Brittni Castille v. Estate of Trissy Hargrave

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

16-758

BRITTNI CASTILLE

VERSUS

ESTATE OF TRISSY HARGRAVE, ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. C-20103865
HONORABLE DAVID MICHAEL SMITH, DISTRICT JUDGE

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JOHN E. CONERY
JUDGE

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Court composed of John D. Saunders, Phyllis M. Keaty, and John E. Conery,
Judges.

REVERSED IN PART AND RENDERED MOOT IN PART.

Paul D. Gibson
Thomas M. Long
Gibson Law Group, PLLC
600 Jefferson Street, Suite 600
Post Office Box 3663
Lafayette, Louisiana 70502-3663
(337) 233-9600
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT/APPELLEE:
Lafayette City-Parish ConsolidatedGovernment
Officer Todd Rogers

Sera Hearn Russell, III
Attorney at Law
Post Office Box 52866
Lafayette, Louisiana 70505-3866
(337) 237-7171
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE/APPELLANT:
Estate of Trissy Hargrave

Jeffery F. Speer
George A. Wright
Doucet-Speer
A Professional Law Corporation
617 St. John Street
Post Office Drawer 4303
Lafayette, Louisiana 70502
(337) 232-0405
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE/APPELLANT:
Brittni Castille
Ella Hargrave
Raywood Hargrave

CONERY, Judge.

All remaining parties to this litigation have appealed a part of the judgment

rendered by the trial court on August 4, 2016. Defendants, Lafayette Consolidated

Government and Officer Todd Rogers (LCG Defendants), appeal the denial by the

trial court of their peremptory exception of prescription. The plaintiff, Brittni

Castille, and third party claimants, the Estate of Trissy Hargrave and Raywood and

Ella Hargrave, who during the litigation substituted themselves in place of the

Estate of Trissy Hargrave (collectively referred to as the Estate of Trissy Hargrave),

appeal the ruling of the trial court after a trial on the merits finding that the LCG

Defendants were free from fault, and thereby dismissing all claims against the

LCG Defendants made by Brittni Castille and the Estate of Trissy Hargrave at their

cost.

For the following reasons, we reverse the trial court’s denial of the LCG

Defendants’ peremptory exception of prescription, which renders moot the appeal

of Brittni Castille and the Estate of Trissy Hargrave of the trial court’s ruling in

favor of the remaining LCG Defendants, Lafayette Consolidated Government and

Officer Rogers.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The initial appeal of the plaintiff, Brittni Castille, was taken from the trial

court’s reason’s for judgment, and docketed under number 16-798. However,

subsquent to its granting the plaintiff’s order of appeal, the trial court signed a

judgment in conformity with its reasons for judgment on August 4, 2016. The

Louisiana Supreme Court in Overmier v. Traylor, 475 So.2d 1094, 1094-95

(La.1985) (emphasis added and footnote omitted), overturned the appellate court’s

dismissal of an appeal taken from the trial court’s reasons for judgment and stated,

“an appeal granted before the signing of a final judgment is subject to dismissal

until the final judgment is signed. However, once the final judgment has been

signed, any previously existing defect has been cured, and there is no useful

purpose in dismissing the otherwise valid appeal.”

The August 4, 2016 judgment was transmitted to this court and docketed

under number 16-1049. Although these two cases are not consolidated, they are

idential, and this court’s ruling under this docket number will be reflected in

docket number 16-1049.

FACTS

On December 4, 2009, an automobile accident took place on Ambassador

Caffery Parkway in Lafayette, Louisiana, when Andrew Garner, driving a black

Infiniti at a high rate of speed, lost control of the vehicle, entered the opposing lane

of travel, and collided with a vehicle driven by Trissy Hargrave. Both Mr. Garner

and Ms. Hargrave died at the scene and Brittni Castille, the guest passenger in the

Hargrave vehicle, suffered injuries.

Actions Prior to the Filing of a Formal Petition

On April 12, 2010, prior to the formal filing of any lawsuit, Brittni Castille

signed a document entitled “Release of All Claims” (Release) with Catherine D.

Garner, the Estate of Andrew M. Garner (Garner Estate), and its insurer USAA

Casualty Insurance Company (USAA). In the Release, Brittni Castille agreed to

discharge Catherine D. Garner, the Garner Estate, and USAA, their heirs,

executors, and assigns:

[F]rom any liability now accrued or hereafter to accrue on account of
any and all claims or causes of action, which I/we now or may
hereafter have for personal injuries, damage to property, loss of
services, medical expenses, contribution, indemnification, losses or
damages of any kind or nature whatsoever, known or unknown or that

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may hereafter develop, by me/us sustained or received on or about
December 4, 2009 through an auto accident[.]

The Release signed by Brittni Castille further states “IT BEING FURTHER

AGREED AND UNDERSTOOD that this settlement is a compromise of a

disputed claim and that the payment is not to be construed as an admission on

the part of the party or parties hereby released of any liability whatever in

consequence of said accident.” (Emphasis added.)

Also on May 14, 2010, prior to the formal filing of any lawsuit, Ella and

Raymond Hargrave signed a document entitled “Release of All Claims (1st Party

and 3rd Party)” with “Catherine D. Garner, Richard M. Garner, Andrew M. Garner,

and its insurer USAA-CIC.” In the Release, the Hargraves agreed to discharge

Catherine D. Garner, Richard M. Garner, Andrew M. Garner, USAA-CIC, and

their heirs, executors, and assigns (emphasis added):

[F]rom any liability now accrued or hereafter to accrue on account of
any and all claims or causes of action, which I/we now or may
hereafter have for personal injuries, damage to property, loss of
services, medical expenses, contribution, indemnification, losses or
damages of any kind or nature whatsoever, known or unknown or that
may hereafter develop, by me/us sustained or received on or about
December 4, 2009 through an auto accident[.]

The Release signed by the Hargraves further stated, “IT BEING FURTHER

AGREED AND UNDERSTOOD that this settlement is a compromise of a

disputed claim and that the payment is not to be construed as an admission on

the part of the party or parties hereby released of any liability whatever in

consequence of said accident.” (Emphasis added.)

Filing of a Formal Petition

On June 7, 2010, Brittni Castille filed suit naming the Estate of Trissy

Hargrave as the only defendant and asking that service be withheld on the

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“ESTATE of Trissy Hargrave.” The petition filed by Brittni Castille alleged

negligence on the part of Andrew Garner in causing the accident, but neither the

Estate of Andrew Garner nor his insurer, USAA, were named as defendants.

Interestingly, the petition did not allege any negligence on the part of the only

named defendant, the Estate of Trissy Hargrave.

On June 14, 2010, the Estate of Trissy Hargrave filed an answer denying

liability, despite never being served with the petition filed by Brittni Castille. The

Estate of Trissy Hargrave also filed a third party demand, cross claim, and

intervention against only one defendant, Pilot’s Sports Pub, Inc. (Pilot’s). The

Estate of Trissy Hargrave alleged Andrew Garner was drinking heavily at Pilot’s,

despite the fact that he was a minor. Further, it was alleged that Pilot’s failed to

check Andrew Garner’s ID, and he became intoxicated, which led to the death of

Trissy Hargrave and the injuries to Brittnii Castille. Once again, although the

negligence of Andrew Garner was alleged to be the cause of death and injury,

neither Garner nor his insurer, USAA, was named as a defendant in the third party

cross claim of the Estate of Trissy Hargrave.

On January 28, 2011, thirteen months after the accident, Brittni Castille filed

a first supplemental and amended petition naming the LCG Defendants and Pilot’s

as additional co-defendants with the Estate of Trissy Hargrave. Brittni Castille

claimed that Pilot’s served alcohol to a minor, Andrew Garner, without checking

for his ID, which contributed to the cause of the accident that resulted in the

injuries to Brittni Castille.

She further claimed that LCG Defendant, Officer Rogers, engaged in a high

speed chase of the black Infiniti driven by Andrew Garner which contributed to or

caused the accident that resulted in the injuries to Brittni Castille. The trial court

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granted the plaintiff’s order to file the amended petition on January 31, 2011, but

the certificate of service on the motion for leave to file the first supplemental and

amending petition is unsigned by counsel for Brittni Castille.

On February 15, 2011, fourteen months after the accident, the Estate of

Trissy Hargrave moved, and was granted leave by the trial court, to file its first

supplemental and amending third party petition and cross claim against the LCG

Defendants. The Estate of Trissy Hargrave’s petition mirrors the petition filed by

the plaintiff, Brittni Castille and seeks damages for the death of Trissy Hargrave.

On August 31, 2015, Pilot’s filed a motion for summary judgment, which

was granted by the trial court also on August 31, 2015, after all parties waived the

delays for notice and formal service. Pilot’s claimed that Andrew Garner had gone

home after leaving Pilot’s, then left his home, which constituted a subsequent

intervening cause to his actions. The trial court dismissed Pilot’s with prejudice

and, pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art. 1915(A)(2), entered a final judgment finding

that Pilot’s, a timely sued co-defendant, was without fault.1 No appeal to the final

judgment dismissing Pilot’s with prejudice was forthcoming.

On September 2, 2015, a bench trial began, and after plaintiffs Brittni

Castille and the Estate of Trissy Hargrave rested their cases, the LCG Defendants

and the Estate of Trissy Hargrave moved for involuntary dismissal pursuant to

1
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1915(A) provides in pertinent part:

A final judgment may be rendered and signed by the court, even though it
may not grant the successful party or parties all of the relief prayed for, or may
not adjudicate all of the issues in the case, when the court:

....

(2) Grants a motion for summary judgment, as provided by Articles 966
through 969.

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La.Code Civ.P. art. 1672(B).2 The trial court granted the motion on behalf of the

Estate of Trissy Hargrave finding that Trissy Hargrave was not at fault in the

accident and the motion on behalf of LCG Defendant, Chief Jim Craft, also finding

he was not at fault, and dismissed all claims against them with prejudice. The trial

court denied the involuntary dismissal motions on behalf of the remaining LCG

Defendants, Lafayette Consolidated Government, and Officer Rogers.

After the trial court denied their motion for involuntary dismissal, the

remaining LCG Defendants filed a peremptory exception of prescription seeking

dismissal of all claims asserted against them by Brittni Castille and the Estate of

Trissy Hargrave. The remaining LCG Defendants urged that pursuant to La.Code

Civ.P. art. 3492, the prescriptive period had run as to all the claims made by Brittni

Castille and the Estate of Trissy Hargrave before the remaining LCG Defendants

were sued. Further, the prescriptive period was not interrupted by the pre-lawsuit

settlement agreements, and finally, no joint obligation remained under La.Code

Civ.P. art. 2324(C), as all timely sued defendants had been found free from fault

and dismissed from the case by the trial court.

The trial court took the peremptory exception of prescription under

advisement and allowed the submission of post-trial memoranda on the issue of

prescription and the fault of the two remaining LCG Defendants. The trial court

issued reasons for ruling on June 27, 2016, finding that the claims against the two

2
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1672(B) provides:

In an action tried by the court without a jury, after the plaintiff has
completed the presentation of his evidence, any party, without waiving his right to
offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal of
the action as to him on the ground that upon the facts and law, the plaintiff has
shown no right to relief. The court may then determine the facts and render
judgment against the plaintiff and in favor of the moving party or may decline to
render any judgment until the close of all the evidence.

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remaining LCG Defendants were not prescribed. In the same reasons, the trial

court found Lafayette Consolidated Government and Officer Rogers “free from

fault.” The trial court signed the “Final Judgment of Dismissal” on August 4, 2016,

which reflected its reasons for ruling, and dismissed all claims filed against the

remaining LCG Defendants made by the plaintiff Brittni Castille, and third party

claimants, the Estate of Trissy Hargrave and Raywood and Ella Hargrave, at their

cost.

The remaining LCG Defendants have appealed the trial court’s ruling

denying their peremptory exception of prescription. Brittni Castille and the Estate

of Tracy Hargrave have appealed the ruling by the trial court that Lafayette

Consolidated Government and Officer Rogers were free from fault in the accident

that caused the death of Trissy Hargrave and the injuries to Brittni Castille. We

will first address the issue of the trial court’s denial of the peremptory exception of

prescription filed on behalf of the remaining LCG Defendants, Lafayette

Consolidated Government and Officer Rogers.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

The remaining LCG Defendants, Lafayette Consolidated Government and

Officer Todd Rogers, assign the following errors on appeal.

1) The trial court [erred] in finding that pre-lawsuit settlement
agreements between the plaintiffs on the one hand and the
negligent driver on the other was an acknowledgement of liability,
interrupting prescription against the LCG Parties.

2) The trial court erred when it first found that an acknowledgment of
prescription had occurred and then imputed it to unrelated LCG
Parties.

3) The trial court misapplied Louisiana Civil Code Article 2324 (C)
by finding that prescription had been interrupted as to the LCG
Parties even though no one could remotely be considered a joint
tortfeasor has ever been sued or served.

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Standard of Review - Prescription

In the recent case of Lomont v. Bennett, 14-2483, p. 8 (La. 6/30/15), 172

So.3d 620, 627, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 1167 (2016) (citations

omitted), our supreme court clarified the appellate standard of review applicable to

a peremptory exception as follows:

At a hearing on a peremptory exception of prescription pleaded
prior to trial, evidence may be introduced to support or controvert the
exception. In the absence of evidence, an exception of peremption
must be decided upon the facts alleged in the petition with all of the
allegations accepted as true. However, when evidence is introduced,
the court is not bound to accept plaintiff’s allegations as true. If
evidence is introduced at the hearing on the peremptory exception of
peremption, the district court’s findings of fact are reviewed under the
manifest error-clearly wrong standard of review. If those findings are
reasonable in light of the record reviewed in its entirety, an appellate
court cannot reverse even though convinced that had it been sitting as
a trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently.

The peremptory exception of prescription urged by the LCG Defendants was

filed after the plaintiff and third party claimants had rested their case, and prior to

submission of the matter to the trial court for decision. Therefore, the LCG

Defendants’ peremptory exception of prescription is timely pursuant to La.Code

Civ.P. art. 928, which provides in pertinent part, “[t]he peremptory exception of

prescription may be pleaded at any stage of the proceeding in the trial court prior to

the submission of the case for decision.”

Further, as evidence was introduced at the trial relevant to the peremptory

exception of prescription, we must review the entire record to determine if the trial

court manifestly erred in making its factual conclusions.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Louisiana Civil Code Article 3429 governs the prescriptive period for a

delictual action and provides in pertinent part, “[d]elictual actions are subject to a

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liberative prescription of one year. This prescription commences to run from the

day injury or damage is sustained.” Louisiana Civil Code Article 2324(A) requires

that, “[h]e who conspires with another person to commit an intentional or willful

act is answerable, in solido, with that person, for the damage caused by such act.”

Likewise, La.Civ.Code art. 2324(B) states in pertinent part, “[i]f the liability is not

solidary pursuant to Paragraph A, then liability for damages caused by two or more

persons shall be a joint and divisible obligation.” However, La.Civ.Code art.

2324(C) provides that “[i]nterruption of prescription against one joint tortfeasor is

effective against all joint tortfeasors.”

In the recent case of Correro v. Ferrer, 16-861, p. 4-5 (La. 10/28/16), ___

So.3d ___, ___, our supreme court recently reiterated the law pertaining to

prescription and stated:

As we have long held, prescriptive statutes are strictly
construed in favor of maintaining a plaintiffs’ cause of action.
Williams v. Jackson Parish Hospital, 00-3170, p. 13 (La. 10/16/01),
798 So.2d 921, 930. Absent clear, contrary legislative intent,
“prescriptive statutes which can be given more than one reasonable
interpretation should be construed against the party claiming
prescription.” Maltby v. Gauthier, 506 So.2d 1190, 1193 n. 5 (La.
1987). Thus, if there are two possible constructions, the one which
favors maintaining an action, as opposed to barring, should be
adopted. Carter v. Haygood, 04-0646, p. 10 (La. 1/19/05), 892 So.2d
1261, 1268.

The Louisiana Supreme Court in Prevo v. State ex rel. Department of Public

Safety and Corrections Division of Probation and Parole, 15-823, p. 4 (La.

1/25/16), 187 So.3d 395, 398, reiterated the burden of proof to be applied in

determining a peremptory exception of prescription:

Ordinarily, the exceptor bears the burden of proof at the trial of the
peremptory exception. Campo v. Correa, 01-2707, p. 7 (La.6/21/02),
828 So.2d 502, 508. However, if prescription is evident on the face of

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the pleadings, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show the action has
not prescribed. Campo, 01-2707 at p. 7, 828 So.2d at 508; Williams v.
Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 611 So.2d 1383, 1386
(La.1993).

As previously stated, Brittni Castille sued the LCG Defendants on January

28, 2011, some thirteen months after the December 4, 2009 accident. Additionally,

third party plaintiff, the Estate of Trissy Hargrave sued the LCG Defendants on

February 15, 2011, more than fourteen months after the December 14, 2009

accident. Therefore the burden is on plaintiff, Brittni Castille, and the third party

plaintiff, the Estate of Trissy Hargrave, to show that prescription has been

interrupted based on La.Civ.Code art. 2324(C).

THE TRIAL COURT’S REASONS FOR RULING

The trial court found that prescription had been interrupted and denied the

remaining LCG Defendants’ peremptory exception of prescription, stating the

following as its basis for ruling (emphasis added):

EXCEPTIONS OF PRESCRIPTION FILED BY LAFAYETTE
CITY-PARISH CONSOLIDATED GOVERNMENT AND OFFICER
TODD ROGERS

Exceptors argued that prescription had run due to the lack of fault on
the part of Trissy Hargrave, thus she was not a joint or solidary
obligor such that an interruption of prescription would have occurred.
The accident occurred on December 4, 2009. USAA, Andrew
Garner’s insurer acknowledged liability and interrupted
prescription as late as May 7, 2010. Interruption of prescription
against one joint tortfeasor interrupts prescription against all joint
tortfeasors. La.[Civ.Code art.] 2324. [Mallett] v. McNeal, [5-2289, 5-
2322], p. 15 [(La. 10/17/06)], 939 So.2d 1254, 1264, holds that the
unconditional payment of property damage interrupts prescription.
Property damage was paid, and deposition of Debra Walter establishes
that USAA issued a check to reimburse Farm Bureau for the payment
of property damage in 2010.

The Third Party Demand/Cross-Claim by Trissy Hargrave’s parents
included a cause of action against Andrew Garner when Pilot’s Pub
was sued. The City of Lafayette and Officer Todd Rogers were added

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as defendants prior to the release of Pilot pub at the trial on the merits
of this case. Since a cause of action is for negligence, the negligence
of co-tortfeasor, Andrew Garner, was pled, the timely filing of the
case against Pilot’s Pub, alleging the negligence of Andrew Garner
interrupts prescription as to the co-tortfeasors, City of Lafayette and
Officer Rogers. The City was added as a defendant on February 9,
2011, well within one year of the acknowledgement by USAA,
Andrew Garner’s insurer. Therefore, LCG’s Exception of
Prescription is denied.

Acknowledgement of Liability by Andrew Garner’s Insurer USAA

Louisiana Civil Code Article 3464 provides, “[p]rescription is interrupted

when one acknowledges the right of the person against whom he had commenced

to prescribe.” The acknowledgement referenced in the trial court’s reasons for

judgment was actually contained in the two documents entitled “RELEASE OF All

CLAIMS[,]” previously cited in the facts portion of this opinion.

Contrary to the trial court’s finding of fact, neither document contained the

acknowledgment of liability necessary to interrupt prescription. The Release was

signed on April 12, 2010, between Brittni L. Castille, as plaintiff, and Catherine D.

Garner, The Estate of Andrew M. Garner, and USAA Casualty Insurance

Company. The second Release was signed on May 18, 2010, between Ella

Hargrave and Raymond Hargrave, parents of Trissy Hargrave, and Catherine D.

Garner, Richard M. Garner, Andrew M. Garner, and USAA-CIC. Both documents

contained the following language which unequivocally does not acknowledge any

liability on the part of any of the potentially liable parties to the release: “IT

BEING FURTHER AGREED AND UNDERSTOOD that this settlement is a

compromise of a disputed claim and that the payment is not to be construed as

an admission on the part of the party or parties hereby released of any

liability whatever in consequence of said accident.” (Emphasis added.)

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Therefore, the trial court erred in finding USAA, Andrew Garner’s insurer,

“had acknowledged liability and interrupted prescription as late as May 7, 2010.”

Thus, the Release on behalf of the Estate of Trissy Hargrave, signed by her parents,

could not serve as an acknowledgment that interrupted prescription as against the

remaining LCG Defendants.

The trial court further found, based on the supreme court case of Mallett v.

NcNeal, 05-2289 (La. 10/17/06), 939 So.2d 1254, that “the unconditional payment

of property damages interrupts prescription.” In Mallett, the supreme court

actually stated, “an unconditional payment constitutes an acknowledgement

sufficient to interrupt prescription.” Mallett, 939 So.2d at 1259 (emphasis added).

As previously stated, the Releases signed by the parties were not “unconditional.”

The trial court also found that an acknowledgement sufficient to interrupt

prescription occurred when USAA issued a check in 2010 to Farm Bureau for the

property damage to the Hargraves’ vehicle, as evidenced by the deposition of

Debra Walter, an employee of USAA. However, the trial court failed to state that

the supreme court in Mallett proceeded, after defining an “acknowledgment,” to

resolve the split in the circuit courts over the application of La.R.S. 22:661, which

was renumbered to La.R.S. 22:1290, effective January 1, 2009.

Louisiana Revised Statute 22:1290 provides:

No settlement made under a vehicle liability insurance policy
for a claim against any insured thereunder arising from any accident
or other event insured against for damage to or destruction of property
owned by another person shall be construed as an admission of
liability by the insured, or the insurer’s recognition of such liability,
with respect to any other claim arising from the same accident or
event.

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The supreme court in Mallett then agreed with this circuit and held, “that

term ‘settlement’ in La.R.S. 22:661[3] can be equated with compromise, as the term

is defined in La. C.C. art. 3071.” 4 Mallett, 939 So.2d at 1264. Crawley v.

National Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 10-2095, p. 5 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/6/11), 65

So.3d 235, 238, also found, based on the holding in Mallett, that “[a] settlement is

defined as a compromise and is distinguished from an unconditional payment.”

As in Crawley, the application of La.R.S. 22:1290 to the Release signed by

the Hargraves on behalf of the Estate of Trissy Hargrave clearly constituted a

“settlement.” Thus any payment by USAA to Farm Bureau pursuant to the terms

of the Release, “cannot be construed as an admission of liability by the insured, or

the insurer’s recognition of such liability, with respect to any other claim arising

from the same accident.” La.R.S. 22:1290.

The trial court further found that prescription had been interrupted based on

a finding that “[t]he Third-Party Demand/Cross Claim by Trissy Hargrave’s

parents included a cause of action against Andrew Garner when Pilot’s Pub was

sued.” Pilots’s was timely sued on June 14, 2010. Although the negligence of

Andrew Garner was alleged to be the cause of the death and injury, neither Garner

nor his insurer, USAA, was named as a defendant in the third party, cross claim of

the Estate of Trissy Hargrave. Clearly this was due to the settlement perfected

between the Estate of Trissy Hargrave and Andrew Garner and his insurer, USAA,

on May 18, 2010, which extinguished any cause of action that might have been

brought against Andrew Garner and USAA. Accordingly, the mere allegations of

3
Effective January 1, 2009 renumbered to La.R.S. 22: 1290.
4
Louisiana Civil Code Article 3071 provides, “A compromise is a contract whereby the
parties, through concessions made by one or more of them, settle a dispute or an uncertainty
concerning an obligation or other legal relationship.”

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negligence made against Andrew Garner cannot serve to interrupt prescription

against the remaining tortfeasors, Lafayette Consolidated Government and Officer

Rogers.

At the time that the remaining LCG defendants, Lafayette Consolidated

Government and Officer Rogers, urged their peremptory exception of prescription,

no remaining co-defendants who had been timely sued remained as defendants in

the case. Pilot’s had been dismissed on summary judgment prior to trial, and

Trissy Hargrave had been dismissed pursuant to an involuntary dismissal granted

after the plaintiff and third party claimants rested their case.

The Louisiana Supreme Court in Renfroe v. State ex rel. Department of

Transportation and Development, 01-1646, p. 4 (La. 2/26/02), 809 So. 2d 947, 950,

clearly stated that the “interruption of prescription by suit against one solidary

obligor is effective as to all solidary obligors. . . . The same principle is applicable

to joint tortfeasors[,]” under La.Civ.Code art 2324(C). The Renfroe court further

stated:

However, a suit timely filed against one defendant does not interrupt
prescription as against any other defendants not timely sued, where
the timely sued defendant is ultimately found not liable to the
plaintiffs, since no joint or solidary obligation would exist. Spott v.
Otis Elevator Co. 601 So.2d 1255 (La.1992).

Renfroe, 809 So.2d at 950.

For the forgoing reasons, we find, after the required review of the entire

record, that the trial court manifestly erred in making its factual conclusions, and

hereby reverse the portion of the trial court’s August 4, 2016 judgment denying

Lafayette Consolidated Government and Officer Rogers’ peremptory exception of

prescription.

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Based on this court’s ruling on the prescription issue, the appeal of Brittni

Castille and the Estate of Trissy Hargrave of the second portion of the trial court’s

August 4, 2016 judgment in favor of Lafayette Consolidated Government and

Officer Rogers dismissing all claims against them is rendered moot.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s judgment dated August 4, 2016,

denying Lafayette Consolidated Government and Officer Todd Rogers’

peremptory exception of prescription is reversed, thereby dismissing all remaining

claims against them made by plaintiff, Brittni Castille, and third party plaintiff, the

Estate of Trissy Hargrave. The appeal of Brittni Castille and the Estate of Trissy

Hargrave of the second portion of the trial court’s August 4, 2016 judgment in

favor of Lafayette Consolidated Government and Officer Todd Rogers dismissing

all claims made against them in this case is rendered moot. All costs of this appeal

are assessed equally to Brittni Castille and the Estate of Trissy Hargrave.

REVERSED IN PART AND RENDERED MOOT IN PART.

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