CA-0018-0370 Nonprecedential Affirmed Processed

Leon J. Arceneaux v. Citgo Petroleum Corporation

Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit · Filed January 9, 2019

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Opinion text

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

CA 18-370 consolidated with CA 18-371, CA 18-372

LEON J. ARCENEAUX, ET AL.

VERSUS

CITGO PETROLEUM CORPORATION, ET AL.

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 2007-2879 c/w 2007-3392 and 2007-3052
HONORABLE RONALD F. WARE, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

CANDYCE G. PERRET
JUDGE

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Court composed of John D. Saunders, Billy Howard Ezell, and Candyce G. Perret,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Robert E. Landry
Kevin P. Fontenot
Scofield, Gerard, Pohorelsky, Gallaugher & Landry
901 Lakeshore Drive, #900
Lake Charles, LA 70601
(337) 433-9436
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT:
CITGO Petroleum Corporation

Craig Isenberg
Kyle W. Siegel
Joshua O. Cox
Barrasso Usdin Kupperman Freeman & Sarver, LLC
909 Poydras, Ste 2400
New Orleans, LA 70112
(504) 589-9700
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT:
CITGO Petroleum Corporation

Marshall Joseph Simien, Jr.
Simien Law Firm
One Lakeshore Drive, Suite 1110
Lake Charles, LA 70629
(337) 497-0022
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT:
CITGO Petroleum Corporation

Wells Talbot Watson
Jake D. Buford
Bagget, McCall , Burgess, Watson & Gaughan
3006 Country Club Road
Lake Charles, LA 70605
(337) 478-8888
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE:
Rickey Haley
Gardenia Amos
Sara Stevens
Bill Peltier
Linda Harris

Richard Elliott Wilson
Somer G. Brown
Cox, Cox, Filo, Camel & Wilson, LLC
723 Broad Street
Lake Charles, LA 70601
(337) 436-6611
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE:
Sara Stevens
Gardenia Amos

Linda Harris
Rickey Haley

Kirk Albert Patrick, III
Heath Savant
Donahue, Patrick & Scott
450 Laurel St., Suite 1600
Baton Rouge, LA 70801
(225) 214-1908
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT:
R & R Construction, Inc.

PERRET, Judge.

This case is one of many stemming from the well-documented CITGO slop

oil release and air release that occurred at its Calcasieu Parish Refinery on June 19,

2006. Defendant-Appellant CITGO Petroleum Corporation (“CITGO”) appeals

the trial court’s judgment finding causation and awarding damages in favor of six

Plaintiffs: Sarah Stevens, Linda Harris, Ricky Haley, Gardenia Amos, and Patrick

Richard, individually, and on behalf of his minor son, Logan Richard. CITGO also

appeals the trial court’s judgment awarding Plaintiff Leon Arceneaux damages for

fear of future injury. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

On June 19, 2006, CITGO had two tremendous releases from its facility, an

air release and a slop oil release. The slop oil release is at issue in this appeal. The

supreme court in Arabie v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 10-2605, pp. 1-2 (La.

3/13/12), 89 So.3d 307, 310-11, summarized the event as follows:

On the night of June 18 and the morning of June 19, 2006,
southwest Louisiana experienced a severe rainstorm. As a
consequence of the storm, the stormwater drainage and storage
system, including the wastewater treatment facility, at the Lake
Charles, Louisiana, refinery of defendant, CITGO Petroleum
Company (CITGO), was filled beyond available capacity and
overflowed, resulting in a major oil spill. The system was designed to
collect the water used in day-to-day operations at the refinery and the
runoff from most areas of the refinery due to rainfall.

....

Over 21 million gallons of waste, including 17 million gallons
of contaminated wastewater and 4.2 million gallons of slop oil,
escaped from the two existing wastewater storage tanks into an area
around the tanks which was surrounded by levees or dikes. . . . Of the
4.2 million gallons of slop oil which escaped, over 1 million gallons
were released into the Calcasieu River. . . . The oil spill, which was
described at trial as “major” and “catastrophic,” eventually
contaminated over 100 miles of shoreline along the Calcasieu River,
and required several months to clean up.

CITGO’s Material Safety Data Sheet (“MSDS”) for slop oil, dated March

29, 2006, indicates that slop oil is amber to dark amber in color and has an odor

similar to rotten eggs. Additionally, the MSDS states that slop oil is “Extremely

Flammable and Poisonous” and that it “Contains Benzene – Cancer Hazard. Can

Cause leukemia and other blood disorders.” The MSDS explains that CITGO’s

slop oil is typically composed of eleven chemicals and describes the different signs

and symptoms of acute exposure through inhalation, eye contact, skin contact, and

ingestion, as well as the chronic health effects, conditions that may be aggravated

by exposure, target organs, and the carcinogenic potential.

CITGO has stipulated to its fault in the release. Plaintiffs at issue in this

appeal worked and socialized in areas they alleged the slop oil contaminated. They

assert injuries as a result of their exposure to the toxic chemicals in the slop oil.

At trial, Plaintiffs gave live testimony. Expert testimony was submitted via

video depositions and exhibits, which included prior trial testimony and prior

depositions in the other CITGO litigation cases and expert reports. Plaintiffs’

medical records, with the exception of the Richards, were also admitted into

evidence.

On March 30, 2017, the trial court ruled in favor of Plaintiffs on causation

and damages. In a judgment dated September 20, 2017, the court awarded expert

fees, trial prep fees, and judicial interest from the date of judicial demand. It also

awarded damages to Plaintiffs as follows:1

1
The damages mentioned are only for those Plaintiffs currently on appeal. The trial court
also awarded damages for nine other plaintiffs whose damages CITGO is not appealing. With
the exception of Leon Arceneaux’s fear of future illness award, CITGO is not appealing the
exposure cases of any Plaintiffs who worked at Calcasieu Refining Company (“CRC”) at the
time of the spill or who were involved in the clean-up.

2

• Leon Arceneaux was awarded $40,492.00, which accounts for
pain and suffering ($23,000.00), loss of enjoyment of life
($10,000.00), fear of future illness ($7,000.00), and medical
expenses ($492.00). Only the award for fear of future illness is
challenged on appeal.

• Sarah Stevens was awarded $36,150.00, which accounts for pain
and suffering ($21,000.00), loss of enjoyment of life ($5,000.00),
fear of future illness ($10,000.00), and medical expenses
($150.00).

• Ricky Haley was awarded $8,200.00, which accounts for pain and
suffering ($6,000.00), loss of enjoyment of life ($2,000.00), fear of
future illness ($0.00), and medical expenses ($200.00).

• Linda Harris was awarded $52,200.00, which accounts for pain
and suffering ($32,000.00), loss of enjoyment of life ($10,000.00),
fear of future illness ($10,000.00), and medical expenses
($200.00).

• Patrick Richard was awarded $7,000.00, which accounts for pain
and suffering ($4,000.00), loss of enjoyment of life ($3,000.00),
fear of future illness ($0.00), and medical expenses ($0.00).

• Patrick Richard for the benefit of his minor son, Logan
Richard, was awarded $4,000.00, which accounts for pain and
suffering ($3,000.00), loss of enjoyment of life ($1,000.00), fear of
future illness ($0.00), and medical expenses ($0.00).

• Gardenia Amos was awarded $41,400.00, which accounts for
pain and suffering ($25,000.00), loss of enjoyment of life
($6,000.00), fear of future illness ($10,000.00), and medical
expenses ($400.00).

CITGO filed a motion for suspensive appeal, which the district court

granted, and timely posted bond on October 18, 2017. CITGO now appeals

asserting three assignments of error:

1. The [trial] court erred in finding that six of the plaintiffs [Sara
Stevens, Ricky Haley, Linda Harris, Patrick Richard, Logan
Richard, and Gardenia Amos,] proved causation, because they
failed to present expert testimony or other objective evidence that
they were exposed to chemicals released by CITGO.[] Plaintiffs’
unscientific testimony about detecting an unusual odor or seeing an
oily substance in the water, and experiencing common symptoms
such as headaches or sinus congestion, is insufficient, in the

3

absence of expert testimony, to establish exposure to CITGO’s
chemicals.

2. The [trial] court erred in awarding damages for fear of future
illness to two plaintiffs – Leon Arceneaux and Gardenia Amos –
who did not testify that they had any fears or concerns for their
future health. These awards should be reversed based on the lack
of any supporting evidence.

3. The [trial] court erred in awarding damages for loss of enjoyment
of life to five plaintiffs, [Ms. Harris, Ms. Amos, Mr. Haley, Mr.
Richard, and Logan Richard,] because they did not testify or offer
any other evidence about whether and how their quality of life
diminished because of their alleged exposure-related injuries.[]
These awards should be reversed based on the lack of supporting
evidence.

DISCUSSION:

On appeal, this court may not set aside a trial court’s factual findings absent

manifest error or unless the trial court was clearly wrong. Stobart v. State,

Through DOTD, 617 So.2d 880 (La.1993); Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840

(La.1989). To reverse a trial court’s factual findings, the appellate court must

apply a two-tiered test when reviewing the facts and must find that (1) the record

does not establish a reasonable factual basis for the finding of the trial court, and

(2) “the record establishes that the finding of the trial court is clearly wrong

(manifestly erroneous).” Bradford v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 17-296, p. 4

(La.App. 3 Cir. 1/10/18), 237 So.3d 648, 658-59, writ denied, 18-272 (La.

5/11/18), 241 So.3d 314. However, “[i]f the trial court’s findings are reasonable in

light of the record reviewed in its entirety, the appellate court may not reverse.”

Arabie, 89 So.3d at 312. Thus, “when there are two permissible views of the

evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous.”

Id.

4

Assignment of Error Number One:

In its first assignment of error, CITGO argues that the six non-CRC

(Calcasieu Refining Company) Plaintiffs did not prove causation. CITGO argues

that Plaintiffs failed to present expert testimony or other objective evidence that

they were exposed to chemicals released by CITGO and that the alleged exposure

was the cause of their symptoms. Additionally, CITGO argues that Dr. Steve

Springer’s medical causation testimony does not establish exposure, but instead

assumes exposure. Finally, CITGO argues that Plaintiffs were in locations where

exposure to CITGO’s slop oil was implausible and that the evidence is undisputed

that oil did not arrive where Plaintiffs were located.

In Arabie, 89 So.3d at 321, the supreme court explained that “[t]he test for

determining the causal relationship between the tortious conduct and subsequent

injuries is whether the plaintiff proved through medical testimony that it was more

probable than not that subsequent injuries were caused by the accident.” Causation

is a factual finding subject to the manifest error standard of review. Bradford, 237

So.3d 648. In Bradford, 237 So.3d at 659 (citations omitted), this court explained:

“Proof of causation in toxic tort cases has two components, general and specific.

‘General causation’ refers to whether a substance is capable of causing a particular

injury or condition in the general population, while ‘specific causation’ refers to

whether a substance caused a particular individual’s injury.” After a review of

various cases, this court concluded that the “cases only establish that expert

testimony on causation is required.” Id.

CITGO suggests that this panel should not follow Bradford, 237 So.3d 648

in determining whether causation was sufficiently proven, arguing that the

Bradford decision conflicts with earlier jurisprudence requiring expert testimony in

5

chemical exposure cases for both general and specific causation. Additionally,

CITGO argues that the Bradford decision incorrectly finds that Dr. Springer’s

expert testimony satisfied the specific causation requirement because his medical

opinions assumed that exposure was established.

In Bradford, general causation was established by Dr. Barry Levy, the

plaintiffs’ occupational and environmental health physician and epidemiologist

expert. Dr. Levy testified via prior deposition and trial testimony regarding

numerous epidemiology studies that involved people working around or living in

the vicinity of oil spills to help explain the association between exposure and

symptoms of exposure. Mr. Frank Parker, the plaintiffs’ industrial hygienist

expert, was also submitted as a general causation expert. Mr. Parker testified

regarding the toxicity of the chemicals spilled, how they are released, and the

symptoms and health effects that occur in people who are exposed to those

chemicals. Finally, the Bradford court reviewed CITGO’s MSDS and significant

events reports, which it used to establish the parameters of the CITGO release. To

establish specific causation, the plaintiffs submitted their own testimony as well as

medical testimony from Dr. Robert Looney and Dr. Steve Springer, who related

the plaintiffs’ symptoms to slop oil exposure.

Similarly, this court in Broussard v. Multi-Chem Group, LLC, 17-985, p. 34

(La.App. 3 Cir. 7/11/18), __ So.3d __,2 reviewed evidence “in the face of

limitations in the available data” as Multi-Chem failed to conduct sufficient air

monitoring of a release following an explosion at the Multi-Chem facility. This

court reviewed expert testimony regarding the amount and nature of the chemicals

stored at the facility; expert testimony regarding the direction of the smoke plume

2
2018 WL 5116943.

6

generated by the explosion; expert testimony that if a plaintiff smelled or tasted the

smoke or chemicals and thereafter suffered from certain symptoms, those plaintiffs

were likely exposed to the chemicals; the plaintiffs’ testimony regarding their

symptoms, location, and experience; and medical expert testimony regarding

causation for those plaintiffs who sought medical treatment. Thereafter, this court

affirmed the finding of causation.

The supreme court has denied writs on the Bradford decision. We find no

error with the Bradford court’s analysis of the jurisprudence on causation.

Therefore, reliance on Bradford is not misplaced.

As in Bradford and Multi-Chem, Plaintiffs in this case provided expert

testimony establishing general causation and provided medical testimony

establishing specific causation. Furthermore, each Plaintiff testified regarding

when they were exposed to the slop oil and their contemporaneous or near-

contemporaneous symptoms, which are consistent with those expected from slop

oil exposure, as Plaintiffs’ experts previously testified.

Mr. Parker testified regarding general causation and exposure through his

prior trial testimony, depositions, and reports. He testified regarding how far the

slop oil and wastewater traveled, the hazardous nature of the chemicals in the slop

oil, and the procedures that CITGO should have implemented at the time of the

release. Although Mr. Parker issued a report dated December 6, 2016, discussing

his opinions regarding the CRC plaintiffs, he did not address the non-CRC

Plaintiffs at issue on appeal.

Mr. Parker did not specifically opine on Plaintiffs’ locations in this case.

However, Mr. Parker’s April 28, 2016 deposition, taken in lieu of live testimony

for the Bradford case, was admitted into evidence. In the Bradford deposition, Mr.

7

Parker agreed that it took approximately two days for an oil sheen to reach CRC,

which was roughly two to two and a half miles south of CITGO, and that heavier

parts arrived sometime around June 23, 2006. Additionally, Mr. Parker agreed that

he previously opined that oil product reached Talens Marine, roughly four to four

and a half miles south of CITGO, several days after the release. He also recalled

that the oil remained around CRC for three to four weeks. Furthermore, although

pressed by defense counsel, Mr. Parker would not give an opinion regarding when

the oil travelled beyond the mouth of the Indian Marias. He did admit, based on

the documents in the record at the time of his deposition, that he did not see any

evidence that slop oil migrated north of the I-210 bridge. However, it was also Mr.

Parker’s understanding that CITGO controlled the monitoring of the release, what

to monitor, and what information was given out regarding the release.

Upon reviewing a colored map showing the different degrees of oil found in

the area, Mr. Parker noted that, as of July 3, 2006, there was moderate oil on the

east side of the I-210 bridge as well as moderate oil at Prien Lake. However, he

was unable to form an opinion regarding when the oil reached these locations

because he had not seen any documents reporting that information.

Additionally, Mr. Parker’s report written for the Cormier trial, and admitted

into evidence in this case, noted that no waste oil from CITGO was reported in the

I-210 area or Big Lake area, but he also clarified that he did not doubt the

plaintiffs’ reports of smelling an odor or experiencing symptoms consistent with

slop oil exposure. Instead, he could not provide an opinion concerning the

significance of their exposure at that time.3

3
Specifically, Mr. Parker opined as follows:

8

Mr. Parker also opined on slop oil’s composition, toxicity, and

characteristics during his April 28, 2016 Bradford deposition. Mr. Parker

explained that slop oil is a complex mixture of chemicals without an exposure

standard. CITGO recommended fresh air breathing protection if there was any

potential exposure to slop oil. Importantly, he explained that when you smell

benzene, you have been overexposed. Specifically, he stated:

Q. And if you smell benzene, you’re overexposed; right?

A. Yes, no question about that.

Mr. Parker further likened how benzene reacts in slop oil to sugar in iced

tea; it does not become absorbed into the water but instead still exists as benzene.

Therefore, when the water is exposed or disturbed, the benzene will start to

“evolve off of the water” and droplets of mist containing the chemicals are released

anew. Mr. Parker also explained that slop oil would have the sheen people

typically relate to oil in water, but it would also appear as a mousse, which is a

mixture of the slop oil, water, and air. Furthermore, due to this mousse

consistency, the hazardous material would not necessarily be liberated early in the

release; instead, it is a continuing problem.

Mr. Parker notes that his opinion regarding the release of chemicals in slop

oil is consistent with CITGO’s spill-related reports he reviewed showing high peak

8. Mr. Boutte was working several miles up the river from the Indian
Marias where the waste oil entered the Calcasieu River. I find no reports that
significant waste oil contamination from the CITGO release made it to his
location. This was a massive release which exposed the entire region to vaporous
emissions so I have no doubt that Mr. Boutte’s testimony is true. However, I
cannot form any opinion at this time concerning the significance of his exposure;
and
9. [redacted] were fishing under the I-210 Bridge also several miles
upstream from the Indian Marias. While they report a “film” and an “oily sheen”
on the water I find no reports that significant waste oil contamination from the
CITGO release made it to their location. I do not doubt their testimony
concerning what they saw and smelled. However, at this time I cannot form an
opinion concerning the significance of their exposures.

9

days later on, such as a nine parts per million reading of benzene taken on the Sea

Bolt Trader ship on June 22, 2006, CITGO’s industrial hygienist’s documents

showing peak VOCs [volatile organic compounds] and peak H2S [hydrogen

sulfide] levels around the Fourth of July, and reports of higher readings for

chemicals later in the clean-up process.

Additionally, Mr. Parker stressed that the concern in the slop oil release is

not only benzene, but all the other chemicals making up the slop oil. The body is

not only exposed to volatile chemicals but can be exposed to everything in the

mixture when that mixture is disturbed and, for example, results in a mist. In

reaching his opinion, Mr. Parker reviewed a document dated July 12, 2006, nearly

three weeks after the release, in which a PAH [polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbons]

odor and sheen was described. Mr. Parker explains that PAHs are big molecules

and components of slop oil; many are known carcinogens. When the soil was

probed in mid-July, there was a PAH odor, which is consistent with his opinion

that once something is contaminated, it is never all recovered, and also consistent

with his opinion that the body may be exposed to volatile chemicals when the

mixture is disturbed.

Mr. Parker further noted that workers within the plant generally withstand

more exposure than people in the community. Additionally, there is a concept

called “individual susceptibility” which acknowledges that some people are more

susceptible to certain insults than others.

Dr. Levy testified regarding general causation through a prior deposition,

trial testimony, and reports. He explained the symptoms expected in individuals

exposed to a slop oil release and supported his opinion with a plethora of scientific

10

literature. In forming his opinions, Dr. Levy looked at studies related to the health

outcomes and health risks of petroleum spills.

For example, Dr. Levy reviewed the effects of the Tasman Spirit oil spill on

the residents of Karachi, Pakistan, and Dr. Levy opined that the court could look at

this study to support general causation for what type of problems are caused by

petroleum spill exposure. The study reported that six weeks after the spill, a smell

was still perceptible approximately one kilometer away. Dr. Levy noted that,

following the spill, those residents reported symptoms including skin irritation,

nausea, headaches, dizziness, irritability, fatigue, and eye and respiratory

symptoms.

He also looked at the Prestige oil spill study which found headaches,

dizziness, eye and throat irritation, and respiratory problems were reported by the

crude oil clean-up workers after the spill. These acute effects are similar to and

consistent with those of other spills. A follow-up study of the Prestige spill

reported respiratory problems five years later.

Dr. Levy further agreed that each individual’s susceptibility to a release

varies, and people react differently for certain environmental effects. This was

consistent with Mr. Parker’s testimony.

Plaintiffs also submitted testimony from Dr. Steve Springer and Dr. Robert

Looney. Dr. Looney testified to general causation via his March 6, 2015

deposition in the Cormier case. Dr. Looney practices occupational medicine and

has experience in the fields of general, environmental, and occupational medicine.

In forming his opinions on general causation, he reviewed several versions of

CITGO’s MSDS for slop oil, medical records, the deposition of CITGO’s

toxicologist, Dr. Kenneth Washburn, and scientific literature related to petroleum

11

spills. He opined that there were four reasons for his conclusion that the slop oil

release caused injuries: (1) “Scientific studies support the fact that chemical[s]

released by Citgo cause injury[,]” (2) The MSDS from Citgo also “indicates strong

evidence that the release was toxic[,]” (3) “The fact that so many statements from

victims were so similar[,]” and (4) “The timing of [the] onset of symptoms was

very strong evidence.” Additionally, in response to the question, whether “the only

real way to determine a person’s actual exposure was through personal

monitoring,” he stated that:

A. You can’t tell what they were exposed to without
personal monitoring or the amount of exposure but by history of
several ways in history that you do -- for instance, these people were
exposed to a particular substance. If that substance was present in
their presence at that time, then I think – and their symptoms pertains
to that, I think it’s reasonable to come to the conclusion that it was a
cause and effect.

Furthermore, Dr. Steve Springer testified by video deposition regarding each

Plaintiff to establish specific causation. In forming his opinions about each

Plaintiff, Dr. Springer considered CITGO’s MSDS, the symptoms and medical

history reported by each Plaintiff, Plaintiffs’ depositions, medical records, as well

as his own observations during their appointments. When Plaintiffs came to see

Dr. Springer, most for a pulmonary function test, they also completed personal

information sheets that asked what symptoms each experienced and how long

those symptoms lasted.4 All opinions given by Dr. Springer were to a reasonable

degree of medical probability. Dr. Springer’s testimony regarding each Plaintiff

will be discussed along with the Plaintiffs’ testimony below.

4
Mr. Richard and Logan Richard did not meet with Dr. Springer, but Dr. Springer did
provide an opinion regarding their symptoms.

12

The Slop Oil MSDS admitted into evidence notes that slop oil is “Extremely

Flammable and Poisonous,” that it smells of rotten eggs, that it contains hydrogen

sulfide gas, and may be fatal if inhaled. The MSDS warns: “Harmful or fatal if

swallowed - Can enter lungs and cause damage” and “Contains Benzene-Cancer

hazard. Can cause leukemia and other blood disorders.” The MSDS explains that

if inhaled, “the gas or vapor may cause severe nose, throat, respiratory tract, and

lung irritation . . . . Symptoms are characterized by coughing, choking, or

shortness of breath. Breathing this material may cause central nervous system

depression with symptoms including nausea, headache, dizziness, fatigue,

drowsiness, or unconsciousness.” If it comes into contact with the eyes, “[t]his

material can cause eye irritation with tearing, redness, or a stinging or burning

feeling.” The MSDS also explains that slop oil can cause skin irritation, “with

redness, an itching or burning feeling, and swelling of the skin.”

Plaintiffs testified regarding their location, what they saw, and their

symptoms they experienced. Additionally, medical records for each Plaintiff were

admitted into evidence.

Sara Stevens:

Sara Stevens was working for Arrowtech-BFE at the Gilliam Dump on John

Ledoux Road. Her primary responsibility was to inspect trucks coming in to dump

hurricane debris at the site. Ms. Stevens testified that she recalled arriving at work

one day and smelling “a distinctive odor.” She further testified: “I couldn’t explain

what it was, [][my] eyes started itching, throat itched, real watery. Just - - just

didn’t feel right.” She does not recall the date she first noticed the smell. Ms.

Stevens testified that after arriving at work and noticing the distinct smell, she

suffered from watery eyes that afternoon and a migraine the following day. She

13

recalled smelling the odor for approximately three days, distinctively, and testified

that the odor gradually dissipated. She recalls positively having symptoms for

those three days. Ms. Stevens also explained that the Gilliam Dump had canals or

ditches on its sides and in those waterways she “observed an oily substance,

sludge-like oily substance.” However, Ms. Stevens admits that she has no

knowledge regarding whether the canals/ditches surrounding the Gilliam Dump

connect to the Calcasieu River.

Ms. Stevens was treated for her symptoms by Dr. Springer beginning in

August of 2006. Her chief complaints and symptoms were severe migraine

headaches, watery eyes, itchy throat, dizziness, trouble sleeping, and feeling run

down, which she described as fatigue at trial. She reported to Dr. Springer that she

noted a gassy smell and oil in the water. She had a follow-up exam with Dr.

Springer in February of 2007, concerning her headaches, insomnia, and anxiety.

At trial, she still complained of sinus problems and headaches. Although her

headaches were less frequent, her sleeping issues had not resolved. When

explaining when her anxiety occurs, she stated, “Only when it cross [sic] my mind,

when I’m thinking about if I - - if, you know, the long - - if I got to go to the

doctor, what they’ll find, something like that.”

Dr. Springer noted that “[a]t the time of that 08/18/06 visit, she basically was

really complaining of insomnia but at around the time of the release, she related a

different - - or a different set of review of systems, basically, which just said that

she had had some sleep disturbances, and feeling worn down since the exposure.”

Additionally, he notes the records indicate “her eyes were watering that afternoon

after the exposure, that for a couple of days after the exposure and lasted for about

three days. She had some sore throat and cough, and that the migraines, the next

14

day after the smell, she was kind of having some headaches there.” Ms. Stevens

returned to Dr. Springer in February of 2007, for headaches and insomnia, but Dr.

Springer notes she had reported to Moss Regional for migraines in the interim.

As to the duration of her symptoms, Dr. Springer opined that Ms. Stevens

reported migraine headaches from the day after she smelled an odor at work

through her February visit. Dr. Springer also explains that “insomnia is an awful

instigator of headaches” and just because Ms. Stevens did not report a headache

every time, “obviously, everybody doesn’t have a headache every day, but

migraines are moody[.]” Dr. Springer further recalls Ms. Stevens related that she

had a sore throat and cough for a couple of days after the exposure and those

complaints “eventually went away about three days.” Additionally, Dr. Springer

opined that Ms. Stevens indicated on her March of 2007 personal information sheet

that she experienced shortness of breath at the time of exposure. Dr. Springer

admits this is inconsistent with her records from August of 2006: “she recorded in

one spot and not in another.” However, it is not out of the question to consider

shortness of breath relatable to the exposure because “she was having cough and

sore throat” and “that’s a reasonable medical opinion that she had shortness of

breath associated with the smell. Many of the people did.” As to the shortness of

breath he opined, “I think it would be more consistent to say it lasted for two to

three days, around the time that she was having the cough.” Finally, Dr. Springer

would relate all of the symptoms Ms. Stevens reported at her initial August of 2006

visit with him to her exposure to CITGO’s slop oil.

Linda Harris:

Linda Harris was also working at the Gilliam Dump like Ms. Stevens. Ms.

Harris explained that much of her job was done from a tower, but that she would

15

go down to the street as well. Ms. Harris explained why she believed she was

exposed to the slop oil chemicals:

Q. Could you explain to the Court why you believe you
were exposed and suffered injuries?

A. Because it happened so sudden. It was like one day I was
fine, cheerful self; and then all of a sudden, I was just deathly ill,
vomiting, diarrhea, nosebleeds. . . . This was all of the above all
together.

I knew something was wrong because I started having cramps.
Like my muscles in my arms and my legs would just tense up and
cramp up where I just couldn’t move. So I went to the doctor[.]

Ms. Harris recalls having abdominal pains; diarrhea; itching on her hands,

legs, and feet; nosebleeds; and itchy eyes. Although Ms. Harris does not recall the

date she alleges she was exposed, she does remember that it rained the day before

her symptoms began, and she remembers seeing a film or substance in the water

the following day. Ms. Harris, like Ms. Stevens, testified that the dump had canals

or ditches around it. She described the ditch: “I call it a ditch. There’s a ditch that

runs in front of the dump. They had boards that they had put across so that you

could either walk across or you could drive across [.]” Additionally, she testified

that:

On the - - I don’t know north, south, east, west right now, but
on the other side, there was a canal. And when I say “canal,” it was
bigger than the ditch. . . . So we were surrounded by water on both
sides, because there was water in the canal all the time[.]

Furthermore, like other Plaintiffs, Ms. Harris recalled that it rained:

A. . . . [B]ut it rained the day before all of this started, and
both of the canals were full. . . .

Q. And when you say “before it all started,” are you
referring to your symptoms or - -

A. My symptoms and what we saw.

16

Ms. Harris continued to testify regarding what she saw after the rain: “There

was a film, like, in the - - a film substance that was on top of the water.” She

testified that she had a habit of taking her safety boots off when getting into her

car, and that the day her symptoms began, she noticed that her hands started

itching on her drive home. Additionally, she recalled seeing people in what she

described as hazmat suits at the lake near the dump a few days after she was first

sick. Unlike the other Plaintiffs, Ms. Harris does not recall a particular odor at the

time she believes she was exposed, but explained, “When you work at a dump, it’s

- - you smell different smells all the time. So I can’t say that I smelled anything

different.”

Ms. Harris testified that she went to Women and Children’s Clinic. The

treating physician believed her symptoms indicated food poisoning, despite the fact

that Ms. Harris did not recall eating food that day. Ms. Harris also testified that her

nose continued to bleed almost every day, though her medical records do not

indicate she complained of a nose bleed until January of 2007. At trial, Ms. Harris

testified that the nose bleeds started before that January visit. When she returned

to Monroe, her hometown, her doctor, Dr. Qayyum, assessed her with acute

sinusitis, and sent her to an ENT, Dr. Barham, for her nose bleeds. Dr. Barham

cauterized the blood vessel in her nose in 2007, though she testified that her nose

still bled regardless. Ms. Harris also testified that she saw Dr. Altick for blisters

and a rash on her hands and feet.

Although the Women and Children’s records reveal that her visits were not

until July 16 and 18, 2016, that her chief complaint at that time was nausea and

diarrhea, and that she complained of getting too hot at work, Ms. Harris testified

that there were additional visits related to the exposure and that she did in fact

17

receive medical care in June. Additionally, Ms. Harris explained that she did not

report every symptom to Dr. Qayyum, such as her skin rash, because she was

treating with Dr. Altick for that issue. Similarly, she explained that she did not

report each symptom every time she went to the doctor because she had already

complained about them in the past.

As to the length of her symptoms, Ms. Harris testified that she experienced

headaches for months, itchy eyes for months, nosebleeds for years, vomiting and

diarrhea for a couple of weeks, and that she continued to have a skin rash at trial,

which comes and goes. Ms. Harris also specifically expressed a fear of future

injury.

Ms. Harris’ Family Medical Center records showed a history of nose bleed

complaints following the slop oil release as well as an early August visit for ear

pain, sinus drainage, headaches, and acute sinuses. Another Family Medical

Center record shows Ms. Harris reported for an injection on September 29, 2006,

and that the doctor checked off abnormal “ENT” on that date. Her records

reporting her nose catherization were also admitted. Dr. Springer reviewed Ms.

Harris’ deposition and medical records before providing a report of his opinion. At

Dr. Springer’s deposition, he was missing the personal information sheet for Ms.

Harris that each Plaintiff filled out when they reported to him for a pulmonary

function test. Regardless, he recalled her complaints of nosebleeds and opined

nosebleeds can result from respiratory irritation and inflammation, which is on the

MSDS sheet for slop oil. He further opined that the fact that Ms. Harris did not

report nosebleeds at her July emergency room visits does not change his opinion

because emergency room physicians are very focused on the main complaint of the

patient, which for Ms. Harris was vomiting and diarrhea. Dr. Springer related Ms.

18

Harris’ nosebleeds and the other immediate symptoms she experienced to slop oil

exposure.

Ricky Haley:

Ricky Haley was working at the Port of Lake Charles around the time of the

slop oil release, which is just north of L’Auberge Casino and Resort. Mr. Haley

was engaged in longshoreman work, which consisted of loading ships under their

decks. On the day of his alleged exposure, Mr. Haley recalls coming up from

under the deck of the ship and smelling an odor. However, he does not recall the

specific date that this occurred. At trial Mr. Haley testified:

Q. . . . Could you tell the Court why you believe that you
suffered injuries as a result of that oil spill?

A. Because we smelled some kind of odor when we came
out the ship to go to lunch. And we smelled - - we smelled some kind
of - - I don’t know what kind of odor it was. Then I got - - end up
going back to work after lunch and then started getting, like,
headaches and I got nausea [sic] and I kind of - - when I went back
home and ate that evening, I kind of couldn’t even eat. Lost my
appetite.

Mr. Haley testified that he had trouble tasting, was vomiting, and had

headaches for approximately two and a half to three days. At trial, he admitted to

not having any future concerns about his exposure to the oil spill.

On cross-examination, defense counsel focused on when Mr. Haley smelled

the odor. On his personal information sheet for Dr. Springer, Mr. Haley wrote that

he worked for the Port of Lake Charles since July 17, 2006. However, at trial, Mr.

Haley testified that he switched back and forth between employers and only

worked for the Port of Lake Charles when ships came in. He also testified that he

had worked for the Port of Lake Charles since the early nineties.

19

Mr. Haley reported to Dr. Springer in March of 2007, for a pulmonary

function test. On his personal information sheet, Mr. Haley indicated he

experienced shortness of breath and a sore throat at the time of the release; sexual

dysfunction for three months; and dizziness, headaches, sleep problems,

coughing/wheezing from the time of the release until the day of the appointment.

Dr. Springer related all symptoms to the exposure but specified he would only

relate six to eight weeks of the gastrointestinal symptoms to the exposure.

However, Mr. Haley’s trial testimony was that his symptoms resolved within a few

days. The trial court noted this discrepancy in its oral reasons. Mr. Haley’s

information sheet indicates he sought treatment at Jennings American Legion, St.

Patrick Hospital, and Women and Children’s for chest pain. Dr. Springer only

relates Mr. Haley’s chest pain experienced within one week of his exposure to the

slop oil release. Dr. Springer agreed that if Mr. Haley was close enough to smell a

strong odor, then he was close enough to have symptomatology as a result of

exposure. Dr. Springer’s report further opines, “to a reasonable degree of medical

probability, that Mr. Haley’s reports of congestion, dizziness, headaches, and

nausea/vomiting/gagging are all related to his exposure to slop oil in June 2006. It

is also my opinion that the reports of chest pain are, to a reasonable degree of

medical certainty, also related to the symptomology from the exposure.”

Patrick Richard and Logan Richard:

Patrick Richard testified regarding his exposure and symptoms as well as

those of his minor son, Logan Richard. Mr. Richard explained that around the

Juneteenth holiday, he and his son, who was three at the time, were at the I-210

beach playing in and around the water. Soon after, both began experiencing

irritated and burning eyes. He testified that they were at the beach for an hour,

20

maybe more, and “we started - - eyes got a little - - started getting irritated, you

know. Throat burning a little bit, you know, just didn’t know what was going on,

so we just - - we just decided to leave.” At the time, Mr. Richard was unaware of

the Citgo releases. He did not seek medical treatment for himself or his son, but

instead decided to self-treat. Mr. Richard explained that he “didn’t know at the

time that they had a spill or anything” so he self-treated with “just basic things, you

know, Tylenol when you get back, you know.” He further stated that he “didn’t

really think much of it at the time.” It was not until a few months later that Mr.

Richard learned by word of mouth that the slop oil release had occurred. He

estimates his symptoms, which included watery eyes, burning nose, itchy throat,

and headaches, lasted about two to three weeks, and his son’s symptoms lasted

about one to two weeks.

Dr. Springer reviewed the deposition of Mr. Richard to provide an opinion

regarding the relationship of Mr. Richard and Logan’s symptoms to the slop oil

release. There were no medical records for Dr. Springer to review, and Dr.

Springer did not evaluate them personally. Dr. Springer recalled Mr. Richard

testified that the family was at the I-210 beach on or around July 21, 2006, when

they smelled a foul smell that burned their nose and made them nauseous. Their

symptoms resolved within a few weeks and Mr. Richard treated the symptoms with

aspirin and Pepto. Mr. Springer opined “to a reasonable degree of medical

probability that their headaches and nausea regarding that and him and his

children, were related to that foul smell they noted there in June.”

Gardenia Amos:

Gardenia Amos was working for the Port of Lake Charles around the time of

the slop oil release. She believed that she was exposed while working at Bulk

21

Terminal 1 at the Port of Sulphur. Her responsibilities included keeping up with

the yard work by cutting grass and weed eating, including along the water.

Although she does not recall the date of her alleged exposure, she does remember

the moment she went “through a gate, something was so strong in the - - in the air,

and all - - I couldn’t stop sneezing. And all of a sudden, my nose start [sic]

bleeding, and I start coughing up blood.” She recalled: “I felt dizzy. I mean, I

really - - I just didn’t feel the same. . . . I was cutting along the water and

weedeating [sic] along the water, along the track and everything, and, I mean, I

start breaking out in a rash.” Ms. Amos testified that she took herself to the

hospital but does not recall whether it was that same day. She recalls the alleged

exposure occurring around the time she went to the hospital and that it was

“pouring down rain” when she went. It was a few days later that she learned of the

slop oil release.

Ms. Amos’s medical records show a July 26, 2006 visit to Christus St.

Patrick’s Hospital for chest pain, diaphoresis, cold sweats, and nausea. Although

Ms. Amos asserts that she also visited Moss Regional in July, the medical records

show that the visit to Moss Regional was in January of 2007.

Ms. Amos saw Dr. Springer in March of 2007, for a pulmonary function test

and complained in April of 2007, about a rosacea-like rash that “comes and goes”

that she related to her exposure. Dr. Springer explained that Ms. Amos reported

symptoms including dizziness, headache, shortness of breath, cough or wheezing,

eye irritation, and skin rash that she believed started around June 19, 2006. Dr.

Springer recalled that Ms. Amos reported that she saw Dr. Kang for sinuses a few

days after the release, and possibly for respiratory complaints. Dr. Springer opined

that the fact that Ms. Amos did not previously mention her rash to other providers

22

is not unusual considering her main complaint at those times was chest pain.

Regarding her rash, Dr. Springer testified that Ms. Amos had a significant malar

rash across the bridge of her nose, between the eyes, and on her forehead. He

explains that rosacea flare-ups can be caused by stress, so if she is stressing about

her exposure to the chemicals, it can cause long term flare ups. However, Dr.

Springer did admit on cross-examination that there are lots of other causes of

rosacea.

Dr. Springer additionally related one visit regarding Ms. Amos’s chest pain

to her exposure, noting that it was musculoskeletal in nature and caused by

inflammation behind the chest, which can occur when one is coughing, wheezing,

or experiencing shortness of breath. Dr. Springer further explained that one can

have continued chest pain caused by coughing, wheezing, or shortness of breath,

even though the initial cause has long subsided. Therefore, his relation of Ms.

Amos’s chest pain to the exposure is supported by Ms. Amos’s reported symptoms

and the diagnosis of musculoskeletal chest pain from St. Patrick’s on July 26,

2006.

After considering Ms. Amos’s medical history, complaints, deposition and

location, as well as her activities on the day of her alleged exposure, Dr. Springer

opined that her sinus issues from the date of the exposure through July 10, 2006,

when she saw Dr. Kang were related to her exposure to slop oil; her chest pain

through July 26, 2006, is related to her exposure to slop oil; and her rash through

her last appointment with hm on April 20, 2007, is related to her exposure to slop

oil.

Based on the above testimony and evidence, we find that Plaintiffs provided

expert testimony on general causation through Mr. Frank Parker, Dr. Berry Levy,

23

and Dr. Looney on the expansiveness of the release and those symptoms that

would generally be expected following exposure to a slop oil release. Although

CITGO argues that there is no expert testimony that Plaintiffs were exposed to slop

oil, let alone harmful levels of slop oil, we disagree. Dr. Levy testified that no

level of benzene is safe, and Mr. Parker opined that if one smells benzene, they are

overexposed. Plaintiffs testified to seeing an oily sheen and smelling a distinct

odor nearly contemporaneous with the onset of their symptoms, symptoms that are

listed on CITGO’s Slop Oil MSDS.

Plaintiffs also provided specific causation through medical evidence

provided by Dr. Springer as well as medical records of other treating physicians.

Dr. Springer’s opinions were supported by CITGO’s MSDS sheet for slop oil,

which warns of the same symptoms complained of by Plaintiffs. Additionally,

Plaintiffs’ testimony regarding the contemporaneous or near-contemporaneous

onset of their symptoms and to their experience of seeing an oily sheen in nearby

water or smelling a distinct odor further supports Dr. Springer’s opinions. Several

Plaintiffs even recalled a recent rain prior to the odor and the onset of their

symptoms.

Plaintiffs further testified regarding where they were working or socializing

when they smelled an odor, saw oily substances, and began experiencing

symptoms. In its oral reasons for ruling, the trial court stated that it found

Plaintiffs “very credible and plainspoken about what happened to them following

their exposure. The sheer consistency of their testimony is striking as well as

compelling.”

The trial court was also given the July 3, 2006 map showing the extent of the

release, as well as CITGO’s Significant Event Report describing comments and

24

complaints regarding the release. There appears to be no map compiling oil

locations prior to July 3, 2006, in the record. It was also testified to that CITGO

controlled the information that was generated in determining the vastness of this

release. Although Plaintiffs could not recall the exact dates of their exposure, the

trial court had significant circumstantial evidence to tie Plaintiffs’ exposure to the

release. Accordingly, we find no manifest error in the trial court’s finding on

causation as to these Plaintiffs.

Assignment of Error Number Two:

In CITGO’s second assignment of error, CITGO argues that no evidence or

testimony was admitted to support damage awards for fear of future illness to Mr.

Arceneaux or Ms. Amos and, therefore, asserts those awards should be reversed.

Although general damage awards are reviewed for an abuse of discretion on

appeal, testimony regarding a fear of future injury is necessary to establish the

evidentiary basis for such an award. See Broussard, __ So.3d __ (where residents

who did not specifically testify regarding fear of cancer did not establish an

evidentiary basis for such an award), and Arabie, 89 So.3d 307 (where each

plaintiff testified to a fear of contracting cancer).

Mr. Arceneaux passed away prior to trial, however, his wife testified on his

behalf. Mr. Arceneaux was an employee of CRC, which became surrounded by

slop oil following the release. Much of Mrs. Arceneaux’s testimony was objected

to as hearsay, but she did properly testify that, in her opinion and experience, Mr.

Arceneaux was not one who went to the doctor or complained often. She recalled

that, following the release, he was careful not to mix his work clothes with other

clothes in the wash. Additionally, she testified that he was not typically a worrier,

but that after the release, his mood changed in terms of worrying. Specifically:

25

Q. Ms. Arceneaux, was L.J. [Mr. Arceneaux] generally a
worrier?

A. No.

....

Q. And so - - and to answer that question, after this
exposure, did his mood, in terms of worrying, change?

A. Yes.

The trial court awarded Mr. Arceneaux $7,000.00 for fear of future illness.

In its oral reasons for ruling, the trial court stated, “fear of future illness is

supported by the direct testimony as well as some indirect circumstantial evidence

by Mrs. Arceneaux saying that he became a worrier and he was careful not to mix

the clothes together . . . while washing, and it caused him some concern that was

obvious to her.” We find no abuse of discretion in this award.

Regarding Ms. Amos, CITGO argues that the trial court improperly awarded

$10,000.00 for fear of future illness. Ms. Amos testified that for some period of

time she did fear that the exposure caused her heart-related issues:

Q. All right. Now, I know over the years, you know, before
’06 and until now, I mean, you’ve had a lot of visits to the hospital
and treatment - -

A. Yes.

Q. - - for heart-related issues, correct?

A. Correct.

....

Q. All right. Now, I know that that was a major concern for
you, so we talked about Dr. Springer’s testimony when he gave a
deposition in this matter for trial, correct?

A. Correct.

26

Q. And you understand that you had two visits. You had a
visit in July to Moss Regional, and you had a visit in July to St. Pat’s,
--

A. Right.

Q. - - right? And at one of them, you had complaints of
chest pain?

A. Correct - - correct.

....

Q. And in this deposition . . . he had an opportunity to look
at all your medical records and all the complaints that you had, and he
limited your chest pain up to that July visit in ’06 to be related, said
after that, it appeared that it was more of your family history and other
heart problems.

A. Uh-huh.

....

Q. Now, with Dr. Springer giving some testimony about the
heart condition, does it kind of alleviate your concerns that the oil
spill contributed to your heart condition?

A. Yes.

Ms. Amos testified that “it kind of” alleviated her concerns that the oil spill

contributed to her heart condition, not that she had no ongoing concerns.

Although Ms. Amos had a history of family heart disease and was already

having some heart issues before the release, at the time of her July 2006 visit to

Christus St. Patrick Hospital, her chest pain was labeled as “atypical unstable

angina” under “impressions” and, instead, seemed musculoskeletal in nature.

According to CITGO’s MSDS, a target organ of slop oil is the heart.

Ms. Amos also testified that she was unable to undergo a pending knee

surgery as a result of her ongoing heart problems. Even if some of her concerns

had been alleviated and attributed to a family history, the testimony about her

27

concerns of ongoing heart ailments was sufficient to warrant an award for fear of

future illness. Therefore, we find no error in the trial court believing Ms. Amos

had a fear of future illness as she was concerned about her heart following the

exposure until she learned that Dr. Springer only related her chest pain until that

July of 2006 visit to her exposure. This assignment of error lacks merit.

Assignment of Error Number Three:

In its third assignment of error, CITGO argues that Ms. Harris, Mr. Richard,

Logan Richard, Mr. Haley, and Ms. Amos provided no evidence to support

damage awards for loss of enjoyment of life.5 CITGO argues that these Plaintiffs

did not testify or offer evidence regarding how their quality of life diminished

because of their alleged exposure injuries.

As stated by this court in Cormier v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 17-104, p. 4

(La.App. 3 Cir. 10/4/17) 228 So.3d 770, 776 (quoting Bouquet v. Wal-Mart Stores,

Inc., 08-309, p. 4 (La. 4/4/08), 979 So.2d 456, 458) general damages are reviewed

for an abuse of discretion because the trial court is “in the best position to evaluate

witness credibility and see the evidence firsthand.” “The role of an appellate court

in reviewing a general damages award is not to decide what it considers to be an

appropriate award but rather to review the exercise of discretion by the trier of

fact.” Id. The trier of fact has great, even vast discretion in awarding general

damages. Youn v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 623 So.2d 1257 (La.1993).

“[W]hether or not loss of enjoyment of life is recoverable depends on the particular

facts of the case, and should be left to the district court’s discretion on a case-by-

case analysis.” McGee, 933 So.2d at 779. The focus is on the total award rather

5
CITGO does not appeal Ms. Stevens’ loss of enjoyment of life award, other than through
its argument in Assignment of Error Number One, that causation was not proven.

28

than on awards for each element of damages. The trial court heard the testimony

of all Plaintiffs and after a careful review of the particular facts and circumstances

of each Plaintiff’s damages, made an award for loss of enjoyment of life.

Plaintiffs in the current case testified regarding the length of their symptoms.

Ms. Harris testified that she:

was one of those people that went to work early because I enjoyed my
job. I even got a medal that the Corps of Engineers gave me because I
was almost the first one to be there, sometimes the last to leave. And
I missed a day from work because I was sick. I know that I would not
have stayed at home that day if I had not been sick.

Additionally, Ms. Harris testified that the skin rash and blisters she endured made

it difficult to do simple tasks such as driving or touching things:

A. . . . I couldn’t even hold the steering wheel . . . .

....

A. This was when I started getting the blisters and the - - the
itching and what I have on my hands now. When I started getting that
to where I couldn’t stand to even touch things I was itching so
bad . . . .

When I was here in Lake Charles, it was just scratch, scratch,
itch, itch. This is where you can’t even stand to put your fingers
together. . . .

Ms. Harris further explained the impact her rash had on her:

Q. Thank you. Are you still treating with your
dermatologist for the rash on your hands?

A. No. After a while, you get to the point where I’m tired of
going to the doctor for them to tell me “I don’t know what’s causing
this.” So you use remedies. You get coconut oil and you put it on
your hands so that it won’t look bad far away, but it does close up.
You don’t worry about the nosebleeds. You don’t worry about the
underarm hair not growing and growing on your legs and whatever.
You just deal with it. It’s been 11 years.

29

The trial court went over Ms. Harris’ symptoms and summarized how she became

tired of going to the doctor all the time. The totality of the record supports the trial

court’s finding that Ms. Harris’ injuries caused an interruption or alteration to her

daily life. We find no abuse of discretion in this award.

As to the Richards, Mr. Haley, and Ms. Amos, the trial court reiterated their

symptoms and the duration of their symptoms before awarding loss of enjoyment

of life damages in the amounts of $3,000.00 to Mr. Richard, $1,000.00 to Logan

Richard, $2,000.00 to Mr. Haley, and $6,000.00 to Ms. Amos. As Appellees

admit, the loss of enjoyment of life experienced by the Richards, Mr. Haley, and

Ms. Amos was not as significant as that of the other Plaintiffs, however, the trial

court obviously took that into account when awarding a smaller damage award to

them.

The Richards’ complaints of headaches, itchy throats, watery eyes, and

burning noses lasted for about three weeks. Mr. Haley’s injuries only lasted

approximately three days and, while he did not testify as to the effects on any

specific activity, it is reasonable to conclude that trouble tasting, vomiting,

headaches, and loss of appetite would detrimentally affect one’s daily living. Ms.

Amos delayed a pending knee surgery because she was unable to undergo the

surgery as a result of her ongoing heart problems which she believes were at a

minimum exacerbated by this incident.

The trial court listened to the testimony of all parties presented and reviewed

the evidence put forth, weighed the totality of the evidence put forth and made a

factual finding that the plaintiffs suffered damages for loss of enjoyment of life and

fear of future illness. The trial court has broad discretion in determining a general

damages award, and we will not disturb that award.

30

CONCLUSION:

For the above-mentioned reasons, we affirm the trial court’s finding of

causation, affirm the awards for fear of future illness to Leon Arceneaux and

Gardenia Amos, and affirm the loss of enjoyment of life award to Linda Harris,

Patrick Richard, Logan Richard, Ricky Haley, and Gardenia Amos. Costs of these

proceedings are assessed to Appellant, Citgo Petroleum Corporation.

AFFIRMED.

31