Daryl Dwayne Thomas v. Johnda Rochelle Ardoin

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

16-393

DARYL DWAYNE THOMAS

VERSUS

JOHNDA ROCHELLE ARDOIN

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APPEAL FROM THE
TWENTY-SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ST. LANDRY, NO. 14-C-1766-C
HONORABLE ALONZO HARRIS, DISTRICT JUDGE

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BILLY HOWARD EZELL
JUDGE

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Court composed of Elizabeth A. Pickett, Billy Howard Ezell, and Phyllis M. Keaty,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Pride J. Doran
Quincy L. Cawthorne
Christopher B. Lear
The Doran Law Firm
521 East Landry Street
Opelousas, LA 70571
(337) 948-8008
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
Daryl Dwayne Thomas

Frank E. Brown, III (appeal counsel)
Law Office of Frank E. Brown, III
2023 Government St.
Baton Rouge, LA 70809
(225) 387-6377
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Johnda Rochelle Ardoin

Demi L. Vorise
Attorney at Law
P. O. Box 697
Maringouin, LA 70757
(225) 361-0424
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Johnda Rochelle Ardoin

EZELL, Judge.

Johnda Rochelle Ardoin appeals the decision of the trial court granting

domiciliary custody of her twin children to their father, Daryl Dwayne Thomas.

For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

Ms. Ardoin and Mr. Thomas engaged in a tumultuous, on-again-off-again

relationship for roughly six years. As a result of this relationship, twins were born

in January of 2007, Jaylon and Jayla Thomas. While involved in the relationship,

Ms. Ardoin and Mr. Thomas lived in a home in Plaisance, Louisiana, which was

given to Mr. Thomas by his parents. The home was on what amounted to a seven

acre compound on which several members of the Thomas family had homes.

Eventually, the relationship deteriorated and Ms. Ardoin moved to Baton Rouge in

2013, where she secured a job with the Louisiana Department of Corrections. The

children remained with Mr. Thomas when she left.

In April of 2014, Mr. Thomas filed a petition for custody. That May, a

hearing officer awarded Mr. Thomas domiciliary custody of the children. Ms.

Ardoin objected to that award. In August of that year, Ms. Ardoin took the

children from their paternal grandparents during a church service, knowing Mr.

Thomas was working offshore. The children remained with her until February of

2015, when Mr. Thomas removed them from school and returned with them to

Plaisance. They remained there until April of that year, when Ms. Ardoin again

removed them to Baton Rouge. Mr. Thomas then requested trial be set for his

petition and requested a temporary custody order. On August 7, 2015, the trial

court issued a temporary order granting Mr. Thomas domiciliary custody and Ms.

Ardoin visitation. A hearing on the matter was held on August 24, 2015. After

that hearing, the trial court issued a judgment granting the parties joint custody,

and again awarding domiciliary custody to Mr. Thomas and visitation to Ms.

Ardoin. From that decision, Ms. Ardoin appeals.

Ms. Ardoin asserts two assignments of error on appeal. She claims that the

trial court erred in not weighing all the factors for determining the best interests of

the children set forth under La.Civ.Code art. 134. She further claims that the trial

court erred in its judgment, as she claims the decision is not supported by the

record. Because these assignments of error overlap so greatly, we will address

them together.

The manner in which child custody determinations are to be made is well

settled.

[T]he court shall award custody of a child in accordance with the best
interest of the child. La. C.C. art. 131. The best interest of the child is
the sole criterion to be met in making a custody award, as the trial
court sits as a sort of fiduciary on behalf of the child and must pursue
actively that course of conduct which will be of the greatest benefit to
the child. C.M.J. v. L.M.C., 14-1119 (La.10/15/14), 156 So.3d 16, 28,
quoting Turner v. Turner, 455 So.2d 1374, 1378 (La.1984). It is the
child’s emotional, physical, material and social well-being and health
that are the court’s very purpose in child custody cases; the court must
protect the child from the real possibility that the parents are engaged
in a bitter, vengeful, and highly emotional conflict. Id. The legislature
has mandated that the court look only to the child’s interests so that
the court can fulfill its obligations to the child. Id. at 28-29.

....

As provided in La. C.C. art. 134, all relevant factors in
determining the best interest of the child must be considered by the
court; such factors may include: (1) the love, affection, and other
emotional ties between each party and the child; (2) the capacity and
disposition of each party to give the child love, affection, and spiritual
guidance and to continue the education and rearing of the child; (3)
the capacity and disposition of each party to provide the child with
food, clothing, medical care, and other material needs; (4) the length
of time the child has lived in a stable, adequate environment and the
desirability of maintaining continuity of that environment; (5) the
permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial
home or homes; (6) the moral fitness of each party, insofar as it
affects the welfare of the child; (7) the mental and physical health of

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each party; (8) the home, school, and community history of the child;
(9) the reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child
to be of sufficient age to express a preference; (10) the willingness
and ability of each party to facilitate and encourage a close and
continuing relationship between the child and the other party; (11) the
distance between the respective residences of the parties; and (12) the
responsibility for the care and rearing of the child previously
exercised by each party.

The list of factors provided in Article 134 is nonexclusive,
and the determination as to the weight to be given each factor is
left to the discretion of the trial court. See La. C.C. art. 134, 1993
Revision Comment (b). The illustrative nature of the listing of factors
contained in Article 134 gives the court freedom to consider
additional factors; and, in general, the court should consider the
totality of the facts and circumstances of the individual case. See La.
C.C. art. 134, 1993 Revision Comment (c).

Hodges v. Hodges, 15-585, pp. 2-4 (La. 11/23/15), 181 So.3d 700, 702-03 (bold

emphasis ours).

Article 134 mandates only that all factors relevant to the best interest
of the child be considered; it then enumerates twelve factors which
may be relevant to the best interest determination. As explained in
Cooper v. Cooper, 43,244, p. 6 (La.App. 2 Cir. 3/12/08), 978 So.2d
1156, 1160 (citations omitted):

The court is not bound to make a mechanical
evaluation of all of the statutory factors listed in La. C.C.
art. 134, but should decide each case on its own facts in
light of those factors. The court is not bound to give more
weight to one factor over another, and when determining
the best interest of the child, the factors must be weighed
and balanced in view of the evidence presented.
Moreover, the factors are not exclusive, but are provided
as a guide to the court, and the relative weight given to
each factor is left to the discretion of the trial court.

See also, Aucoin v. Aucoin, 02-756 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/30/02), 834
So.2d 1245; Hawthorne v. Hawthorne, 96-89 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/22/96),
676 So.2d 619, writ denied, 96-1650 (La.10/25/96), 681 So.2d 365
(holding that the factors of Article 134 are illustrative and serve as a
guide to the trial court).

Thibodeaux v. O’Quain, 09-1266, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/24/10), 33 So.3d 1008,

1012-13 (footnote omitted)(bold emphasis ours).

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Finally, this court has stated the standard of review for an appellate court in

child custody matters: “The trial court is in a better position to evaluate the best

interest of the child from its observances of the parties and witnesses; thus, a trial

court’s determination in a child custody case is entitled to great weight on appeal

and will not be disturbed unless there is a clear abuse of discretion.” Hawthorne v.

Hawthorne, 96-89, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/22/96), 676 So.2d 619, 625, writ denied,

96-1650 (La. 10/25/96), 681 So.2d 365.

Our review of the record and the trial court’s written reasons indicates that it

did consider all the relevant factors enumerated in La.Civ.Code art. 134. The trial

court specifically stated in its reasons that “[w]hen the court looks at the factors in

determining the child’s best interest, petitioner, Daryl Thomas wins on the majority

of the factors.” While the trial court did not specifically address all the factors

enumerated in La.Civ.Code art. 134 in its reasons, it is clear that it did consider

them.

Further, a review of the record shows that the trial court’s determination as

to the best interests of the children is reasonable. With respect to the applicable

La.Civ.Code art. 134 factors, Ms. Ardoin and Mr. Thomas are essentially equal in

many respects. Both care for their children, and both work hard and rely on their

families to help them with the children while at work. Both have made unfortunate

decisions in the past, and both have failed to allow proper communication between

the children and the other parent.

However, the trial court mentions specifically several factors that it felt

separated Mr. Thomas from Ms. Ardoin, causing the trial court to find that

domiciliary custody with him was in the best interests of the children. Notably, the

trial court found that because the children had lived with Mr. Thomas on the

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Thomas family land for six of their eight years of life, that home provided them

with familiarity and stability. The trial court noted the strong family support in

favor of Mr. Thomas. The record indicates that the family support is substantial in

his home, as he lives surrounded by his parents and other family who frequently

help with the children, most notably the paternal grandmother. Moreover, the

record indicates that Mr. Thomas recently changed jobs, sacrificing $70,000.00 per

year to spend more time with the children. Finally, as noted by the trial court, the

children stated a preference to stay with their father.

Given the great weight we must place on the trial court’s determination, we

can find no clear abuse of the trial court’s discretion in the record before us. The

trial court’s assessment of the relevant factors set forth in La.Civ.Code art. 134 and

its ultimate determination are reasonably supported by the record. Therefore, we

can find no error with the trial court’s designation of Mr. Thomas as domiciliary

parent.

Finally, Ms. Ardoin mentions as part of her argument on her second

assignment of error that the trial court’s reasons do not articulate the facts upon

which its conclusions are based. As a matter of law, “a judgment and reasons for

judgment are two separate and distinct legal documents and appeals are taken from

the judgment, not the written reasons for judgment.” Ziegel v. S. Cent. Bell, 93-

547 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/16/94), 635 So.2d 314, 316. “The written reasons for

judgment are merely an explication of the Trial Court’s determinations. They do

not alter, amend, or affect the final judgment being appealed . . . .” State in

Interest of Mason, 356 So.2d 530, 532 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1977). Accordingly, any

arguments Ms. Ardoin has with the content of the reasons are of no moment legally.

Moreover, a simple reading of those reasons shows that the trial court articulated

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several reasons in support of its decision, including the strong family support and

the preferences of the children, as mentioned above. Therefore, any argument Ms.

Ardoin makes in this regard is not only incorrect legally, but factually, as well.

For the above reasons, we hereby affirm the decision of the trial court.

Costs of this appeal are hereby assessed against Johnda Rochelle Ardoin.

AFFIRMED.

This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION. Uniform
Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-16.3.

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