more than what

would be expected of a general ob/gyn.

On cross-examination, Dr. Sibai agreed that if Dr. Fredericks had told Dr.

Guidry to transfer Eboni, it would have been essential for Dr. Guidry to follow that

recommendation. He said, ―She has the responsibility to follow what the

consultant says.‖ However, he believed that Dr. Fredericks only indicated the need

for the transfer following Eboni‘s death because nothing in Dr. Frederick‘s chart

indicated a need for transfer as she was being treated in the customary step-fashion

based on her previous diagnosis of ITP. Dr. Sibai said, ―Nothing in his note makes

me even think he was thinking of transferring the patient.‖

Dr. Sibai‘s reasoning was based on some of the differences between TTP

and ITP. He said a splenectomy has nothing to do with TTP; only ITP. He further

said that ITP is not an emergency, whereas TTP is. Thus, there was no need for an

immediate transfer when she was being treated for ITP, because the steroids must

be given forty-eight to seventy-two hours to start working. He essentially opined

that the hematologists were focused on ITP because of her past diagnosis and not

27

the TTP. When asked if Dr. Guidry had the responsibility to understand the

severity of Eboni‘s condition, Dr. Sibai testified:

In what way, you know? I don‘t see how she would ever even think
of it. As I told you, I don‘t expect 99.99999 percent, not only general
OB-GYN, even MFM [maternal-fetal medicine specialist], to think of
TTP. This is one of the rarest things. It‘s not only a zebra. It‘s a
green zebra, when I give my lecture. It‘s a green zebra to be able to
see a case like that. Hematologists are the only people who really
think of TTP.

Dr. David Darbonne, an ob/gyn in Westlake since 1996, testified that he has

treated pregnant patients with ITP. Dr. Darbonne was a member of the medical

review panel that found that Dr. Guidry did not breach the standard of care.

Dr. Darbonne explained that Dr. Guidry was aware of the seriousness of the

condition and immediately consulted with the specialists regarding the hematologic

issues. She continued to be aware of the possibility of other obstetric issues such

as HELLP syndrome. She consulted by phone with a maternal-fetal medicine

specialist from Baton Rouge, and she noted in Eboni‘s chart that she made the

patient aware of the treatment pathway. Dr. Darbonne said that Dr. Guidry ―did

everything that she could have.‖ He said that if he had a patient under these same

circumstances, he would not have done anything differently. Dr. Darbonne agreed

that Eboni‘s issues were the underlying hematologic disorder rather than anything

having to do with her pregnancy and that Dr. Guidry properly co-managed Eboni

from an obstetric standpoint. He further said that Women & Children‘s Hospital

was fully capable of providing obstetric and neonatal care to high-risk pregnant

patients.

On cross-examination, Dr. Darbonne admitted that if Dr. Fredericks had told

Dr. Guidry that Eboni needed to be transferred to a tertiary center, and she ignored

his advice, that would be malpractice. However, Dr. Darbonne said that nowhere

28

in Dr. Fredericks‘ chart was the transfer recommended and that something of that

magnitude should have been noted. He further testified that because Eboni‘s

problems were hematological rather than obstetrical, it would have been the

hematologist‘s primary responsibility to convey the risk and benefits associated

with remaining at Women & Children‘s Hospital.

Dr. Albert Diket, a maternal-fetal medicine specialist (perinatologist) from

Baton Rouge, testified that 98% of his practice is consultation. Dr. Diket testified

that there are not a lot of perinatologists as compared to ob/gyns, so the

perinatologists travel once or twice a week to satellite clinics and provide around-

the-clock phone consultation. He said it was very common to be consulted by

phone. Dr. Diket said that based on Eboni‘s presenting labs of a low platelet count

of 14,000, it was appropriate of Dr. Guidry to continue Eboni on steroids and

consult with a hematologist. He said it was appropriate for Eboni to be treated at

Women & Children‘s Hospital in Lake Charles and that nothing in the history,

physical, or lab values indicated an immediate need for transfer. Again, after

reviewing the records from Saturday, Dr. Diket testified that he saw no need for

immediate transfer nor a need for a hands-on evaluation by a maternal-fetal

medicine specialist. Dr. Diket said that HELPP syndrome is very common in

pregnancy and can be followed by an ob/gyn.

Dr. Diket reviewed the chart from Sunday and did not see any indication of a

need to immediately transfer Eboni from an obstetrical standpoint nor of a need to

be evaluated by a maternal-fetal medicine consultant. He further said that there

was no need for a hands-on evaluation by a maternal-fetal medicine specialist,

even though Dr. Guidry had scheduled one for Monday.

29

Regarding the events of Monday morning, Dr. Diket said that Dr. Guidry

immediately arrived at the hospital in the middle of the night when Eboni

experienced this TTP episode. Plasmapharesis was indicated as the treatment for

TTP. Dr. Guidry attempted helicopter and jet transfer and to have a

plasmapharesis team come from another hospital, but these efforts were thwarted

by the weather. However, Dr. Diket said that even if the weather had not been a

factor, the mortality rate for an acute TTP event such as this one was over 99%.

He testified that the treatment for the ITP lay with the hematologist rather than the

ob/gyn. Also, he said that while physicians try to do things in coordination, the

primary responsibility for relaying the hematologic condition and its treatment

would be the specialist hematologist rather than the ob/gyn. He noted no charting

in the records by Dr. Fredericks of the need to be immediately transferred. In fact,

Dr. Diket testified that the Dr. Fredericks‘ chart indicated that Eboni would remain

at Women & Children‘s Hospital and would not receive gamma globulin until

Tuesday, February 8, 2005, if necessary.

Dr. Diket concluded that Dr. Guidry‘s care was appropriate and above the

standard of care for an ob/gyn. Dr. Diket further felt that Drs. Bergeron and

Fredericks erred in diagnosing Eboni with ITP. He said that she clearly had TTP.

Dr. Diket said that ITP and TTP are two totally different diseases. He further

opined that as of Monday, February 7, 2005, there was nothing that could have

saved Eboni. He stated that even if the plasmapharesis had occurred on February 7,

―it wouldn‘t have worked.‖ Further, he opined that a splenectomy would kill a

person with TTP, because the person‘s blood does not clot; thus major surgery

would be lethal.

30

Dr. Guidry testified again stating her conversations with Dr. Fredericks. Dr.

Guidry said that she said:

Dr. Fredericks, if I need to go right now and make her go for an
emergent splenectomy, I will. I can make her go. But she‘s refusing it.
But if you‘re telling me she needs it emergently, I will go tell her that,
and we will make her go.‖ And he said, ―No. But she needs it [the
splenectomy] by Thursday‖

Andre again testified that Dr. Guidry told he and Eboni that she would not

need a splenectomy.

Based on our thorough review of the record, it would be inappropriate for us

to find that the jury erred in concluding that Dr. Guidry did not breach the

applicable standard of care. Clearly, the jury found Dr. Guidry‘s testimony and

that of the experts who testified on her behalf more credible. This finding was

more than reasonable. First, the expert testimony was overwhelming, save for Dr.

Prince, that an ob/gyn would not be expected to diagnose, treat, or manage ITP or

TTP and that Dr. Guidry did just what would be expected of her by calling in a

hematology consult. Second, the conflicting testimony of whether the need for

transfer was immediate, as testified to by Dr. Fredericks, or whether it was

something to be done in the future, as testified to by Dr. Guidry, is a credibility call.

Dr. Fredericks‘ notes in the hospital‘s medical chart mention nothing of the need

for immediate transfer, and, in fact, indicate that Eboni would be treated with

steroids for the forty-eight to seventy-two hour period, as had been done before,

before proceeding.

While it is clear that as of Sunday, Dr. Guidry knew that Dr. Fredericks

advised a transfer to a tertiary facility, it is debatable what level of immediacy was

required. The jury‘s finding that Dr. Guidry‘s version of events—that the transfer

31

need only occur by Thursday—is certainly reasonable in light of the testimony and

evidence.

Further compounding the course of events in this case is Eboni and her

family‘s clear dislike of Dr. Fredericks. While we are not in a position to judge Dr.

Fredericks‘ bedside manner, if Dr. Fredericks felt that Eboni‘s life was in

immediate danger, he should have talked with the family further about the need for

an immediate transfer rather than declaring, ―I‘m done.‖ However, even if Dr.

Bergeron had been available, the evidence suggests that it is unlikely that the

outcome in the case would have been any different, since the treatment for Eboni‘s

suspected ITP, which was reasonable based on her prior diagnoses, was still in its

initial phase (i.e. forty-eight to seventy-two hours of steroid use), and Eboni‘s

decline from TTP was sudden and unexpected. Several experts concurred that the

plasmapharesis that would have possibly saved Eboni‘s life would have had to

have been administered prior to her sudden downfall.

It is hard to imagine the pain and suffering endured by Andre and Eboni‘s

family over this tragic loss. However, there simply can be no manifest error in the

jury‘s finding that Dr. Guidry acted as a reasonable ob/gyn in a similar situation

would have and, therefore, we must affirm the jury‘s finding.

CONCLUSION

The judgment in favor of the defendant-appellee, Dr. Tricia N. Guidry, is

affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed against the defendant-appellant,

Andre Perkins.

AFFIRMED.

32