Wilbert Joseph Levier and Rose Richard Levier v. Jeff Davis Bancshares, Inc.
Wilbert Joseph Levier and Rose Richard Levier v. Jeff Davis Bancshares, Inc., No. CA-0017-0472 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. Apr. 18, 2018).
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- Duncan v. USAA Ins. Co. 950 So. 2d 544
- Wright v. Louisiana Power & Light 951 So. 2d 1058
- King v. Parish National Bank 885 So. 2d 540
- Jones v. Estate of Santiago 870 So. 2d 1002
- Samaha v. Rau 977 So. 2d 880
Opinion text
STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
17-472
WILBERT JOSEPH LEVIER AND ROSE RICHARD LEVIER
VERSUS
JEFF DAVIS BANCSHARES, INC.
**********
APPEAL FROM THE
TWENTY-SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ST. LANDRY, NO. 16-C-3007-A
HONORABLE JAMES P. DOHERTY, JR., DISTRICT JUDGE
**********
D. KENT SAVOIE
JUDGE
**********
Court composed of Elizabeth A. Pickett, D. Kent Savoie, and Van H. Kyzar,
Judges.
AFFIRMED.
Steven J. Diebold
Diebold Law Firm, LLC
Post Office Box 51836
Lafayette, Louisiana 70505
(337) 347-6640
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS:
Wilbert Joseph Levier
Rose Richard Levier
Stephen C. Polito
Stockwell, Sievert, Viccellio, Clements & Shaddock, L.L.P.
Post Office Box 2900
Lake Charles, Louisiana 70602-2900
(337) 436-9491
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Jeff Davis Bancshares, Inc.
SAVOIE, Judge.
In this case concerning the amendment of building restrictions, the trial court
granted a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant Jeff Davis Bancshares,
Inc. (JD Bank), affirming the amendment to the restrictions at issue. Plaintiffs,
Wilbert Joseph Levier and Rose Richard Levier, now appeal. For the following
reasons, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 3, 1949, Edward Patterson Smiley transferred ownership of a
lot in the Smiley Subdivision to Otis Burton Stander. In the act which transferred
ownership, the building restrictions for the Smiley Subdivision were formed. In
the 1949 Restrictions, Smiley established general and special restrictions for all
lots in the Smiley Subdivision, including a prohibition on commercial use. The
restrictions also allow for amendment, in whole or in part, by a “vote of the
majority of the owners of the lots in the subdivision.”
Lots 13, 14, and 15 of Block F of the Smiley Subdivision are located on
South Union Street. They are zoned by the City of Opelousas as a Neighborhood
Mixed Use District. This type of zoning allows for commercial uses, including
banks and financial institutions.
On May 9, 2016, James Maddock McCarthy, M.D. and the Joan Sybil
Leblanc McCarthy Credit Shelter Trust (sellers) executed a purchase agreement
with JD Bank, wherein JD Bank agreed to buy Lots 13, 14 and 15 of Block F of
the Smiley Subdivision from the sellers. JD Bank planned to build a new bank
branch on the lots. Before the purchase could be finalized, however, JD Bank
needed to confirm that the zoning and building restrictions affecting the property
allowed for the construction of the branch building.
JD Bank needed zoning approval for its signage and drive-through, which
was obtained at an Opelousas City Council meeting on April 12, 2016. The last
step in the process was to amend the 1949 Building Restrictions to allow for
commercial use of the three lots in the Smiley Subdivision. To that end, Tina
Vidrine, a JD Bank employee, went door to door to lot owners in the subdivision
with a written document. She explained the proposed amendment, and the lot
owners had a choice to either reject the amendment or sign the agreement as
evidence of their approval. There are seventy-seven lots in Smiley Subdivision.
The agreement and vote of the owners of 38.5 of the lots were required for an
amendment of the restrictions to be valid. Vidrine ultimately acquired forty-one
signatures. This document, with the signatures, was then duly acknowledged and
filed in the St. Landry Parish Clerk of Court’s Conveyance Records.
JD Bank, having received zoning approval and amendment of the 1949
Restrictions, purchased the lots at issue. On July 13, 2016, the Leviers, lot owners
in Smiley Subdivision, filed a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and For
Injunction against JD Bank, alleging that the amendment to the 1949 Restrictions
was not valid. JD Bank subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment
arguing that the amendment constitutes a “vote” by the majority of the lot owners
as required to amend the building restrictions. After a hearing on the motion, the
trial court ruled in favor of JD Bank, finding:
[T]hat the Amendment to Restrictions recorded on April 1, 2016, in
the St. Landry Parish Clerk of Court’s Conveyance Records, bearing
Act. No. 1139450, constituted a vote as required by the Smiley
Subdvision [sic] Building Restrictions created by the Mortgage Sale
from Edward Patterson Smiley to Otis Burton Stander executed on
December 3, 1949, and recorded in St. Landry Parish Clerk of Court’s
Conveyance Records, Book F-9, Page 43, Act No. 276728, and that,
because a vote occurred with a majority of the owners of the lots
voting in favor of the said amendment, the Amendment to Restrictions
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recorded on April 1, 2016, in St. Landry Parish Clerk of Court
Conveyance Records, bearing Act. No. 1139450, validly amended the
Smiley Subdivision Building Restrictions to allow commercial
development on Lots 13, 14, and 15 of Block F of the Smiley
Subdivision.
The Leviers now appeal.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
The Leviers contend that:
1) The [trial court] committed reversible error in finding that the
Amendment to Restrictions instrument recorded under Act. No.
1139450 constituted a vote as required by the Smiley Subdivision
Building Restrictions.
2) The [trial court] committed reversible error in finding that the
Amendment to Restrictions validly amended the Smiley
Subdivision Building Restrictions to allow commercial
development of Lots 13, 14, and 15 of Block F of the Smiley
Subdivision.
3) The [trial court] committed reversible error in granting summary
judgment and dismissing the Leviers’ case.
LAW AND DISCUSSION
The appellate standard of review for motions for summary judgment is set
forth as follows:
A motion for summary judgment is a procedural device used
when there is no genuine issue of material fact for all or part of the
relief prayed for by a litigant. Duncan v. U.S.A.A. Ins. Co., 2006-
363[,] p. 3 (La.11/29/06), 950 So.2d 544, 546, see La. C.C.P. art.
966. A summary judgment is reviewed on appeal de novo, with the
appellate court using the same criteria that govern the trial court’s
determination of whether summary judgment is
appropriate; i.e. whether there is any genuine issue of material fact,
and whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Wright v. Louisiana Power & Light, 2006-1181[,] p. 17
(La.3/9/07), 951 So.2d 1058, 1070; King v. Parish National
Bank, 2004-0337[,] p. 7 (La.10/19/04), 885 So.2d 540, 545; Jones v.
Estate of Santiago, 2003-1424[,] p. 5 (La.4/14/04), 870 So.2d 1002,
1006.
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Samaha v. Rau, 07-1726, pp. 3-4 (La. 2/26/08), 977 So.2d 880, 882-83 (footnote
omitted).
Louisiana Civil Code Article 780 (emphasis added) provides:
Building restrictions may be amended, whether such amendment
lessens or increases a restriction, or may terminate or be terminated,
as provided in the act that establishes them. In the absence of such
provision, building restrictions may be amended or terminated for the
whole or a part of the restricted area by agreement of owners
representing more than one-half of the land area affected by the
restrictions, excluding streets and street rights-of-way, if the
restrictions have been in effect for at least fifteen years, or by
agreement of both owners representing two-thirds of the land area
affected and two-thirds of the owners of the land affected by the
restrictions, excluding streets and street rights-of-way, if the
restrictions have been in effect for more than ten years.
In the present case, the act that established the 1949 Restrictions does
include a provision for amendment of the restrictions. General Restrictions
Section 15 (emphasis added) states:
The General Restrictions herein contained shall be binding on
all purchasers, their heirs or assigns, and on all persons claiming
under all purchasers, their heirs or assigns, and any special restrictions
that may be set forth in any deed to any lot or parcel of ground in said
subdivision, shall be binding on the particular purchasers, their heirs
or assigns, and on all persons claiming under them, until January 1,
1975, at which time said restrictions shall be automatically extended
for successive periods of ten years, unless by a vote of the majority
of the owners of the lots in said subdivision it should be agreed to
change the said restrictions in whole or in part.
The building restrictions do not contain a section explaining what constitutes
a vote or how the vote is to be conducted. It is the Leviers’ contention that a vote
to amend the restrictions did not take place. The Leviers argue that the “generally
prevailing meaning of the word ‘vote’ minimally requires some kind of a proposal
put before all potential voters and a specific timeframe in which the vote will
occur.” That was not done in this case. We disagree.
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“The words of a contract must be given their generally prevailing meaning.”
La.Civ.Code art. 2047. In that regard, we turn to the general and ordinary meaning
of the word “vote” which is a “formal expression of opinion or will in response to
a proposed decision” and/or “an indication of approval or disapproval of a
proposal.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 1403 (11th ed. 2004). The
amendment document signed by the lot owner states, “that [she/he] does hereby
approve the Amendment to Restrictions to permit Lots 13, 14 and 15 of Block F to
be used for commercial purposes.” We find this language to be unambiguous.
Signing of the document clearly expresses approval of a proposal, which is the
amendment of the building restrictions.
In addition, we find no authority that requires notice or a hearing on the
matter. The drafters of the 1949 Building Restrictions could have included such
language in the document, but they did not. Such requirements cannot now be read
into the restrictions. We do not find that notice and hearing requirements attach
with the addition of the word “vote.”
Further, JD Bank attached the affidavit of Bruce Gaudin, a title attorney
doing business in St. Landry Parish, Lafayette and Evangeline Parishes. He
drafted the agreement to amend the subdivision restriction, and he avers “[t]hat
using written agreements to amend building restrictions and recording said written
agreement, as was done in this case with the 2016 Amendment, is the standard real
estate practice in St. Landry Parish and the surrounding areas.”
For these reasons, we find that the written document signed by the lot
owners constituted an amendment of the 1949 Building Restrictions, permitting
Lots 13, 14 and 15 of Block F of the Smiley Subdivision to be used for commercial
purposes. The Leviers’ assignments of error are without merit.
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DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. All
costs associated with this appeal are assessed to Plaintiffs Wilbert and Rose Levier.
AFFIRMED.
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