William O. Belt v. Tracy Bryant Belt

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

16-136

WILLIAM O. BELT

VERSUS

TRACY BRYANT BELT

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APPEAL FROM THE
TWELFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF AVOYELLES, DOCKET NO. 2012-8288
HONORABLE RONALD COX, AD HOC, PRESIDING
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SYLVIA R. COOKS
JUDGE

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Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, John D. Saunders, and Marc T. Amy, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Patrick B. Sadler
2804 Hill Street
Alexandria, LA 71301
(318) 794-9016
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT
William O. Belt

Terry Aubin
Aubin Law Firm
3600 Jackson Street, Suite 107
Alexandria, LA 71303
(318) 561-7000
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE
Tracy Bryant Belt

COOKS, Judge.

William Belt and Tracy Bryant Belt (hereafter Ms. Bryant) were married on

December 11, 1992 in Avoyelles Parish, Louisiana. Mr. Belt was the Sheriff of

Avoyelles Parish, retiring from that position on July 1, 2008. While employed as

the Sheriff, Mr. Belt participated in the Louisiana Sheriff’s Pension and Relief

Fund. Upon his retirement in 2008, Mr. Belt had to choose which option to select

from the Fund. He selected Option 2, which provided a reduced amount of

monthly benefits, but provided a lifetime benefit for Ms. Bryant. Thus, by

selecting Option 2, the maximum monthly benefit Mr. Belt was entitled to,

$10,131.61, was reduced to $8,051.28. However, in the event Mr. Belt died first,

Ms. Bryant would continue to receive that reduced amount for the remainder of her

life.

After almost twenty years of marriage, Mr. Belt filed a Petition for Divorce

on July 24, 2012. In response, Ms. Bryant filed an Answer and Reconventional

Demand seeking child custody (the marriage produced three children), child

support, interim spousal support and permanent spousal support. Ms. Bryant also

sought to partition the community of acquets and gains existing between the

parties.

The parties, through several consent judgments, resolved the issues of child

custody, child support and spousal support. The parties were not able to reach an

amicable resolution as to the community of acquets and gains.

A trial on the partition of the community was held, after which the trial court

awarded Ms. Bryant 50% of the community property portion of Mr. Belt’s benefit

in the Louisiana Sheriff’s Pension and Relief Fund. The percentages established

are not in dispute and it was determined Ms. Bryant was entitled to 28.19% of

$8,051.28, the reduced benefit being paid to Mr. Belt. Mr. Belt protested, arguing

he should be granted an offset for this amount against the $2,080.32 reduction of

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his lifetime benefits to establish Ms. Bryant’s lifetime entitlement. He argued the

entire $2,080.32 should be reimbursed to him now that the parties are divorced if

she refuses to relinquish her present entitlement to 28.19% of the reduced

retirement amount being paid to him. The trial court denied Mr. Belt’s

reimbursement claim for the reduced portion of the maximum retirement benefit.

Mr. Belt filed a Motion for New Trial which was denied by the trial court.

This appeal followed, wherein Mr. Belt asserts the following assignments of error:

1. The trial court committed error when it assigned the lifetime
benefit to Ms. Bryant but failed to assign the liability associated with
the lifetime benefit payable to her upon Mr. Belt’s death.

2. The trial court committed error for failing to reimburse Mr. Belt
for the reduced portion of his retirement benefit.

3. The trial court committed error for failing to assess Ms. Bryant
with the entire reduction amount of $2,080.32, or the difference
between the maximum retirement benefit of $10,131.61 and the
reduced retirement benefit of $8,051.28, on all future withholdings.

ANALYSIS

In his first assignment of error, Mr. Belt asserts the trial court erred when it

held Ms. Bryant is entitled to have her “Option 2” survivor benefits, but failed to

offset a liability associated with those benefits. We find this assignment of error is

without merit.

The “Option 2” survivor benefit chosen by Mr. Belt is set out in La.R.S.

11:2178(I)(1), and provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

I. (1)(a) Upon application for service retirement, any participant
may elect to receive benefits in a retirement allowance payable
throughout life, or

(b) May elect at that time to receive the actuarial equivalent of
the retirement allowance in a reduced retirement allowance payable
throughout life with the following options, subject to the limitation
that no member may elect an optional settlement in any amount in
excess of the member’s final average compensation, after the
reduction produced by the option selected:

....

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Option 2. Upon the member’s death, a reduced retirement
allowance shall be continued throughout the life of and paid to the
spouse to whom the member was married and living with at the time
of retirement.

Mr. Belt could have elected to receive the maximum, lifetime-only benefit,

but chose instead to select “Option 2.” Under that option, the amount of the

monthly benefit paid during the retiree’s lifetime is reduced, but that reduced

amount is payable throughout the life of the spouse to whom the retiree was

married and living with at the time of his retirement. Ms. Bryant is statutorily

entitled to receive the survivor benefit because she was the spouse to whom Mr.

Belt was married to at the time of his retirement.

We agree with Ms. Bryant that when Mr. Belt elected the option by which

he would receive his retirement benefits, he did not incur a community liability

subject to partition. Any survivor benefits payable by Mr. Belt’s retirement plan,

to the extent attributable to his employment during the community, are an asset of

the community not a liablility. Herrington v. Skinner, 93-1556 (La.App. 3 Cir.

6/1/94), 640 So.2d 748.

Ms. Bryant is Entitled to the survivor benefit provided in La.R.S.

11:2178(I)(1)(b), Option 2, that was selected by her then husband, and owes no

reimbursement for it. No legislation or jurisprudence provides otherwise.

Mr. Belt argues both he and Ms. Bryant, together, selected Option 2.

Whether that is true is irrelevant, as Mr. Belt had the sole authority to make the

selection. He did so, and under La.R.S. 11:2178(I)(2) “no change in the option

selected shall be permitted after the application has been officially filed with the

board . . . .” That Mr. Belt may now regret his choice does not change the law.

Mr. Belt suggests La.R.S. 11:2178(I)(3) provides Ms. Bryant with a way to

voluntarily relinquish her right to the survivor benefit and avoid having to

reimburse for the “cost” associated with the survivor benefit. It states:

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(3) If any option of this Subsection is selected, and the retiree’s
spouse was designated as the beneficiary, and a judgment of divorce is
rendered with respect to the retiree and the spouse, and, in connection
therewith, the spouse, irrevocably, by court order, relinquishes the
spouse’s survivorship rights under the option originally selected by
the retiree, the originally selected option shall be considered revoked
and the retiree shall be considered as retired under the maximum
benefit, subject to reduction as hereinafter set forth, and without
affording the retiree the right to select an option under which the
retiree could designate a new beneficiary, and the benefit payable to
the retiree shall be increased to the amount the retiree would have
received had the retiree selected the maximum benefit, adjusted for
any cost-of-living increases granted to the retiree, less any amount
required as a result of such change in retirement status to render the
new benefit to be the actuarial equivalent of the maximum benefit.
The retiree shall be required to reimburse the system, by way of a one-
time deduction from the retiree’s next benefit check, the reasonable
cost incurred by the system to have these calculations made. The
retiree shall be required to contractually hold the system harmless in
the event that the former spouse ever successfully asserts a property
right relative hereto which has any adverse effect upon the system. It
shall be the responsibility of the retiree to notify the system of these
circumstances, to present satisfactory evidence of same, and to request
the recomputation of benefits. Adjustment of benefits under this
Subsection shall not be retroactive, and shall be effective on the first
day of the next month following official approval of the application
for recomputation benefits.

We do not find the language of the statute supports Mr. Belt’s interpretation.

As Ms. Bryant argues, if the legislature intended for La.R.S. 11:2178(I)(3) to

provide the means for a non-employee spouse to relinquish the survivor benefit

that by law applies to her alone, in order to avoid a “cost” associated with that

benefit, it could easily have provided so. It did not.

Mr. Belt notes in the event the non-employee spouse voluntarily relinquishes

the survivor benefit, the monthly benefit paid to the retiree spouse reverts back to

the maximum, lifetime only benefit. He asserts this is so because there is a cost

associated with the survivor benefit which should be borne by the party that

benefits from the survivor benefit. We disagree. The statute plainly provides all of

the benefit payment options are actuarially equivalent. See La.R.S.

11:2178(I)(1)(b). That is why in the event a non-employee spouse voluntarily

relinquishes the survivor benefit, the retiree spouse is returned to the maximum,

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lifetime only benefit. This maintains the needed actuarial equivalence.

In his second and third assignments of error, Mr. Belt attempts to extend

Sims v. Sims, 358 So.2d 919 (La.1978), to create a reimbursement obligation for

the lifetime benefit resulting from his election of the Option 2 survivor benefit. In

his argument, Mr. Belt continues to argue the selection of Option 2 and the

subsequent reduction in the amount of benefits constitutes a liability incurred. He

then uses the Sims formula to calculate his separate property interest in each

foregone monthly payment. As Ms. Bryant argues, this is a misapplication of Sims

Sims is a jurisprudential tool which the courts have used to classify and

allocate lifetime pension benefits. No court has ever interpreted Sims to apply to

reimbursement. Moreover, as Ms. Bryant notes, the courts have never interpreted

the Louisiana Civil Code’s reimbursement articles to make a spouse pay for the

survivor benefit which the other spouse selected.

As Ms. Bryant notes, this was not an extrajudicial partition, where the

parties negotiated or traded certain rights or benefits. There was absolutely no

agreement that Ms. Bryant would relinquish the survivor benefit in exchange for

something else. The law simply does not provide any avenue for the relief which

Mr. Belt seeks.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. All

costs of this appeal are assessed against plaintiff-appellant, William Belt.

AFFIRMED.

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