Jamestown Forestland, LLC v. Robbie Lee Setliff

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

CA 17-637

JAMESTOWN FORESTLAND, L.L.C.

VERSUS

ROBBIE LEE SETLIFF, ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF RAPIDES, NO. 257,524
HONORABLE PATRICIA EVANS KOCH, DISTRICT JUDGE

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CANDYCE G. PERRET
JUDGE

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Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, John D. Saunders, and Candyce G. Perret,
Judges.

JUDGMENT VACATED; REMANDED

Michael H. Davis
Attorney at Law
2017 MacArthur Dr., Bldg 4, #A
Alexandria, LA 71301
(318) 445-3621
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS:
Robbie Lee Setliff
Lee Ray Setliff
Susan Stark

Randall B. Keiser
Jeremy C. Cedars
Keiser Law Firm, P.L.C.
P. O. Box 12358
Alexandria, LA 71315
(318) 443-6168
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
Jamestown Forestland, L.L.C.

PERRET, Judge.

This action was initially filed as an eviction action by plaintiff,

Jamestown Forestland, L.L.C. (“Jamestown”), against defendants Robbie Lee

Setliff, Lee Ray Setliff, and Susan Stark (collectively “Defendants”).

Defendants responded to the eviction action by filing a reconventional demand

seeking a judgment of ownership and/or possession of the 3.23 acre property

that was the subject of the eviction proceeding. After a hearing, the trial court

granted Jamestown’s peremptory exception of res judicata. For the following

reasons, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand this matter to the

trial court in order for the owner of the subject property, W.T. Burton Industries,

Inc. (“Burton Industries”), to be joined as a necessary party to the litigation.

FACTS:

The following facts have been ascertained from the record pleadings and the

exhibits to the pleadings. Jamestown is the leasehold tenant of property located in

Rapides Parish, Louisiana, described as “[a] 3.23 acre more or less parcel of

property lying and being situate in the Northwest Quarter (NW ¼) of Section 29,

Township 5 North, Range 5 West . . . .” Jamestown’s lease is with Burton

Industries, who is the owner of the subject property. On December 7, 2016,

Jamestown filed a petition for eviction against Defendants, alleging that they have

no ownership or possessory interest in the subject property and that Defendants

refuse to vacate the premises despite receiving written notice on November 15,

2016.

On January 31, 2017, Defendants filed an answer and reconventional

demand against Jamestown, alleging that they possess, as owner, the 3.23 acre

property that was the subject of the eviction proceeding. In addition, Defendants

sought ownership and/or possession of an “adjoining thirty (30) acres also in

Section 29, Township 5 North, Range 5 West, Louisiana, Meridian, Northwest

Land District, Rapides Parish, Louisiana.” Defendants argue that they “had

possession as owners of the above described property quietly and without

interruption for more than thirty (30) years, immediately prior to the written notice

to vacate said premises delivered on November 15, 2016.”

On February 10, 2017, Jamestown filed peremptory exceptions of res

judicata and non-joinder of a party and dilatory exceptions of improper cumulation

of actions, unauthorized use of summary proceeding, and vagueness. In support of

its exceptions, Jamestown attached the following exhibits: (1) a January 20, 1977

judgment [Civil Suit No. 91,760] that recognized “Wm. T. Burton Industries, Inc.

[Burton Industries] . . . as legal owner of the immovable property” and ordered

Defendants’ grandfather, Leo George (“Mr. George”), to vacate the property,

which is now the subject of the eviction action; (2) a July 13, 1977 judgment that

denied Mr. George’s motion for a new trial; (3) the trial court’s reasons for

judgment, dated December 22, 1976; and (4) discovery responses from Mr. George

in Suit No. 91,760.

In its memorandum in support of the exceptions, Jamestown argued that

Defendants have pled the same cause of action that existed and was asserted by Mr.

George in Civil Suit 91,760, and that the 1977 judgment is final and valid.

Jamestown argued that the parties in this current action are “simply the successors

of the 1977 litigation: Jamestown as a lessee of Burton [Industries] and the

Plaintiffs-in-reconvention [Defendants] as direct descendants of Leo George.”

Thus, Jamestown argued that Defendants’ reconventional demand is res judicata

and should be dismissed with prejudice. Further, Jamestown argued that if the trial

court did not dismiss on grounds of res judicata, its peremptory exception of non-

joinder of a party should be granted because Jamestown’s lease is with Burton

Industries, the owner of the subject property.

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In opposition to the exception of res judicata, Defendants argued that the

parties are not the same because the 1975 litigation involved only their grandfather,

Mr. George. Further, Defendants assert that the cause of action in the first suit was

relying on claims of possession predating 1977 and that their current cause of

action relies on thirty year possession following 1977. In regard to Jamestown’s

exception of non-joinder of a party, Defendants submit that the owner of the

property, Burton Industries, is not an indispensable party because Jamestown has a

ninety-nine year lease on the subject property that terminates in 2065.

After a hearing, the trial court signed a judgment on April 24, 2017, that

granted Jamestown’s peremptory exception of res judicata, “finding that the parties

are in the same capacity, and, the claims regarding bad faith acquisitive

prescription are the same as asserted in Civil Suit No. 91,760 (William Burton

Industries, Inc., v. Leo George).” The trial court pretermitted the peremptory

exception of non-joinder and dilatory exceptions of improper cumulation of actions,

unauthorized use of summary proceeding and vagueness. Defendants now appeal

this final judgment.

Jamestown answered the appeal requesting that the judgment of the trial

court granting the exception of res judicata be affirmed at Defendants’ cost.

Further, Jamestown alleges that if, and only if, this court reverses the judgment of

the trial court, that this court address the pretermitted exceptions and issue a

judgment on the pretermitted exceptions. While on appeal, Jamestown also filed a

motion to dismiss Defendants’ appeal and an exception of no right of action

arguing that even though it has the right to bring an eviction action, it is not a

proper party defendant on the issue of ownership because its lease with Burton

Industries does not confer any real rights to the property. However, because we are

remanding this matter to the trial court in order for Defendants to amend their

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reconventional demand to add Burton Industries as a necessary party, we deny both

the motion to dismiss the appeal and the exception of no right of action.

DISCUSSION:

In their sole assignment of error, Defendants allege that the trial judge erred

in granting the exception of res judicata and dismissing their reconventional

demand of acquisitive prescription against Jamestown.

The underlying issue herein concerns the ownership of the disputed property.

In response to Jamestown’s petition for eviction, Defendants’ filed a

reconventional demand alleging that they “possess as owner” the subject property

based on thirty years acquisitive prescription. The record indicates that Burton

Industries was recognized as the “legal owner of the immovable property” at issue

on January 20, 1977. Because Defendants do not possess an actual title to the

property in dispute, in order to prove their claim of ownership, they must establish

ownership through acquisitive prescription. Acquisitive prescription is the

“acquiring [of] ownership or other real rights by possession for a period of time.”

La.Civ.Code art. 3446. This “ownership and other real rights in immovables may

be acquired by the prescription of thirty years without the need of just title or

possession in good faith.” La.Civ.Code art. 3486. In order to acquire ownership

with thirty years of possession, there must be “continuous, uninterrupted,

peaceable, public, and unequivocal” corporeal possession for thirty years.

La.Civ.Code art. 3476.

After a review of the record and caselaw, we find it was error for the trial

court to address Defendants’ acquisitive prescription argument, and grant an

exception of res judicata on issues concerning the ownership of the immovable

property, without the owner of the immovable property, Burton Industries, being a

party to the suit. We also note that we are not convinced the 1977 judgment

precluded ownership by thirty years acquisitive prescription when the time period

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arguably began anew after the judgment. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure

Article 641(emphasis supplied) provides for the joinder of parties as follows:

A person shall be joined as a party in the action when
either:

(1) In his absence complete relief cannot be accorded
among those already parties.

(2) He claims an interest relating to the subject matter of
the action and is so situated that the adjudication of
the action in his absence may either:

(a) As a practical matter, impair or impede his ability to
protect that interest.

(b) Leave any of the persons already parties subject to a
substantial risk of incurring multiple or inconsistent
obligations.

“It is well settled that the lack of an indispensable party to a proceeding in the trial

court is fatal to any adjudication of the dispute.” Shamieh v. Liquid Transp. Corp.,

07-1282, p. 6 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1/30/08), 975 So.2d 161, 164 (citations omitted).

Further, “[a] party shall be deemed necessary for just adjudication when that

party’s presence is absolutely necessary to protect its substantial rights.” Id. at 165

(citation omitted). As stated in Stephenson v. Nations Credit Fin. Servs. Corp., 98-

1688, 98-1689, p. 10 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/24/99), 754 So.2d 1011, 1019, “an

adjudication made without making a person described in Article 641 a party to the

litigation is an absolute nullity.”

The trial judge erred when proceeding with this case when her ruling on the

res judicata exception could not bind Burton Industries as the legal owner of the

subject property. As such, we vacate the trial court judgment, signed on April 24,

2017, and remand the matter for joinder of the absent party and retrial of the case.

For these reasons, we vacate the trial court’s judgment on the exception of

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res judicata and remand this matter to the trial court for further consideration after

joinder of Burton Industries.

JUDGMENT VACATED; REMANDED

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