CA-0017-0149 Nonprecedential Affirmed Processed

Riley Mouton v. Ean Holdings, LLC

Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit · Filed November 2, 2017

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Opinion text

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

17-149

RILEY MOUTON

VERSUS

EAN HOLDINGS, LLC, ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ACADIA, NO. 2012-10489
HONORABLE MICHELLE M. BREAUX, DISTRICT JUDGE

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D. KENT SAVOIE
JUDGE

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Court composed of John D. Saunders, John E. Conery, and D. Kent Savoie, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Donna E. Powe Green
Attorney at Law
Post Office Box 17947
Hattiesburg, Mississippi 39404
(601) 271-9031
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
EAN Holdings, LLC
Kyle Jordan

Riley Mouton
210 East Eleventh Street
Jennings, Louisiana 70546
(337) 230-3343
IN PROPER PERSON:
Riley Mouton

SAVOIE, Judge.

Plaintiff Riley Mouton appeals the ruling of the trial court which granted

Defendants EAN Holdings, L.L.C. (EAN) and Kyle Jordan’s Motion for Summary

Judgment and dismissed Mouton’s claims. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 11, 2011, Mouton was a guest passenger in a vehicle driven by

Kyle Jordan when the vehicle was involved in an accident. The vehicle had been

rented from EAN. The vehicle was traveling eastbound on Interstate 10 at

approximately seventy miles per hour between Jennings and Lafayette, Louisiana,

when a hit-and-run driver sideswiped it, causing it to flip. Mouton sustained

injuries as a result of the accident.

Mouton filed a Petition for Damages on May 10, 2012, against Jordan and

EAN.1 Jordan and EAN filed an Answer and a subsequent Motion for Summary

Judgment. After a hearing on October 31, 2016, the motion was granted, and

Mouton’s claims were dismissed. Mouton now appeals.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

The standard of review for motions for summary judgment is set forth as

follows:

Courts of appeal review summary judgments de novo applying
the same analysis as the trial court. Schroeder v. Bd. of Supervisors of
La. State Univ., 591 So.2d 342 (La.1991). Summary judgment is
governed by La.Code Civ.P. arts. 966 and 967. Article
966 provides that while the burden of proving entitlement to summary
judgment rests with the mover, if the mover will not bear the burden
of proof at trial on the matter that is before the court on
the motion for summary judgment, the mover’s burden does not

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Mouton also filed suit against Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, however, Mouton later
dismissed them with prejudice.

require him to negate all essential elements of the adverse party’s
claim, action or defense, but rather to point out that there is an
absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the
adverse party’s claim, action or defense. Thereafter, if the adverse
party fails to produce factual support sufficient to establish that he
will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof at trial, there is
no genuine issue of material fact. Hardy v. Bowie, 98-2821 (La.
9/8/99), 744 So.2d 606.

Berard v. Home State County Mut. Ins. Co., 11-1372, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/9/12),

89 So.3d 470, 471–72.

II. Liability of Kyle Jordan

Defendants attached the deposition testimony of Riley Mouton in support of

the motion for summary judgment. Mouton states that, at the time of the accident,

Jordan had the cruise control set on seventy miles per hour. When asked how

Jordan was driving, Mouton stated that “he was driving correct.” He was driving

“the way he was supposed to” and was staying in his lane. The Jordan vehicle was

riding in the right lane behind an 18-wheeler. Mouton stated that Jordan put on his

blinker and moved into the left lane in order to pass the 18-wheeler. Mouton

further stated that Jordan allowed an appropriate amount of time and distance

between their car and the 18-wheeler to make the move. Mouton testified that a

Kia Soul then attempted to pass their vehicle from the right side and move into the

left lane in front of them. This was done even though there was very little space

between the Jordan car in the left lane and the 18-wheeler in the right lane. While

the driver of the Kia Soul was attempting to “shoot the gauntlet”, it sideswiped the

Jordan vehicle, causing Jordan to lose control of the vehicle. As he attempted to

gain control, he overcorrected, and the vehicle flipped. Mouton testified that there

was nothing Jordan could have done to avoid the accident.

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“A motorist who attempts to change lanes on a multiple lane highway must

ascertain before attempting the maneuver that it can be made safely without

endangering oncoming traffic.” Brewer v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., 09-1408, p.

15 (La. 3/16/10), 35 so.3d 230, 241. On the roadway, the left lane is the passing

lane. La.R.S. 32:73. When passing, there should be a safe distance between the

vehicles and sufficient time to do so. Id. According to the sudden emergency

doctrine, “[o]ne who finds himself in imminent danger, without sufficient time to

weigh and consider all of the circumstances or means of avoiding danger, is not

guilty of negligence if he fails to choose what subsequently appears to be the better

method.” Bryn Lynn Corp. v. Valliere, 434 So.2d 600, 602 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1983).

It is clear from the deposition testimony of Mouton that Jordan faced a sudden

emergency event. The driver of the Kia Soul attempted to pass on the right side of

the interstate and did not do so with sufficient time or distance, thereby resulting in

the accident at issue. According to Mouton, there was nothing Jordan could have

done that would not have resulted in an accident. Mouton cannot be held liable for

the actions of the driver of the Kia Soul, who left the scene and has not been

identified.

III. Liability of EAN Holdings, L.L.C.

The only allegation of liability against EAN in the petition is that EAN

owned the vehicle operated by Jordan and occupied by Mouton. It is well-settled

that the negligence of a lessee in the exclusive physical control of the object of the

lease cannot be imputed to the lessor. Dixie Drive It Yourself Sys. v. American

Beverage Co., 242 La. 471, 137 So.2d 298 (La.1962). Therefore, EAN cannot be

liable to Mouton as owner of the vehicle without some other allegation of

negligence, which is not present in this case.

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CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. All costs of these proceedings

are assessed to Riley Mouton.

AFFIRMED.

This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION.
Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2–16.3.

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