Marilyn Clark v. State of Louisiana, Department of Transportation and Development

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

18-73
GAYNELWYN SONNIER

VERSUS

STATE OF LOUISIANA, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND
DEVELOPMENT
Consolidated With

18-74
MARILYN CLARK

VERSUS

STATE OF LOUISIANA, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, ET AL.

Consolidated With

18-75
ELWOOD SONNIER

VERSUS

THE UNOPENED SUCCESSION OF LACY N. JOHNSON, ET AL.

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTY-THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ALLEN, NOS. C-2007-190, C-2007-186 & C-2007-188
HONORABLE ERROL DAVID DESHOTELS, JR., DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX
CHIEF JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Marc T. Amy, and
Elizabeth A. Pickett, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Stacey Allen Moak
Special Assistant Attorney General
P. O. Box 77651
Baton Rouge, LA 70879-7651
Telephone: (225) 751-6300
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendant/Appellee – State of Louisiana, Department of Transportation
and Development

Dorwan G. Vizzier
Broussard, Halcomb & Vizzier
P. O. Box 11875
Alexandria, LA 71315
Telephone: (318) 487-4589
COUNSEL FOR:
Plaintiff/Appellant – Gaynelwyn Sonnier

Judi F. Abrusley
P. O. Box 1114
Oakdale, LA 71463
Telephone: (318) 335-9771
COUNSEL FOR:
Plaintiff/Appellee – Marilyn Clark

THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge.

The plaintiff, Gaynelwyn Sonnier, appeals interlocutory judgments

limiting her experts’ testimony, along with a final judgment memorializing the

jury’s verdict in favor of the defendant, State of Louisiana, Department of

Transportation and Development (DOTD), involving a single vehicle accident

caused by an allegedly defective highway. Finding no abuse of discretion on the

part of the trial judge and no manifest error on the part of the jury, we affirm the

judgments of the trial court.

I.

ISSUES

We must decide:

(1) whether the trial court abused its discretion in
limiting the testimony of traffic experts Duaine
Evans and Douglas Robert, precluding their
opinions on “unreasonable risk of harm”; and

(2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in
limiting the testimony of traffic experts Duaine
Evans and Douglas Robert, precluding their
opinions on whether a 1949 DOTD project was a
“major construction”; and

(3) whether the jury manifestly erred in finding that
the accident site did not have defects that created
an unreasonable risk of harm.

II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case involves a tragic accident on Louisiana Highway 10 in

Allen Parish near Oakdale. Two young women in their early twenties were killed

when their vehicle failed to navigate a curve in the road, traveled across the

opposing lane and its shoulder, and hit a tree stump in the ditch opposite their lane

of travel. The driver of the vehicle was Lacy Johnson. Her passenger was Breann

Sonnier. Breann Sonnier’s mother, Gaynelwyn Sonnier, filed suit against the

DOTD, alleging faulty construction and maintenance of the roadway and the ditch.

Breann Sonnier’s father, Elwood Sonnier, and Lacy Johnson’s mother, Marilyn

Clark, filed similar suits. The three suits were consolidated.1 Prior to trial, the

suits of Marilyn Clark and Elwood Sonnier were settled.

Also prior to trial, the trial court made interlocutory rulings on various

motions in limine, two of which precluded the plaintiff’s traffic experts from

giving opinions on whether a DOTD project was a “major reconstruction” and on

whether the subject roadway created an “unreasonable risk of harm” for drivers.

The court also ruled that a lab report would be admitted at trial showing that Lacy

Johnson had a 0.10% blood alcohol concentration (BAC) at the time of her death.

Following an eight-day jury trial, the jury rendered a verdict finding

that the roadway at issue did not contain defects creating an unreasonable risk of

harm for drivers. The plaintiff, Gaynelwyn Sonnier, appeals the trial court’s

interlocutory judgments 2 limiting the testimony of her experts for trial, and she

appeals the final judgment dismissing her suit based upon the jury verdict in favor

of the DOTD. She asks this court to reverse those rulings, allocate fault between

1
The three consolidated suits are Gaynelwyn Sonnier v. State of Louisiana, Department of
Transportation and Development, trial docket no. C-2007-190, appeal no. 18-73; Marilyn Clark
v. State of Louisiana, Department of Transportation and Development, et al., trial docket no. C-
2007-186, appeal no. 18-74; Elwood Sonnier v. The Unopened Succession of Lacy N. Johnson, et
al., trial docket no. C-2007-188, appeal no. 18-75.
2
“Although an interlocutory judgment may itself not be appealable, it is nevertheless
subject to review on appeal when a final, appealable judgment has been rendered in the case.”
Hayward v. Hayward, 12-720, p. 7 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/18/13), 182 So.3d 966, 970.

2

the driver and the DOTD, and award damages to her between $500,000 and

$3,000,000 for the loss of her daughter Breann.

III.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A trial court has great discretion in evidentiary matters, and its

decisions regarding motions in limine are reviewed using the abuse of discretion

standard. See Scott v. Dauterive Hosp. Corp., 02-1364 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/23/03),

851 So.2d 1152, writ denied, 03-2005 (La. 10/31/03), 857 So.2d 487; see also

Heller v. Nobel Ins. Group, 00-261 (La. 2/2/00), 753 So.2d 841.

The long-standing standard for appellate review of jury

determinations of fact was set forth in Mart v. Hill, 505 So.2d 1120 (La.1987).

There, the court established a two-part test for the reversal of a factfinder’s

determinations: (1) The appellate court must find from the record that a reasonable

factual basis does not exist for the finding of the trial court, and (2) determine that

the record establishes that the trial court’s finding is clearly wrong (manifestly

erroneous). Id.

“[T]he issue to be resolved by a reviewing court is not whether the

trier of fact was right or wrong, but whether the factfinder’s conclusion was a

reasonable one.” Stobart v. State through DOTD, 617 So.2d 880, 882 (La.1993).

Additionally, “the reviewing court must always keep in mind that ‘if the trial court

or jury’s findings are reasonable in light of the record reviewed in its entirety, the

court of appeal may not reverse, even if convinced that had it been sitting as the

trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently.’” Id. at 882-83

(quoting Housley v. Cerise, 579 So.2d 973, 976 (La.1991)).

3

IV.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

The 1999 version of La.R.S. 48:35, which applies to this 2006

accident, imposes a duty upon DOTD “to maintain, repair, construct, or reconstruct

any public road, highway, bridge, or street, or portion thereof in a manner that is

not unreasonably dangerous for a reasonably prudent driver.” Specifically, this is

the language from La.R.S. 48:35(F)(1)(a)3 which was newly-enacted law in 1999,

along with subparagraphs (G) through (I).

The newly-enacted law from La.R.S. 48:35(F) through (I) was

promulgated from Section 1 of Act. No. 1223, originating with Senate Bill 858 of

the regular legislative session of 1999. Louisiana Revised Statutes 48:35(F)(1)(b)

provided that when a public road is maintained or constructed according to the

standards in place at the time, there “shall be a presumption” that the road was

maintained or constructed in a “reasonably safe condition.” Louisiana Revised

Statutes 48:35(F)(1)(c) provided that when a public road does not conform to

standards adopted “subsequent to” the approval of the maintenance or construction,

“such nonconformity shall not render any such public road . . . unreasonably

dangerous or defective.” Louisiana Revised Statutes 48:35(F)(2) provided that

“[w]hen determining whether or not an unreasonably dangerous condition exists . .

. if a standard, regulation, or guideline is not directly applicable to the

maintenance, repair, construction, or reconstruction, then evidence of failure to

adhere to such standard . . . shall not be admissible in a court proceeding for any

purpose.”

3
It is now La.R.S. 48:35(E)(1)(a).

4

Louisiana Revised Statutes 48:35(G) provided that the “provisions of

this Section shall not affect the requirement” that the DOTD “prioritize the repair,

maintenance, construction, or reconstruction of public roads . . . based on the need

for repair” beginning with those “most in need” and ending with those “least in

need” pursuant to “the priority program set forth in R.S. 48:228 through 233.”

Louisiana Revised Statutes 48:35(H) provided that the above priority program was

an administrative process and did not create “an independent cause of action for

personal injury or property damage.” Louisiana Revised Statutes 48:35(I)

provided that the provisions of Section 1 “shall not apply to regulations affecting

the installation or design of signs imposed by the United States Department of

Transportation.”

Section 2 of Act 1223 stated that “[t]he provisions of this Act are

intended to legislatively overrule that portion of Aucoin v. State Through the Dept.

of Transp. And Development, 97-1938 (La. 4/24/98), 712 So.2d 62, which imposes

liability on the [DOTD] for failing to maintain and/or reconstruct an existing

highway to modern standards.”4

DOTD has a duty to maintain the public roadways,
including adjacent shoulders and areas in the DOTD’s
right-of-way, in a condition that is reasonably safe and
does not present an unreasonable risk of harm to the
motoring public exercising ordinary care and reasonable
prudence. Campbell v. State, Through Depart. of
Transportation and Development, 1994-1052, p. 6
(La.1/17/95), 648 So.2d 898, 901-902; Brown v.
Louisiana Indem. Co., 1997-1344 p. 3 (La.3/4/98), 707
So.2d 1240, 1242; Oster v. Dept. of Transp. &
Development, 582 So.2d 1285, 1289-91 (La.1991). This
duty, however, does not render DOTD the guarantor for
4
In the partially overruled Aucoin, the supreme court had affirmed the trial court’s finding
that the road at issue was unreasonably dangerous because of the combination of dangerous
defects that DOTD allowed to accumulate on an older highway, including a drop off shoulder, a
nonrecoverable sloping, and limited horizontal clearance. There, the trial court had also found
that DOTD “failed to prioritize proper maintenance.” Id. at 64.

5

the safety of all of the motoring public or the insurer for
all injuries or damages resulting from any risk posed by
obstructions on or defects in the roadway or its
appurtenances. Netecke v. State ex rel. DOTD, 1998-
1182, 1998-1197 p. 8 (La.10/19/99), 747 So.2d 489, 495.
Further, this court has held that DOTD’s failure to design
or maintain the state’s highways to modern standards
does not establish the existence of a hazardous defect in
and of itself. Myers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
493 So.2d 1170, 1173 (La.1986). Whether DOTD has
breached its duty to the public depends on all the facts
and circumstances determined on a case by case basis.
Campbell, 1994-[1052,] p. 6, 648 So.2d at 901-902.

Forbes v. Cockerham, 08-762 (La. 1/21/09), 5 So.3d 839, 858-59.

A reviewing court should afford considerable
weight to an administrative agency’s construction and
interpretation of its rules and regulations adopted under a
statutory scheme that the agency is entrusted to
administer, and its construction and interpretation should
control unless they are found to be arbitrary, capricious,
or manifestly contrary to its rules and regulations. See,
Dixie Electric Membership Corp. v. Louisiana Public
Service Comm’n., 441 So.2d 1208, 1211 (La.1983); see,
also, In the Matter of Recovery I, Inc., 1993-0441
(La.App. 1st Cir.4/8/94), 635 So.2d 690, 696, writ
denied, 1994-1232 (La.7/1/94), 639 So.2d 1169.

....

This court has previously described the
unreasonable risk of harm criterion as a guide in
balancing the likelihood and magnitude of harm against
the social utility of the thing, all the while considering a
broad range of social and economic factors, including the
cost to the defendant of avoiding the harm, as well as the
risk and the social utility of the party’s conduct at the
time of the accident. Netecke, 1998-1182, 1998-1197 p.
14–15, 747 So.2d at 498. In every determination, all the
circumstances surrounding the particular accident under
review must be considered to determine whether
DOTD’s legal duty encompassed the risk which caused
the plaintiff’s damages. Oster, 582 So.2d at 1289.

Id. at 859-60.

The highway department’s duty to maintain safe
shoulders encompasses the foreseeable risk that for any

6

number of reasons, including simple inadvertence, a
motorist might find himself traveling on, or partially on,
the shoulder. Id. This duty extends to drivers who are
slightly exceeding the speed limit or momentarily
inattentive. Ledbetter v. State, Through Louisiana Dept.
of Transp. and Development, 502 So.2d 1383 (La.1987).
As to the area off the shoulder of the road, but within the
right of way, DOTD owes a duty to maintain the land in
such a condition that it does not present an unreasonable
risk of harm to motorists using the adjacent roadway or
to others, such as pedestrians, who are using the area in a
reasonably prudent manner. Oster v. Department of
Transp. and Development, State of La., 582 So.2d 1285
(La.1991) (where off road motorcyclist hit a drainage
ditch within DOTD’s right of way, DOTD not liable
because DOTD has no duty to maintain every inch of
property within its control neatly mowed or face the
prospect of tort liability).

Cormier v. Comeaux, 98-2378, p. 7 (La. 7/7/99), 748 So.2d 1123, 1127.

Plaintiff’s Experts and Unreasonable Risk of Harm

Ms. Sonnier contends that the trial court erred in excluding the

opinions of her professional engineering experts, Duaine Evans, P.E., and Douglas

Robert, P.E., on the narrow issue of whether the road contained a defect creating

an “unreasonable risk of harm” for reasonably prudent drivers. It should be noted

at this point that Mr. Evans and Mr. Robert did provide testimony regarding their

opinions that the roadway contained defects. Mr. Evans testified that the ten-foot

travel lanes were too narrow; that the two-foot-wide shoulders should have been

four feet wide; that the foreslope of the ditch was too steep at 1:1 and should have

been 1:3 to allow a vehicle to recover after leaving the pavement; and that the

stump “at the toe of the slope” was an impermissible obstruction.

However, Mr. Evans, who was testifying as an expert in traffic

engineering and accident reconstruction, did not reconstruct the accident; he did

not inspect the vehicle or perform a damage and crash analysis of the vehicle; he

7

did not calculate what path the vehicle would have taken if the shoulders had been

wider and flatter, or where the vehicle might have gone if it had not hit the stump.

He relied heavily on the police report regarding the stump as causing all of the

vehicle’s damage and regarding where the vehicle left the road. He thought the

police report said the driver was traveling almost parallel to the road when the left

tires left the pavement causing him to opine that she was “following the curve”

with no loss of control and still inputting steering, even though she was going

eastbound in the westbound lane when she left the road and entered the shoulder.

Mr. Evans opined that the opposing shoulders were designed to benefit even

drivers who crossed the opposing lane to access the shoulder driving in the wrong

direction, and he denied the characterization that the driver actually had twelve feet

of width, ten feet of travel lane width and two feet of shoulder width, to correct her

path after crossing the center line.

The trial court permitted all of Mr. Evans’s testimony except for a few

pages from his total deposition of over 160 pages. The reasoning of Judge Cole

that was adopted by Judge Deshotels was in part to preclude the terminology

“unreasonably dangerous” or “unreasonable risk of harm” because that language

constitutes the legal test to be decided by the jury. The plaintiff asserts that this

was error, quoting La.Code Evid. art. 704, which states:

Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference
otherwise admissible is not to be excluded solely because
it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of
fact. However, in a criminal case, an expert witness shall
not express an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the
accused.

Here, the trial court had multiple reasons for limiting Mr. Evans’s

testimony which involved keeping his testimony within the bounds of his expertise.

8

[T]he Court is accepting Mr. Evans as an expert in the
field of traffic engineering. He is not an expert in the
fields of highway engineering, construction, or design, or
human factors engineering. And he wasn’t proffered as
that.

....

Whether the State has breached its duty by knowingly []
maintaining a defective or unreasonably dangerous
roadway, depends on the facts and circumstances of each
case. This is a task for the trier of fact. To determine
this risk, the trier of fact will consider the broad range of
social, economic and moral factors and the social utility
of the plaintiff’s conduct at the time of the accident.
Again he is not being offered as a human factors expert,
although that is kind of - - it is a field that is not far from
it, engineering expert. The cost to the State in avoiding
the risk is one of the factors that has to be considered in
this utility-risk evaluation. And that is up to the trier of
fact. This includes not only the cost to fix the instant
deviation but other similar deviations on Highway 10.
The Court does not believe that he can give an opinion as
to whether the roadway is unreasonably dangerous or not
because it falls outside his area of expertise. It is not
included in his education, training or methodology. The
specialized knowledge of Mr. Evans [is] the field of
traffic engineering so it cannot assist the trier of fact in
making this utility-risk determination. So he can’t say,
oh because of these factors it is unreasonably dangerous
because he has told this Court that he doesn’t look at
costs or those kinds of things, nor is he a human factors
engineer. So I don’t believe that he can give an opinion
as to whether the condition of the road at the site of the
accident is unreasonably dangerous or not. He can’t
make that statement. He can talk about what hazards are
there.

The trial court’s reasoning follows the requirements set forth above in

Forbes, 5 So.3d 839. In addition, the trial court found that Mr. Evans did not

examine the crash history at the site or the work records on the road; nor did he

address feasible countermeasures or look at similar defects.

In support of her position, Ms. Sonnier cites Rosen v. State ex rel.

Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 01-499 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/30/02), 809 So.2d 498, writ

9

denied, 02-605 (La. 5/10/02), 815 So.2d 842, which affirmed the trial court’s

judgment in favor of the plaintiff after a bench trial. There, the plaintiff

hydroplaned into a bridge abutment that did not have a guardrail right after a

reconstructed portion of the roadway was prematurely opened to traffic and before

the 1994 plan was completed; the plan called for a guardrail, which was installed

only days after the accident. The trial court allowed one of the plaintiff’s experts,

Mr. James Clary, to testify that “an unguarded bridge end on a highway of [that]

classification [was] unreasonably dangerous.” Id. at 505. Even though he testified

that an AASHTO guidelines manual classified the absence of a guardrail as

unreasonably dangerous, and then was not able to produce corroborating evidence,

the appellate court did not find the trial court in error for allowing him to testify

regarding the “ultimate issue” under La.Code Evid. art. 704. Id. at 508. The only

reason the appellate court gave was that “DOTD did not object to a substantial

majority of Mr. Clary’s testimony; therefore, it cannot now complain that Mr.

Clary declared the accident site ‘unreasonably dangerous.’” Id. Moreover, Mr.

Clary was qualified in the fields of highway design, engineering, signage, safety,

and maintenance. This case is both factually distinguishable and not binding in

this court.

The stump was on the backslope of the ditch, not at the toe of the

foreslope as indicated by Mr. Evans. The jury heard testimony that DOTD

removed tree limbs after Hurricane Katrina came through in 2005, but the plaintiff

presented no work orders for tree removal. DOTD Maintenance Supervisor

Damon Cooley testified at trial that the National Guard was removing trees after

the hurricane. Wade Wilson testified that he saw DOTD cutting trees but admitted

that he did not see DOTD cut the stump at issue.

10

When Mr. Evans, who was eighty-five and in ill health, retired, the

plaintiff retained Mr. Robert, who had the same qualifications and used the same

methodology. DOTD again filed a motion to limit the testimony of the plaintiff’s

expert, Mr. Robert. When the plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the

earlier ruling by Judge Cole, Judge Deshotels, after a hearing and after taking the

issue under advisement, denied the motion for reconsideration. Both experts

testified regarding conditions that in their opinions were hazardous. No proffer

was made of the excluded testimony. The question of unreasonable risk of harm is

a question of fact for the jury. Fontenot v. Patterson Ins., 09-669 (La. 10/20/09),

23 So.3d 259. The jury in this case found no defect creating an unreasonable risk

of harm. There is no manifest error.

Plaintiff’s Experts and Major Reconstruction

Ms. Sonnier contends that the trial judge erroneously excluded the

testimony of her experts regarding whether the roadway at issue had undergone a

“major reconstruction” such that certain standards had to be applied; and that not

meeting those standards constituted a breach of DOTD’s duty to maintain the

roadway. More specifically, Ms. Sonnier argues that the 1946 DOTD guidelines

for major reconstruction included four-foot-wide shoulders, a 3:1 side slope, and

twenty feet of horizontal clearance beyond the travel lanes, and that these

guidelines apply to the roadway which was converted from gravel to asphalt in

1949. Mr. Evans testified that he reviewed the final estimate for the 1949 project

and that it constituted a “major reconstruction” that required application of the

1946 guidelines. DOTD’s representative testified that the conversion to asphalt in

1949 was an overlay project, not a major reconstruction. Judge Cole found that

11

whether or not the project was a major reconstruction could only be determined by

design engineers or construction engineers and that Mr. Evans and Mr. Robert

were traffic engineers.

Mr. Evans’s bachelor’s degree in the 1950s was in electrical

engineering, and he took a post-graduate course in traffic engineering which he

said included geometric design of highways. His work has been largely consulting

work. Ms. Sonnier argues that Mr. Evans’s affidavit shows that he was qualified

by fifty years of experience. In his affidavit, however, he admits that he was “not

generally involved in the specific design or even in the maintenance of roads and

highways.”

The court stated as follows:

As I said earlier a traffic engineer, they are not
responsible for infrastructure of the highway system.
The Court doesn’t believe that his education, experience
and methodology qualifies him to . . . evaluate the project
proposed, the cost of same, and make a determination
that this is or is not major reconstruction. The Court
believes it is beyond his area of expertise and not
included in his methodology. Therefore, the Court does
not believe he can give an opinion that the 1949 project
for Highway 10 was a major reconstruction. He can talk
about the AASHTO Standards and, you know, why it is
unsafe there. I don’t think he can make that one opinion.
But he can certainly talk about the roadway and what he
believes are a hazard there.

We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling on this issue.

In Forbes, 5 So.3d 839, which is virtually on-point with the present case, the

Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the first circuit’s judgment in favor of the

plaintiff, finding that the evidence did not support a reconstruction of the roadway

at issue. There, a legally intoxicated driver with a 0.12% BAC was “straightening

out the curves” in a section of Highway 37 by driving south in the opposing north-

12

bound lane of the two-lane highway as he approached each curve. Id. at 843. The

driver’s car went into a ditch, struck at least one tree, caving in the roof and

ejecting both the front-seat passenger and the rear-seat passenger. The front-seat

passenger was killed, and the back-seat passenger, who was the driver’s nine-year-

old nephew, was thrown into the road and hit by another vehicle. He survived.

The child’s expert in Forbes testified that the roadway at the accident

site had been reconstructed in 1975 and that DOTD had failed to comply with its

own and AASHTO’s design standards. He further testified that the substandard

lane width, shoulder width, shoulder slope ratio, and right of way with trees was a

cause-in-fact and legal cause of the accident. The jury found the driver 60% at

fault and DOTD 40% at fault. The trial court granted DOTD’s motion for a

judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), and the first circuit reversed on

appeal, reinstating the jury’s verdict. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed,

finding that the car was already out of control before it left the road, finding the

driver to be 100% at fault, and reinstating the trial court’s JNOV in favor of

DOTD. In addressing the design and maintenance of the roadway, the supreme

court found that the 1975 project/plan, which had “Reconstruct Base and

Surfacing” in its title, was nevertheless not a “major reconstruction” requiring the

application of 1975 standards. DOTD experts had testified that the plaintiff’s

expert was the only person who would characterize the 1975 overlay or

preservation project as a major reconstruction. Those witnesses testified that

reconstruction projects took four to five years to develop, cost $500,000 to

$600,000 per mile in the 1970s, involved federal funds, required a full topographic

survey, required upgrades to the vertical and horizontal geometry of the road, and

required the purchase of land for additional rights-of-way. Conversely, the project

13

in Forbes was done by an independent contractor, to be completed in sixty days at

$520,000 for all 4.5 miles, did not require additional rights-of-way, and required

no work on the existing shoulders.

We note that the plaintiff’s expert in Forbes was Mr. James Clary, and

he was allowed to give his opinion on what constituted a major reconstruction.

However, as seen above in Rosen, 809 So.2d 498, Mr. Clary had qualifications in

the fields of highway design, engineering, signage, safety, and maintenance. In the

present case, Mr. Evans did not have those qualifications; nor did he support his

opinion on major reconstruction with proper evidence, such as the kind of

information as that testified to by DOTD’s engineers in Forbes. The plaintiff’s

other traffic engineer, Mr. Robert, also testified that Highway 10 had undergone a

major reconstruction in 1949, using the same reasoning that the travel surface went

from gravel to asphalt. Accordingly, the record supports the trial court’s limitation

on the testimony of the plaintiff’s experts. This is no abuse of discretion in this

ruling.

Jury’s Verdict

Ms. Sonnier contends that the jury manifestly erred in finding that the

roadway contained no defect resulting in an unreasonable risk of harm that caused

the passenger’s injuries. We disagree. Over eight days of trial, the jury heard and

saw ample evidence to support its verdict. DOTD’s accident reconstructionist,

Jeremy Hoffpauir, testified that Lacy Johnson simply drove her vehicle straight off

the road. Trooper Anthony Scott Farris, Mr. Hoffpauir, Mr. Evans, and Mr. Robert

all testified that there was no physical evidence, such as tire marks, indicating that

the driver attempted to apply her brakes or input steering before she left the

14

roadway. Contrary to Mr. Evans’s belief expressed in his deposition testimony,

Trooper Farris did not believe that the driver was parallel to the road when she

entered the shoulder on the other side of the highway. Trooper Farris testified at

trial that the driver’s car travelled straight from the east-bound lane, crossed the

center line, and went off the edge of the road in a straight path with no evidence of

steering or breaking.

Trooper Farris further testified that the warning sign of the curve

ahead and the advisory speed was in place. DOTD’s traffic engineering expert, Dr.

Joseph Blaschke, and the plaintiff’s expert, Mr. Robert, testified that the signage

met the requirements of the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices

(MUTCD). Dr. Blaschke also said there was no defect in the striping, design, or

speed limit. Additionally, he said the shoulder width and slope did not violate

DOTD policy. Typically, plans and guidelines are adjusted because of the

geometry and conditions present. Further, the stump was in a heavily wooded

area, and removal of the tree would make no difference because other trees were

next to the stump.

Testimony at trial indicated that the driver drove this highway every

day and was familiar with the road. Mr. Hoffpauir testified that the driver could

see the curve ten seconds in advance of reaching it and had time to react. He said

the curve was not severe and required only nine degrees of steering, which most

drivers do on a daily basis. Mr. Evans also testified that the curve was not severe

and that a driver could safely negotiate the curve. All agreed that the driver had a

ten-foot travel lane and a two-foot unimproved shoulder on the other side of the

center line within which to correct her path and get back into her own lane. DOTD

Maintenance Engineer Damon Cooley said he inspected the area and did not

15

observe a defect in the roadbed or the shoulder that could have caused this

accident. Trooper Farris said no defect caused the driver to leave the road.

As previously discussed, the DOTD owes a duty to a prudent driver

who is momentarily distracted, but Dr. Blaschke testified that Lacy Johnson, the

driver, was more than momentarily inattentive. The plaintiff’s toxicologist, Dr.

Ernest Lykessa agreed. DOTD’s toxicologist, Dr. Gary Wimbish, and Dr. Lykessa

testified that 0.10% BAC results in cognitive impairment, blurred vision, decreased

hand-to-foot-to-eye coordination, decreased perception-reaction time, and impaired

judgment and reasoning. Dr. Wimbish further stated that the driver’s BAC

impairment more probably than not included a reduced ability to timely input a

steering maneuver before the crash. Dr. Blaschke said that driver perception-

reaction time is impaired at 0.08% BAC. The plaintiff’s own expert, Mr. Evans,

stated in his report that alcohol may have played a part in the driver’s having left

the roadway.

The purpose of a roadside ditch is to drain the highway. La.R.S.

48:1(17). In cases involving alcohol and/or injuries occurring in ditches, the courts

usually do not find a duty of DOTD to protect against such risks. That is because

the utility of the ditch is high while the conduct of the driver is not.

In Oster v. Department of Transportation and Development, State of

Louisiana, 582 So.2d 1285, 1289 (La.1991) (emphasis added), the court stated the

following:

We begin by recognizing, as did the court of
appeal, that the drainage ditch in question serves a useful
purpose. Draining ditches similar to the one involved in
this case are a common feature along the roads and
highways throughout this State. The ditch into which
Gernard Casbon rode his dirt bike is but one of a series of
drainage ditches along Judge Perez Highway. The

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purpose of these ditches is to keep water from draining
onto the travel portion of the Highway and causing a
dangerous situation for motorists. Because drainage
ditches help make travel along the roads of this state
more safe, their utility is great.

In Miller v. State, Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 95-548, pp. 4-5 (La.App.

3 Cir. 3/20/96), 679 So.2d 134, 137-38, writ denied, 96-1674 (La. 10/11/96), 680

So.2d 650, we held:

[U]nder the facts of this case, we must ask: was the risk
that a speeding and intoxicated motorist, driving an A-
frame vehicle of this size and design, might lose control
of his vehicle, travel across the opposite lane of travel,
then traverse the shoulder and ditch beyond, and strike
this tree at the precise angle it did, within the ambit of
duty that DOTD owes motorists?

Additionally, when determining whether a
condition or defect presented an unreasonable risk of
harm, courts balance several factors, including the
probability and gravity of the harm presented by the risk
against the social utility of the thing involved, the cost to
the defendant of avoiding the risk, and the social utility
of the plaintiff’s conduct at the time of the accident.
Nicks v. Teche Elec. Co-op. Inc., 93-1418 (La.App. 3 Cir.
6/1/94), 640 So.2d 723, writ denied, 94-1710
(La.10/7/94), 644 So.2d 640.

The tree in question was part of a vast wooded
area. The evidence reveals that there is no reason to
believe that the risk of harm this tree posed to this driver
was in any way different from that presented by the trees
around it. Plaintiffs’ own expert, Mr. Moody, testified
that “[i]f that tree hadn’t been there, and he’d gone off
that curve, then there are other trees that he could’ve hit,”
some further away, and been killed at his calculated
speed. This tree had been there for approximately thirty
years, and Allen had driven that road many times, and
made that curve, all without incident. Thus, plaintiffs
postulate that this tree, with its odd shape and unique
position, posed an unreasonable risk of harm, and
without it Allen would be alive today, is pure
speculation. Moreover, given the “lay of the land,” it is a
most unlikely scenario.

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Furthermore, the record does not substantiate that,
indeed, DOTD intended that area to be a “recovery
zone,” nor that it had any obligation to create and
maintain one. In fact, DOTD did not design the highway.
We also note that “recovery zones” are intended to aid
those drivers, traveling adjacent to them who slightly
veer off the road, to return safely onto their own lane of
travel. Id. Plaintiffs’ position implies that had such a
zone existed, it would have allowed this driver to regain
control of his vehicle and return to the road. However,
there is no evidentiary basis for this. It is simply
academic, especially in light of plaintiffs’ expert’s
speculation that Allen had fallen asleep at the wheel.
Even if DOTD had an obligation to maintain such a
recovery zone, and did so, likely, it would have served no
purpose to this driver who never took evasive action nor
attempted to regain control of his vehicle.

Holmes v. State, through Dept. of Highways, 466
So.2d 811, 821 (La.App. 3 Cir.), writ denied, 472 So.2d
31 (La.1985), speaks directly to this situation: “[t]he
Highway Department’s duty to maintain a safe shoulder
does not encompass the foreseeable risk of injury to a
motorist who strays completely off the traveled portion
of the highway because his driving ability is impaired by
reason of intoxication....” (Emphasis added). In another
case similar to the present one, the court found that a
utility pole located near the highway did not create an
unreasonable risk of harm such that the state was liable
for resulting injuries, where evidence indicated that the
driver lost control of the auto and was intoxicated at the
time of the accident. Beecher v. Keel, 94-314 (La.App. 4
Cir. 9/29/94), 645 So.2d 666; writ denied, 95-0108
(La.3/10/95), 650 So.2d 1185.

As to the area off the shoulder of the road, but
within the right-of-way, DOTD owes a duty to maintain
that area in such a condition that it does not present an
unreasonable risk of harm to motorists or others using the
roadway in a reasonably prudent manner. Oster, 582
So.2d 1285. The logic of the holdings in Holmes,
Beecher and Oster would apply with even greater force
to the more removed area where Allen had his accident.

In Cormier, 748 So.2d 1123, the driver of a vehicle apparently went to

sleep, drove off the roadway across the shoulder and into the back embankment of

the roadside ditch. The trial court denied recovery, and the court of appeal

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reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal, and reinstated the trial

court’s judgment, observing: “Generally, in other cases such as this one, where no

road defect caused the driver to leave the road and the driver hit an object in the

DOTD’s right of way, the DOTD has been relieved of liability.” Id. at 1129-30.

In this case, the jury’s verdict is supported by the evidence in the

record, and it is in alignment with the statutory and jurisprudential law on the

issues surrounding an unreasonable risk of harm. The jury’s verdict is not clearly

erroneous.

V.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, the trial court’s interlocutory judgments

limiting expert testimony and its final judgment memorializing the jury’s verdict in

favor of the State of Louisiana, Department of Transportation and Development,

are affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to the plaintiff, Gaynelwyn Sonnier.

AFFIRMED.

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