Succession of Colleen McCalmont

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

CA 18-344

SUCCESSION OF COLLEEN MCCALMONT

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APPEAL FROM THE
NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF RAPIDES, NO. 43,462
HONORABLE MONIQUE FREEMAN RAULS, DISTRICT JUDGE

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BILLY HOWARD EZELL
JUDGE

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Court composed of John D. Saunders, Billy Howard Ezell, and Candyce G. Perret,
Judges.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART.

Michael Hathorn Davis
P.O. Drawer 12180
Alexandria, LA 71315
(318) 445-3621
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
James Addison McCalmont, III

Bernard Slattery Johnson
Cook, Yancey, King & Galloway
P. O. Box 22260
Shreveport, LA 71120-2260
(318) 221-6277
COUNSEL FOR OTHER APPELLEES:
Heard, McElroy & Vestal, LLC
Ben Woods

Roger Joseph Naus
Wiener, Weiss, & Madison
333 Texas Street, Suite 2350
Shreveport, LA 71101
(318) 226-9100
COUNSEL FOR OTHER APPELLEE:
Grant McCalmont

Curtis Ray Shelton
Ayres, Shelton, Williams, Benson, & Paine, LLC
Post Office Box 1764
Shreveport, LA 71166-1764
(318) 227-3500
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS:
Alexandria Management Systems,LLC
J. Mack Ind., LLC
McCalmont Ind., LLC
Premier Technical Plastics (Minden)LLC
James Addison McCalmont, III

William Alan Pesnell
Pesnell Law Firm
P. O. Box 1794
Shreveport, LA 71166-1794
(318) 226-5577
COUNSEL FOR OTHER APPELLEE:
James Addison McCalmont, IV

Mark Vilar
Aaron L. Green
Paul Boudreaux, Jr.
Vilar & Green, L.L.C.
P. O. Box 12730
Alexandria, LA 71315-2730
(318) 442-9533
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
James Addison McCalmont, IV, in his capacity as the independent
executor of the succession of Colleen Hawthorn McCalmont

Beverly A. DeLaune
Deutsch & Kerrigan
755 Magazine Street
New Orleans, LA 70130-3672
(504) 581-5141
COUNSEL FOR OTHER APPELLEES:
Wise, Martin & Cole, LLC
Michael Wise

Matthew Nowlin
Keiser Law Firm, PLC
P. O. Box 12358
Alexandria, LA 71315
(318) 443-6168
COUNSEL FOR OTHER APPELLEES:
Lauren McCalmont
James Addison McCalmont, IV
Payton McCalmont

EZELL, Judge.

James McCalmont III, appeals the decision of the trial court below ordering

the production of documents and entry onto land in favor of his son, James

McCalmont, IV, (hereinafter Jay), as part of the succession of his former wife,

Colleen McCalmont. For the following reasons, we reverse the judgment of the

trial court in part and affirm in part.

Mr. and Mrs. McCalmont were married in 1985 and had three children. Mrs.

McCalmont filed for divorce in August of 2016, but before the divorce was

finalized or community property partitioned, she passed away from a brain tumor

in February of 2017. Contentiousness from the divorce remained high among the

family and spilled into the current succession proceedings. Jay was appointed

executor of his mother’s estate. As part of his duties in preparing the succession’s

detailed descriptive list, Jay sought information from Mr. McCalmont regarding

property that was believed to be part of the McCalmonts’ community property

regime. After Mr. McCalmont refused to provide the information, Jay sought to

compel discovery, filing a motion to show cause for entry onto land and for

production of documents.

On December 4, 2017, the trial court heard the discovery dispute, ruling for

Jay. The trial court ordered Mr. McCalmont to produce several types of lists,

estimates of properties, as well as personal, financial, and business documents

relating to him, his community property, and businesses the couple had held an

interest in. The trial court further ordered Mr. McCalmont to allow Jay entry onto

certain properties for the purpose of appraising their values for the estate. From

that decision, Mr. McCalmont appeals.

On appeal, Mr. McCalmont asserts eight assignments of error, though there

is significant overlap between the assignments. For conciseness, we will address

the assignments of error in terms of the discovery ordered against Mr.

McCalmont’s business entities, and that ordered against him personally.

In ruling upon discovery matters, the trial court is vested with broad

discretion and, upon review, an appellate court should not disturb such rulings

absent a clear abuse of discretion. Sercovich v. Sercovich, 11-1780, (La.App. 4 Cir.

6/13/12), 96 So.3d 600.

Generally, a party may obtain discovery of any matter, not privileged, which

is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation, “including the

existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books,

documents, or other tangible things.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 1422. “Relevant

evidence is ‘evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is

of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable

than it would be without the evidence.” Sercovich, 96 So.3d at 603 (quoting

La.Code Evid. art. 401. “The test of discoverability is not whether the particular

information sought will be admissible at trial, but whether the information sought

appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”

Wollerson v. Wollerson, 29,183, p. 2 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1/22/97), 687 So.2d 663, 665.

It is well-established in Louisiana jurisprudence that discovery statutes are to

be liberally and broadly construed to achieve certain basic objectives of the

discovery process:

(1) to afford all parties a fair opportunity to obtain facts pertinent to
pending litigation, (2) to discover the true facts and compel disclosure
of these facts wherever they may be found, (3) to assist litigants in
preparing for trial, (4) to narrow and clarify the issues between the
parties, and (5) to facilitate and expedite the legal process by

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encouraging settlement or abandonment of less than meritorious
claims.

Hodges v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 433 So.2d 125, 129 (La.1983).

However, there are limitations on discovery, particularly “when justice requires

that a party or other person be protected from annoyance, embarrassment,

oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Stolzle v. Safety & Systems Assur.

Consultants, Inc., 02-1197, p. 2 (La. 5/24/02), 819 So.2d 287, 289. In addition,

Louisiana jurisprudence has required a showing of relevancy and good cause by a

party seeking production of records from a non-party. Id. “An appellate court must

balance the information sought in light of the factual issues involved and the

hardships that would be caused by the court’s order when determining whether the

trial court erred in ruling on a discovery order.” Wollerson, 687 So.2d at 665.

Accordingly, we will review the trial court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion.

DISCOVERY OF LLC DOCUMENTS

Mr. McCalmont first argues that specific provisions of the Louisiana

Limited Liability Companies Act, La.R.S. 12:1301-12:1270, expressly restrict an

assignee of a membership interest in an LLC to statutorily limited rights that

specifically do not include the right to inspect the records of the LLC. He asserts

that the trial court abused its discretion in granting Jay’s motion to compel and

ordering the production of certain financial documents of the involved LLCs. He

further argues that the operating agreement for J-Mack Industries specifically

restricts assignees of a member from inspecting records. We must find merit in Mr.

McCalmont’s argument.

An operating agreement, whether written or oral, governs the operation of

the LLC. La.R.S. 12:1330. In the absence of such an agreement, the default

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provisions of the Louisiana Limited Liability Companies Act govern. Susan

Kalinka, Limited Liability Companies and Partnerships, 9 Louisiana Civil Law

Treatise § 1.5, 16 (3d ed.2001). After a review of the record before this court, the

only operating agreement in evidence dealing with the keeping of business records

and the rights of assignees was that of J-Mack Industries. The record is silent

regarding the remaining LLCs as to their operating agreements and those issues;

therefore, we must apply the default provisions of the Louisiana Limited Liability

Companies Act. The LLCs, other than J-Mack, will be discussed separately below.

J-Mack Industries

An operating agreement is contractual in nature; thus, it binds the members

of the LLC as written and is interpreted pursuant to contract law. Powertrain of

Shreveport, L.L.C. v. Stephenson, 49,327 (La.App. 2 Cir. 10/1/14), 149 So.3d 1274;

La.Civ.Code art.1983. In Henderson v. Sellers, 01-529, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 3 Cir.

12/5/01), 815 So.2d 853, 856, we explained the law pertaining to contractual

interpretation:

The interpretive purpose is to determine the common intent of the
parties. La.Civ.Code art.2045. In attempting to determine that
common intent, we may not seek a different interpretation “when the
words of a contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd
consequences.” La.Civ.Code art.2046. However, if words of a
contract are susceptible of different meanings, we must interpret them
in the manner that “best conforms to the object of the contract.”
La.Civ.Code art.2048. We are required to interpret a doubtful
provision “in light of the nature of the contract, equity, usages, the
conduct of the parties before and after the formation of the contract,
and of other contracts of a like nature between the same parties.”
La.Civ.Code art.2053. Additionally, where the doubt created by a
contract provision cannot be removed, we must interpret that
provision against the party who furnished it. La.Civ.Code art.2056.

The determination of whether the words of a contract are clear and explicit

or ambiguous is a question of law. Thus, an appellate court’s determination on

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review is whether the trial court interpreted the contract correctly or incorrectly.

Hebert v. Ins. Ctr., Inc., 97-298 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/7/98), 706 So.2d 1007, writ

denied, 98-353 (La. 3/27/98), 716 So.2d 888.

The operating agreement of J-Mack Industries states in section 6.1, Books

and Records, that certain records, including several sought by Jay, are to be

maintained and to be available to “any Member or an assignee of an Interest.”

However, the operating agreement more specifically states in section 8.5, Rights of

Unadmitted Assignees, that:

A person who acquires all or any portion of an Interest but who
is not admitted as a Substituted Member . . . shall be entitled only to
allocations and distributions with respect to such interest . . . but shall
have no right to any information or accounting of the affairs of the
company, shall not be entitled to inspect the books or records of the
company, and shall not have any of the rights of a Member.

We are required by La.Civ.Code art. 2050 to interpret each contractual

provision in light of the other provisions in order to arrive at the meaning of the

contract as a whole. Interpreting the clauses in the manner that best conforms to

the object of the contract, we are forced to conclude that Jay, as an assignee, has

“no right to any information or accounting of the affairs of the company, shall not

be entitled to inspect the books or records of the company, and shall not have any

of the rights of a Member.” To ignore that clear, specific provision of section 8.5

in favor of the more generally worded records provision would simply eliminate

the effects of section 8.5 entirely and would be an absurd reading of the contract as

a whole.

Accordingly, it is clear the operating agreement of J-Mack Industries

prohibits Jay from receiving the tax, financial, and other such information the trial

court ordered the entities to produce. Therefore, Jay was not entitled to that

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information and the trial court abused its discretion in ordering J-Mack Industries

to produce those documents. The trial court’s order compelling J-Mack Industries

to produce those documents is, therefore, reversed.

The remaining LLCs

Having discussed the specific operating agreement of J-Mack Industries, we

now turn to the Louisiana Limited Liability Companies Act, which governs the

remaining companies, whose operating agreements were silent as to the rights of

assignees of member interests. Louisiana Revised Statutes 12:1333(A) states:

Except as otherwise provided in the articles of organization or a
written operating agreement, if a member who is an individual dies . . .
the member’s membership ceases and the member’s executor,
administrator, guardian, conservator, or other legal representative
shall be treated as an assignee of such member’s interest in the limited
liability company.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 12:1332(A)(2) reads: “Until the assignee of an interest

in a limited liability company becomes a member, the assignor shall continue to be

a member.”

[Thus] the LLC statute recognizes only one form of interest
transfer, an assignment. Even when the disposition of an interest is
involuntary, as in the case of death or a charging order by a judgment
creditor, the person acquiring rights with respect to the interest of the
deceased or debtor member is treated strictly as an assignee of the
interest involved. An assignee of an LLC interest is entitled to receive
only those distributions and allocations of profits, losses, and tax
items that the assignor member would otherwise have received. The
assignee may not vote or otherwise participate in the management of
the LLC unless and until he is actually admitted to membership in the
LLC—a step that requires the unanimous consent in writing of the
other members of the LLC

Wendell H. Holmes and Glenn G. Morris, 8 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise,

Business Organizations § 44:20 (2018)(footnotes omitted).

[B]ifurcation of membership rights occurs when a member (the
assignor) transfers an interest in the LLC, whether by voluntary sale,
seizure, or death. The recipient of a transferred interest (the assignee)

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is immediately vested with the financial rights associated with that
interest. The assignee is only entitled to the financial rights that the
assignor was entitled to receive, unless and until the assignee is
admitted as a member to the LLC. As a result, the management rights
remain vested with the assignor, even if deceased, until the assignee is
admitted as a member to the LLC. Such admission requires the
unanimous consent of the remaining members.

William A. Neilson, Uncertainty in Death and Taxes-the Need to Reform

Louisiana’s Limited Liability Company Laws, 60 Loy. L. Rev. 33, 36

(2014)(footnotes omitted).

In our review of Louisiana jurisprudence, there appears to be only one case

that is directly on point with the matter before this Court. In Kinkle v. R.D.C,

L.L.C., 04-1092 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/8/04), 889 So.2d 405, plaintiff was the personal

representative of the estate of a deceased LLC member. There, the plaintiff sought

a declaratory judgment against the LLC, seeking judgment declaring that the estate

was entitled to its share of distributions and to an accounting of all the LLC’s

activities since the member’s death. Citing La.R.S. 12:1333, this court found that

plaintiff, as the representative of the deceased member, became an assignee of

decedent’s membership interest in the LLC. Id. Applying the provisions relating to

the assignment of a membership interest, especially La.R.S. 12:1330, this court

found that while the estate was entitled to any distributions to which decedent was

due, it was not entitled to an accounting of the distributions. The court found that

plaintiff, “as an assignee, is not entitled to inspect [the LLC’s] records, since this

action is reserved for members of the LLC.” Kinkle, 889 So.2d at 413. In the

instant case, we likewise apply the specific provisions of the Louisiana Limited

Liability Companies Act and find that Jay, as an assignee, is not entitled to inspect

any of the business and financial records he seeks from the LLCs, because that

right is reserved for members of the LLC.

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We agree with Professors Holmes and Morris that “the LLC statute manages

to combine the worst features of both corporation and partnership law. . . . and

creates a form of property that, under the default rules of LLC law, has little

transferable value.” Wendell H. Holmes and Glenn G. Morris, 8 Louisiana Civil

Law Treatise, Business Organizations § 44:20 (2018). We further note that the law

as written allows for the creation of situations whereby an assignee of a deceased

member’s rights, while due distributions, may never be able to see company

records to ensure he is actually receiving those distributions in full, because

remaining members can simply withhold records that would show what, if

anything, may be owed. However, the Limited Liability Companies Act and the

limited jurisprudence dealing with the transfer issue before us clearly limit what

Jay, as an assignee, is entitled to. While Jay and the estate may be entitled to

distributions from the LLCs, they are not entitled to the records which they seek.

Accordingly, we must again find that the trial court abused its discretion in

ordering the LLCs at issue to provide any business, financial, and tax records to

Jay and the estate. The granting of all discovery orders and motions to compel

regarding the tax returns, daily journals, cash receipts, company credit card

statements, financial statements, property deeds, and any other business records of

the LLCs are hereby reversed.

PERSONAL, FINANCIAL, AND OTHER NON-LLC INFORMATION

Mr. McCalmont next asserts several assignments of error concerning

discovery ordered involving him personally, the former community, and

documents relating to a family trust. We will deal with each briefly, as each item

sought requires the same showing and review. To reiterate, in order to be granted

the information sought, Louisiana jurisprudence only requires Jay show relevancy

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and good cause. Stolzle, 819 So.2d 287. The information sought need only appear

reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Wollerson,

687 So.2d 663. We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting

the discovery sought by Jay.

Mr. McCalmont claims the trial court erred in ordering him to provide

financial records, including credit card statements, dating back to 2011. William

Cole testified as an expert certified public accountant. He stated that the bank and

credit card records were needed to determine the value of community bank

accounts and to determine if any reimbursement claims existed for the estate

against Mr. McCalmont. Applying the discovery statutes liberally and broadly, as

required by Hodges, 433 So.2d 125, we cannot find an abuse of the trial court’s

discretion based on this testimony.

Mr. McCalmont next claims the trial court erred in ordering him to provide

documents relating to the McCalmont Family Trust. Mr. McCalmont laughably

claims that there was no evidence to show that Mrs. McCalmont’s estate had any

interest in the trust. It is obvious that the point of discovery is to gather evidence

to determine if the estate did have any interest therein. Mr. McCalmont is seeking

to deny trust information to Jay on the basis of Jay’s lack of information regarding

that trust. To the contrary, Mr. Cole testified that information regarding the trust

was relevant to the succession proceedings, especially as pertaining to estate and

gift tax purposes. Based on that testimony, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in ordering discovery regarding the trust.

Mr. McCalmont further maintains that the trial court erred in ordering him to

produce records regarding expenses surrounding his paramour during the existence

of the former community. Mr. Cole testified that this information could be used in

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the estate seeking a reimbursement claim against Mr. McCalmont for the use of

community funds for a purpose that certainly would not have served common

community interests. As any reimbursement claim would be an estate asset, it

would certainly be relevant to the succession. The trial court, therefore, did not

abuse its discretion in ordering discovery regarding any expenses relating to

Kimberly Ilercil.

Mr. McCalmont alleges that the trial court erred in ordering him to value

movable property that may be assets of the succession by way of the former

community. Mr. McCalmont acts as if he is a completely disinterested third party

to his former wife’s succession, despite the fact that the community property

regime had just been terminated roughly three months before Mrs. McCalmont’s

death, their divorce had not yet been finalized, and community property had not

been partitioned. Mr. Cole testified that it was common on smaller assets to use

statements to determine value for tax purposes, rather than the appraisals required

of more significant assets. Mr. McCalmont was by all accounts the manager of the

family finances and property, and him producing the items sought and values

therefor should not be the hardship he claims it to be. The trial court did not abuse

its discretion in ordering Mr. McCalmont to value the listed movable properties, as

any value would certainly be relevant to Mrs. McCalmont’s succession.

Finally, Mr. McCalmont avers that the trial court erred in allowing Jay

access to immovable property to view, photograph, and appraise the properties and

any movables thereon that could be community property. Mr. Cole again testified

that access to the properties was necessary to inspect and value the properties for

tax purposes. This testimony was unrefuted. Again, applying the discovery

statutes liberally and broadly, we can find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion.

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The record before this court establishes that Jay has good cause to seek

information regarding each personal and financial item referenced above and the

information sought could lead to admissible evidence relevant to the succession.

Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the production

of the discovery sought. The trial court’s rulings as to all production regarding Mr.

McCalmont both personally and as manager of the former community are hereby

affirmed.

For the above reasons, we hereby reverse the judgment of the trial court

below granting any and all discovery ordered as to the LLCs the McCalmonts had

any interest in. We affirm the judgment in all other respects. Costs of this appeal

are hereby assessed against Mr. McCalmont.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART.

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