Brandon Wayne Osborn v. Juanita Howington

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

CA 18-68

BRANDON WAYNE OSBORN

VERSUS

JUANITA HOWINGTON

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CONCORDIA, NO. 50837 A
HONORABLE KATHY A. JOHNSON, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

CANDYCE G. PERRET
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Phyllis M. Keaty, and
Candyce G. Perret, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Richard Tracy Conrad, III
Wells Marble & Hurst, PLLC
300 Concourse Blvd, Suite 200
Ridgeland, MS 39157
P. O. Box 131
Jackson, MS 39205
(601) 605-6900
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT:
Brandon Wayne Osborn

Philip Allan LeTard, Sr.
Attorney at Law
109 Carter Street
P. O. Box 187
Vidalia, LA 71373
(318) 336-8990
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE:
Juanita Howington

PERRET, Judge.

This appeal originates from a judgment dissolving a writ of attachment

obtained by Plaintiff-Appellant, Brandon Wayne Osborn (“Mr. Osborn”), against

the Defendant-Appellee, Juanita Howington (“Ms. Howington”), who was also

awarded $2,500.00 in attorney’s fees. The issues on appeal are whether the

attachment was rightfully dissolved and whether the trial court erred in awarding

Ms. Howington attorney’s fees and court costs, or, alternatively, whether those fees

are excessive. For the following reasons we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Facts and Procedural Background:

Mr. Osborn filed a Petition for Writ of Attachment and a Petition for

Revindicatory Action and Damages on August 1, 2017. Mr. Osborn’s Petition for

Revindicatory Action and Damages is not before us. 1 Before this Court is Mr.

Osborn’s Petition for Writ of Attachment. The Petition for Writ of Attachment

alleges that Ms. Howington conspired with her daughter, Keisha, to wrongfully

transfer certain funds that comprise a part of Keisha’s bankruptcy estate from

Keisha to Ms. Howington. Mr. Osborn asserts that Ms. Howington continues to

hold these funds beyond the reach of himself and the bankruptcy trustee and, as a

result, he has suffered damages as sought in his revindicatory action. Mr. Osborn

alleges that Ms. Howington is about to sell her home located in Ferriday,

Louisiana, “which property is connected to the money Keisha fraudulently

transferred to her” before Mr. Osborn can obtain a judgment against Ms.

Howington, and that she is doing so in order to place the money “beyond the reach

1
The Petition for Revindicatory Action seeks damages allegedly caused by Ms.
Howington’s “conspiracy to commit fraud and conversion, and for her continuing fraudulent
activity in secreting, converting or otherwise wrongfully diverting funds belonging to [her
daughter] Keisha’s bankruptcy estate and thereby, defrauding [Mr. Osborn] in the event of a
judgment in his favor in the Madison County action.” Mr. Osborn asserts that Ms. Howington’s
actions have caused him “emotional distress, stress, mental anguish, worry, lost wages,
attorney[’s fees] and other general and special damages in the premises.” Mr. Osborn has claims
against Keisha for damages associated with defamation in Madison County, Mississippi.

of her creditors, including” Mr. Osborn. Mr. Osborn asserts a writ of attachment is

necessary to protect his interests as a judgment creditor in the event he is

successful in his revindicatory action against Ms. Howington. A writ of

attachment was issued on August 3, 2017, and bond set by the trial court at

$7,500.00. Mr. Osborn asserts in brief that he paid the bond on August 18, 2017.2

Mr. Osborn amended both petitions on September 5, 2017, and Ms.

Howington responded by filing a Petition to Release Attachment and a Rule to

Dissolve Attachment four days later. Ms. Howington’s Petition to Release

Attachment asserted that Mr. Osborn does not have a claim to funds that are

potentially the property of Keisha’s bankruptcy estate, and that La.Code Civ.P. art.

3544 requires security for a writ of attachment in the amount of the plaintiff’s

demand, which is $500,000.00 not $7,500.00. Ms. Howington prayed the property

be released upon her furnishing bond in the amount of $7,500.00 in accordance

with La.Code Civ.P. art. 3507, or alternatively, that Mr. Osborn be required to

furnish bond in the amount of $500,000.00.

On the same day, the trial court set the bond on Mr. Osborn’s Amended

Petition for Writ of Attachment at $500,000.00, which has not been paid. The trial

court also set Ms. Howington’s Rule to Dissolve Attachment for a hearing.

At the hearing, the trial court heard the testimony of Ms. Howington, elicited

by the court itself, regarding the home she recently purchased, and is currently

living in, in Winnsboro, Louisiana, as well as the status of her Ferriday property, to

which the writ of attachment is attached. Ms. Howington testified that the

Winnsboro property has an interest only loan on it, that she is trying to sell the

Ferriday property in order to pay for the Winnsboro property, and that the reason

2
The record does not contain documentation of the payment of the $7,500.00 bond by Mr.
Osborn. However, the record does contain an “Order to Release Funds” of $7,500.00 “posted by
the Plaintiff, Brandon Wayne Osborn” signed by the trial court on November 2, 2017.
2

for her move was to be closer to family while she undergoes chemotherapy

treatment. She further testified that she has a buy/sell agreement for the Ferriday

property, but that the attachment prevented the sale from going through. Ms.

Howington testified that any remaining money from the sale of the Ferriday

property would be put into savings or something similar.

Judgment was signed on October 19, 2017, and ordered the attachment

dissolved, awarded Ms. Howington $2,500.00 for attorney’s fees, as well as court

costs associated with the filing of the motion to dissolve and the posting of the

bond, transferred the litigation to the fifth judicial district court, and released the

$7,500.00 bond posted by Ms. Howington. Mr. Osborn appeals and asserts that the

attachment was wrongfully dissolved by the trial court and that the trial court erred

in awarding Ms. Howington attorney’s fees, or, alternatively, that those fees are

excessive. Mr. Osborn appeals only that portion of the judgment dissolving the

attachment and awarding Ms. Howington attorney’s fees.3

Discussion:

A writ of attachment may be dissolved by contradictory motion “unless the

plaintiff proves the grounds upon which the writ was issued.” La.Code Civ.P. art.

3506. Contrary to Mr. Osborn’s assertion, the burden of proof at the hearing on

the motion to dissolve the attachment is on the plaintiff to prove the grounds upon

which the attachment was issued. See Chas. A. Kaufman Co. v. Gregory, 244 La.

766, 154 So.2d 392 (1963); Yorkwood Sav. and Loan Ass’n v. Thomas, 379 So.2d

798 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1980). Specifically, the supreme court in Chas. A. Kaufman

Co., 154 So.2d at 394-95 (citations omitted) explained:

3
This Court previously issued an Order to show cause why the case should not be
dismissed for having been taken from an interlocutory judgment as to venue. That Order was
recalled after Mr. Osborn asserted the appeal is limited to those portions of the judgment which
dissolve the attachment and award attorney’s fees, and that he is not appealing the venue change.

3

Formerly the order and burden of proof upon the trial of a
motion to dissolve required the defendant (the party moving for the
dissolution) to proceed with the presentation of his evidence in an
effort to rebut the prima facie case existing in favor of plaintiff by
virtue of plaintiff’s petition, the supporting affidavits and the order
granting the attachment. Failure to rebut the prima facie case resulted
in the writ of attachment being maintained.

This order of proof and the burden of proof formerly observed
at the trial of a motion to dissolve an attachment have been changed
by the enactment of Article 3506 of the LSA-Code of Civil Procedure
which provides:

‘The defendant by contradictory motion may obtain the
dissolution of a writ of attachment or of sequestration,
unless the plaintiff proves the grounds upon which the
writ was issued.’

Under this new Code of Civil Procedure article it readily
appears that the filing by defendant of a contradictory motion to
dissolve the attachment obliges the party who has petitioned for and
obtained the issuance of the attachment to proceed at the trial of the
motion to dissolve. He must at that time discharge the burden of
proof by establishing the facts alleged as grounds for the issuance of
the writ of attachment. Failure to discharge this burden would entitle
the mover to an order of dissolution.

Therefore, it is Mr. Osborn’s burden to prove that the evidence clearly shows his

right to the attachment “existed at the time the writ was issued.” Am. Steel Bldg.

Co. v. Brezner, 158 So.2d 623, 629 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1963). Additionally, “even

though the surrounding circumstances at the time the writ issues may reasonably

seem to justify the attachment; the attachment will not be sustained if, on trial of

the motion to dissolve it, the evidence shows that in fact the statutory ground for

the attachment did not exist.” Id. at 629-30.

Mr. Osborn sought the present writ of attachment under La.Code Civ.P. art.

3541, which pertinently provides, “A writ of attachment may be obtained when the

defendant: . . . . (3) Has converted or is about to convert his property into money

or evidences of debt, with intent to place it beyond the reach of his creditors[.]”

In the current case, the trial court did not provide detailed oral or written

4

reasons for its ruling. However, the hearing transcript indicates that the trial court

had two reasons for dissolving the attachment. First, the trial court concluded that

Mr. Osborn did not meet his burden of proving that the attachment was properly

granted. Second, the trial court explained that dissolving the attachment was

proper because the court had increased the bond and bond was never posted. We

agree.

The trial court’s finding that Mr. Osborn did not prove the attachment was

properly granted is a factual finding subject to the manifest error standard of

review on appeal. Teche Elec. Supply, Inc. v. D.W. William, Inc., 00-1139

(La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 780 So.2d 474. On the other hand, the trial court’s

determination that the attachment is dissolved for the failure to post bond requires

the application of La.Code Civ.P. arts. 3544 and 3501. Errors of law and questions

of law are reviewed by the appellate court under the de novo standard of review.

Land v. Vidrine, 10-1342 (La. 3/15/11), 62 So.3d 36.

The trial court found that Mr. Osborn failed to meet his burden of proving

the attachment was properly granted. Mr. Osborn asserts that Ms. Howington’s

testimony that a buy/sell agreement for the Ferriday property exists is proof that

she is attempting to convert this asset into money. But, Mr. Osborn must also

prove Ms. Howington is converting this asset “with the intent to place it beyond

the reach of [her] creditors[.]” La.Code Civ.P. art. 3541(3).

In order to prove fraudulent intent, the acts and declarations of the
debtor, as well as the surrounding circumstances, may be shown, since
intent, which is subjective, can only be proved by objective signs. It
is well settled that an actual fraudulent intent must exist on the part of
the debtor. Mere appearances are not sufficient, even though the
conduct of the debtor may indicate an intent to defraud.4

Douglas Pub. Serv. Corp. v. Leon, 200 So. 21, 22-23 (La.1941).
4
Douglas Public Service Corp., 200 So. 21, discussed the requirement of intent in
reference to both subsections (2) and (3) of Louisiana Code of Practice article 240, of which
subsection (3) is now substantially reproduced in La.Code Civ.P. art. 3541(A)(3).
5

At the hearing, the trial court heard argument regarding Mr. Osborn’s

allegations that Ms. Howington participated in a fraud of the bankruptcy court,

which allegedly caused Mr. Osborn to sustain damages. Copies of the petitions

involving the fraud allegations in the bankruptcy court are part of the record.

Ms. Howington testified that she is trying to sell the Ferriday property in

order to pay for the interest only loan on the Winnsboro property, and that the

reason for her move was to be closer to her family while she undergoes

chemotherapy treatment. Although Mr. Osborn suggests he was not given the

opportunity to put on proof in support of the attachment, a reading of the transcript

shows that, despite the fact that the trial court moved the hearing along, Mr.

Osborn’s counsel did not make any attempt to inform the court of additional

evidence he had in support of the attachment and that he was given an opportunity

to do so.

The trial court was not convinced that Ms. Howington is attempting to sell

her Ferriday property with the intent to place it beyond the reach of Mr. Osborn,

nor are we. Based on the record, we cannot say that the trial court was manifestly

erroneous in finding that Mr. Osborn failed to carry his burden in proving the

grounds upon which the attachment was issued.

The trial court also found that Mr. Osborn’s failure to furnish bond requires

the dissolution of the attachment. We agree. Mr. Osborn does not argue that he

was not required to furnish an increased bond. Additionally, at the trial court level

he did not argue that he was not required to furnish the increased bond, but instead

argued that the Petition for Revindicatory Action did not specify an amount of

damages and instead requests a more reasonable bond be set.

“The security required for the issuance of a writ of attachment shall be for

the amount of the plaintiff’s demand, exclusive of interest and costs.” La.Code
6

Civ.P. art. 3544. “The applicant shall furnish security as required by law for the

payment of damages the defendant may sustain when the writ is obtained

wrongfully.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 3501. “[A] creditor praying for a writ of

attachment must, among other things, give bond before the writ is issued. . . . it

has been repeatedly held that the legal prerequisites must be fully complied with

under pain of nullity.” Lee v. Lee, 38 So.2d 66, 69 (La.1948).5

Although Mr. Osborn’s amended revindicatory action did not pray for a

specified amount of damages, his amended writ of attachment set forth damages in

the amount of $500,000.00. The trial court set the bond for $500,000.00, which

Mr. Osborn did not furnish. After a de novo review, we find Mr. Osborn failed to

furnish bond after the bond amount was increased. We agree that such failure

requires the dissolution of the attachment.

Next, we must determine whether the trial court properly awarded attorney’s

fees for dissolving the attachment or whether the amount awarded was excessive.

We review the reasonableness of attorney’s fees awarded under La.Code Civ.P. art.

3506 for abuse of discretion. See Brawley v. Montgomery, 177 So.2d 317 (La.App.

1 Cir. 1965). If a writ of attachment was wrongfully issued, the court may allow

damages: “Attorney’s fees for the services rendered in connection with the

dissolution of the writ may be included as an element of damages[.]” La.Code

Civ.P. art. 3506.

Where a plaintiff sues out a [sic] writ of attachment in the
honest belief that it is necessary for the protection of its rights, it
seems rather unfortunate that it must be held liable for the payment of
damages. But the writ of attachment is an extremely harsh remedy,
and, when a party makes use of this powerful legal weapon he must be
ready to respond in damages if it be found that the writ was
wrongfully used.
5
Although Lee was decided under Article 245 of the Code of Practice, no substantive
change was made under the new Code of Civil Procedure. La.Code Civ.P. arts. 3501 cmt (a) and
3544 cmt (a).

7

Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Sneed, 167 La. 432, 445, 119 So. 417, 445

(1928).

Mr. Osborn argues attorney’s fees are not warranted because the attachment

should not have been dissolved, so no attorney’s fees are due, and that the amount

awarded is arbitrary and without evidentiary support. In regards to the dissolution

work, Ms. Howington’s counsel, Mr. Philip Letard, Sr., stated at the hearing: “But,

$2500 is what I’ve Asked the Court and that’s what I charged them to ask that the

petition to be dissolved[.]” Mr. Letard prepared and filed a Petition to Release

Attachment as well a Rule to Dissolve Attachment, tried the rule at a hearing, and

has prepared an opposition in this court. “All the work done by counsel was under

the eyes of the trial judge, whose opinion as to value of services of this kind is

entitled to great weight.” Douglas Pub. Serv., 200 So. 21 at 25. The trial court

accepted $2,500.00 as a fair amount. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial

court’s valuation of attorney’s fees.

Ms. Howington also requests this court award additional attorney’s fees for

appellate work. However, Ms. Howington did not file an answer to the appeal and,

therefore, this issue is not properly before this court. See La.Code Civ.P. art. 2133;

Thibodeaux v. Kaufman Trailers, Inc., 12-885 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/6/13), 108 So. 3d

1283.

Conclusion:

For the reasons articulated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Costs of this appeal are assessed against Plaintiff-Appellant, Brandon Osborn.

AFFIRMED.

This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION.
Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-16.3.

8