Shirlene Britt v. Riceland Petroleum Company

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

17-941

SHIRLENE BRITT, ET AL.

VERSUS

RICELAND PETROLEUM COMPANY, ET AL.

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTY-FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON DAVIS, NO. C-0397-14
HONORABLE EDWARD J. GAIDRY, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX
CHIEF JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, John D. Saunders, and
Elizabeth A. Pickett, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Alan David Ezkovich
Ezkovich & Co., LLC
650 Poydras Street - Suite 1220
New Orleans, LA 70130
Telephone: (504) 593-9899
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendant/Appellant - Mt. Hawley Insurance Company

Stephen Douglas Baker
Law Office of Stephen Baker
412 West University Avenue – Suite 101
Lafayette, LA 70506
Telephone: (337) 235-8298
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendant/Appellee - Riceland Petroleum Company

Sidney Wallis Degan, III
Catherine N. Thigpen
Degan, Blanchard & Nash
400 Poydras Street, Suite 2600
New Orleans, LA 70130
Telephone: (504) 529-3333
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendant/Appellee - Evanston Insurance Company

Chad Ellis Mudd
David Paul Bruchhaus
Michael Keith Prudhomme
Matthew P. Keating
Mudd & Bruchhaus, L.L.C.
410 East College Street
Lake Charles, LA 70605
Telephone: (337) 562-2327
COUNSEL FOR:
Plaintiffs/Appellees – C. W. Britt, Norma Jean Broussard, Michael D
Meche, Barbara Britt, Beulah Britt Meche, Shirlene Britt, Joyce Britt
Doherty, and Jeffrey Meche

Eric Earl Jarrell
King, Krebs & Jurgens, PLLC
201 St. Charles Avenue – Suite 4500
New Orleans, LA 70170
Telephone: (504) 582-3814
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendant/Appellee – Conoco Phillips Company

John William Hite, III
Salley, Hite, Mercer & Resor, LLC
One Canal Place
365 Canal Street - Suite 1710
New Orleans, LA 70130
Telephone: (504) 566-8800
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendant/Appellant - United National Insurance Company

Robert Michael Kallam
Preis PLC
P. O. Drawer 94-C
Lafayette, LA 70509
Telephone: (337) 237-6062
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendant/Appellee - Riceland Petroleum Company

Céleste D. Elliott
Anne E. Briard
Lugenbuhl, Wheaton, Peck, Rankin and Hubbard
601 Poydras Street – Suite 2775
New Orleans, LA 70130
Telephone: (504) 568-1990
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendants/Appellants - Northfield Insurance Company, St. Paul Fire
and Marine Insurance Company, and St. Paul Surplus Lines Insurance
Company

Thear J. Lemoine
Brown Sims
1100 Poydras Street - 39th Floor
New Orleans, LA 70163
Telephone: (504) 569-1007
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendant/Appellee - Westchester Fire Insurance Company

Kelly B. Becker
Kathryn Z. Gonski
Liskow & Lewis
One Shell Square
701 Poydras Street - Suite 5000
New Orleans, LA 70139-5099
Telephone: (504) 581-7979
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendant/Appellee - BP America Production Company

Penny L. Malbrew
Liskow & Lewis
P. O. Box 52008
Lafayette, LA 70505-2008
Telephone: (337) 232-7424
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendant/Appellee - BP America Production Company

Jonathan B. Womack
Taylor Wellons Politz & Duhe, APLC
1515 Poydras Street – Suite 1900
New Orleans, LA 70112
Telephone: (504) 525-9888
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendant/Appellant - Commerical Union Assurance Company PLC

Ross J. Donnes
Talbot, Carmouche & Marcello
17405 Perkins Road
Baton Rouge, LA 70810
Telephone: (225) 400-9991
COUNSEL FOR:
Plaintiffs/Appellees – C. W. Britt, Barbara Britt, Norma Jean
Broussard, Jeffrey Meche, Michael D Meche, Shirlene Britt, Joyce Britt
Doherty, and Beulah Britt Meche

Cory T. Stuart
Larzelere Picou Wells Simpson
3850 North Causeway Boulevard – Suite 110
Metairie, LA 70002
Telephone: (504) 834-6500
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendant/Appellee - Gotham Insurance Company

Margaret V. Glass
Gieger, Laborde & Laperouse, LLC
One Shell Square
701 Poydras Street – Suite 4800
New Orleans, LA 70139-4800
Telephone: (504) 561-0400
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendant/Appellant - Lexington Insurance Company

THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge.

In this legacy lawsuit governed by La.R.S. 30:29 (Act 312), several

landowners (plaintiffs) 1 sued Riceland Petroleum Company (Riceland) and BP

America Production Company (BP), seeking remediation of their property

contaminated by historical oil and gas operations conducted by the defendants.

Riceland subsequently filed a third-party demand against several of its insurers

(Certain Insurers),2 all of whom denied coverage. The plaintiffs eventually settled

all their claims against Riceland and BP and provided notice to the Louisiana

Department of Natural Resources (LDNR) and the Attorney General (AG) of the

settlement, as required by La.R.S. 30:29(J)(1). Receiving no objection therefrom,

the plaintiffs moved for the trial court’s approval, which the court ultimately

granted after a hearing. Interpreting the provisions of La.R.S. 30:29(J), we find

that all of the requirements for approval of the settlement herein have been

satisfied. Finding no legal error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

I.

ISSUES

Certain Insurers ask this court to decide:

(1) whether the trial court erroneously applied the law
by failing to determine whether remediation is
required prior to signing the Judgment for

1
The plaintiffs are Shirlene Britt, Barbara Britt, C. W. Britt, Norma Jean Broussard, Joyce
Britt Doherty, Michael D. Meche, Beulah Britt Meche, Jeffrey Meche, Linda F. Smith, Marjorie
Britt Morvant, Kelly Britt Layman, William John Britt, Terri S. Britt, Kyle Reed, Barbara S.
Morgan, Helen Morgan Shipman, John M. Suggs, Dwight J. Hollier, Mary R. Hollier, Matthew
E. Miller, Douglas E. Miller, and MPIC, L.L.C.
2
Certain Insurers are St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company, St. Paul Surplus Lines
Insurance Company, Northfield Insurance Company, Lexington Insurance Company, United
National Insurance Company, Mt. Hawley Insurance Company, and Commercial Union
Assurance Company PLC.

Approval of Settlement in this case governed by
Act 312; and,

(2) if remediation is necessary in this case governed
by Act 312, whether the trial court erroneously
signed the Judgment for Approval of Settlement
without monies being deposited into the registry of
the court?3

II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This matter involves property contamination caused by historic oil

and gas operations conducted on or near a tract of land located in Jefferson Davis

Parish. On June 25, 2014, the plaintiffs filed suit against Riceland and BP, as the

current and former operators, seeking damages for and remediation of the

contamination. Riceland, in turn, filed a third-party demand against Certain

Insurers, seeking indemnity, contribution, payment of attorneys’ fees, defense

costs, and other expenses available under the applicable insurance policies issued

to Riceland. Certain Insurers answered the third-party demand, denying coverage

under any of the applicable policies.

After nearly three years of litigation, the plaintiffs, BP, and Riceland

(settling parties) reached a compromise to resolve all of the plaintiffs’ claims

against BP and Riceland. As part of the settlement agreement, BP and Riceland

agreed to remediate the property in accordance with state regulatory standards. In

addition, Riceland assigned to the plaintiffs its rights, causes of action, claims, or

abilities to recover against Certain Insurers under any applicable insurance

3
Certain Insurers also raise an issue as to the trial court’s suggestion, made during the
hearing, that these insurers may not have standing to raise the Act 312 requirements. We note
with significance, however, that the trial court made no such finding and nothing to that effect is
included in the judgment on appeal. Therefore, we pretermit any discussion of this issue, which
is not dispositive of the matter before us.

2

contracts, while reserving its rights to recover against Certain Insurers for unpaid

attorneys’ fees, expert fees, and expenses incurred prior to the effective date of the

settlement.

On April 28, 2017, the settling parties provided notice and a redacted

copy of the settlement agreement to the LDNR and the AG, pursuant to the express

requirements of La.R.S. 30:29(J). Thereafter, the LDNR issued a letter to the trial

court on May 15, 2017, indicating that it had no objection to the settlement. The

plaintiffs then moved for court approval of the settlement, which the trial court

initially granted on May 25, 2017.

Subsequently, Certain Insurers requested a conference with the trial

court, claiming that the court’s approval of the settlement failed to comply with

La.R.S. 30:29(J) because the trial court failed to: (1) hold a contradictory hearing;

(2) determine if remediation was required; and if so, (3) order the deposit of funds

into the court registry. On June 1, 2017, the trial court held a telephone conference

with the parties and agreed, at Certain Insurers’ request, to hold a contradictory

hearing on June 9, 2017. Prior to that hearing, Certain Insurers filed a “response”

to the plaintiffs’ motion for approval of the settlement agreement and, in the

alternative, a motion for new trial and/or for reconsideration.

From the outset, Certain Insurers always maintained that they did not

object to the terms of the settlement. Rather, their sole argument was that La.R.S.

30:29(J) required that, prior to approval of any settlement agreement, the trial court

had to determine whether remediation of the property was necessary and, if so,

whether BP and Riceland were required to deposit any amount of the settlement

funds into the registry of the court.

3

Rejecting the insurers’ interpretation of La.R.S. 30:29(J), the trial

court approved the settlement, finding the settling parties had complied with the

requirements of La.R.S. 30:29(J). Finding no just reason for delay, the trial court

designated the judgment as final pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art. 1915(B). Certain

Insurers now appeal the judgment of approval but raise no objections to the

proposed settlement per se.

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

An appellate court reviews the approval of a settlement agreement

pursuant to an abuse of discretion standard. Opelousas Gen. Hosp. Auth. v.

Fairpay Sols., Inc., 13-17 (La.App. 3 Cir. 7/3/13), 118 So.3d 1269. A trial court’s

interpretation of a statute, as a question of law, however, is reviewed under the de

novo standard of review. Holly & Smith Architects, Inc. v. St. Helena Congregate

Facility, Inc., 06-582 (La. 11/29/06), 943 So.2d 1037.

IV.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

The primary issue before this court is one of statutory interpretation.

Specifically, we are called upon to interpret the provisions of La.R.S. 30:29(J)(1)

to determine whether its requirements for approval of settlements in legacy

lawsuits have been satisfied in this case.

In applying the general rules of statutory construction, we are mindful

of the following axioms:

The function of statutory interpretation and the
construction given to legislative acts rests with the
judicial branch of the government. Theriot v. Midland

4

Risk Ins. Co., 95-2895 (La.5/20/97), 694 So.2d 184, 186.
The rules of statutory construction are designed to
ascertain and enforce the intent of the Legislature.
Succession of Boyter, 99-0761 (La.1/7/00), 756 So.2d
1122, 1128; State v. Piazza, 596 So.2d 817, 819
(La.1992). Legislation is the solemn expression of
legislative will and, thus, the interpretation of legislation
is primarily the search for the legislative intent. Boyter,
756 So.2d at 1128; Cat’s Meow, Inc. v. City of New
Orleans through Dep’t of Fin., 98-0601 (La.10/20/98),
720 So.2d 1186, 1198. We have often noted the
paramount consideration in statutory interpretation is
ascertainment of the legislative intent and the reason or
reasons which prompted the Legislature to enact the law.
State v. Johnson, 03-2993 (La.10/19/04), 884 So.2d 568,
575; Theriot, 694 So.2d at 186.

The starting point in the interpretation of any
statute is the language of the statute itself. Johnson, 884
So.2d at 575; Theriot, 694 So.2d at 186. “When a law is
clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead
to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as
written and no further interpretation may be made in
search of the intent of the legislature.” La. Civ.Code. art.
9; Johnson, 884 So.2d at 575. However, “when the
language of the law is susceptible of different meanings,
it must be interpreted as having the meaning that best
conforms to the purpose of the law.” La. Civ.Code art.
10; Fontenot v. Reddell Vidrine Water Dist., 02-0439
(La.1/14/03), 836 So.2d 14, 20. Moreover, “when the
words of a law are ambiguous, their meaning must be
sought by examining the context in which they occur and
the text of the law as a whole.” La. Civ.Code art. 12.

M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 07-2371, pp. 12-13 (La. 7/1/08), 998 So.2d

16, 26-27. Courts are further required to construe words and phrases “according to

the common and approved usage of the language” with the additional directive that

the “word ‘shall’ is mandatory and the word ‘may’ is permissive.” La.R.S. 1:3.

As the starting point in our interpretation, we turn now to the language

of La.R.S. 30:29(J)(1), which provides, with emphasis supplied by this court:

In the event that any settlement is reached in a case
subject to the provisions of this Section, the settlement
shall be subject to approval by the court. The department

5

and the attorney general shall be given notice once the
parties have reached a settlement in principle. The
department shall then have no less than thirty days to
review that settlement and comment to the court before
the court certifies the settlement. If after a contradictory
hearing the court requires remediation, the court shall not
certify or approve any settlement until an amount of
money sufficient to fund such remediation is deposited
into the registry of the court. No funding of a settlement
shall occur until the requirements of this Section have
been satisfied. However, the court shall have the
discretion to waive the requirements of this Section if the
settlement reached is for a minimal amount and is not
dispositive of the entire litigation.

A plain reading of these provisions reveals three requirements “shall”

be applicable to all settlements in cases governed by Act 312: (1) the settlement

“shall be subject” to the trial court’s approval (first sentence), but before which;

(2) notice of the settlement “shall be given” to the LDNR and the AG (second

sentence); and, (3) the LDNR and the AG “shall then have” thirty days to review

the settlement and provide any comment to the trial court (third sentence).

Through the use of the term “shall,” the legislature explicitly renders these three

requirements mandatory for all settlements and further prohibits the funding of any

settlement until these requirements “have been satisfied” (fifth sentence).

Contrary to the position of Certain Insurers, however, the remaining

mandatory provisions of the statute only come into play when certain

circumstances are met, such as when (1) a contradictory hearing is held and the

court requires remediation (fourth sentence), or (2) the settlement amount is de

minimis and the settlement does not dispose of the entire matter (final sentence).

In both of these sentences, the use of the conjunction “if” serves as an introduction

to a conditional clause.

6

Under the fourth sentence, “the court shall not certify or approve any

settlement” until sufficient funds for remediation are deposited, but this is only

“[i]f after a contradictory hearing the court requires remediation.” What is

generally understood through the use of the adjective “contradictory” is the

existence of opposing or inconsistent views. In this case, it is on the need for or

extent of remediation. If there is no opposition to or concern for the settlement

raised by either the state actors or another party with a vested interest, then there

would be no corresponding need for a contradictory hearing and determination by

the court on the issue of remediation and the cost thereof. It logically follows,

therefore, that the need for a hearing is triggered by and conditioned upon an

objection to the remediation proposed by the settling parties. In the absence of

such an objection, settling parties need only provide the required notice to the

LDNR and the AG and allow for the time mandated for review, after which time

the settlement is ripe for the court’s approval.

Nevertheless, the final sentence of the statute states that the court

“shall have the discretion,” in any given settlement, to waive the mandatory

requirements in their entirety. But again the exercise of this discretion is

conditioned upon a finding that the settlement amount is minimal and the

settlement “is not dispositive of the entire litigation.”

Under this plain reading of the statutory provisions, we find that

La.R.S. 30:29(J)(1) does not, as Certain Insurers advance, require: (1) a

contradictory hearing; (2) a finding concerning remediation; and, (3) a deposit of

necessary funds for court approval in all settlements under Act 312. We further

find that to read those requirements into the statute would, in effect, expand its

7

provisions beyond the explicit intent of the legislature, which both contemplated

and sought to encourage court-approved settlements in these legacy lawsuits.

With this understanding of the statutory requirements, we turn now to

the issue of whether the trial court legally erred in approving the settlement.

Pursuant to La.R.S. 30:29(J)(1), the settling parties herein had to and did seek court

approval after first providing the LDNR and the AG with notice and allowing

thirty days for their review and comments on the proposed settlement. Because no

one raised any objection to the settlement, all the mandatory requirements for

approval were satisfied, and the trial court acted well within its authority to

approve the settlement at that time.

Notably, no contradictory hearing was necessary for the determination

of whether remediation was, in fact, required in the absence of the triggering

condition, i.e., an objection by the LDNR, the AG, or another interested party.

Even so, the trial court, clearly in an abundance of caution, conducted a hearing, at

Certain Insurers’ request, during which no evidence was introduced concerning the

need for or extent of remediation. At this time, no one has ever contested or

opposed the settlement or the remediation it proposes. Moreover, the settlement

explicitly recognizes the need for remediation, and BP and Riceland expressly

agree to remediate the property in accordance with state regulatory standards. The

public purpose behind the enactment of Act 312 is to ensure

the natural resources and the environment of the state,
including ground water, are to be protected, conserved,
and replenished insofar as possible and consistent with
the health, safety, and welfare of the people and further
mandates that the legislature enact laws to implement this
policy. It is the duty of the legislature to set forth
procedures to ensure that damage to the environment is
remediated to a standard that protects the public interest.

8

La.R.S. 30:29(A). To the extent that BP and Riceland agreed to remediate the

property in accordance with the state regulatory standards, the remediation

proposed by the settlement fully complies with the public policy of this state on

this very issue. This begs the question of what further remediation could have

been necessitated or required by the trial court.

Regardless, given that the settling parties provided the required notice

to the LDNR and AG and waited the necessary time for the LDNR and AG to

comment before seeking approval by the trial court, we find the trial court’s

approval of the settlement was legally sound and affirm its judgment accordingly.

V.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Costs of this appeal are assessed to the Third-Party

Defendants/Appellants.

AFFIRMED.

9