Savanah Williams v. Vincent Alexander

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

17-435

SAVANAH WILLIAMS

VERSUS

VINCENT ALEXANDER

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APPEAL FROM THE
BREAUX BRIDGE CITY COURT
PARISH OF ST. MARTIN, NO. 16-317
HONORABLE RANDY P. ANGELLE, CITY COURT JUDGE

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MARC T. AMY
JUDGE

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Court composed of Marc T. Amy, D. Kent Savoie, and Van H. Kyzar, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Randy M. Guidry
Durio, McGoffin, Stagg & Ackermann
Post Office Box 51308
Lafayette, LA 70505
(337) 233-0300
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Vincent Alexander

Savanah Williams
417 Martin Street
Breaux Bridge, LA 70517
(404) 823-7348
IN PROPER PERSON

AMY, Judge.

The plaintiff filed suit seeking the return of a truck to which she claimed

ownership. The defendant, who maintained possession of the truck, asserted that the

plaintiff had transferred ownership of the vehicle to him. Following trial in city court,

the trial court found in favor of the plaintiff and ordered the defendant to tender

possession of the truck to the plaintiff. The trial court further denied damages

otherwise claimed by the parties. The defendant appeals. For the following reasons,

we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

The record indicates that the plaintiff, Savanah Williams, acquired a 1995

Chevrolet truck from the defendant, Vincent Alexander, on October 16, 2013. The

title to the truck, issued on that date, lists Mrs. Williams as the owner. The parties

differ on the underlying financial arrangement for the transfer of the vehicle. While

Mrs. Williams contends that her husband, Calvin Paul Williams, completed carpentry

work for Mr. Alexander in exchange for the truck and did so at the time of the 2013

transfer, Mr. Alexander asserts that the full extent of the expected work was not

completed.

In January 2015, and after Mr. Williams did not respond to a demand letter, 1

Mr. Alexander traveled to the Williams‟ home, seeking the return of the truck. With

Mr. Williams working out of town, the record indicates that Mrs. Williams

surrendered physical possession of the truck to Mr. Alexander. Additionally, it is

unquestioned that she signed the reverse of the original title as “Seller[.]” However,

as observed by the trial court, “[t]here was no Bill of Sale, there was no other act of

transfer, merely [Mr. Alexander] took possession of the „Original Title‟ that was

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The exhibits include an October 17, 2014 demand letter from Mr. Alexander to Mr.
Williams, in which Mr. Alexander asked, among other things: “Please provide me with a list of the
work you claim you have done for the Chevrolet Diesel truck. I need your signature on the list.
Please provide me with this list within the next five days.”

issued at the time of the acquisition of the truck[.]” Mr. Williams explained that, upon

his return to town, he went to see Mr. Alexander, who returned the truck to him. Mr.

Williams testified that, although he asked for the return of the original title, Mr.

Alexander ultimately informed him that it was lost. Mrs. Williams thereafter obtained

a duplicate title to the vehicle.2

After the truck was returned to Mr. and Mrs. Williams, their nephew, Phillip

Williams, began using the truck. Phillip testified that, although he gave Mr. Williams

$200 for the truck, he never owned the truck as he never finished paying the $300 he

agreed to pay his uncle. When asked by the court, Phillip denied that he acquired title

to the truck or that a bill of sale was completed. Instead, Phillip explained that Mr.

Alexander called him and told him: “he got the [t]itle for the truck . . . Paul not [sic]

finish paying for the truck, I need to bring the truck to his house.” Phillip explained

that he did so, driving the truck to Mr. Alexander‟s house.

Mrs. Williams instituted this matter in city court in August 2016 and sought the

return of the vehicle to her as well as damages she alleged were incurred as a result of

Mr. Alexander‟s retention of the truck. Mr. Alexander responded to the claim with a

reconventional demand, seeking his own damages due to what he contends were

defamatory allegations made by Mrs. Williams.

Following a trial, at which both parties represented themselves, the trial court

found in favor of Mrs. Williams, explaining that: “The vehicle, it‟s clear to the [c]ourt

beginning in October of 2016 [sic], 2013, was owned by, transferred to and became

owned by Savanah Williams and the community of Savanah and Mr. Williams and

continues to be owned by them to this day.” Accordingly, the trial court ordered the

immediate return of the truck to Mrs. Williams. It denied damages as requested by

both parties.

Mr. Alexander appeals, asserting that:
2
Copies of both the original and the duplicate title were placed into evidence by Mr.
Alexander and Mrs. Williams, respectively.
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1. The lower [c]ourt erroneously applied the facts to the law in
this matter as it relates to ownership of a motor vehicle by rendering a
[j]udgment which failed to recognize the fact that legal ownership of a
motor vehicle transferred back to the original owner once the proper
assignor executed the assignment.

2. The lower [c]ourt erred when it overreached in its role as
neutral arbiter of the facts, and rather operated as trial counsel rather than
[j]udge, with said overreaching or interference with the flow of evidence
thereby allowing the [c]ourt to reach an incorrect result.

Discussion

Merits

Mr. Alexander first questions the trial court‟s determination of ownership,

asserting that, while he had not achieved merchantable title pursuant to La.R.S.

32:705, other evidence was suggestive of his ownership. In particular, he argues that

“the transaction of Mrs. Savanah Williams voluntarily signing the original [t]itle over

to [him], completed the deal on the vehicle. Ownership should have been recognized

as being held by [him] upon completion of her execution of the [t]itle, or, at the very

least, through her own ratifying testimony.”

Notably, Mr. Alexander equates Mrs. Williams‟ signature on the reverse of the

original title as her “signing the original [t]itle over to him[.]” However, La.R.S.

32:705 provides, in pertinent part, that:

A. No person shall sell a vehicle without delivery to the purchaser
thereof, whether such purchaser be a dealer or otherwise, a certificate of
title issued under this Chapter in the name of the seller with such signed
endorsement of sale and assignment thereon as may be necessary to show
title in the purchaser[.]

....

B. For purposes of this Section, an “endorsement” means one of
the following:

(1) The signature of the seller in the presence of a notary who shall
subscribe his name thereon.

(2) The signature of the seller in the presence of two witnesses
who shall subscribe their names thereon, which signature shall be
acknowledged by a subscribing witness . . . [.]

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Certainly, in this case, it cannot be said that the original title returned to, and then

retained by, Mr. Alexander contained Mrs. Williams‟ “endorsement” for purposes of

La.R.S. 32:705. As noted by the trial court, her signature as “seller” was neither

notarized nor witnessed. Additionally, Mr. Alexander‟s name is absent from the title

as the document introduced into the record includes no “Buyer” on the reverse of the

title.

Neither do we find merit in Mr. Alexander‟s contention that, although the

formalities of La.R.S. 32:705 were not completed, the trial court was otherwise

required to find the evidence supportive of transfer of ownership. While Mrs.

Williams surrendered possession of both the original title bearing her name as owner

and the truck to Mr. Alexander upon his demand, other evidence and events support

the trial court‟s determination. In particular, Mr. Williams demanded the return of the

truck when he returned to town, Mr. Alexander complied with that demand, Mrs.

Williams obtained a duplicate title in her name after Mr. Alexander did not return the

original title to her, and Mr. Alexander issued a policy of automobile insurance on the

truck in Mrs. Williams‟ name. Mr. Alexander did not produce a bill of sale, title

indicating his purchase of the truck, or insurance on the truck. To the contrary, the

above objective markers favored Mrs. Williams. Additionally, any credibility

determinations regarding Mr. Williams‟ completion of any work anticipated for the

retention of the truck were within the province of the trial court as “it observes and

participates in the live presentation, while the appellate court merely reviews the cold

transcript.” Hayes Fund for First United Methodist Church of Welsh, LLC v. Kerr-

McGee Rocky Mountain, LLC, 14-2592, p. 10 (La. 12/18/15), 193 So.3d 1110, 1116-

17.

Finding no manifest error in the trial court‟s determination regarding

ownership, we find no merit in this assignment.

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Neutral Arbiter

In his final assignment, Mr. Alexander contends that the trial court

“overstepped its bounds in determining ownership.” In particular, Mr. Alexander

asserts that his questioning of Phillip Williams regarding his delivery of the truck to

Mr. Alexander upon demand “can be interpreted as consistent with his believing Mr.

Alexander was still owed money by Mr. Calvin Paul Williams.” Yet, Mr. Alexander

argues that the trial court conducted its own cross-examination “focused on drawing

facts to support the legal conclusion and/or legal determination that the truck could

not have belonged to Mr. Phillip Williams.” Mr. Alexander suggests that such

questioning, as well as other exchanges which he contends reveal “frustration” by the

trial court, indicate that its role as neutral arbiter was undermined.

As explained above, the record supports the trial court‟s determination on the

merits. This basis is apparent, notwithstanding the testimony from Phillip complained

of by Mr. Alexander as to whether he believed that his uncle had not performed work

as demanded by Mr. Alexander. Furthermore, and to the extent the trial court made

inquiries of the witnesses, La.Code Evid. art. 614(B) specifically provides that “[t]he

court may question witnesses, whether called by itself or by a party.” Having

reviewed the testimony, we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in this

regard. Further, we point out that this matter was a bench trial at which the parties

proceeded in proper person. Reference to the transcript reveals that the trial court

found the need to maintain control of the proceedings, advising at one point that:

“[W]hen people come here to this [c]ourt and do not have an attorney I do the best I

can to try and maintain some decorum between the two of you and it‟s very difficult,

very difficult. Alright. I want to make sure that all you reach and have a fair trial.”

Given these factors, and following review of the record in its entirety, we find

no merit in this assignment of error.

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DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs of

this proceeding are assigned to the defendant—appellant, Vincent Alexander.

AFFIRMED.

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