CA-0016-0390 Nonprecedential Processed

Robert Caillier v. Strictly Star Touring

Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit · Filed June 22, 2016

Authorities cited

Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.

Opinion text

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

16-390

ROBERT CAILLIER

VERSUS

STRICTLY STARS TOURING;
DAWN HARRINGTON; I BOOK
STARS AGENCY, LLC; EARNEST
JOHNSON; AND NAYADIUS DEMUN
WILBURN ("FUTURE")

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
TWENTY-SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ST. LANDRY, NO. 15-C-3202-C
HONORABLE D. JASON MECHE, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

BILLY H. EZELL

JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, Billy H. Ezell, and John E. Conery, Judges.

APPEALS DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

Nadia de la Houssaye
Jones Walker LLP
600 Jefferson Street, Suite 1600
Lafayette, Louisiana 70502-3408
(337) 593-7600
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS:
Epic Records, a Division of Sony Music Entertainment; and Nayadius
Demun Wilburn (“Future”)

I Book Stars Agency Touring
2360 Corporate Circle
Henderson, Nevada 899074
DEFENDANT:
In Proper Person

W. Glenn Soileau
Soileau & Soileau
Post Office Box 344
Breaux Bridge, Louisiana 70517
(337) 332-4561
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
Robert Caillier

Strictly Stars Touring
520 Dunailie Drive
Nashville, Tennessee 37217
DEFENDANT:
In Proper Person

EZELL, Judge.

This court issued a rule ordering Appellants, Epic Records, a Division of

Sony Music Entertainment (Epic), and Nayadius Demun Wilburn, a/k/a Future

(Future), to show cause, by brief only, why their appeals should not be dismissed

for having been taken from a partial judgment which has not been designated

immediately appealable pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art. 1915(B) and for lack of

decretal language (see State v. White, 05-781 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/1/06), 921 So.2d

1144). For the reasons that follow, we dismiss the appeals without prejudice and

remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Robert Caillier (Caillier) filed a petition for damages naming the following

parties as defendants: Strictly Stars Touring (Strictly Stars); Dawn Harrington

(Harrington); I Book Stars Agency, LLC (I Book Stars); Earnest Johnson; 1 and

Future. The petition alleged that Caillier booked Future to perform in Lafayette,

Louisiana, on August 29, 2014. Future cancelled the performance a week or two

before the agreed upon date. Caillier sought return of the part of the deposit that

was not refunded ($12,500.00) and damages for breach of contract in the amount

of $150,000.00.

After the defendants failed to answer or file responsive pleadings, Caillier

moved for a preliminary default. The preliminary default was issued, and a

hearing to confirm the default was held. After the trial court took the matter under

advisement, a written judgment was signed on February 2, 2016.2 The judgment

found in favor of Caillier with respect to his claim for the unreturned deposit
1
Earnest Johnson was not served.
2
Notice of judgment issued February 12, 2016.

($12,500.00) and out-of-pocket expenditures ($16,000.00). The judgment ordered

Strictly Stars, Harrington, I Book Stars, Future, and Epic3 to pay those amounts to

Caillier. The trial court made no finding that the defendants were jointly liable.

The judgment does not mention whether the defendants are liable in equal

amounts.4

With respect to Caillier’s claim for lost profits, the trial court found that

Caillier’s “testimony alone was too speculative to support an award of lost profits”

in the amount of $150,000.00. The judgment states that the claim for lost profits is

“denied at this time.”

Devolutive appeals were filed on behalf of Epic and Future. When the

record was lodged in this court, a rule was issued ordering Epic and Future to show

cause why their appeals should not be dismissed for the above-stated reasons.

DISCUSSION

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 2083(A) states that “[a] final

judgment is appealable in all causes in which appeals are given by law, whether

rendered after hearing, by default, or by reformation under Article 1814.”

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1841 provides, in pertinent part, “[a]

judgment that determines the merits in whole or in part is a final judgment.”

Appellants argue that these provisions lead to the inevitable conclusion that a

confirmed default judgment is unambiguously a final judgment that is subject to an

immediate appeal.

Appellants’ reasoning is flawed. A default judgment can be a partial

judgment when it does not dispose of all the claims made by the plaintiff. See

3
The judgment orders Epic to pay, but Epic was not named as a defendant and was not
mentioned in the trial court’s written reasons for judgment except in a footnote which says that
the certified mail receipt showing service on Epic was introduced into the record at the hearing.
4
At the hearing to confirm the default, the trial court specifically stated that “if I’m going
to give a judgment, I need to know who owes you what.
2

Apartment Redevelopment Corp. v. Polkey, 01-180 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/17/01), 800

So.2d 968. In such a case, if the partial default judgment is not certified as a final

judgment, any appeal must be dismissed as premature. Id.

The default judgment denies Caillier’s claim for lost profits “at this time.”

This court finds that the inclusion of “at this time” makes the judgment a partial

judgment because it suggests that the record is being held open and that the court

might reverse its ruling as to lost profits if Caillier presented the necessary

evidence to support the claim.

The motions for appeal claim that the trial court “entered a judgment

declaring the [j]udgment to be a final, appealable [j]udgment.” However, the

record does not contain evidence that the judgment was designated as final by the

trial court. The issuance of the rule to show cause gave Appellants an opportunity

to supplement the record with the certification if one, in fact, existed. No

supplement to the record was made, and Appellants do not mention this assertion

in the brief submitted in response to the rule to show cause. Thus, this court

cannot determine whether the claim that the trial court designated the judgment as

final was a mere clerical error or a recognition by Appellants that there was some

issue as to the finality of the judgment.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1915(B) provides that:

(1) When a court renders a partial judgment or partial summary
judgment or sustains an exception in part, as to one or more but less
than all of the claims, demands, issues, or theories against a party,
whether in an original demand, reconventional demand, cross-claim,
third-party claim, or intervention, the judgment shall not constitute a
final judgment unless it is designated as a final judgment by the court
after an express determination that there is no just reason for delay.

(2) In the absence of such a determination and designation, any
such order or decision shall not constitute a final judgment for the
purpose of an immediate appeal and may be revised at any time prior
to rendition of the judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights
and liabilities of all the parties.
3

However, La.Code Civ.P. art. “1915 does not provide for any exception to its

applicability as to any particular case.” Seaman v. Seaman, 10-1295, p. 4 (La.App.

3 Cir. 12/15/10), 54 So.3d 756, 759. However, “the jurisprudence has held that not

all provisions in this statute are applicable in every instance.” Id. Several cases

have held that certain judgments are not subject to the requirements of La.Code

Civ.P. art. 1915.5

In this instance, we find that the judgment at issue required a designation of

finality from the trial court in order to be subject to immediate appeal. The

concerns addressed in the cases cited in note 4 do not exist in this case. Moreover,

there are several cases which hold that judgments of default that do not adjudicate

all of the claims of the parties are subject to the provisions of La.Code Civ.P. art.

1915(B). See Apartment Redevelopment Corp., 800 So.2d 968, and Laviolette v.

Dubose, 07-916 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/25/08), 983 So.2d 160.

The rule to show cause order also indicated that Appellants were to show

cause, if there was any, why the appeal should not be dismissed as having been

taken from a judgment lacking decretal language. Appellants do not address this

issue in their brief which was submitted in response to the rule to show cause

order.

5
In Rhodes v. Lewis, 01-1989, p. 8 (La.5/14/02), 817 So.2d 64, 69, the Louisiana
Supreme Court held “that an appeal from a determination of a workers’ compensation hearing
officer is impermissible under [La.Code Civ.P. art. 1915(A)(1)” because “[t]o hold otherwise
would render meaningless the goals [of] the Workers’ Compensation Act,” including the goal of
avoiding protracted appellate proceedings.

In Seaman, 54 So.3d at 759, this court held that “La.Code Civ.P. art. 1915(B) should not
apply to a judgment as to custody or visitation.

In Martinez v. Rivet, 16-100, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/13/16), ___ So.3d ___, this court held
that there was “no reason to delay the appeal of the partial summary judgment [in an eviction
proceeding] for a determination of finality” because so doing “would lead to piecemeal appeals
with the probability of inconsistent outcomes.”

4

The jurisprudence is clear that “[a] final appealable judgment must contain

decretal language, and it must name the party in favor of whom the ruling is

ordered, the party against whom the ruling is ordered, and the relief that is granted

or denied.” Thomas v. Lafayette Parish Sch. System, 13-91, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir.

3/6/13), 128 So.3d 1055, 1056, quoting State v. White, 05-718, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir.

2/1/06), 921 So.2d 1144, 1146.

In Bd. of Sup’rs of Louisiana State Univ. & Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Mid City

Holdings, L.L.C., 14-506, pp. 2-3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/15/14), 151 So.3d 908, 910

(footnote added), the court stated:

We cannot determine the merits of an appeal unless our
jurisdiction is properly invoked by a valid final judgment. 6 See
Input/Output Marine Sys., Inc. v. Wilson Greatbatch, Tech., Inc., 10-
477, p. 12 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/29/10); 52 So.3d 909, 915. “A judgment
is the determination of the rights of the parties in an action and may
award any relief to which the parties are entitled.” La. C.C.P. art.
1841. “A valid judgment must be precise, definite and certain.... [sic]
The decree alone indicates the decision.... [sic] The result decreed
must be spelled out in lucid, unmistakable language. .... [sic] The
quality of definiteness is essential to a proper judgment. Input/Output
Marine, 10-477, pp. 12-13; 52 So.3d at 915-16 (citations omitted).

....

“The specific relief granted should be determinable from the judgment
without reference to an extrinsic source such as pleadings or reasons
for judgment.” Input/Output Marine, . . . 52 So.3d at 916.

While the judgment in this case clearly rules in favor of Caillier with respect

to the return of the remainder of his deposit and out of pocket expenses, it casts

five parties in judgment, i.e., Strictly Stars, Harrington, I Book Stars, Future, and

Epic. The judgment does not set forth any determination as to whether the

defendants are jointly or solidarily liable such that it is unknown what amount each

6
In this case, Appellants filed motions for devolutive appeals on April 11, 2016. Notice
of judgment was issued February 12, 2016. Therefore, this court cannot convert the appeals to
applications for supervisory review because they were not filed within the thirty-day period
pertinent to applications for supervisory writs. See Duckering v. Rapides Healthcare System,
LLC, 15-049 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/2/16), ___ So.3d ___, and Favrot v. Favrot, 10-986 (La.App. 4
Cir. 2/9/11), 68 So.3d 1099, writ denied, 11-636 (La. 5/6/11), 62 So.3d 127.
5

defendant is obligated to pay despite the trial court’s recognition that “if I’m going

to give a judgment, I need to know who owes you what.

Therefore, this default judgment “does not contain all of the necessary

decretal language to meet the requirements of a final judgment.” Dietz v. Dietz,

13-186, p. 8 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/6/13), 128 So.3d 1215, 1220. Accordingly, the

appeals must be dismissed. When a final, appealable judgment is rendered,

Appellants may file new appeals with this court. See Smith v. State, Dept. of

Transp. and Dev., 15-962 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/17/16), 186 So.3d 1180.

DECREE

For all the reasons given, this court lacks jurisdiction to consider the merits

of these devolutive appeals. The devolutive appeals taken by Epic Records, a

Division of Sony Music Entertainment (Epic), and Nayadius Demun Wilburn,

a/k/a Future (Future), are dismissed as having been taken from a partial judgment

that has not been designated immediately appealable pursuant to La.Code Civ.P.

art. 1915(B) and for lack of decretal language (see State v. White, 05-781 (La.App.

3 Cir. 2/1/06), 921 So.2d 1144). The dismissals are without prejudice. The matter

is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this

opinion.

APPEALS DISMISSED. REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

6