Robin Rogers Richard, Et Ux. v. Town of Lake Arthur

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

16-113

ROBIN ROGERS RICHARD, ET UX.

VERSUS

TOWN OF LAKE ARTHUR, ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTY-FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON DAVIS, NO. C-562-14
HONORABLE CRAIG STEVE GUNNELL, DISTRICT JUDGE

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ELIZABETH A. PICKETT
JUDGE

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Court composed of Jimmie C. Peters, Elizabeth A. Pickett, and Shannon J.
Gremillion, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Allen Anthony McElroy, Jr.
Robert L. Duffy
McElroy & Duffy (APLC)
P. O. Box 208
Berwick, LA 70342-0208
(985) 384-2157
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS:
David Richard
Robin Rogers Richard

John Fayne Wilkes, III
Allison Ackal
Borne, Wilkes, & Rabalais, LLC
P. O. Box 4305
Lafayette, LA 70502-4305
(337) 232-1604
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE:
Town of Lake Arthur

Timothy W. Hassinger
Patrick J. Schepens
Galloway Johnson Tompkins Burr & Smith
#3 Sanctuary Blvd., 3rd Floor
Mandeville, LA 70471
(985) 674-6680
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE:
John H. Anderson, Jr.

PICKETT, Judge.

Robin Rogers Richard and her husband David appeal the judgment of the

trial court granting summary judgment in favor of the Town of Lake Arthur, John

Anderson, John Anderson Concrete Finishers, Inc., and Seneca Specialty Insurance

Company dismissing their claims against after she fell on a town sidewalk and

sustained injuries.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Ms. Richard went for a walk on July 11, 2014, with her sister-in-law and her

daughter through Lake Arthur. The sidewalk they were travelling on at the time of

her fall was immediately adjacent to the roadway on one side and a public park on

the other. At the portion of the sidewalk where Ms. Richard fell was a driveway to

allow maintenance vehicles to have access to the public park. In addition to

sloping up from the street, the sidewalk had sloped transitions on either side

running perpendicular to the street. Ms. Richard alleges these transition areas are

defective because they do not meet certain standards and that this transition caused

her fall. At her deposition, though, she indicated that her last step before she fell

was on a flat portion of the new sidewalk, not a sloped portion.

John Anderson Concrete Finishes, Inc. (Anderson) installed the portion of

the sidewalk at issue in this case at the direction of Robert Bertrand, mayor of Lake

Arthur. Mr. Bertrand did not provide specifications or plans to him, but simply

requested that Anderson tear out the old sidewalk and install a driveway. The

project was completed and accepted by the city in September 2013.

Ms. Richard claims that the slope of the transition area does not meet certain

state and national requirements, and therefore is defective per se. She filed a

motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability. Lake Arthur, Anderson,

and its insurer, Seneca Specialty Insurance Co., filed motions for summary

judgment alleging that the condition of the sidewalk was open and obvious, and

therefore they are not liable. They also asserted statutory immunity from liability.

Following a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of

the defendants. Based on Ms. Richard’s deposition testimony, the trial court found

there was no evidence that the sloped area caused Ms. Richard’s fall. The trial

court also found that the condition of the sidewalk was open and obvious.

Ms. Richard and her husband have appealed that judgment.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

On appeal, the Richards assert three assignments of error:

1. The trial judge erred by not granting summary judgment as filed by
Plaintiffs, which was supported by proper documentation admitted
into evidence by the trial judge.

2. The trial judge erred by granting defendants’ summary judgments.

3. Alternatively, in the event Appeal Court does not grant summary for
Plaintiffs, then trial judge erred by not finding genuine material issues
of facts in dispute to preclude summary judgments.

DISCUSSION

An appeals court reviews summary judgments de novo, using the same

criteria as the trial court. Gray v. Am. Nat’l Prop. & Cas. Co., 07-1670 (La.

2/26/08), 977 So.2d 839. In order to prevail on a motion for summary judgment,

the moving party must show that there are no genuine issues of material fact and

that she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La.Civ.Code art. 966(B)(2);

Duncan v. U.S.A.A. Ins. Co., 06-363 (La. 11/29/06), 950 So.2d 544. Lousiana

Code of Civil Procedure Article 966(C)(2) sets forth the burden of proof in this

case:

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The burden of proof remains with the movant. However, if the
movant will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the matter that is
before the court on the motion for summary judgment, the movant's
burden on the motion does not require him to negate all essential
elements of the adverse party's claim, action, or defense, but rather to
point out to the court that there is an absence of factual support for
one or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim, action, or
defense. Thereafter, if the adverse party fails to produce factual
support sufficient to establish that he will be able to satisfy his
evidentiary burden of proof at trial, there is no genuine issue of
material fact.

Summary judgment is appropriate when a plaintiff is unable to meet her burden of

proving that a complained-of condition or thing is unreasonably dangerous. Allen

v. Lockwood, 14-1724 (La. 2/13/15), 156 So.3d 650.

Premises liability of public entities is limited by La.R.S. 9:2800, which

states, in pertinent part:

A. A public entity is responsible under Civil Code Article 2317
for damages caused by the condition of buildings within its care and
custody.

....

C. Except as provided for in Subsections A and B of this
Section, no person shall have a cause of action based solely upon
liability imposed under Civil Code Article 2317 against a public entity
for damages caused by the condition of things within its care and
custody unless the public entity had actual or constructive notice of
the particular vice or defect which caused the damage prior to the
occurrence, and the public entity has had a reasonable opportunity to
remedy the defect and has failed to do so.

D. Constructive notice shall mean the existence of facts which
infer actual knowledge.

....

F. A violation of the rules and regulations promulgated by a
public entity is not negligence per se.

In Campbell v. Evangeline Parish Police Jury, 2014-1301, pp. 7-8

(La.App. 3 Cir. 5/6/15), 164 So.3d 408, 415, writ denied, 15-1067 (La. 9/11/15),

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176 So.3d 1043, this court explained the elements a plaintiff must prove in a case

against a public entity for a fall on a sidewalk:

[I]in order to recover from a public entity for damages caused
by a thing, the plaintiff must prove 1) custody or ownership of the
defective thing by the public entity; 2) that the defect created an
unreasonable risk of harm; 3) that the public entity had actual or
constructive notice of the defect; and 4) that the public entity failed to
take corrective action within a reasonable time. Chambers v. Village
of Moreauville, 11-898 (La.1/24/12), 85 So.3d 593. In determining
whether a condition is unreasonably dangerous, the trier of fact should
balance the gravity and risk of harm against the cost and feasibility of
repair. Id.

With regard to defective sidewalks, there is no fixed test for
determining whether a defect is unreasonably dangerous; instead, the
determination requires “the consideration of whether or not the
sidewalk was maintained in a reasonably safe condition for persons
exercising ordinary care and prudence.” Id. at 598. Although public
entities are responsible for maintaining their sidewalks in a reasonably
safe condition, they are neither required to maintain the sidewalks in
perfect condition nor are they the insurers of pedestrians’ safety. Id.

It is clear from the record that Lake Arthur had custody of the sidewalk at

the time of Ms. Richard’s fall. We must next determine whether the sidewalk, as

constructed, created an unreasonable risk of harm.

[A] municipality is not an insurer of the safety of pedestrians. It must
keep the sidewalks reasonable safe, but the maintaining of them in
perfect condition is not necessary. To render it liable in damages the
defect complained of must be dangerous or calculated to cause injury.

For determining what is a dangerous defect in sidewalk ... there is no
fixed rule; the facts and surrounding circumstances of each particular
case control. The test usually applied, however, requires an answer
to the question of whether or not the walk was maintained in a
reasonable (sic) safe condition for persons exercising ordinary care
and prudence.

Boyle v. Bd. of Sup’rs, Louisiana State Univ., 96-1158, p. 4 (La.1/14/97), 685

So.2d 1080, 1082 (quoting White v. City of Alexandria, 216 La. 308, 314-15, 43

So.2d 618, 620 (1949)). To determine whether a condition is unreasonably

dangerous, the supreme court has adopted a four-factor risk-utility balancing test:

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(1) the utility of the thing; (2) the likelihood and magnitude of harm,
which includes the obviousness and apparentness of the condition; (3)
the cost of preventing the harm; and (4) the nature of the plaintiffs’
activities in terms of its social utility, or whether it is dangerous by
nature. Pitre v. Louisiana Tech University, 95-1466 (La.5/10/96), 673
So.2d 585, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1007, 117 S.Ct. 509, 136 L.Ed.2d
399 (1996).

Pryor v. Iberia Parish Sch. Bd., 10-1683, p. 4 (La. 3/15/11), 60 So.3d 594, 597.

In this case, the evidence establishes the utility of the sidewalk and the

driveway. Before the sidewalk was reconstructed, there was an asphalt ramp that

protruded into the roadway for vehicles to enter the park at that same spot on the

sidewalk. The replacement sidewalk allowed vehicles to enter without damaging

their undersides and without a ramp protruding into the road.

The likelihood and magnitude of harm was testified to by the mayor, who

stated that until Mrs. Richard fell, no person had reported an injury because of the

condition of the sidewalk. Mrs. Richard testified in her deposition that she knew

from driving past that area there was a driveway at that point in the sidewalk. She

also testified that on the day she was injured, she noticed the driveway well before

she reached it. Furthermore, the photographs entered into the record show that the

concrete of the driveway was lighter in color than the older sidewalk, and there

were signs indicating where the driveway was located.

Mrs. Richard makes much of the fact that because the transition area where

she allegedly stepped violated codes, which require such areas to have a slope of

no greater that 8.33%, the area is defective per se. At the time of her fall, Mrs.

Richard and her relatives were walking side-by-side-by-side, with Mrs. Richard

nearest the road to the far left side. This is also the point at which the slope in the

transition area was most acute. If she felt like she could not negotiate that slope,

which she testified that she saw, she only had to move to the right three feet.

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While Mrs. Richard did suffer from the injuries to her ankles, we find that

the likelihood of such damages at this location was low. Furthermore, we find the

condition of the sidewalk was obvious and apparent, as established by Mrs.

Richard’s own testimony.

Mrs. Richard argues that the condition was not obvious and apparent

because the failure of the slope to conform to certain standards was not apparent

until an engineer surveyed the area as a result of this lawsuit. We disagree with

that assessment. The obviousness and apparentness of the condition is determined

by the condition of the sidewalk as Mrs. Richard saw it, not as measured by a

survey.

The next element in determining whether a thing is unreasonably dangerous

is the cost of preventing the harm. Under the facts of this case, Mrs. Richard

admitted that she saw the change in slope where the driveway crossed the

sidewalk. The record before us does not include any evidence of steps the town

could have taken to make the area more obvious to Ms. Richard.

The final element is the social utility of Mrs. Richard’s activity. She was

using the sidewalk for the purpose intended, and her activity was not dangerous by

nature.

Analyzing these factors, we find that the obvious and apparent condition of

the sidewalk is sufficient to show that the sidewalk was not unreasonably

dangerous. Because the Richards will be unable to prove an essential element of

their claim against the defendants, the trial court properly granted summary

judgment. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

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CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court dismissing the Richards’ claims against the

Town of Lake Arthur, John Anderson, John Anderson Concrete Finishers, Inc., and

Seneca Specialty Insurance Company, is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are

assessed to the Richards.

AFFIRMED.

This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION.
Uniform Rules−Courts of Appeal, Rule 2−16.3.

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