George Raymond Williams, M.D., Orthopaedic Surgery, a Professional Medical, LLC v. Sif Consultants of Louisiana, Inc., Risk Management Services, LLC, Med-Comp USA, Inc.

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

17-694

GEORGE RAYMOND WILLIAMS, M.D., ORTHOPAEDIC SURGERY,
A PROFESSIONAL MEDICAL L.L.C.

VERSUS

SIF CONSULTANTS OF LOUISIANA, INC., RISK MANAGEMENT
SERVICES, L.L.C., MED-COMP USA, INC., ET AL.

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
TWENTY-SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ST. LANDRY, NO. 09-C-5244-C
HONORABLE ALONZO HARRIS, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

JOHN E. CONERY
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, Marc T. Amy, Shannon J. Gremillion, Phyllis
M. Keaty, and John E. Conery, Judges.

Amy, M., Judge dissents and assigns reasons.
Gremillion, S., Judge dissents for the reasons provided by Amy, M., Judge,
and writes separately.

AFFIRMED.

E. Paige Sensenbrenner
Martin A. Stern
Raymond P. Ward
Sara C. Valentine
Adams and Reese, L.L.P.
701 Poydras Street, Suite 4500
New Orleans, LA 70139
(504) 581-3234
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Homeland Insurance Company of New York

Michael J. Rosen
Peter F. Lovato, III
Skarzynski Black, LLP
205 N. Michigan Avenue, Suite 2600
Chicago, IL 60601
(312) 946-4200
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Homeland Insurance Company of New York

Michael E. Parker
Randall K. Theunissen
D. Paul Gardner, Jr.
Allen & Gooch
P. O. Drawer 81129
Lafayette, LA 70598
(337) 291-1350
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Homeland Insurance Company of New York

Thomas A. Filo
Somer G. Brown
Cox, Cox, Filo, Camel & Wilson, L.L.C.
723 Broad Street
Lake Charles, LA 70601
(337) 436-6611
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
George Raymond Williams, M.D.
Orthopaedic Surgery, A Professional Medical L.L.C.

John S. Bradford
William B. Monk
Stockwell, Sievert, Viccellio, Clements & Shaddock, L.L.P.
P. O. Box 2900
Lake Charles, LA 70602
(337) 436-9491
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
George Raymond Williams, M.D.
Orthopaedic Surgery, A Professional Medical L.L.C.

Patrick C. Morrow, Sr.
James P. Ryan
Morrow, Morrow, Ryan, Bassett & Haik
P. O. Box 1787
Opelousas, LA 70570
(337) 948-4483
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
George Raymond Williams, M.D.
Orthopaedic Surgery, A Professional Medical L.L.C.

Stephen B. Murray, Sr.
Stephen B. Murray, Jr.
Arthur M. Murray
Murray Law Firm
650 Poydras Street, Suite 2150
New Orleans, LA 70130
(504) 525-8100
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
George Raymond Williams, M.D.
Orthopaedic Surgery, A Professional Medical L.L.C.

Charles T. Curtis, Jr.
Gerard George Metzger
Attorneys at Law
829 Baronne Street
New Orleans, LA 70113
(504) 581-9322
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Med-Comp USA, Inc.

L. Lane Roy
Brown Sims, P.C.
600 Jefferson Street, Suite 800
Lafayette, LA 70501
(337) 484-1240
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Bestcomp, Inc.

Janice Bertucci Unland
Rabalais, Unland
1404 Greengate Drive, #110
Covington, LA 70433
(985) 893-9900
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Risk Management Services

Ronald P. Schiller
Daniel J. Layden
Hangley, Aronchick, Segal, Pudlin & Schiller
One Logan Square, 27th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19103
(215) 568-6200
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Risk Management Services

Steven William Usdin
Barrasso, Usdin, Kupperman, Freeman & Sarver
909 Poydras Street, 24th Floor
New Orleans, LA 70112
(504) 589-9700
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Executive Risk Specialty Ins. Co.

Cynthia J. Thomas
Galloway, Johnson, Thompkins, Burr & Smith
#3 Sanctuary Boulevard, Third Floor
Manderville, LA 70471
(985) 674-6680
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
SIF Consultants of Louisiana, Inc.

John Mark Fezio
Stone Pigman Walther Wittman, L.L.C.
909 Poydras Street., Suite 3150
New Orleans, LA 70112-4042
(504) 581-3200
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
CorVel Corp.

Patrick A. Juneau, Jr.
The Juneau Firm
P. O. Drawer 51268
Lafayette, LA 70505-1268
(337) 269-0052
SPECIAL MASTER

CONERY, Judge.

This appeal addresses the appropriate date from which legal interest will

attach to a judgment. Homeland Insurance Company of New York (Homeland)

appeals the judgment of the trial court awarding legal interest to the plaintiff class,

represented by George Raymond Williams, M.D., Orthopaedic Surgery, A

Professional Medical L.L.C., in an action against, among other defendants, CorVel

Corporation (CorVel), which was insured by Homeland. The trial court’s

judgment awarded legal interest from December 22, 2006, the date plaintiff class

demanded arbitration in federal court against CorVel. Homeland claims legal

interest is due from March 24, 2011, the date suit was filed in state court by the

plaintiff class naming CorVel as a defendant and its insurer, Homeland, as a direct

action defendant. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This matter was initially filed on December 22, 2006 as a class arbitration

against CorVel. It is undisputed that CorVel was insured under a 2006-2007

claims-made policy issued by Homeland. It is also undisputed that the arbitration

demand originally included a prayer for legal interest. The plaintiff class

arbitration petition claimed that CorVel had violated La.R.S. 40:2203.1 titled,

“Prohibition of certain practices by preferred provider organizations,” by providing

preferred provider organization (PPO) discounts to their clients without providing

the medical providers the necessary notification under the statute. Therefore, the

plaintiff class claimed that the PPO’s alternative rates of payment were not

enforceable against the medical providers. The arbitration was never completed but

remained pending when the plaintiff class filed the state court petition.

On September 20, 2009, the plaintiff class filed a “Petition for Damages and

Class Certification” naming additional PPOs as defendants. On March 24, 2011,

CorVel was named as a defendant, and its insurer, Homeland, was added as a

direct action defendant in the plaintiff class’s “First Amended and Re-Stated

Petition for Damages and Class Certification.” Homeland filed an exception of no

right of action claiming that the suit by the plaintiff class was an action in contract

and therefore they were not subject to suit under the direct action statute. This

court on appeal found that the petition filed by the plaintiff class could provide the

basis for a claim sounding in both tort and contract, and therefore the plaintiff class

was allowed to proceed with its direct action claim against Homeland. Williams v.

SIF Consultants of La. Inc., 12-419 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/7/12), 103 So. 3d 1172, writ

denied, 12-2637 (La. 3/15/13), 109 So. 3d 381. (Williams I)

Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff class and CorVel entered into a class-wide

settlement due to the number of claims and litigation in various forums. On April

27, 2011, the parties filed a joint motion for preliminary approval of the settlement.

On November 4, 2011, the trial court approved the settlement, which reserved the

plaintiff class’s demands against the remaining defendants, including its direct

action claims against Homeland, CorVel’s insurer.

The plaintiff class filed a partial motion for summary judgment against

CorVel’s insurers, which included Homeland. The trial court found that the initial

claim for class arbitration filed on December 22, 2006 triggered coverage under the

2006-2007 Homeland claims-made policy issued to its insured CorVel. The trial

court’s ruling resulted in a final judgment dated February 5, 2016, in favor of the

plaintiff class and an award of Homeland’s full policy limits of ten million dollars,

“together with legal interest thereon.” Homeland filed a timely appeal. A panel of

2

this court affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the plaintiff class, and the

supreme court subsequently denied writs. Williams v. SIF Consultants of La., Inc.,

16-343 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/29/16), 209 So.3d 903, writ denied, 17-390 (La.

4/13/17), 218 So.3d 629. (Williams II)

Once the judgment became final, Homeland paid its policy limits of ten

million dollars and legal interest only from March 24, 2011, the date that

Homeland was named as a direct action defendant as CorVel’s insurer. Homeland

failed to pay legal interest from December 22, 2006, the date of the original

demand against its insured CorVel, and additionally failed to pay court costs also

included in the judgment.

Because the judgment failed to specify a commencement date or limit legal

interest to the date of judicial demand, the plaintiff class filed an “Expedited

Motion to Fix Commencement Date for Legal Interest under Final Judgment,”

arguing that legal interest should be fixed as of December 22, 2006, the date the

plaintiff class made a demand on CorVel for arbitration, and the date legal interest

was first prayed for and demanded. Homeland unsuccessfully argued to the trial

court that legal interest did not begin to accrue until March 24, 2011, the date

Homeland, as CorVel’s insurer, was added to the suit as a direct action defendant.

In its June 20, 2017 judgment, the trial court awarded legal interest to the plaintiff

class commencing on December 22, 2006, the date the original arbitration demand

was made by the plaintiff class against Homeland’s insured, CorVel. The trial

court designated the June 20, 2017 judgment as a final judgment pursuant to

La.Code Civ.P. art. 1915(B). Homeland then timely perfected this appeal.

3

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Homeland asserts one error on appeal, “The trial court erred by awarding

plaintiff class legal interest from December 22, 2006, the date arbitration was

invoked against CorVel, and not from the date this suit was filed against

Homeland.”

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

There are no issues of fact in this case, so the determination of pre-judgment

interest is a legal issue and thus is subject to de novo review. “Questions of law

are reviewed de novo, without deference to the legal conclusions of the tribunals

below.” Snider v. La. Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 13-579, p. 6 (La. 12/10/13), 130 So.3d

922, 928.

Statutory And Contractual Obligations Owed to CorVel by Homeland

Homeland relies on La.R.S. 13:4203 in its argument that legal interest

should only begin to run on March 24, 2011, the date of judicial demand, when

Homeland was named as a direct action defendant as the insurer of CorVel by the

plaintiff class in state court. Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:4203 states, “Legal

interest shall attach from date of judicial demand, on all judgments, sounding in

damages, ‘ex delicto’, which may be rendered by any of the courts.”

However, the issue of whether the claim by the plaintiff class against

CorVel and its insurer Homeland was one in tort or contract was discussed by a

panel of this court in Williams I. Homeland sought to dismiss the direct action

claim filed against them as the insurer of CorVel by the plaintiff class based on an

exception of no cause of action. In affirming the trial court’s ruling allowing the

4

direct action claim of the plaintiff class to proceed against Homeland, a panel of

this court in Williams I found:

“[T]he same acts or omissions may constitute a breach of both a
general duty owed to all persons (ex delicto) and a breach of a
special obligation the obligor contractually assumed (ex
contractu).” Cooper v. Louisiana Dept. of Public Works, 03-1074,
pp. 19-20 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/3/04), 870 So.2d 315, 331-32. Here, a
statutory duty is involved. Thus, “the source of the duty involved
would not be the contract itself, but rather society’s interests in
protecting its members against uncompensated … injury.” Id.

Williams, 103 So.3d at 1177. (other cites omitted.)

Therefore, this court has found, and it is now the law of the case, that the

claim against CorVel, which is the basis of the direct action against Homeland, is a

statutory duty which sounds in tort. However, the contract between CorVel as the

insured and Homeland as the insurer provides the legal basis for the award of legal

interest from the original date of the demand for arbitration against CorVel filed by

the plaintiff class on December 22, 2006.

The Award of Legal Interest

The trial court in its reasons for judgment cited La.Code Civ.P. art. 1921,

which provides, “[T] he court shall award interest in the judgment as prayed for or

as provided by law.” It is undisputed that the plaintiff class in both its demand for

arbitration filed in federal court in 2006, and its state court suit, filed in 2009,

amended in 2011, sought and prayed for legal interest.

The trial court also relied on La.Civ.Code art. 2000, which provides for legal

interest when the “object of performance is a sum of money,” and states in

pertinent part:

When the object of the performance is a sum of money,
damages for delay in performance are measured by the
interest on that sum from the time it is due, at the rate agreed

5

by the parties or, in the absence of agreement, at the rate of
legal interest as fixed by R.S. 9:3500. The obligee may
recover these damages without having to prove any loss, and
whatever loss he may have suffered he can recover no more.

The first claim by the plaintiff class against CorVel, Homeland’s insured,

was made on December 22, 2006 by the filing of a class arbitration demand in

federal court which included a request for legal interest. This court in our earlier

opinion in Williams, 209 So.3d 903,1 specifically found that the December 2006

arbitration claim constituted the first filed claim against CorVel. CorVel properly

and timely reported the claim to its insurer, Homeland, under its claims-made

policy with CorVel. We find that the initial reporting of the class arbitration

demand by CorVel triggered Homeland’s 2006-2007 claims-made policy coverage

on behalf of CorVel. Homeland had actual notice of the claim as well as the

arbitration dispute pending in federal court from 2006 and was put on notice of its

possible exposure as the insurer of CorVel for a claims-made policy with a ten-

million-dollar limit plus legal interest as of December 22, 2006. In its reasons for

ruling, the trial court correctly found that “the maximum amount owed was

ascertainable then in [2006] just as it was in 2011 when Defendants [Homeland]

were added to the suit.”

The same Homeland 2006-2007 claims-made policy which provided

coverage to CorVel for the plaintiff class’s 2006 arbitration claim also formed the

basis of the payment on April 21, 2017 by Homeland of its policy limits in

satisfaction of the ten-million-dollar judgment in favor of the plaintiff class against

CorVel. In addition to the payment of its policy limits, Homeland paid the

1
Though this writer dissented in the earlier decision, it is now the law of the case, and the
question now before us is the date from which legal interest should run on the judgment. In its
February 5, 2016 judgment, the trial court was not specific, hence the subsequent motion by the
plaintiff class and judgment now before us.

6

undisputed portion of the legal interest owed of $2,439,383.56, as of March 24,

2011, when Homeland was named as CorVel’s insurer and a direct action

defendant in the state court petition.

It is undisputed that the 2006-2007 Homeland claims-made policy issued to

CorVel provided for the payment of prejudgment interest and required Homeland

to pay “prejudgment interest” as a “Loss” under the policy. Therefore, the

Homeland claims-made policy required the payment of any prejudgment interest

owed by CorVel regardless of whether it is also required or allowed under law. In

its insurance contract with CorVel, the Homeland claims-made policy does not

limit “prejudgment interest” to post-judicial demand interest,” payable in

accordance with La.R.S. 13:4203, as Homeland claims.

Accordingly, when CorVel was first named as a defendant by the plaintiff

class on December 22, 2006 in the class arbitration demand and Homeland was

notified of claim, the terms of the 2006-2007 Homeland’s claims-made policy

were triggered. Homeland then became responsible from December 22, 2006

forward under the terms of the claims-made policy contract for any damages and

legal interest owed by its insured, CorVel, to the plaintiff class.

In finding that legal interest was due to the plaintiff class from the date of

the first demand against CorVel on December 22, 2006, the trial court relied on the

supreme court case of Trans-Global Alloy Ltd. v. First Nat’l Bank of Jefferson

Parish, 583 So.2d 443, (La. 1991). The Trans-Global court found that when the

damages are ascertainable, which is the case in this litigation as the policy limits of

Homeland’s policy with CorVel were never in dispute, that to deny the plaintiff

class the legal interest from the date of the first “legal demand” on December 22,

2006 would result in unjust enrichment. The Trans-Global court stated:

7

Courts and commentators have also noted that allowing the defendant to
keep the interest that could be earned on the amount eventually awarded
would result in his unjust enrichment, …. The defendant is not penalized by
prejudgment interest because he is only returning the benefits he has
received from use of the plaintiff’s money. Miller v. Robertson, 266 U.S.
243, 45 S.Ct. 73, 69 L.Ed. 265 (1924)
Id. at 458.
In granting the plaintiff class’s expedited motion to set commencement date

for legal interest under final judgment, the trial court found:

There is no justification that can be ascertained in allowing
Defendants [Homeland] to be exempt from paying interest for a
period of five years knowing that the initial 2006 claim, which was
affirmed by both this court and the Third Circuit, is the first date
judicial demand was made.

We agree and affirm the trial court’s judgment of June 20, 2017 finding that

legal interest referenced in the trial court’s February 5, 2016 judgment “began to

accrue on December 22, 2006, the date arbitration was initiated against CorVel

Corporation.”

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the June 20, 2017 judgment in favor of George

Raymond Williams, M.D., Orthopaedic Surgery, A Professional Medical L.L.C.

and against Homeland Insurance Company of New York for legal interest from

December 22, 2006, requiring Homeland to pay the additional $2,836,780.82 in

unpaid legal interest, plus, as stated in the judgment, any additional legal interest

accruing from May 12, 2017, the date of the trial court’s reasons for judgment, and

all court costs is affirmed in its entirety. All costs of this appeal are taxed to

Homeland Insurance Company of New York.

AFFIRMED.

8

AMY, J., dissenting.

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion as I find that a reversal is

required.

A previous panel of this court addressed the nature of the plaintiff’s

underlying claim and observed that it alleged a statutory violation of La.R.S.

40:2203.1. Williams v. SIF Consultants of La., Inc., 12-419 (La.App. 3 Cir.

11/7/12), 103 So.3d 1172, writ denied, 12-2637 (La. 3/15/13), 109 So.3d 381.

Thus, the subject claim was found not to be contractual in nature. Such a finding,

in my opinion, renders La.Civ.Code art. 2000 inapplicable.

Rather, as it has been determined that a statutory duty was breached, I find

the question presented to this panel is resolved by linear application of La.R.S.

13:4203. That provision instructs that: “Legal interest shall attach from date of

judicial demand, on all judgments, sounding in damages, ‘ex delicto’, which may

be rendered by any of the courts.” Id. Clearly, given the absence of a contractual

claim, the claim as to the statutory duty involved here is ex delicto in nature. See

La.Civ.Code art. 1757 (providing that: “Obligations arise from contracts and other

declarations of will. They also arise directly from the law, regardless of a

declaration of will, in instances such as wrongful acts, the management of the

affairs of another, unjust enrichment and other acts or facts.”).

Accordingly, and given the “ex delicto” nature of the plaintiff’s claim, I

would award legal interest pursuant to La.R.S. 13:4203, i.e., from “date of judicial

demand[.]” (Emphasis added.) I find no merit in a conclusion that the demand for

arbitration in this case constituted a “judicial demand.” Rather, that conflation of

proceedings, and absent a court-involved demand, removes “judicial” from the

positive law of La.R.S. 13:4203.

9

For these reasons, I dissent from the majority opinion’s affirmation of the

trial court’s judgment.

10

GREMILLION, Judge, dissenting.

I subscribe to Judge Amy’s dissent, but there are additional reasons for which I

disagree with the majority.

The starting point of any judicial decision is the law, the sources of which are

legislation and custom. La.Civ.Code art. 1. Legislation is the expression of the

legislature’s will. La.Civ.Code art. 2. Custom acquires the force of law from

practices that are repeated to the point that they become generally accepted.

La.Civ.Code art. 3.

Legislation always trumps custom. Id. “When a law is clear and unambiguous,

and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as

written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the

legislature.” La.Civ.Code art. 9. Only in the absence of legislation and custom may

courts “proceed according to equity.” La.Civ.Code art. 4. Statutory law clearly and

unambiguously governs this situation.

“The court shall award interest in the judgment as prayed for or as provided by

law.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 1921. “The phrase ‘as provided by law’ applies to tort

claims, since in these cases interest attaches automatically, without being prayed for.

Grennon v. N.O. Public Service, 17 La.App. 700, 136 So. 309 (1931); Poulan v.

Gallagher, 148 So. 511 (La.App.1933).” Id. Official Revisions Comment (a). As

Judge Amy notes, this matter has been deemed by this court as involving a delictual

obligation, i.e., a tort.

Relevant to matters that proceeded to arbitration, Louisiana Civil Code Article

3128 reads (emphasis added):

The arbitrators may likewise pronounce by their award on the
interest and costs; but their silence on that subject is not a cause of nullity.
If legal interest would have been payable by law from date of judicial
demand, such legal interest awarded by the arbitrators shall attach from
the date the matter was submitted to arbitration.

11

In the present matter, there was no award by an arbitrator; the demand for arbitration

was withdrawn by the plaintiff. Had the matter proceeded to an arbitration award, the

terms of article 3128 would apply; here, by the statute’s plain wording, it does not.

The trial court erred in basing its ruling, even in part, on Article 3128.

Similarly, the trial court’s reliance upon La.Civ.Code art. 2000 is misplaced.

Louisiana Civil Code Article 2000 states:

When the object of the performance is a sum of money, damages
for delay in performance are measured by the interest on that sum from
the time it is due, at the rate agreed by the parties or, in the absence of
agreement, at the rate of legal interest as fixed by R.S. 9:3500. The
obligee may recover these damages without having to prove any loss, and
whatever loss he may have suffered he can recover no more. If the parties,
by written contract, have expressly agreed that the obligor shall also be
liable for the obligee's attorney fees in a fixed or determinable amount,
the obligee is entitled to that amount as well.

Article 2000 applies to conventional obligations. While Homeland was

conventionally bound for performance through its insurance policy, its obligee was

CorVel, not plaintiff. Homeland entered into no contract with plaintiff at all.

Lastly, the trial court relied upon Trans-Global Alloy Ltd. v. First Nat. Bank of

Jefferson Parish , 583 So.2d 443 (La.1991). In Trans-Global, the court was faced

with a suit between an importer of oilfield equipment and its bank over the bank’s

refusal to honor a commitment to issue monthly letters of credit to the importer. After

a jury found for the importer, the trial court awarded legal interest from the date of its

judgment rather than from the date of demand. The supreme court held that, even

though damages were not ascertainable until the matter was litigated, awarding

interest from the date of judicial demand was in keeping with longstanding Louisiana

jurisprudence, and should have run from that date. This matter bears no semblance to

the case at bar, as it dealt only with whether interest should be awarded from date of

demand or date of judgment.

Judge Amy persuasively argues that interest should run from the date of judicial

demand based upon La.R.S. 13:4203, which attaches legal interest in all cases

12

involving delictual obligations, whether they are prayed for. In the present matter,

though, plaintiff did pray for ‘all general and equitable relief proper under the

premises, including legal interest from the date of judicial demand, attorney fees, and

all costs of these proceedings.” (Emphasis added). This prayer is found in plaintiff’s

original petition and in the amended petition whereby CorVel was added to the suit.

The date of judicial demand is not the date arbitration was demanded.

Louisiana Code of Civil procedure Article 421 provides (emphasis added), “A

civil action is a demand for the enforcement of a legal right. It is commenced by the

filing of a pleading presenting the demand to a court of competent jurisdiction.

Amicable demand is not a condition precedent to a civil action, unless specifically

required by law.” Thus, the date of judicial demand is the date of filing the suit in

which judgment is rendered. See Burton v. Foret, 498 So.2d 706 (La.1986).

The precursor to La.Code Civ.P. art. 421 was Louisiana Code of Practice

Article 1, which read:

An action is the right given to every person, to claim judicially
what is due or belongs to him.

Action means also the exercise of that right, that is to say, a
judicial demand founded on a contract, or given by law, by which the
plaintiff prays that the person against whom he proceeds be ordered to do
that which he has bound himself towards him to perform.

In Abraham v. Abraham, 233 La. 808, 98 So.2d 197 (1957), the Louisiana Supreme

Court held that judicial demand for purposes of calculating legal interest was made

when a husband filed his action for partition of the community rather than his earlier

filing of the petition for separation.

Far more recently, this court held (emphasis added), “[W]hen a judgment

awards interest from the date of judicial demand and when multiple judicial demands

are pleaded in the same suit, interest on each claim accrues from the time the judicial

demand was made for that claim.” Amoco Prod. Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 03-1625 p. 8

(La.App. 3 Cir. 6/16/04), 876 So.2d 944, 950. Clearly, a “judicial demand” is a filing

13

in the same judicial proceeding in which judgment is rendered, and the date of judicial

demand is the date demand was made in that suit against a particular party.

Thus, the fact that plaintiff sought arbitration against anyone is irrelevant

because there was no arbitration award. Plaintiff prayed for legal interest from the

date of judicial demand, and that prayer governs the award under the plain wording of

La.Code Civ.P. art. 1921.

I view the law as quite straightforward in this instance; awards of legal interest

in delictual matters submitted to arbitration should only run from the date arbitration

is demanded when an award is made by the arbitrators. Otherwise, and particularly

when the prayer is for legal interest “from the date of judicial demand,” that date

should be fixed as the date suit was filed, which is a true judicial demand.

14