Darrel D. Ryland v. Constance Ryland

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

18-134

DARREL D. RYLAND

VERSUS

CONSTANCE RYLAND

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APPEAL FROM THE
TWELFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF AVOYELLES, NO. 94-588
HONORABLE KERRY L. SPRUILL, DISTRICT JUDGE

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ELIZABETH A. PICKETT
JUDGE

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Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, Elizabeth A. Pickett, Billy H. Ezell, Phyllis M.
Keaty, D. Kent Savoie, Van H. Kyzar, and Jonathan W. Perry, Judges.

Keaty, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.
Cooks, J., dissents for the reasons assigned by Judge Keaty.
Savoie, J., dissents with written reasons.

AFFIRMED.

Steven J. Lane
John S. Creevy
Charles M. King
Herman, Herman & Katz, LLC
820 O’Keefe Avenue
New Orleans, Louisiana 70113
(504) 581-4892
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:
Constance Ryland

Jennifer J. Greene
Attorney at Law
820 O’Keefe Avenue
New Orleans, Louisiana 70113
(504) 264-2888
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:
Constance Ryland

Harry J. Philips, Jr.
Michael S. Walsh
Ryan K. French
Taylor, Porter, Brooks & Phillips, LLP
Post Office Box 2471
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70821-2471
(225) 381-0262
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee:
Darrel D. Ryland

PICKETT, Judge.

Defendant/Appellant, Constance Ryland, appeals the trial court’s judgment in

favor of Plaintiff/Appellee, Darrel D. Ryland, finding that their community property

regime was terminated on June 15, 1994. For the following reasons, the trial court’s

judgment is affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Constance and Darrel were married on August 9, 1975. On June 15, 1994,

Darrel filed a Petition for Divorce. On July 13, 1994, the trial court issued a

Judgment on Rule regarding alimony and issues concerning their minor children, i.e.,

child support payments, health insurance/medical expenses, domicile, joint custody,

and holiday visitation. On August 12, 1994, Darrel filed a Rule for Judgment

Decreeing Separation of Property. On that same day, the trial court issued a

Judgment on Rule “decreeing a separation of property and dissolving the community

property . . . retroactive to the date of filing of the Rule for Judgment Decreeing

Separation of Property.” The parties reconciled but eventually were divorced on

February 20, 2014, pursuant to a Judgment of Divorce.

During their marriage, the parties executed a Partial Partition of Community

Property on January 20, 1995 (hereinafter the “1995 partition”), which provided, in

pertinent part:

[Darrel and Constance] declare that they are currently living separate
and apart as evidenced by the Petition for Divorce as filed with the 12 th
Judicial District Court . . . Civil Suit No. 94-0588-A, and that they now
desire to settle and liquidate the community which formerly existed
between them and that they have agreed to settle the same in the manner
hereinafter set forth:

....

The parties hereto discharge each other from any further
accounting to the community which formerly existed between them; the
same being fully liquidated as above set forth . . . .

....

The parties agree that the community of acquets and gains
formerly existing between them was ended as of June 15, 1994, and that
each debt whatsoever incurred by either party after said date . . . shall
be considered the separate obligation of the party that incurred the debt.

The parties executed another Partial Partition of Community Property in

January 2000 (hereinafter the “2000 partition”), which provided, in pertinent part:

[Darrel and Constance] did declare that they now desire to settle and
liquidate the community which formerly existed between them and that
they have agreed to partially settle the same . . . .

....

The parties hereto discharge each other from any further
accounting to the community which formerly existed between them; the
same being fully liquidated as above set forth and both parties receiving
proportionate shares equal in value; each party acknowledging full
consideration for this partition.

....

The parties agree that the community of acquets and gains
formerly existing between them was ended as of June 15, 1994[.]

Both the 1995 partition and the 2000 partition were authentic acts filed in the court

records.

On August 24, 2012, the trial court issued a judgment terminating the

community property regime between Constance and Darrel pursuant to their joint

Petition for Approval of Matrimonial Regime of Separate Property and Matrimonial

Agreement, For Termination of Matrimonal Regime of Community Property, and

for Entry of Judgment. On that same date, the parties also submitted a Consent

Judgment of Partition of Community Property which stated that they “were married

on August 9, 1975, and their community property regime terminated on 24th of

August, 2012, pursuant to the Judgment of this Court signed on 24 th August, 2012”

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(hereinafter “2012 consent judgment”). This consent judgment also contained the

following terms:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED
that the parties do hereby confirm and ratify: the Partial Partition of
Community Property executed by and between them on or about
January 20, 1995; and the Partial Partition of Community Property
executed by and between them on or about the 7th day of January, 2000;
and both parties acknowledge that the property partitioned to them
therein is and has been, and will continue to be, their separate property
from the date of those respective partial partitions; and that neither party
has any claims against the other, in any fashion whatsoever, regarding
who owns the property previously partitioned, or for reimbursement for
the use of any of those separate properties or to improve the community
of acquets and gains or the separate property of the other spouse; and
and all such claims are hereby knowingly waived and compromised,
without itemization or limitation.

On May 11, 2016, Constance filed a Petition to Rescind the Partition of

Community Property, which sought to rescind the 2012 consent judgment under

La.Civ. Code art. 814 and requested her one-half interest in and to the community

property that formerly existed between her and Darrel as of August 24, 2012.

Pursuant to another consent judgment dated March 10, 2017, and in an attempt to

simplify the matter, the parties agreed to a hearing before the trial court to determine

the issue of whether the community property regime terminated in June 1994 as

opposed to August 2012. The hearing on that issue occurred on May 22, 2017, after

which both parties filed post-trial memoranda. On September 25, 2017, the trial

court issued Written Reasons for Ruling (hereinafter “written reasons”) and found

that the community property regime was terminated on June 15, 1994. A judgment

ratifying the written reasons was signed by the trial court on November 15, 2017.

Constance appealed.

On appeal, Constance asserts the following assignments of error:

1. The trial court erred in relying on case law which was superseded
by revisions to the statute.

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2. The trial court erred in ignoring two valid judgments and altering
the date that the parties’ community terminated based on an
authentic act.

3. The trial court erred in relying on a Partial Partition of
Community Property to determine when the community
terminated when there was a valid judgment on August 12, 1994
which terminated the community and that judgment was vacated
or superseded by the August 24, 2012 proceedings.

4. The totality of the circumstances prove that the parties did not
execute a matrimonial agreement to the contrary before they
reconciled.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The trial court’s factual findings are reviewed under the manifest error

standard of review. Stobart v. State through Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 617 So.2d

880 (La.1993). Applying the manifest error standard of review, in order to reverse

a trial court’s factual findings, an appellate court must review the entire record and

conclude that (1) a reasonable factual basis does not exist for the trial court’s finding

and (2) the record establishes that the finding is clearly wrong or manifestly

erroneous. Id.

On the other hand, an appellate court reviews questions of law de novo.

Speyrer v. Gray Ins. Co., 11-1154 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/1/12), 83 So.3d 1231. De novo

review is a determination of whether the trial court was legally correct or incorrect

in its application of the law. Id. “If the trial court’s decision was based on its

erroneous interpretation or application of the law, rather than a valid exercise of

discretion, such incorrect decision is not entitled to deference by the reviewing court.”

Id. at 1233 (quoting Citgo Petroleum Corp. v. Frantz, 03-88, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir.

6/4/03), 847 So.2d 734, 736, writ denied, 03-1911 (La. 10/31/03), 857 So.2d 484).

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DISCUSSION

The lone issue presented to the trial court was the determination of the date

that the community terminated. The parties agreed for the trial court to determine

the limited issue of the date that the community terminated prior to ruling on the

merits of Constance’s petition to rescind for grounds of lesion. The trial court

determined that the community terminated on June 15, 1994, which was the date

stated in the 1995 and 2000 partition documents as the termination date of the

community regime, and certified the judgment as final and appealable.

Our review of the record reveals that Darrel filed for divorce in 1994. The

trial court rendered a separation of property judgment in 1994 in accordance with

La.Civ.Code art. 2374 on the ground that the parties had lived separate and apart for

the requisite amount of time. At that time, the effect of a separation of property

judgment was governed by La.Civ.Code art. 2375(B) (emphasis added) and

provided:

If a judgment has been rendered on the ground that the spouses
were living separate and apart after the filing of a petition for divorce
without having reconciled, a reconciliation reestablishes the regime
of community property between the spouses retroactively to the day of
the filing of the motion therefor, unless prior to the reconciliation the
spouses execute a matrimonial agreement to the contrary. This
agreement need not be approved by the court and is effective toward
third persons when filed for registry in the manner provided by Article
2332. The reestablishment of the community is effective toward third
persons when a notice thereof is filed for registry in the same manner.

Therefore, according to La.Civ.Code art. 2375(B), while the community

regime would generally be automatically re-established upon reconciliation after the

judgment of separation, there can be a matrimonial agreement to the contrary, prior

to reconciliation, which does not need court approval. 1 Accordingly, the 1995

partition and 2000 partition can be considered matrimonial agreements prior to

1
Former La.Civ.Code art. 2375(B) and present La.Civ.Code art. 2375(B) are similar.
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reconciliation that terminate the community as of June 1994, which is the date stated

in those authentic acts. Specifically, the 1995 partition indicates that Constance and

Darrel “are currently living separate and apart as evidenced by the Petition for

Divorce.” The 1995 partition and the 2000 partition state that the parties “desire to

settle and liquidate the community which formerly existed between them.” Both

partitions further provide that “[t]he parties agree that the community of acquets and

gains formerly existing between them was ended as of June 15, 1994[.]”

According to the record before us, Constance and Darrel did not divorce until

February 2014. Therefore, the next question is whether, following the 2000 partition,

they subsequently re-established a community regime. Louisiana Civil Code Article

2329 provides:

Spouses may enter into a matrimonial agreement before or
during marriage as to all matters that are not prohibited by public policy.

Spouses may enter into a matrimonial agreement that modifies
or terminates a matrimonial regime during marriage only upon joint
petition and a finding by the court that this serves their best interests
and that they understand the governing principles and rules. They may,
however, subject themselves to the legal regime by a matrimonial
agreement at any time without court approval.

During the first year after moving into and acquiring a domicile
in this state, spouses may enter into a matrimonial agreement without
court approval.

Additionally, a matrimonial agreement “shall be made by authentic act or by an act

under private signature duly acknowledged by the spouses.” La.Civ.Code art. 2331.

The 1995 and 2000 authentic acts clearly evidenced the intent of the parties

to establish a separate property regime dating back to June 15, 1994. At the hearing

on August 24, 2012, both Darrel and Constance expressly confirmed that they

executed both documents, and that the consent judgment pending before the court

ratified both of those instruments. The trial court found that this constitued an effort

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by the parties to secure court authority for the 1995 and 2000 Partial Partitions of

Community Property, which expressly terminated the community of acquets and

gains effective June 15, 1994. We agree with that conclusion. We find no manifest

error in the trial court’s conclusion that the community property regime terminated

effective June 15, 1994.

DECREE

For the above reasons, the trial court’s judgment in favor of Darrel D. Ryland

is affirmed. All costs associated with this appeal are assessed to Constance Ryland.

AFFIRMED.

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STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

18-134

DARREL D. RYLAND

VERSUS

CONSTANCE RYLAND

KEATY, Judge, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion, and I would reverse the

appealed judgment.

The majority finds that the community property regime terminated on

June 15, 1994. In my opinion, the documents filed in connection with the 2012

proceedings, as shown in the record, constitute a matrimonial agreement to re-

establish the community regime retroactive to the date of Constance and Darrel’s

marriage, and then terminate as of August 24, 2012. On August 24, 2012, for the

first time, Constance and Darrel jointly filed a Petition for Approval of Matrimonial

Regime of Separate Property and Matrimonial Agreement, For Termination of

Matrimonial Regime of Community Property, and for Entry of Judgment, as

required by La.Civ.Code art. 2329. In their joint petition, the parties acknowledged

the following: that “[a] community of acquets and gains exists between petitioners

. . . but petitioners desire to enter into a Matrimonial Agreement for a regime of

separation of property”; that “[t]his Matrimonial Agreement terminates their

community property regime and establishes a regime of separate property”; and that

they “understand the legal ramifications of contractually adopting a regime of

separation of property in place of the legal regime of community property heretofore

existing between them.” Attached to the joint petition is a document signed by both

parties, two witnesses, and a notary declaring same. Both parties appeared in court

on August 24, 2012 and testified under oath that they understood the governing rules

and principles. After the hearing, the trial court rendered a judgment on August 24,

2012, reflecting that agreement. That judgment has not been appealed.

Additionally, the parties submitted a Consent Judgment of Partition of

Community Property on August 24, 2012, acknowledging the trial court’s judgment

of that same date and that their community property regime terminated on

August 24, 2012. In my opinion, however, the specific property that the parties

partitioned in connection with the 1995 partition and 2000 partition is, and has been

since the date of those documents, the parties’ separate property, as recognized in

the 2012 judgment, which accepts those partitions. Notably, the 1995 partition only

addresses community debt rather than community assets. Therefore, I believe that

the community property regime terminated on August 24, 2012, as specifically

stated in the trial court’s August 24, 2012 judgment, rather than June 15, 1994, as

determined by the trial court in its judgment rendered on November 15, 2017, and

affirmed by the majority of this court on appeal.

I further believe that the majority’s affirmation of the trial court’s

November 15, 2017 judgment creates a dangerous precedent by overturning a

decades-old statute and corresponding jurisprudence regarding how spouses

terminate their community property during marriage. Louisiana Civil Code Article

2329, which was enacted approximately forty years ago, provides the exclusive

procedure for spouses to terminate their community property during their marriage,

as follows: (1) spouses must file a joint petition to terminate their community; (2)

the trial court must find that the parties understand the rules and governing

principles, and; (3) the trial court must find that the termination serves their best

interests. “The formalities of Article[] 2329 . . . must be construed stricti juris

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because of the strong legislative policy against spouses giving up their community

rights during marriage without judicial supervision.” Deshotels v. Deshotels, 13-

1406, pp. 2-3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/5/14), 150 So.3d 541, 543-44. Only the August 24,

2012 judgment satisfies the requirements of La.Civ.Code art. 2329 as opposed to the

1995 partition and 2000 partition. Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court’s

judgment.

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STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
18-134

DARREL D. RYLAND

VERSUS

CONSTANCE RYLAND

Savoie, J. dissenting with written reasons.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion to affirm. Ms. Ryland’s

2016 Petition seeks to rescind the August 24, 2012 consent judgment for lesion under

La.Civ.Code art. 814. However, because an action under La.Civ.Code art. 814 is

available only to “an extrajudicial partition,” and not a consent judgment, Ms.

Ryland’s 2016 Petition fails to state a cause of action under La.Civ.Code art. 814.

See Wurtzel v. Wurtzel, 03-902 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/30/03), 864 So.2d 727, writ

denied, 04-280 (La. 3/26/04), 871 So.2d 353. An appellate court may notice on its

own motion a plaintiff’s failure to state a cause of action. La.Code Civ.P. art.

927(B). Therefore, I would dismiss Ms. Ryland’s 2016 Petition for no cause of

action.

In addition, while Ms. Ryland’s Petition does not specifically seek to nullify

the August 2012 judgment under La.Code Civ.P. art. 2004, even if the Petition is

construed as asserting such a claim, it would be barred by peremption. The 2016

Petition is based upon Ms. Ryland’s allegation that Mr. Ryland withheld from her

his intentions of filing a divorce during their discussions leading to the 2012 consent

judgment; however, Ms. Ryland acknowledges that Mr. Ryland filed for divorce in

2013. Therefore, any nullity action under La.Code Civ.P. art. 2004 asserted in the

2016 Petition is barred by the applicable one-year peremption period. See In re

Succession of Bernat, 13-277 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/9/13), 123 So.3d 1277, writ denied,

13-2640 (La. 2/7/14), 131 So.3d 865, and Knox v. W. Baton Rouge Credit, Inc., 08-

1818, (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/27/09), 9 So.3d 1020. Peremption may be noticed by the

appellate court on its own motion. La.Code Civ.P. art. 927(B). Therefore, I would

dismiss Ms. Ryland’s 2016 Petition for this reason as well.

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