Lynton O. Hester, IV v. Burns Builders

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

CA 17-824

LYNTON O. HESTER, IV

VERSUS

BURNS BUILDERS, ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF RAPIDES, NO. 230,061
HONORABLE THOMAS MARTIN YEAGER, DISTRICT JUDGE

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SYLVIA R. COOKS

JUDGE

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Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, John E. Conery, and Van H. Kyzar, Judges.

RULE RECALLED. APPEAL MAINTAINED.

Harold Alan Murry
Attorney at Law
608 Murray Street
Alexandria, Louisiana 71301
(318) 448-4441
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:
Lynton O. Hester, IV

Wade Thomas Visconte
All American Law Firm
401 Edwards Street, #2100
Shreveport, Louisiana 71101
(318) 918-1245
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Malcolm L. Burns d/b/a Burns Builders

Karl H. Schmid
Degan, Blanchard & Nash
400 Poydras Street, Suite 2600
New Orleans, Louisiana 70130
(504) 529-3333
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Gemini Insurance Company

Lynton O. Hester, IV
2517 Avenue B
Alexandria, Louisisna71301
(318) 442-5667
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:
IN PROPER PERSON

COOKS, JUDGE.

This court issued, sua sponte, a rule ordering the Plaintiff-Appellant, Lynton

O. Hester, IV, to show cause, by brief only, why the appeal in this case should not

be dismissed for having been taken from a partial final judgment which has not

been designated immediately appealable pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art. 1915(B).

For the reasons assigned, we hereby recall the rule and maintain the appeal.

Plaintiff and Defendant, Malcolm L. Burns d/b/a Burns Builders, entered

into a contract for Defendant to build Plaintiff a new home in Rapides Parish. The

initial contract price was $303,287.00; however, pursuant to an addendum to the

contract, the contract price was increased to $322,287.00. Plaintiff made the first

three installment payments that were due under the home construction contract.

However, because Plaintiff was dissatisfied with the quality of Defendant’s work

at the trim stage of construction, Plaintiff refused to tender a scheduled payment

for that stage of construction. After the parties were unable to reach an agreement

regarding correction of the alleged construction defects, Plaintiff filed suit against

Defendant seeking damages for breach of contract, defects in construction, and

delay in completion of the home. Defendant filed a reconventional demand

seeking payment of sums that Plaintiff allegedly owed Defendant under the

construction contract.

Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of

Plaintiff’s claims and payment of Defendant’s reconventional demand. On August

30, 2011, the trial court signed a judgment granting Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment. Via that judgment, Plaintiff’s claims for damages and specific

performance under the construction contract were dismissed, and Defendant was

awarded $96,686.10 plus interest for the reconventional demand. Also, a third

party claim which Defendant had filed against Gemini Insurance Company

(Gemini) was reserved.

In 2011, Plaintiff appealed the August 30, 2011 judgment in a prior appeal

which was filed under this court’s docket number 11-1537. In that prior appeal,

this court found that the contract between the parties requires Defendant to fix any

defects in construction and permits Plaintiff to withhold payment if there are any

defects. Hester v. Burns Builders, 11-1537 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/6/12), 92 So.3d 641,

writ denied, 12-1576 (La. 10/12/12), 98 So.3d 875. This court also found that the

question of whether there were defects in the construction is a question of fact that

should be determined by the trier of fact. Id. Therefore, this court reversed the

August 30, 2011 judgment and remanded the case to the trial court. Id.

After the case was remanded to the trial court, Defendant and the third-party

defendant, Gemini, filed a motion for summary judgment seeking to have

Plaintiff’s claims dismissed and to have the residential construction contract

dissolved so that Defendant would owe no future performance under the contract.

On March 30, 2017, the trial court signed a judgment granting summary judgment

and dismissing Plaintiff’s claims but reserving Defendant’s reconventional demand

against Plaintiff and Defendant’s third-party demand against Gemini. Plaintiff

now seeks to appeal that judgment. After the appeal was lodged with this court,

the rule to show cause order was issued requiring Plaintiff to show cause why the

appeal should not be dismissed for having been taken from a partial judgment

which has not been designated immediately appealable pursuant to La.Code Civ.P.

art. 1915(B).

In his response to this court’s rule, Plaintiff takes the position that the instant

appeal should be allowed to proceed because the March 30, 2017 judgment

dismisses all of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant with prejudice. The judgment

is styled, “Partial Judgment,” and it initially appeared to be a partial judgment

under La.Code Civ.P. art. 1915(B). However, upon further review of the record

and judgment at issue, we note that this case does not involve a situation in which

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only some of a particular party’s claims have been dismissed. Instead, the March

30, 2017 judgment, which grants Defendant’s motion for summary judgment,

dismisses all of Plaintiff’s claims in the principal demand but reserves all of the

claims in Defendant’s reconventional demand and in Defendant’s third-party

demand against Gemini. Thus, while the judgment at issue dismisses Plaintiff

from the lawsuit in his capacity as Plaintiff, it does not serve to dismiss Plaintiff in

his capacity as Defendant-in-Reconvention.

This court has previously addressed the application of La.Code Civ.P. art.

1915 in a case wherein principal and incidental demands had been filed but

summary judgment was granted only with regard to the main demand. In Weeks v.

SunStream, Inc., 09-706 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/10/10), 30 So.3d 1163, writ denied, 10-

0577 (La. 06/25/10), 38 So.2d 337, the plaintiff, Adonis Cole Weeks (Weeks), was

injured during the course and scope of his employment as a maintenance mechanic

for Pilgrim’s Pride Corporation (Pilgrim’s). An “arcing explosion” allegedly

occurred when Weeks attempted to re-set a circuit breaker. Weeks filed a

negligence action against SunStream, which is a contractor that provided electrical

services to Pilgrim’s; Northern, which is SunStream’s insurer; Schneider Electric

Engineering Services, L.L.C. (Schneider); and Square D, which is the

manufacturer of the breaker. Schneider was dismissed from the case on an

exception of no cause of action. Pilgrim’s filed an intervention action against

SunStream, Northern, Schneider, and Square D. SunStream and Northern filed a

motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of Weeks’ claims against them on

the ground that Weeks had no evidence to prove the issues of causation and breach

of duty.

The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment and dismissed

Weeks’ claims against SunStream and Northern. Weeks’ principal demand against

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Square D and Pilgrim’s intervention action remained pending in the trial court.

Weeks appealed the judgment granting the motion for summary judgment.

Seeking to have the appeal dismissed, SunStream and Northern argued that

the judgment at issue in that case was a partial final judgment under La.Code Civ.P.

art. 1915(B) and that the appeal was not properly before this court because the

judgment had not been designated immediately appealable. On the other hand,

Weeks argued that designation was not required. This court held as follows:

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1915(A) provides
that “[a] final judgment may be rendered and signed by the court,
even though it may not grant the successful party or parties all of the
relief prayed for, or may not adjudicate all of the issues in the case.”
We find that the judgment at issue is a final judgment under La.Code
Civ.P. art. 1915(A)(1) and (3), rather than a partial judgment under
1915(B), because it disposes of Weeks’ entire claim against
SunStream and Northern. No designation is necessary under La.Code
Civ.P. art. 1911, which provides that “[a]n appeal may be taken from
a final judgment under Article 1915(A) without the judgment being so
designated.” This is not a situation where the summary judgment
does not dispose of the entire case under La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(E).
That SunStream and Northern remain in the suit as defendants-in-
intervention is of no moment because the summary judgment
dismissed all of Weeks’ claims against them in the principal demand.

Weeks, 30 So.3d at 1165 (footnote omitted).

Following the reasoning and holding set forth by this court in Weeks, 30

So.3d 1163, we find that the judgment at issue in the instant case does not

constitute a partial judgment under La.Code Civ.P. art. 1915(B). Rather, we find

that the March 30, 2017 judgment, which dismisses Plaintiff’s principal demand,

falls under La.Code Civ.P. art. 1915(A)(1) and (3). Pursuant to 1915(A)(1) and

(3), even if all of the claims in a case have not been adjudicated, a judgment is

deemed final if it “[d]ismisses the suit as to less than all of the parties, defendants,

third party plaintiffs, third party defendants, or intervenors” or “[g]rants a motion

for summary judgment, as provided by Articles 966 through 969, but not including

a summary judgment granted pursuant to Article 966(E).” Louisiana Code of Civil

Procedure Article 966(E), in pertinent part, provides that “[a] summary judgment

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may be rendered dispositive of a particular issue, theory of recovery, cause of

action, or defense, in favor of one or more parties, even though the granting of the

summary judgment does not dispose of the entire case as to that party or parties.”

In the instant case, the March 30, 2017 judgment falls under La.Code Civ.P. art.

1915(A)(3) because it grants Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and

disposes of Plaintiff’s principal demand in its entirety, rather than granting

summary judgment as to particular issues as contemplated by La.Code Civ.P. art.

966. We find that the judgment also falls 1915(A)(1) because it dismisses Plaintiff

from the lawsuit in his capacity as Plaintiff. This finding is not affected by the fact

that the Plaintiff remains in the lawsuit in the capacity of the Defendant-in-

Reconvention. See Weeks, 30 So.3d 1163.

Having determined that the judgment at issue in this appeal is a final

judgment under La.Code Civ.P. art. 1915(A), we find that there is no need for the

judgment to be designated immediately appealable. See La.Code Civ.P. art.

1911(B). Therefore, we hereby recall the rule and maintain the appeal.

RULE RECALLED. APPEAL MAINTAINED.

This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION.
Rules 2-16.2 and 2-16.3, Uniform Rules, Courts of Appeal.

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