McKinley Taylor v. Cajun Constructors, Inc.

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

18-237

MCKINLEY TAYLOR

VERSUS

CAJUN CONSTRUCTORS, INC.

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APPEAL FROM THE
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 2014-3448
HONORABLE ROBERT L. WYATT, DISTRICT JUDGE

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PHYLLIS M. KEATY
JUDGE

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Court composed of Phyllis M. Keaty, John E. Conery, and Van H. Kyzar, Judges.

APPEAL DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

J. Craig Jones
Jones & Hill, LLC
131 Highway 165 South
Oakdale, Louisiana 71463
(318) 335-1333
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee:
McKinley Taylor

Craig Ray Hill
Jones & Hill, LLC
Post Office Box 1260
Oberlin, Louisiana 70655
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee:
McKinley Taylor

Eric R. Miller
The Kullman Firm, APLC
4605 Bluebonnet Boulevard, Suite A
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70809
(225) 906-4250
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:
Cajun Constructors, Inc.

KEATY, Judge.

This court issued a rule ordering Appellant/Defendant, Cajun Constructors,

Inc., to show cause, by brief only, why its appeal should not be dismissed for lack

of a final judgment. See La.Code Civ.P. art. 2083. For the reasons that follow, we

dismiss the suspensive appeal, but remand the matter with instructions and for

supplementation.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff, McKinley Taylor, filed suit against Defendant for unpaid wages

during his employment with Defendant as a carpenter from March 16, 2012,

through March 19, 2013. Following a trial on the merits, on October 24, 2017, the

trial court issued a six-page untitled document which appears to be written reasons

for ruling as opposed to a final judgment. The trial court found therein that Taylor

was never paid a per diem upon which the parties had agreed for his first week of

work. The trial court also found that Defendant’s failure to pay the daily per diem

was not in good faith and awarded penalty wages and attorney fees as provided in

La.R.S. 23:632.

On December 4, 2017, Defendant filed a motion for suspensive appeal. The

order of appeal was signed on January 11, 2018. In due course, the record was

lodged in this court, at which time a rule was issued ordering Defendant to show

cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for the above-stated reason.

Defendant timely filed its brief in response to the rule wherein it acknowledges that

the October 24, 2017 written reasons for ruling did not contain the necessary

decretal language, “ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED,” as repeatedly

suggested by this court. See GBB Props. Two, LLC v. Stirling Props., LLC, 17-384

(La.App. 3 Cir. 7/5/17), 224 So.3d 1001; Barlow v. Barlow, 13-1092 (La.App. 3

Cir. 10/23/13), 161 So.3d 24; Parker v. S. Am. Ins. Co., 578 So.2d 1021 (La.App. 3

Cir.), rev’d on other grounds, 590 So.2d 55 (La.1991). Defendant also

acknowledges there is no separate document apart from the written reasons as

contemplated by La.Code Civ.P. art. 1918.

Defendant explained that, faced with the uncertainty of a delay period for

appealing the ruling as to liability, it “opted to preserve its right to appeal” the

October 24, 2017 ruling. Nevertheless, it agrees that the subject ruling “does not

appear to be a final appealable judgment according to this Court’s precedent.”

Defendant also notes that the trial court has not yet determined the amount of

attorney fees to be awarded. As such, Defendant requests that this court retain the

lodged record, dismiss the appeal without prejudice, and remand the case to the

trial court for the entry of a judgment, allowing reasonable time for the resolution

of the attorney fees issue and supplementation of the record with the matters being

docketed for final disposition by this court.

DISCUSSION

In Barlow, 161 So.3d at 26-27, this court addressed the exact issue herein:

“Appeals are taken from the judgment, not the written reasons
for judgment.” Greater New Orleans Expressway Comm’n v. Olivier,
02-2795, p. 3 (La.11/18/03), 860 So.2d 22, 24. “A final judgment
shall be identified as such by appropriate language. When written
reasons for the judgment are assigned, they shall be set out in an
opinion separate from the judgment.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 1918. “A
judgment and reasons for judgment are two separate and distinct
documents.” Olivier, 860 So.2d at 24. “A valid judgment must be
precise, definite, and certain. A final appealable judgment must
contain decretal language, and it must name the party in favor of
whom the ruling is ordered, the party against whom the ruling is
ordered, and the relief that is granted or denied.” State v. White, 05-
718, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/1/06), 921 So.2d 1144, 1146 (quoting
Jenkins v. Recovery Tech. Investors, 02-1788 (La.App. 1 Cir.
6/27/03), 858 So.2d 598) (citations omitted).

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1918 was enacted to
avoid confusion and recording of lengthy opinions. Hinchman v. Int’l
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 130, 292 So.2d 717
(La.1974). Thus, the trial court’s disregard of La.Code Civ.P. art.
1918 does not automatically nullify a judgment, and the article should
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not be applied mechanically. Id. As long as the instrument contains
the essentials of a judgment, it should be regarded as a valid
judgment. Id. In Hinchman, the court reasoned:

Except for the inclusion of reasons, this instrument
contains the essentials of a judgment. The document
rendered on December 14, 1972 determines the rights of
the parties and awards the relief to which they are
entitled. C.C.P. 1841. The final judgment was read and
signed by the judge in open court. C.C.P. 1911. The
instrument is identified as a final judgment by
appropriate language. C.C.P. 1918.

Id. at 719. Where an instrument titled “Reasons for Judgment” was
argued to constitute a judgment for the purposes of appellate delays,
this court reasoned:

We see a distinction in the facts of Hinchman and the
facts of the case before us. Here, the parties were not
alerted in the title, as they were in Hinchman, that what
followed was intended to be a judgment. The parties
might have reasonably assumed that the title “REASONS
FOR JUDGMENT” was meant to convey the fact that
reasons were all that was intended by the document.
Further, in Hinchman, the language of the judgment in
that case concluded with a formal decree employing the
words “IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED that. . . .” In the case before us the document
appears to be nothing more than reasons for judgment but
concludes with the one sentence reading: “Accordingly[,]
the exception of prescription is maintained and plaintiff’s
suit is dismissed at her costs.” While this language is no
doubt technically sufficient to constitute a valid decree,
we feel that it is of such an ambivalent nature following
what was so far reasons for judgment, that counsel were
not placed on adequate notice that the document was
intended to be a judgment.

Parker v. S. Am. Ins. Co., 578 So.2d 1021, 1023-24 (La.App. 3 Cir.),
rev’d on other grounds, 590 So.2d 55 (La.1991).

In the instant case, the document at issue has no title, but the notation

“WYATT, J,” the name of the trial judge, appears at the beginning of the six-page

document. The document discusses the law and evidence of the case and

concludes:

Applying the applicable law as it relates to amounts due and
potential penalties this Court determines that this employer – Cajun –
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failure to pay wages due - $75.00 per day per diem, was not in good
faith. The evidence clearly reflects that there was an acknowledged
confusion or reflection of disconnect between the person who hired
Taylor and the person who actually made the call of the eligibility for
per diem. Documentation clearly reflects that corrections were made
by Cajun to address the issue, but all without addressing the matter of
what had already been determined to have been an offer, and
subsequent failure to pay an employee. Applying the above referred
to penalty provision, Taylor is owed additional “wages” of $75.00 per
day per diem, for the week of March 16, 2012, with [sic] comes to an
addition [sic] $375.00. And for 90 days extra per diem which by this
court[’]s calculation is an additional $6,750.00. The matter of
attorney fees also provided for in LSA-R.S. 23:632, will be awarded.
Plaintiff counsel is permitted to submit a post trial attorney fee
application documenting counsel’s time and expenses which will be
considered by the Court with defense counsel given the opportunity to
address and/or dispute. All other Court costs to defendant.

We find that, because of the lack of a title on the aforementioned document,

it fails to alert the parties that what followed was intended to be a judgment. Thus,

the parties could have reasonably assumed that the document was intended to

convey only the trial court’s reasons for ruling. Additionally, in the absence of a

separate document and/or the lack of a formal decree employing the words “IT IS

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that. . . ,” we conclude that the

document appears to be nothing more than the trial court’s reasons for ruling.

Although the language may be technically sufficient to constitute a valid decree,

we find that parties were not placed on adequate notice that the document was

intended to be the final judgment.

Accordingly, we find that there was no final judgment from which

Defendant could appeal.

DECREE

For all the reasons given herein, this court lacks jurisdiction to consider the

merits of Defendant’s appeal without a final judgment. We dismiss this appeal

without prejudice and remand the matter to the trial court for the entry of a final

judgment. The trial court is instructed that a judgment shall be rendered within
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sixty days of the issuance of this opinion. In keeping with Simple Enterprises, Inc.

v. Texas Property, LLC, 17-222, p. 1 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/2/17) (unpublished

opinion), this record will “remain lodged in this court and the final judgment on

remand may be added to supplement this record.”

APPEAL DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. REMANDED WITH
INSTRUCTIONS.

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