CA-0016-0781 Nonprecedential Reversed and remanded Processed

Donald J. Pickney v. Andrew White

Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit · Filed February 8, 2017

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Opinion text

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

16-781

DONALD J. PICKNEY

VERSUS

ANDREW WHITE, ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
TWENTY-SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ST. LANDRY, NO. 16-C-1807-C
HONORABLE ALONZO HARRIS, DISTRICT JUDGE

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ELIZABETH A. PICKETT
JUDGE

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Court composed of Elizabeth A. Pickett, Billy Howard Ezell, and John E. Conery,
Judges.

MOTION TO STRIKE DENIED.
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS DENIED.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Bradford Hyde Felder
Huval, Veazey, Felder & Renegar, L.L.C.
P. O. Box 80948
Lafayette, LA 70598-0948
(337) 234-5350
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT:
Donald J. Pickney

David L. Carriere
Law Office of David L. Carriere
322 S. Market St.
Opelousas, LA 70570
(337) 948-6217
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES:
Andrew White
Bernadell White

PICKETT, Judge.

Donald J. Pickney appeals a judgment of the trial court sustaining the

declinatory exception of lis pendens filed by Andrew and Bernadell White.

FACTS

Donald is the father of Ethan Pickney, a minor child. Ethan’s mother,

Chanda White Pickney, is deceased. Since Chanda’s death on October 29, 2011,

Andrew and Bernadell White, Ethan’s maternal grandparents, have had custody of

Ethan. On April 27, 2016, Donald filed a Petition for Sole Custody in St. Landry

Parish, seeking sole custody of Ethan. Donald specifically alleges in his petition

that there “is currently no order in place governing custody of the child.” The

Whites filed a Declinatory Exception of Lis Pendens, alleging that a proceeding

bearing on the custody of Ethan was pending in Rapides Parish.

In fact, three separate actions involving these parties have been filed in

Rapides Parish. The district court in Rapides Parish issued an Order of Protective

Custody in favor of Bernadell White on January 20, 2012. This order terminated

by its own terms on January 20, 2013. Bernadell White, as administratrix of the

estate of Chanda and on behalf of Ethan as provisional tutrix, filed a personal

injury action against Donald in Rapides Parish in 2012. Finally, an individual

named Mary Pickney filed an action against Donald and the Whites seeking

visitation with Ethan.

Following mediation in the personal injury suit, Donald and the Whites

agreed to divide the assets of Chanda and certain proceeds from life insurance

policies. The Agreement to Settle, dated May 9, 2013, also included the following

language regarding custody of Ethan:

The parties agree to jointly choose a professional child
counselor/psychologist to mediate the issues of child visitation and
custody of Ethan Andrew Pickney, with the best interests of the child
as the standard. All current custody hearings are to be referred to the
counselor/psychologist and all current orders remain in full force and
effect. It is further agreed that after the completion of the 2013 school
year, Mary B. Pickney and Dieadra Cains will have custody every
other weekend beginning Friday evening at 5:00 pm and ending on
Sunday evening at 5:00 p.m. with the condition that Donald Pickney
will not be present at his sister’s house and will live with another
family member during these visitation periods. Any violation of this
visitation agreement would be a violation of his bond.

Though the agreement states that this agreement was subject to court approval, it

was never submitted to the district court in Rapides Parish for approval. The trial

court in Rapides Parish did appoint Dr. John Simoneaux as the psychologist to

consider the case when the parties could not agree on a counselor or psychologist.

As a result of a motion filed by the Whites (not in the record), the district

court in Rapides Parish issued the following order on March 6, 2014 (in the

record):

IT IS ORDERED that any custody changes be and the same are
hereby stayed pending the rule herein;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant, Donald J.
Pickney, show cause on the 24th day of March, 2014, at 9:30 o’clock
a.m., why he should not be ordered to comply with the terms of the
settlement agreement reached in this matter in all respects and why,
pending the resolution of this motion, that all other proceedings filed
or to be filed regarding custody of the minor, Ethan Pickney, be
stayed pending resolution of issues raised by this motion.

In March 2016, the Whites filed a motion to consolidate the three actions

pending in Rapides Parish. In the March 24, 2016 Rapides Parish district court

order setting a hearing on the motion to consolidate, the following language was

included:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that custody of Ethan should
remain with Andrew and Bernadell White with Donald Pickney
having no contact with the child.

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At a May 16, 2016 hearing in Rapides Parish, the motion to consolidate was denied

because the protective order had expired by its own terms in 2013 and the suit by

Mary Pickney seeking visitation had been abandoned. All that remained was the

personal injury action, which had been settled following mediation, with

outstanding issues regarding the custody of Ethan unresolved.

The district court in St. Landry Parish held a hearing on the exception of lis

pendens on June 24, 2016. The trial court sustained the exception and dismissed

Donald’s Petition for Custody in a judgment dated August 25, 2016. Donald now

appeals.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Donald asserts two assignments of error on appeal:

1. The trial court erred when it held that there is a custody suit pending in
Rapides Parish, Louisiana.

2. The trial court therefore erred in granting the Whites’ exception of lis
pendens.

Donald has also filed a motion to strike in this court, asking that this court strike

certain references in the Whites’ brief and seeking sanctions for violation of

La.Code Civ.P. art. 863.

DISCUSSION

Motion to Strike and for Sanctions

The trial court granted a motion to strike certain portions of the Whites’

exception for lis pendens that referred to facts not relevant to the issue before the

court. At the hearing on the exception, the Whites agreed that the allegations were

not relevant, and the trial court granted the motion to strike. In their brief to this

court, the Whites have reiterated the same allegations stricken by the trial court.

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Donald filed a Motion to Strike and for Sanctions. We concur that these

allegations are not relevant to the judgment appealed and have not considered these

allegations in our resolution of this case. Nevertheless, we decline to grant the

motion to strike. The Whites’ brief either references their original exception of lis

pendens or documents proffered in the trial court. These documents form a part of

the record on appeal. Furthermore, we lack the authority to award sanctions

pursuant to La.Code Civ.P art. 863. The supreme court, in Hampton v. Greenfield,

618 So.2d 859, 862 (La.1993)(alterations in original), stated:

Under La.Code Civ.P. art. 863A, every pleading must be signed
by the attorney of record or by the party himself, if the party is
unrepresented. A signature constitutes a certification that the attorney
or party has read the pleading and, after reasonable inquiry, the
attorney or party believes that the pleading is well grounded in fact,
legally tenable, and not interposed for any improper purpose. Id. art.
863B. A court may find a violation of the certification requirements
of this article on its own motion or motion of any party. If the court
determines that a violation has occurred, the court “shall” impose
appropriate sanctions. Id. art. 863D. However, sanctions under
article 863D can only be imposed “after a hearing at which any party
or his counsel may present any evidence or argument relevant to the
issue of imposition of the sanction.” Id. art. 863E. Only a trial court
is capable of holding the required art. 863 hearing where evidence
may be presented on the sanctions issue. Therefore, on its face, the
ability to impose sanctions under art. 863 is limited to the trial court.
Moreover, we believe that the authority to impose art. 863 sanctions is
limited to the trial court. The court of appeal’s authority to regulate
conduct before it is governed by La.Code Civ.P. art. 2164, which
provides in pertinent part that “[t]he [appellate] court may award
damages for frivolous appeal.” By limiting the court of appeal’s
authority to awarding damages solely for frivolous appeals, art. 2164
places a logical limit on the application of art. 863 to matters before
the trial court. Therefore, it was improper for the court of appeal to
look beyond the appeal filed in that court. Additionally, it was
improper for the court of appeal to award sanctions under La.Code
Civ.P. art. 863.

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Declinatory Exception of Lis Pendens

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 531states:

When two or more suits are pending in a Louisiana court or
courts on the same transaction or occurrence, between the same
parties in the same capacities, the defendant may have all but the first
suit dismissed by excepting thereto as provided in Article 925. When
the defendant does not so except, the plaintiff may continue the
prosecution of any of the suits, but the first final judgment rendered
shall be conclusive of all.

In order to dismiss a suit pursuant to an exception of lis pendens, three

requirements must be satisfied: 1) there must be two or more suits pending; 2) the

suits must involve the same transaction or occurrence; and 3) the suits must

involve the same parties in the same capacities. Bandaries v. Cassidy, 11-1267

(La.App. 3 Cir. 3/17/12), 86 So.3d 125, writ denied, 12-780 (La. 5/25/12), 90

So.3d 412. This court has held that a court ruling on an exception of lis pendens

should ask whether a final judgment in the first suit filed would constitute res

judicata in the suit filed later. Travcal Prop., LLC v. Logan, 10-323 (La.App. 3

Cir. 10/6/10), 49 So.3d 466. The parties may introduce evidence in a trial on a

declinatory exception of lis pendens pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art. 930. Olson v.

Louisiana Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 13-1182 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/5/14), 134 So.3d 1276,

writ denied, 14-1053 (La. 10/24/14), 151 So.3d 601.

The requirement that two suits are pending is not met. The personal injury

suit in Rapides Parish is the only suit pending before that court. The record does

not include any judgment concluding that proceeding. But, there has been a

settlement after mediation of the issues in the personal injury case. There have

also been filings to enforce the settlement in Rapides Parish, but those pleadings

addressing custody issues fall outside of the scope of the original petition.

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The suits also do not involve the same transaction or occurrence. The

petition for damages filed in Rapides Parish does not raise custody issues. The

custody issues in the Rapides Parish case only surfaced when the settlement

agreement was signed.

Furthermore, the suits do not include the same parties. Bernadell White is

the plaintiff in the personal injury suit as provisional tutrix of Ethan and as

administratrix of the estate of Chanda. Andrew White is not a party to that suit,

though he is a party to the settlement agreement.

The exception of lis pendens must be overruled. While it is true that the trial

court in Rapides Parish has acted to enforce the agreement between the parties, that

does not convert that personal injury case into a custody proceeding.

The Whites claim that the court in Rapides Parish indicated its intent to

continue hearing the case when it stated, “So, um, what I’m going to do is the

parties that are here today, y’all are excused until further orders of the Court until

we have another hearing.” This statement does not change the nature of the

proceeding pending in Rapides Parish from a personal injury case, though it would

indicate that the case is pending. The Whites also claim that the order of the trial

court appointing Bernadell as provisional tutrix of Ethan is dispositive. That order

of the court may be relevant on the merits of the custody proceeding, but it does

not constitute an ongoing action for the purposes of the consideration of the

exception of lis pendens.

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CONCLUSION

The motion to strike and for sanctions filed by Donald Pickney are denied.

The trial court erred in sustaining the defendants’ exception of lis pendens. The

judgment of the trial court is reversed. The exception of lis pendens is overruled,

and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Costs of this

appeal are assessed to Andrew and Bernadell White

MOTION TO STRIKE DENIED.
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS DENIED.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.

This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION.
Uniform Rules−Courts of Appeal, Rule 2−16.3.

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