Amber Lynn Lange Frazier v. Shelton Lundra Frazier

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

18-129

AMBER LYNN LANGE FRAZIER

VERSUS

SHELTON LUNDRA FRAZIER

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
TENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF NATCHITOCHES, NO. C-89055, DIV. B
HONORABLE LALA BRITTAIN SYLVESTER, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

D. KENT SAVOIE
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Billy Howard Ezell, Shannon J. Gremillion, and D. Kent Savoie,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Robert C. Owsley
Murchison & Murchison, L.L.C.
616 Front Street
P. O. Box 226
Natchitoches, LA 71458-0226
(318) 352-2302
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
Amber Lynn Lange Frazier

Shelton Lundra Frazier
In Proper Person
941 Lucille St.
Natchitoches, LA 71457
(318) 471-6788
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT

SAVOIE, Judge.

In this custody dispute, the father, Shelton Frazier, appeals the trial court’s

judgment awarding the parties with shared, equal custody of their two-year-old

daughter and designating the mother as the domiciliary parent. For the following

reasons, we affirm.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Shelton and Amber Frazier were married on October 18, 2014. They have

one child together, Anaiah, who was born on July 10, 2015.

Ms. Frazier filed a petition for divorce on January 6, 2017, and therein sought

joint custody of Anaiah, with her being designated as domiciliary parent and with

reasonable visitation given to Mr. Frazier.

Mr. Frazier filed an answer and reconventional demand on January 31, 2017,

alleging that Anaiah had been in his physical custody since the parties separated on

December 12, 2016. Therein, he also sought emergency temporary custody of

Anaiah. He alleged that on March 26, 2016, inappropriate sexual contact had taken

place between Amber’s two other children from a previous relationship, T.L and

S.L., while those children and Anaiah were in the care of Mr. Frazier’s mother. T.L.

was eight years old at the time, and S.L. was four years old. There were no

allegations of sexual abuse with respect to Anaiah, who was a year old at the time.

The emergency relief Mr. Frazier sought was not granted in light of an

agreement reached by the parties. They agreed to submit to a custody evaluation

with Ms. Robin Miley and to share custody of Anaiah on a week-to-week basis,

under the condition that Anaiah was not to be left alone with T.L. An Interim

Judgment reflecting the parties’ agreement was signed on February 13, 2017.

The next hearing on the matter was held April 26, 2017. An attorney was

appointed to represent T.L., and the parties stipulated that T.L. and S.L. would meet

with Ms. Miley in connection with the custody evaluation concerning Anaiah. The

parties further agreed that the custody arrangement established by the February 13,

2017 interim judgment was to remain in effect. A judgment reflecting the parties’

stipulations was signed by the court on May 12, 2017.

Prior to trial, Ms. Miley submitted a report to the trial court as requested,

which recommended a shared custody arrangement. Trial on the issue of custody

was held August 14, 2017. After considering the evidence, including the evaluation

by Ms. Miley and her testimony, the trial court rendered a judgment on October 4,

2017, awarding the parties with joint custody of Anaiah “on an alternating one

week/one week basis,” with Ms. Frazier designated as the domiciliary parent.

Mr. Frazier appeals. We note that he was represented by counsel through trial

in this matter; however, his appeal was filed pro se, and he is no longer represented

by counsel.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR:

On appeal, Mr. Frazier asserts the following as assignments of error:

I. The Trial Court Failed To Make A Determination On the Best
Interest of the Child by Omitting The First Nine Factors (1-9)
Under La. Civil Code Article 134 And Considered Only Factors
10, 11, 12 For Designating The Custodial Parent. Such Legal
Error Requires A de novo Determination Of the Ignored Factors
in Light of the Record, or, In the Alternative, A Reversal And
Remand.

II. The Trial Court Applied An Improper Standard By Viewing The
Court’s Expert Recommendation For Equal Shared Custody As
The Baseline From Which To Set Permanent Custody. Such
Legal Error Requires A de novo Review Of The Record, Or, At
The Very Least A Reversal and Remand.

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III. The Trial Court Misapplied La. R.S. Art. 9:335 Because The
Two-Prong Test For Equal Shared Physical Custody Was Not
Met And In The Absence Of A Best Interest Analysis The Statute
is Rendered Inoperable. Such Legal Errors Requires A de novo
Review of the Record, Or, In the Alternative A Reversal and
Remand.

IV. The Trial Court Erred Because The Record Support[s] A 70/30
Custody Regime With Mr. Frazier having 70% and Ms. Frazier
Having 30% and Mr. Frazier Designated As A Domiciliary
Parent.

V. The Trial Court Erred By Finding the Expert Did Not Waiver
From Her Report and Basing The Ruling on Findings Not
Substantiated In The Record.

VI. The Trial Court Erred Because She Failed To Rule On the Sexual
Behavior Claim Of The Two Older Children.

ANALYSIS

Standard of Review:

As recognized by this court in Guidry v. Guidry, 07-1272, pp. 2-3 (La.App. 3

Cir. 3/5/08), 979 So.2d 603, 605:

An appellate court may not set aside a trial court’s findings of
fact in absence of manifest error or unless it is clearly wrong. Stobart
v. State, Through DOTD, 617 So.2d 880 (La.1993). This is especially
applicable in a child custody dispute wherein appellate courts accord
substantial deference to the trial judge’s conclusions. “The trial judge
is in a better position to evaluate the best interest of a child from his
observance of the parties and the witnesses and his decision will not be
disturbed on review absent a clear showing of abuse.” Deason v.
Deason, 99-1811, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/5/00), 759 So.2d 219, 220
(citing State in the Interest of Sylvester, 525 So.2d 604, 608 (La.App. 3
Cir.1988) (citing Bagents v. Bagents, 419 So.2d 460 (La.1982))).

Every child custody case must be viewed within its own peculiar
set of facts, and a trial court’s award of custody is entitled to great
weight and will not be overturned on appeal unless an abuse of
discretion is clearly shown. Connelly v. Connelly, 94-527 (La.App. 1
Cir. 10/7/94), 644 So.2d 789. Both the Louisiana Legislature and the
Louisiana Supreme Court have made it abundantly clear that the
primary consideration and prevailing inquiry is whether the custody
arrangement is in the best interest of the child. See Evans v. Lungrin,
97-541, 97-577 (La. 2/6/98), 708 So.2d 731.

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In his first assignment of error, Mr. Frazier argues we should deviate from the

standard of review set forth in Guidry, and review the record de novo because,

according to Mr. Frazier, the trial court failed to consider each of the best interest of

the child factors set forth in La.Civ.Code art. 134. However, we note that the trial

court’s judgment and incorporated reasons for ruling make clear that it did consider

each of the twelve factors. First, the trial court noted: “As Ms. Miley stated in her

report, factors 1-9 seem to be fairly equal for both parties.” It then went on to

thoroughly discuss the remaining factors. While the trial court ultimately gave some

of the factors more weight than others in reaching its conclusion, it was permitted to

do so. See Hudson v. Strother, 17-1044 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/2/18), 246 So.3d 851. The

trial court’s analysis was properly focused on the best interest of the child; therefore,

this assignment of error lacks merit.

In his second assignment of error, Mr. Frazier argues that it was legal error

for the trial court to use Ms. Miley’s custody recommendation as “the baseline” from

which to determine custody, and therefore we should review the record de novo. He

suggests that the trial court’s analysis was based on an improper belief that it was

compelled to accept Ms. Miley’s recommendation. In support of his argument, Mr.

Frazier cites to W.M.E. v. E.J.E., 619 So.2d 707 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1993), wherein this

court affirmed a trial court’s decision to not accept the expert’s custody

recommendation because it was contrary to La.Civ.Code art. 133, which, at the time,

required suspension of visitation between an abusive parent and the abused child.

The W.M.E. court stated:

Faced with . . . the growing use of psychological and psychiatric
testimony in child custody and visitation cases, we find it necessary to
again clarify the role of such expert witnesses. Expert witnesses are
intended to “assist the trier of fact” in understanding the evidence or in
the determination of a fact in issue. Louisiana Code of Evidence article

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702. Undeniably in certain cases, expert assistance may prove
invaluable in the court’s determination, particularly regarding issues
touching on the psychological and emotional welfare of the children.

However, the ultimate “best interest of the child” decision
squarely remains in the exclusive province of the court. This decision
necessarily focuses on all of the evidence and testimony presented. The
trial court is not bound to follow the recommendations of an expert
witness.

Moreover, the court is restrained from following an expert’s
recommendation when to do so would be contrary to law. The decision
to grant or prohibit visitation by the father with his daughter, in this
case, rested on a conclusion of law rather than fact. As a matter of law,
the trial judge correctly refused to adopt the expert’s recommendation.

W.M.E. v. E.J.E, 619 So.2d at 710-711.

In the instant matter, however, there was no finding that either parent had

subjected the child to physical or sexual abuse, and the parties’ visitation rights are

not established by specific statute. Rather, after weighing the evidence, the trial

court was permitted to accept or reject Ms. Miley’s custody recommendation, and

its decision is reviewed under the standard enunciated in Guidry, 979 So.2d 603.

Therefore, Mr. Frazier’s second assignment of error lacks merit.

Mr. Frazier also argues that a de novo review is appropriate because La.R.S.

9:3351 requires equal physical custody to be both feasible and in the child’s best

interest; whereas, in this case, equal custody is not in Anaiah’s best interest. We

note, however, that the trial court properly considered whether equal custody was

both feasible and in Anaiah’s best interest prior to awarding it. Therefore, there is

no legal error in the trial court’s analysis that warrants de novo review. Rather, the

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Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:335(A)(2)(b) states: “To the extent it is feasible and in the
best interest of the child, physical custody physical custody of the children should be shared
equally.”

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trial court’s findings are reviewed below in accordance with the standard enunciated

in Guidry, 979 So.2d 603.

Review of Trial Court’s Custody Award:

Mr. Frazier’s remaining assignments of error address the merits of the trial

court’s award of custody, so we will address them together and consider whether the

trial court erred in awarding the parties with equal physical custody and in

designating Ms. Frazier as the domiciliary parent. Mr. Frazier argues that he should

have been designated as the domiciliary parent and awarded with physical custody

for 70% of the time, with Ms. Frazier having 30%.

“The paramount consideration in any determination of child custody is the

best interest of the child.” C.M.J. v. L.M.C, 14-1119, p. 16 (La. 10/15/14), 156 So.3d

16, 28. The factors a court considers in determining the best interest of the child are

set forth in La.Civ.Code art. 134, which, at the time of these proceedings, provided:

The court shall consider all relevant factors in determining the
best interest of the child. Such factors include:

1) The love, affection, and other emotional ties between each
party and the child.

2) The capacity and disposition of each party to give the child
love, affection, and spiritual guidance and to continue the education and
rearing of the child.

3) The capacity and disposition of each party to provide the child
with food, clothing, medical care, and other material needs.

4) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, adequate
environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity of that
environment.

5) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed
custodial home or homes.

6) The moral fitness of each party, insofar as it affects the welfare
of the child.

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7) The mental and physical health of each party.

8) The home, school, and community history of the child.

9) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the
child to be of sufficient age to express a preference.

10) The willingness and ability of each party to facilitate and
encourage a close and continuing relationship between the child and the
other party.

11) The distance between the respective residences of the parties.

12) The responsibility for the care and rearing of the child
previously exercised by each party.

As this court stated in Hudson v. Strother, 246 So.3d at 858 (citations omitted):

The best interest of the child standard in a child custody case is a fact
intensive inquiry that requires the weighing and balancing of factors
favoring or opposing custody in the competing parties on the basis of
the evidence presented. The trial court is not required to make a
mechanical evaluation of all of the factors enumerated in La.Civ.Code
art. 134 in determining what is in a child’s best interest for custody
purposes, nor is it bound to give more weight to one factor over another;
the relative weight of each factor is left to the discretion of the trial
court.

We first note that Mr. Frazier argues that the trial court’s ruling was in error

because “the record support[s]” an award that designates him as the domiciliary

parent and gives him physical custody for 70% of the time. However, in accordance

with Guidry, 979 So.2d 603, we do not consider whether Mr. Frazier’s proposed

custody arrangement is supported by the record, but rather whether the trial court’s

factual findings are supported by the record and whether the trial court abused its

discretion in awarding custody.

Mr. Frazier argues that the trial court failed to rule on the issue concerning the

alleged sexual behavior between Ms. Frazier’s other children that took place in

March 2016 when the parties were out of town and the children were in the care of

Mr. Frazier’s mother. Anaiah was a baby at the time and was napping in another

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room when the alleged incident took place. Mr. Frazier argues that this incident is

“the most important factor” that should have been considered when awarding

custody. While the trial court’s written reasons for ruling do not specifically address

the allegations, we disagree with Mr. Frazier’s suggestion that it was not considered

at all. Rather, this issue was a focal point of the testimony elicited at trial, and the

trial court’s ruling adopting Ms. Miley’s recommendation indicates that it agreed

with Ms. Miley’s opinion that neither T.L. nor S.L. posed a safety concern for

Anaiah.

At trial, Ms. Miley testified that she interviewed both T.L. and S.L. separately,

and she testified as follows:

A. I believe I said in my report, I refer to [ the March 2016 incident]
as exploratory play. . . .

....

A. Both of the children were very remorseful to me. They, they
knew they had gotten in trouble. . . . They did not have the sexual
information that I would have expected from children who had engaged
in a lot of sexual play.

....

Q. Okay. But, So the children never admitted what happened in the
closet . . . [?]

....

A. I believe he said that they kissed. But no they didn’t tell me
exactly what went on as far as specifics of the play.

Ms. Miley further testified that the parties had responded appropriately after

the situation occurred and ensured that there was adequate supervision. She

concluded that T.L. posed no risk of harm to Anaiah, and she stated as follows with

respect to her risk assessment:

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A. We look at history. We also uh, look at what happened in that
incident, we look at behavior problems, what’s happening outside of
that isolated incident. . . . In this situation, there wasn’t a lot of history
that led me to believe that these children were dangerous in any way. . . .
And so in assessing the risk which I felt like was my task I just felt like
these children were again not dangerous if there was supervision put
into place.

A. . . . Again, I don’t believe these children are predators. I don’t think
they are going to seek out this little girl to hurt her. If the adults act like
parents or parents act like adults and there’s supervision . . . . There is
some benefit that will come from her interacting with her siblings, not
at a risk of danger but with safeguards in place, she needs to know her
siblings.

After reviewing the record, we find that it adequately supports a conclusion

that the March 2016 incident does not require a reduction in the amount of physical

custody awarded to Ms. Frazier or designation of Mr. Frazier as the domiciliary

parent.

Mr. Frazier also argues on appeal that in weighing the various factors

governing the best interest of the child, the trial court failed to consider certain

evidence, and as a result, erred in its analysis. Specifically, Mr. Frazier notes the

following in his brief: when Anaiah leaves Ms. Frazier’s care, she is often ill or

injured; he brings Anaiah to church, whereas there was no evidence concerning Ms.

Frazier’s spirituality; Anaiah has her own bedroom when in Mr. Frazier’s care, but

does not when in Ms. Frazier’s care; Ms. Frazier has moved several times since the

parties’ separation; Anaiah is around her family when in Mr. Frazier’s care; there is

evidence indicating Ms. Frazier’s unwillingness to co-parent; the distance between

the parties resulted from Ms. Frazier’s choices; and, when the parties lived together,

Mr. Frazier’s mother, and not Ms. Frazier, watched Anaiah during the day. In

addition, Mr. Frazier argues that the trial court erred in suggesting that Ms. Miley’s

trial testimony did not waiver from her written report.

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At trial, testimony was elicited from Ms. Frazier, Mr. Frazier, Ms. Miley, Ms.

Frazier’s sister, Mr. Frazier’s mother, and Mr. Frazier’s sister. Ms. Miley’s report,

which recommended equal physical custody until Anaiah began school, was also

submitted into evidence.

A review of the record indicates that while married, the parties lived in

Natchitoches. After the parties separated, Mr. Frazier has primarily resided with his

sister in her residence in Natchitoches with his sister’s young child as well as his

mother. Mr. Frazier is employed and works away from home during the day. His

mother watches Anaiah while Mr. Frazier is at work. At trial, Mr. Frazier testified

that he was in the process of moving into his own trailer home, which is close in

proximity to his sister’s home, and that Anaiah has her own bedroom there.

According to Mr. Frazier, he is concerned about Anaiah’s health because she is often

sick when he picks her up from Ms. Frazier, and, on several instances, she has had

bruises, bug bites, scratches, and a sunburn.

Since the parties’ separation, Ms. Frazier and her children have, for the most

part, lived with her sister and her sister’s young children in a four-bedroom home on

a ten-acre lot in Merryville. Ms. Frazier is employed by her father’s business and

works from home. She also indicated that Anaiah often plays outside. Ms. Frazier

testified that, in her opinion, every time Mr. Frazier picks up Anaiah, he “does an

inspection” and finds a reason to take her to the doctor. She indicated that when

they were together, Anaiah suffered from six earaches, frequently had a runny nose

or cough, and that the issues Mr. Frazier complained about were not new. After the

parties separated, Anaiah had a surgery where tubes were inserted into her ears. Ms.

Frazier also testified that Mr. Frazier failed to communicate with her concerning

details of Anaiah’s scheduled medical appointments, including Anaiah’s ear surgery.

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Ms. Miley testified that, after considering the factors governing the child’s

best interest, it was her opinion the parties should share physical custody of Anaiah

on a week-to-week basis until two-year-old Anaiah begins school, noting that the

distance between the parties will likely make this arrangement difficult when Anaiah

begins school. She testified that “[n]either one of them in my opinion are bad

parents.” Ms. Miley did not provide a recommendation as to who the court should

appoint as the domiciliary parent. Rather, she suggested that the parties’ parenting

history while sharing equal physical custody of Anaiah would be better established

by the time Anaiah started school. This is consistent with the recommendation in

her written report.

Ms. Milely indicated that the parties were relatively equal when analyzing the

best interest of the child factors; however, it was her opinion that Mr. Frazier

exhibited animosity towards Ms. Frazier and was more unwilling to co-parent. The

following colloquy with Ms. Miley and counsel occurred at trial:

Q. Okay. Could you expound on your statements in regards to this
animosity that you were able to kind of pick up from Mr. Frazier
towards Ms. Frazier?

A. I think in general I got the sense that Mr. Frazier, I think he
approached this relationship almost as if a knight in shining armor had
ridden into [Ms. Frazier’s] life and rescued her to a certain extent. He
talked a lot about the opportunities that he had provided for her. He
helped her get a driver’s license, he helped her get a GED. She was in
school at the time. . . . And I think he was very proud of that. There
was a little twist to it that gave me the impression that he felt like that
because of that [Ms. Frazier] owed him something. . . . I didn’t get that
same impression when I met with [Ms. Frazier].

Q. You didn’t get the same impression that she had animosity or that
he saved her quite so much in a sense?

A. A little of both. It wasn’t as much animosity that I recognized in
Ms. Frazier. It was frustration in trying to deal with Mr. Frazier. . . .
he gave her the impression that now he had a right to, in a sense lord
over her with regards to the child. And she felt like she was an

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independent woman that yes he had given her those opportunities but
she’d actually done the work for them.

....

A. . . . I got the impression that Mr. Frazier felt like he had a right to
call the shots with the little girl rather than talking with Ms. Frazier and
getting her opinion on things.

....

A. . . . But he does seem to have uh, I think when he gets too
emotional, he can get aggressive. I don’t believe it’s an intent to harm.
I think his emotions just get the best of him. I think he truly feels like
he can take care of this little girl better than Ms. Frazier can. Uh, and
so . . . I was hoping that in writing the report he would recognize this
and just step back a little bit and enjoy parenting. More in a way where
he could work with the mother rather than against her.

....

A. . . . I got the impression that that Mr. Frazier had a clear idea in his
head how he felt like his children needed to be raised, his daughter. I
don’t fault that. However, other parents don’t always raise children like
we think they need to be raised. So that’s where co-parenting comes in,
working together, rather than just kind of circumventing the other
parent out of the situation.

In its reasons for awarding equal physical custody and designating Ms. Frazier

as the domiciliary parent, the trial court stated as follows:

Ms. Miley recommended that the Court order a shared custody
arrangement identical to the present Interim Judgment, until the child
is school age. . . .

The Court shall award custody of a child in accordance with the
best interest of the child. Further, La[.]R.S. 9:335A(2)(b) states, “To
the extent feasible and in the best interest of the child, physical custody
of the children should be shared equally.”. . . .

Ms. Miley testified at the hearing[,] and the testimony she gave
did not waiver from her report. Ms. Miley found Ms. Frazier was
cooperative and a good parent. Initially she had concerns that Ms.
Frazier would be overwhelmed because she had two other children.
According to her testimony[,] she stated that she actually felt that
“Amber did better in the interview than Shelton did”.

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During her testimony, Ms. Miley stated that she had concerns
about Mr. Frazier, finding that he “seemed to focus on Amber’s
inadequacies and his superiority over her”. Further, she was
“concerned about his dominating personality and how it may affect his
parenting efforts. I am not sure Shelton has any intentions of working
with Amber and raising Anaiah.” Mr. Frazier re-inforced [sic] this by
his testimony at the hearing. Despite Ms. Frazier’s having raising the
children before their separation, he now says that he should be the
parent with a 70/30 custody arrangement, with Ms. Frazier only having
Anaiah 30% of the time. He also stated that it is not in Anaiah’s best
interest for there to be shared custody on a 50/50 basis, despite the
recommendation of the Court’s expert. This is exactly what Ms. Miley
was worried about; that Mr. Frazier would not co-parent with Ms.
Frazier.

As Ms. Miley stated in her report, factors 1-9 [of La.Civ.Code
art. 134] seem to be fairly equal for both parties. Therefore, the court
should focus on factors 10, 11, and 12.

Factor 10, “The willingness and ability of each party to facilitate
and encourage a close and continuing relationship between the child
and the other party[,]” is the essence of co-parenting. Ms. Miley felt
that this would be a problem for Mr. Frazier, since he felt that Ms.
Frazier should be indebted to him forever for helping her get her life on
track. Further, at the hearing, Ms. Miley thought that Mr. Frazier would
not co-parent with Ms. Frazier.

Factor 11 is very significant in that it led Ms. Miley to recognize
that her recommendation of shared custody would only last until the
child reaches school age. At that time, due to the distance between the
parties’ residences, one party would have to be named domiciliary
parent, subject to the other’s visitation rights.

Factor 12, “the responsibility for the care and rearing of the child
previously exercised by each party.” During her testimony, Ms. Frazier
testified that she had cared for the child when the parties were together
since Mr. Frazier worked and she was home with her other children.
Mr. Frazier also admitted that Ms. Frazier had been the parent who was
at home raising Anaiah until the parties separated in December 2016.
Even though Ms. Frazier has raised her two other children, Mr. Frazier
testified he was more experienced as a parent due to the numerous
nieces and cousins that he had helped raise. Mr. Frazier refused to
admit that Ms. Frazier had more experience as a parent than he has,
despite his only being a parent for two years.

Ms. Miley testified that it was in the best interest of Anaiah that
the shared custody arrangement continue in effect at least until the child
reached school age. Further, this arrangement is definitely feasible as

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demonstrated by the fact that the parties have been exercising physical
custody in this matter since February 1, 2017.

Ms. Miley’s recommendation and report were supported by her
testimony. Mr. Frazier testified that he did not agree with Ms. Miley’s
recommendation and instead he recommended that Ms. Frazier only
have visitation on a 70/30 basis with him having 70% of the time. This
merely reflects to the Court his inability to accept any co-parenting or
equal standing with Ms. Frazier. As Ms. Miley suggested, both parties
need to work equally and see each other as equals in order for them to
properly raise this child. Mr. Frazier clearly does not see Ms. Frazier
as an equal as a parent by his own testimony. Mr. Frazier is not
considering the best interest of the child.

After thoroughly reviewing the record, with substantial deference given to the

trial court as required by Guidry, 979 So.2d 603, we find that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in adopting Ms. Miley’s recommendation of equal physical

custody and that the record supports a finding that an equal physical custody

arrangement was both feasible and in Anaiah’s best interest. In addition, we note

that the trial court seemed most concerned with evidence as to Mr. Frazier’s

unwillingness to co-parent with Mrs. Frazier and that this weighed in Ms. Frazier’s

favor when awarding domiciliary status. We find that the record adequately supports

this conclusion as well, and there was no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial

court.

DECREE

For the reasons stated above, the ruling of the trial court is affirmed. Costs of

this appeal are assessed to the appellant, Mr. Shelton Frazier.

AFFIRMED.

This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION.
Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2–16.3

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