CA-0016-0851 Nonprecedential Affirmed Processed

Larry Kebodeaux v. Nabors Drilling, Lp

Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit · Filed March 1, 2017

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Opinion text

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

CA 16-851

LARRY KEBODEAUX

VERSUS

NABORS DRILLING, LP, ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. C-20115874
HONORABLE KRISTIAN DENNIS EARLES, DISTRICT JUDGE

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BILLY HOWARD EZELL
JUDGE

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Court composed of Billy Howard Ezell, Shannon J. Gremillion, and David E.
Chatelain*, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

_________________________
* Honorable David E. Chatelain participated in this decision by appointment of the Louisiana
Supreme Court as Judge Pro Tempore.

Charles A. Cerise Jr.
Robert Bernard Nolan
Adams & Reese
701 Poydras Street, Suite 4500
New Orleans, LA 70139
(504) 581-3234
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
S.H.R.M. Catering Services, Inc.

Carol Stookey Hunter
Assistant Attorney General
556 Jefferson Street, 4th Floor
Lafayette, LA 70501
(337) 262-1700
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES:
State of Louisiana, Board of Supervisors for University of Louisiana
System
University of Louisiana at Lafayette Marine Survival Training Center

Mark Louis Riley
The Glenn Armentor Law Corporation
300 Stewart Street
Lafayette, LA 70501
(337) 233-1471
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:
Larry Kebodeaux

Henry Harvey LeBas
F. Douglas Ortego
LeBas Law Office
201 Rue Iberville, Ste 100
Lafayette, LA 70508
(337) 236-5500
COUNSEL FOR INTERVENOR/APPELLEE:
SeaBright Insurance Company

EZELL, Judge.

Larry Kebodeaux appeals the decision of the trial court granting summary

judgment in favor of the State of Louisiana, through the Board of Supervisors of

the University of Louisiana System and the University of Louisiana at Lafayette

Marine Survival Training Center (hereinafter referred to as ULL-MSTC). For the

following reasons, we hereby affirm the decision of the trial court.

On October 8, 2010, Mr. Kebodeaux was a student at ULL-MSTC

participating in a marine survival course required by his employer. Calvin

Washington was likewise participating in the course that day. The training

consisted of two parts: a classroom session and a pool session, where the

information taught in the classroom would be put into effect. As part of the

training, participants were taught how to enter the water from an offshore platform

in case of an emergency. The students were instructed, both in the classroom and

poolside, to look into the water to make sure there were no people or obstructions

before entering the water. At the pool, students were specifically instructed to wait

until the person who had entered the pool before them had cleared the way before

jumping into the water. Mr. Kebodeaux entered the water as instructed, but before

he could even return to the water’s surface, Mr. Washington jumped in, landing on

him. After Mr. Kebodeaux was taken to safety, Mr. Washington told him “My bad;

I jumped too soon.”

Mr. Kebodeaux filed the current suit against ULL-MSTC, an instructor at

the school, Mr. Washington, and Mr. Washington’s employer for injuries he

alleges he sustained as a result of the accident. ULL-MSTC filed a motion for

summary judgment, claiming that it had not breached any duty to Mr. Kebodeaux

and that all fault for the accident belonged to Mr. Washington. The trial court

agreed, granting ULL-MSTC’s motion for summary judgment and dismissing it

from the suit with prejudice. From this decision, Mr. Kebodeaux appeals.

On appeal, Mr. Kebodeaux asserts one assignment of error, claiming that the

trial court erred in finding that ULL-MSTC did not breach any duty of reasonable

supervision to him under La.Civ.Code art. 2320. We disagree.

“The summary judgment procedure is designed to secure the just, speedy,

and inexpensive determination of every action . . . . The procedure is favored and

shall be construed to accomplish these ends.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 966 (A)(2). “[A]

motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the motion, memorandum, and

supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and

that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” La.Code Civ.P. art.

966(A)(3) The movant bears the burden of proof. La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(D)(1).

“If the movant meets this initial burden, the burden then shifts to plaintiff to

present factual support adequate to establish that he will be able to satisfy the

evidentiary burden at trial.” Champagne v. Ward, 03-3211, p. 5 (La. 1/19/05), 893

So.2d 773, 776 (citation omitted). “Thereafter, if the plaintiff fails to meet this

burden, there is no genuine issue of material fact and defendant is entitled to

summary judgment as a matter of law.” Id. at 776-77.

We apply the de novo standard of review in reviewing a district court

judgment on a motion for summary judgment. Gray v. Am. Nat’l Prop. & Cas. Co.,

07-1670 (La. 2/26/08), 977 So.2d 839. In our review, we shall use “the same

criteria that govern the trial court’s consideration of whether summary judgment is

appropriate, i.e., whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and whether the

mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Supreme Servs. & Specialty Co.,

Inc. v. Sonny Greer Inc., 06-1827, p. 4 (La. 5/22/07), 958 So.2d 634, 638.

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The facts of this case are not in dispute. It is clear from the record, and from

Mr. Kebodeaux’s own deposition testimony, that Mr. Washington entered the

water too soon, and admitted doing so. Mr. Kebodeaux claims that ULL-MSTC

failed in its duty to supervise Mr. Washington. He cites as authority La.Civ.Code

art. 2320, which reads, “Teachers and artisans are answerable for the damage

caused by their scholars or apprentices, while under their superintendence.”

However, that article goes on to state that “[i]n the above cases, responsibility only

attaches, when the masters or employers, teachers and artisans, might have

prevented the act which caused the damage, and have not done it.” Id.

It is well established that a school, through its agents and teachers, is

responsible for reasonable supervision over students. Adams v. Caddo Parish Sch.

Bd., 25,370 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1/19/94), 631 So.2d 70, writ denied, 94-684 (La.

4/29/94), 637 So.2d 466. However, the school is not the insurer of the safety of its

students. Id. The supervision required is reasonable, competent supervision

appropriate to the age of the students and the attendant circumstances. Id.

“[C]onstant supervision of all students is not possible nor required for educators to

discharge their duty to provide adequate supervision.” Id. at 73.

In Lemelle v. State, Through Bd. of Secondary & Elementary Educ., 435

So.2d 1162 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1983), an adult vocational-technical student brought an

action for damages against the school and others. There, the plaintiff alleged that

he injured his knee when a sheet of steel he was moving, contrary to his teacher’s

instructions, fell on him. This court concluded that a twenty-nine-year-old mature

adult should have been able to carry out his teacher’s instructions without the need

of supervision.

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Similarly, in Robinson v. Jefferson Parish Sch. Bd., 08-1224, 08-1225 (La.

App. 5 Cir. 4/7/09), 9 So.3d 1035, writ denied, 09-1187 (La. 9/18/09), 17 So.3d

975, a twenty-year-old, mature young man drowned after being warned by an

ROTC instructor not to go near a lake. The fifth circuit held that the man should

have been able to carry out the instruction that the lake was off limits without the

need of supervision, and that the trial judge there did not err in concluding that the

Jefferson Parish School Board and its employees did not owe constant supervision

to the deceased to ensure that he obeyed the instruction. That court found that there

were no issues of material fact as to the Jefferson Parish School Board’s liability.

Likewise, the duty to use reasonable care in this instance did not dictate

continuous supervision of Mr. Washington. See Hunter v. Evergreen Presbyterian

Vocational Sch., 338 So.2d 164 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1976). It is clear from the record

that ULL-MSTC provided unquestionably clear instructions that Mr. Washington,

a fully grown and functional man, should have been able to follow. Mr.

Washington, by his own admission, failed to follow the simple instructions given

and jumped into the water before Mr. Kebodeaux was clear. ULL-MSTC did not

owe Mr. Kebodeaux constant supervision over Mr. Washington to ensure that he

obeyed the instruction. There is no evidence in the record to support a finding of

inadequate supervision on the part of ULL-MSTC. The trial court committed no

error in its findings.

For the above reasons, the decision of the trial court granting summary

judgment in favor of ULL-MSTC is hereby affirmed. Costs of this appeal are

hereby assessed against Mr. Kebodeaux.

AFFIRMED.

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