Michaela Elouise Jordan Devos v. Robin L. Hooter, in Her Official Capacity as Rapides Parish Clerk of Court

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

18-652

BILLIE THI LE

VERSUS

LEEANNA VANDERWATER LU, ET. AL.

Consolidated With 18-655

MICHAELA ELOUISE JORDON DEVOS, ET. AL.

VERSUS

ROBIN L. HOOTER, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS RAPIDES
PARISH CLERK OF COURT

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF RAPIDES, NO. 259,736 C/W 260,723
HONORABLE PATRICIA EVANS KOCH, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

JOHN E. CONERY
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of John D. Saunders, Phyllis M. Keaty, John E. Conery, Van H.
Kyzar, and Candyce G. Perret, Judges.

Keaty, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.
Perret, J., dissents for the reasons assigned by Judge Keaty.

REVERSED AND RENDERED.

Jeremy C. Cedars
Lineage Law, LLC
4615 Parliament Drive, Suite 202
Alexandria, Louisiana 71303
(318) 767-2226
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS:
Michaela Elouise Jordan DeVos
John Scott Martin

Eugene Paul Cicardo, Jr.
Attorney at Law
Post Office Box 11976
Alexandria, Louisiana 71315
(318) 445-2097
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
Billie Thi Le

Robin L. Hooter, Rapides Parish Clerk Of Court
701 Murray Street, Suite 102
Alexandria, Louisiana 71301
DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
In Proper Person

CONERY, Judge.

Michaela Jordan DeVos and John Scott Martin (DeVos and Martin) appeal

the trial court’s April 9, 2018 judgment dismissing their exceptions of no cause or

right of action against Billie Thi Le (Ms. Le) and their petition for writ of

mandamus against Robin Hooter, the Rapides Parish Clerk of Court, on the basis

that the sale of property on September 13, 2013 from Leeanna Vanderwater Lu

(Ms. Vanderwater) to DeVos and Martin, under instrument number 1610399, was

set aside and declared invalid. Based on this ruling, the trial court found that Ms.

Le was the lawful owner of the immovable property located at 5815 Bruyninckx,

Alexandria, Louisiana. For the following reasons, we reverse.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Ms. Vanderwater came into possession of the immovable property at issue, a

house and lot situated at 5815 Bruyninckx, Alexandria, Louisiana, on March 3,

2011, by the judgment of possession recorded in Rapides Parish Conveyance Book

1882, page 535. The name on the judgment of possession was Leeanna L.

Vanderwater Lu.

On July 8, 2017, Ms. Le and Ms. Vanderwater entered into a buy-sell

agreement for Ms. Le to purchase the property from Ms. Vanderwater (the Le buy-

sell agreement). The name signed on the Le buy-sell agreement was “Leeanna

Ann Vanderwater.” The closing was scheduled for August 17, 2017 at the office

of Ms. Le’s attorney, Mr. Michael S. Tudor. After Ms. Vanderwater was informed

of the closing date, on the morning of the closing she informed Mr. Tudor that she

no longer wished to proceed with the sale to Ms. Le and canceled the closing.

On August 28, 2017, Ms. Le filed a petition for specific performance and

damages in the Ninth Judicial District Court claiming breach of the Le buy-sell

agreement. The case was assigned civil docket number 259,736. Ms. Le also filed

a notice of lis pendens in the mortgage records of Rapides Parish in Book 3036,

Page 630, on August 30, 2017, with a specific reference to the civil docket number

(August 2017 notice). No municipal address or legal description was included in

the August 2017 notice, only the civil docket number of Ms. Le’s specific

performance suit filed in the civil suit records.

On September 13, 2017, Ms. Vanderwater executed an act of sale in order to

convey the same property to DeVos and Martin. Ms. Vanderwater testified that

about two weeks before the execution of the act of sale between herself and DeVos

and Martin, she informed DeVos and Martin of Ms. Le’s pending suit, and showed

them the actual petition with her citation to answer.

Ms. DeVos testified that she never had notice of the pending lawsuit, but,

was aware through discussions with Ms. Vanderwater of a threat of a lawsuit. Ms.

DeVos testified that prior to the act of sale on September 13, 2017, she neither told

her closing attorney, Mr. Marion French, nor her friend, Sallie McManus of

Lawyer’s Abstract, who did the chain of title, of the threat of a lawsuit over the

sale of the property at issue. Ms. DeVos testified that Ms. Vanderwater informed

her that Ms. Le had failed to attend the previous closing and hence she was selling

the property to DeVos and Martin. The trial court in its reasons for judgment

specifically found that DeVos and Martin did not discover that there was a pending

lawsuit by Ms. Le until December of 2017, some three months after they purchased

the property at issue, thereby implicitly finding that the testimony of Ms.

Vanderwater as to giving actual notice of the suit to DeVos and Martin was not

credible.

Neither Mr. French, the closing attorney, nor Ms. McManus, the abstractor,

noted the August 2017 lis pendens notice in the mortgage records prior to the sale

of the property to DeVos and Martin, as neither examined the mortgage records
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after the August 30, 2017 filing of the notice, notwithstanding that the actual sale

to DeVos and Martin did not take place until September 13, 2017. Neither of them

checked the suit records to determine whether the “threatened” lawsuit had been

filed and whether it may have affected title to the subject property.

On January 5, 2018, after Ms. Le discovered that Ms. Vanderwater had sold

the property in question to DeVos and Martin, she filed a first supplemental and

amending petition naming DeVos and Martin as additional defendants in the

pending lawsuit, and seeking declaratory relief that she be declared owner of the

property. A second notice of lis pendens was filed in the mortgage records of

Rapides Parish, which included the municipal address of the property (January

2018 notice.) By contrast, the municipal address was not contained in the August

2017 notice. However, as with the August 2017 notice, the civil docket number of

the pending suit for specific performance was listed in the January 2018 notice.

DeVos and Martin responded to Ms. Le’s lawsuit with exceptions of no cause and

no right of action.

DeVos and Martin subsequently filed a petition for a writ of mandamus and

declaratory relief against Robin Hooter in her official capacity as Rapides Parish

Clerk of Court claiming that the August 2017 notice was defective on its face, and

requesting that the trial court issue an order cancelling the August 2017 notice

from the Rapides Parish Mortgage records.

On February 18, 2018, a trial was held on Ms. Le’s claims against Ms.

Vanderwater. After Ms. Vanderwater testified, the proceedings concluded with a

consent judgment in which Ms. Vanderwater agreed to, and the trial court ordered

her to, execute the documents necessary to convey ownership of the property

located at 5815 Bruyninckx, Alexandria, Louisiana to Ms. Le, contingent on the

outcome of a later determination by the trial court of the validity of the August
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2017 notice filed on behalf of Ms. Le. Ms. Le was also required to deposit the

sales price for the property of $50,000 into the registry of the court. The consent

judgment was signed on February 28, 2018.

The consent judgment specifically severed and reserved for a subsequent

trial the claims of DeVos and Martin seeking a writ of mandamus, along with their

exceptions of no cause or right of action, and Ms. Le’s claims against DeVos and

Martin in her suit for specific performance.

DeVos and Martin filed a motion for summary judgment on or about

February 20, 2018, against Ms. Le’s supplemental and amending petition, which

was heard on March 9, 2018. The trial court denied the motion for summary

judgment and found there was a genuine issue of material fact as to the validity of

the August 2017 notice.

On March 21, 2018, all of the remaining issues were heard by the trial court.

After hearing testimony from Ms. DeVos and her former closing attorney, Marion

French, along with John Tudor, the original attorney who handled the initial

aborted sale of the property to Ms. Le, the trial court found in favor of Ms. Le. In

oral reasons given on the record, the trial court denied DeVos and Martin’s petition

for a writ of mandamus, as well as the exceptions of no cause and right of action.

The trial court further ordered that the sale between Ms. Vanderwater and DeVos

and Martin be set aside and declared invalid. All claims by DeVos and Martin

against Robin Hooter were dismissed. All costs were assessed against DeVos and

Martin. The judgment was signed on April 9, 2018, from which DeVos and Martin

have now timely appealed.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

1) The trial court erred as a matter of law in finding that the Notice of
Lis Pendens filed on August 28, 2017, was valid notice that

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satisfied the requirements of Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
articles 3751 and 3752.

2) The trial court erred in permitting a Notice of Lis Pendens which
encompassed any property of a potential debtor to be declared
valid prior to the rendition of a judgment.

3) The trial court erred by failing to grant the Writ of Mandamus and
Declaratory Judgment in favor to DeVos and Martin.

4) The trial court erred in permitting expert opinion testimony from
Marion French and Michael Tudor on the ultimate issue of law.

5) Because the trial court found the August 2017 Notice of Lis
Pendens valid, it pretermitted the issue of whether the January 5,
2018, Notice of Lis Pendens could have retroactive effect. The
trial court erred in failing to invalidate the January 2018 Notice of
Lis Pendens.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This case poses a question of law, which requires a determination of whether

the August 2017 notice of lis pendens filed in this case meets the statutory

requirements of La.Code Civ.P. arts. 3751 and 3752. Accordingly, the appropriate

standard of review is de novo. A de novo review simply asks whether the trial

court was legally correct or legally incorrect. Domingue v. Bodin, 08-62 (La.App. 3

Cir. 11/5/08), 996 So.2d 654. “[T]he appellate court assigns no special weight to

the trial court.” Id. at 657. Instead, the appellate court reviews the record in its

entirety and determines “whether the trial court’s decision was legally correct in

light of the evidence.” Id.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

“The purpose of a notice of lis pendens is to give effective notice to third

persons of the pendency of an action affecting title to, or asserting a mortgage or

lien on, immovable property. La[.Code Civ.P. art.] 3751.” L.E.C., Inc. v. Collins,

332 So.2d 565, 568 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1976); See also Karst v. Fryar, 430 So.2d 318

(La.App. 3 Cir. 1983).

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The Louisiana Supreme Court in Cimarex Energy Co. v. Mauboules, 09-

1170, pp. 19-20 (La. 4/9/10), 40 So.3d 931, 944, discussed the history of the

jurisprudence of the public records doctrine and stated:

The public records doctrine has been described as a negative doctrine
because it does not create rights, but, rather, denies the effect of
certain rights unless they are recorded. Title, supra at § 8.16; Camel,
526 So.2d at 1089-1090; Phillips v. Parker, 483 So.2d 972, 975
(La.1986). In explaining the negative nature of the doctrine, this
Court has stated that third persons are not allowed to rely on what is
contained in the public records, but can rely on the absence from the
public records of those interests that are required to be recorded.
Camel, 526 So.2d at 1090 [citing Redmann, The Louisiana Law of
Recordation: Some Principles and Some Problems, 39 Tul. L.Rev.
491 (1965) ]. The primary focus of the public records doctrine is the
protection of third persons against unrecorded interests. Camel, 526
So.2d at 1090; Phillips, 483 So.2d at 976.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Articles 3751 and 3752 govern the

necessary recording process and the required elements for a notice of lis pendens to

be validly executed:

Article 3751:

The pendency of an action or proceeding in any court, state or
federal, in this state affecting the title to, or asserting a
mortgage or privilege on, immovable property does not
constitute notice to a third person not a party thereto unless a
notice of the pendency of the action or proceeding is made, and
filed or recorded, as required by Article 3752.

Article 3752:

A. The notice referred to in Article 3751 shall be in writing,
signed by the plaintiff, defendant, or other party to the action or
proceeding who desires to have the notice recorded, or by a
counsel of record for such party showing the name of the
persons against whom it is to be effective, the name of the court
in which the action or proceeding has been filed, the title,
docket number, date of filing, and object thereof, and the
description of the property sought to be affected thereby.

B. This notice shall be recorded in the mortgage office of the
parish where the property to be affected is situated and has
effect from the time of the filing for recordation. The notice
shall cease to have effect after ten years from the date of its
filing for recordation. Nevertheless, if the action or proceeding
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is still pending, the notice may be reinscribed by refiling the
notice. A reinscription of the notice that is filed before the
effect of recordation ceases continues that effect for five years
from the day the notice is reinscribed.

A panel of this court in Trouth Air Conditioning & Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Bay

Electric Co., Inc., 17-529, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 8/23/17), 226 So.3d 552, 555

provided:

[O]ur law states that lis pendens is stricti juris and ‘any doubt
concerning the application of lis pendens must be resolved against
its application.’ Rayner v. Evangeline Bank & Trust Co., 17-75, p. 4
(La.App. 3 Cir. 5/10/17), 219 So.3d 1122 (quoting Robbins v.
Delta Wire Rope, Inc., 15-1757, p. 7 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/3/16), 196
So.3d 700, 705).

Additionally, La.R.S. 1:3 provides with respect to the interpretation of a

statute as follows:

Words and phrases shall be read with their context and shall be
construed according to the common and approved usage of the
language. Technical words and phrases, and such others as may have
acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be
construed and understood according to such peculiar and appropriate
meaning.

The word “shall” is mandatory and the word “may” is permissive.
(Emphasis ours.)

Therefore, with the necessary framework in place for the interpretation of

the validity of the August 2017 notice filed by Ms. Le, we will address

assignments of error raised by DeVos and Martin.

Assignment of Error One -Validity Of The Notice of Lis Pendens

DeVos and Martin urge in their first assignment of error that the August

2017 notice filed in conjunction with the lawsuit for specific performance filed by

Ms. Le on August 28, 2017 does not meet the specific requirements of La.Code

Civ.P. art. 3752. More specifically, they argue that the August 2017 notice filed on

behalf of Ms. Le is defective for the following reasons:

a. The Notice of Lis Pendens does not describe the “object thereof” as
7

required by Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3752;

b. The Notice of Lis Pendens does not contain any description (either
legal or municipal) of the property for which the Notice is
allegedly to be enforced in contravention of Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure article 3752.

The August 2017 notice filed by Ms. Le in conjunction with her lawsuit for

specific performance filed on August 28, 2017 stated as follows:

CIVIL SUIT NO. 259,736 E

BILLIE THI LE 9TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

VERSUS PARISH OF RAPIDES

LEEANNA VANDERWATER STATE OF LOUISIANA

NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS

Please take notice that in the above captioned suit one of the
defendants[plaintiffs] is BILLIE THI LE, a citizen and resident of
Rapides Parish, Louisiana. It has been alleged that LEEANNA
VANDERWATER is justly, truly, and legally indebted unto the
BILLIE THI LE for specific performance in the above captioned suit.

Any individual seeking to acquire an interest in any property
owned by LEEANNA VANDERWATER or a security interest
thereon are hereby notified that any acquisition or rights may be
subject to the above captained suit and demands made therein.

There is no dispute that the August 2017 notice filed on behalf of Ms. Le on

August 28, 2017, was recorded in the mortgage records two weeks prior to the

September 13, 2017 closing of the sale to DeVos and Martin of Ms. Vanderwater’s

property located at 5815 Bruyninckx, Alexandria, Louisiana. It is also undisputed

that neither Ms. McManus nor Mr. French examined the mortgage records

subsequent to the filing of the August 2017 notice. Therefore, the primary issue is

whether the August 2017 notice filed by Ms. Le was valid.

Article 3752(A) (emphasis ours) requires that the notice of lis pendens:

[S]hall be in writing, signed by the plaintiff, defendant, or other party
to the action or proceeding who desires to have the notice recorded, or
by a counsel of record for such party showing the name of the persons
8

against whom it is to be effective, the name of the court in which the
action or proceeding has been filed, the title, docket number, date of
filing, and object thereof, and the description of the property
sought to be affected thereby.

DeVos and Martin agree that “There is no issue that the title, docket number,

date of filing, court of record, and the signature of counsel of record is present in

the August 2017 Notice of Lis Pendens.” Although the August 2017 notice

identifies Ms. Le as a defendant, it is clear that the basis of the August 2017 notice

is that Ms. Vanderwater is subject to a suit for specific performance. However,

DeVos and Martin argue that there is “no object set forth” and “there is no

municipal or legal description” contained in the August 2017 notice.

No Specific Object Stated In The August 2017 Notice

The August 2017 notice at issue refers to “any property owned by

LEEANNA VANDERWATER or a security interest thereon.” Although

subsequent testimony provided that Ms. Vanderwater only owned the property at

issue, DeVos and Martin argue that the term “property” in conjunction with a lien

is overly broad. Louisiana Civil Code Article 448 provides, “Things are divided

into common, public, and private; corporeals and incorporeals; and movables and

immovables.” Therefore, the August 2017 notice as written does not clearly define

the “object thereof,” and does not meet the requirements of La.Code Civ.P. art.

3752.

Failure to Include Either a Municipal Address Or Property Description

The August 2017 notice at issue provides that “any acquisition or rights

may be subject to the above captioned suit [Civil Suit No. 259,736 E] and

demands made therein.” (emphasis added) On its face it is clear that the

“description of the property sought to be affected thereby,” as required by

La.Code Civ.P. art. 3752(A) (emphasis added) is not included in the August 2017

9

notice. Instead, in order to determine the property what is the subject of the lien,

an individual would then be required to search the civil suit records in order to

obtain the municipal address of the property, 5815 Bruyninckx, Alexandria,

Louisiana. In Cardinal Federal Savings Bank v. Corp. Towers Partners, Ltd., 629

So.2d 462, 465 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1993), writ denied, 634 So.2d 396 (La.1994), a

panel of this court found, “there is no law or jurisprudence which considers the suit

index the ‘public records’ for purposes of title searches.”

Although Ms. Le later filed a January 5, 2018 notice which did contain the

municipal address of the property at issue in conjunction with her first

supplemental and amending complaint, this action by Ms. Le did not cure the

deficiency in the August 2017 notice. We find that the act of sale conveying the

property to DeVos and Martin took place on September 13, 2017, months before

the January 2018 notice was filed. Louisiana Civil Code Article 3347 controls and

provides, “The effect of recordation arises when an instrument is filed with the

recorder and is unaffected by subsequent errors or omissions of the recorder. An

instrument is filed with a recorder when he accepts it for recordation in his office.”

Accordingly, the January 5, 2018 notice only serves to give notice to any third

person after the date it was filed, and does not relate back to the August 2017

notice at issue. Accordingly, we find that the August 2017 notice does not contain

the required “description of the property sought to be affected thereby” as required

by La.Code Civ.P. art. 3752 (A).

Trial Court’s Ruling

The trial court in its reasons for judgment found that DeVos and Martin

“only learned about the problems in the month of December when the suit was

filed back in September.” The trial court continued with its reasons and found:

10

It is my finding today that based on Mr. French and Mr. Tudor’s
testimony that Joint [Exhibit] Six [the August 28, 2017 notice], the
document itself, is filed in the mortgage records, and it’s listed in the
daily filings report, provided enough notice of a pending action to
satisfy [Article] 3751. That would draw attention of any public
searching records that Leeanna Vanderwater was involved in an
action.

The trial court then discussed the application of La.Code Civ.P. art. 3752 to

the contents of the August 28, 2017 notice and found:

No, the document is not perfect. However both testified (sic) by
French and Tudor, it would’ve prompted further inquiry. And I cited
also from Carr [v.] Oak Tree, which states that: “The guidelines
indicate that errors in a recorded document do not automatically
preclude the effectiveness of a document against third parties, third
persons. Determinations concerning the sufficiency of notice in the
public records must be decided on a case-by-case basis.” And this, I
felt like, was one of those cases that needed to be a case-by-case basis
review, looking closely at what the abstractor missed completely, so
that it deprived them of an opportunity to know what Joint Six meant.

The trial court cited Carr v. Oaktree Apartments, 45,514 (La.App. 2 Cir.

8/11/10), 46 So.3d 793, writ denied, 10-2092 (La. 11/12/10), 49 So.3d 896, to

support its ruling that the August 2017 notice was valid pursuant to La.Code Civ.P.

art. 3752, and thus served its intended purpose to give notice to DeVos and Martin

of the pending claim for specific performance by Ms. Le. The trial court found

that errors in the recorded document, such as the different spelling of the name of

the apartment complex in Carr, “do not automatically preclude the effectiveness of

the document.” Id. However, in this case the failure to give any property

description, either legal or municipal, is not an error but an omission. Under the

required strict statutory interpretation of La.Code Civ.P. art. 3752, this omission

renders the August 28, 2017 notice invalid.

We find the trial court erred in first making a legal determination that the

August 2017 notice would have been sufficient to give notice of the pending

litigation without first examining whether the August 2017 notice met the strict

11

statutory requirements of La.Code Civ.P. art. 3752 to constitute a valid notice of lis

pendens.

This omission under the required strict statutory interpretation of La.Code

Civ.P. art. 3752, coupled with the failure of the August 2017 notice to clearly

define the “object thereof,” renders the August 28, 2017 notice invalid and requires

reversal of the trial court’s April 9, 2018 judgment in favor of Ms. Le.

Having found merit in assignment of error one asserted by DeVos and

Martin, we pretermit any further discussion of their three remaining assignments of

error.

CONCLUSION

Considering the foregoing, the April 9, 2018 judgment of the trial court is

reversed. The petition for a writ of mandamus filed on behalf of Michaela Jordan

DeVos and John Scott Martin is hereby granted. The Clerk of Court for Rapides

Parish, Robin Hooter, is ordered to cancel the notice of lis pendens filed on August

28, 2017 on behalf of Billie Thi Le in the mortgage records of Rapides Parish in

Book 3036, Page 630. Costs for the cancellation, all costs of court, as well as costs

of this appeal are assessed to Billie Thi Le.

REVERSED AND RENDERED.

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STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

18-652

BILLIE THI LE

VERSUS

LEEANNA VANDERWATER LU, ET AL.

Consolidated With
18-655

MICHAELA ELOUISE JORDON DEVOS, ET AL.

VERSUS

ROBIN L. HOOTER, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS RAPIDES
PARISH CLERK OF COURT

Keaty, J., dissenting:

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion as I find that it applies a more

rigid and onerous standard than that which the law requires. As Judge Conery

correctly notes, “[t]he primary focus of the public records doctrine is the protection

of third persons against unrecorded interests.” Cimarex Energy Co. v. Mauboules,

09-1170, p. 20 (La. 4/9/10), 40 So.3d 931, 944.

In Voelkel v. Harrison, 572 So.2d 724, 726-27 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1990)

(emphasis added), writ denied, 575 So.2d 391 (La.1991), the fourth circuit made the

following observations about the public records doctrine:

Under the public records doctrine, third persons need only to
look to the public records to determine adverse claims. See McDuffie
v. Walker, 125 La. 152, 51 So. 100 (1909). All persons are held to have
constructive notice of the existence and contents of recorded
instruments affecting immovable property. Thomas v. Lewis, 475
So.2d 52 (La.App. 2nd Cir.1985); Wells v. Joseph, 234 La. 780, 101
So.2d 667 (1958).

The jurisprudence has established some guidelines to determine
when recorded instruments place a third party on inquiry as to the title

and/or description of the property involved. However, the criteria is
not precise. A review of the jurisprudence reveals that the
determinations of the sufficiency of notice must be decided on a case
by case basis. Watterson v. Magee, 498 So.2d 30 (La.App. 1st
Cir.1986). Where a recorded instrument has language that fairly
puts a third person on inquiry as to the title and he does not avail
himself of the means and facilities at hand to obtain knowledge of
the true facts, he is to be considered as having bought at his own
peril. Wells v. Joseph, supra; Brown v. Johnson, 11 So.2d 713
(La.App. 2nd Cir.1942); Florida Gas Exploration Company v. Bank of
St. Charles and Trust Company, 435 So.2d 535 (La.App. 5th Cir.1983);
Judice–Henry–May–Agency, Inc. v. Franklin, 376 So.2d 991 (La.App.
1st Cir.1979), writ denied, 381 So.2d 508 (La.1980). When one is put
on inquiry as to title, availing one’s self of “means and facilities at
hand” requires an examination of any necessary public records,
but not a wide ranging search of unrecorded documents. Judice–
Henry–May–Agency, [376 So.2d 991].

The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that the description of
real property in a mortgage or deed, although such description may be
inaccurate or faulty, is sufficient to serve as notice to third parties
dealing with that property if the description is adequate to enable the
court to locate and identify the property with certainty, and if it is not
so inaccurate or faulty as to be misleading.

See also Carr v. Oaktree Apartments, 45,514, pp. 6-7 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/11/10), 46

So.3d 793, 797, (emphasis added), writ denied, 10-2092 (La. 11/12/10), 49 So.3d

896.

At the March 21, 2018 hearing in this matter, Mr. Marion French, DeVos’s

former closing attorney testified that if he had checked the title of the Vanderwater

property, he would have “come across” the August 28, 2017 Notice of Lis Pendens,

and he would have brought it to the attention of his clients. Thereafter, Mr. Michael

Tudor, Ms. Le’s real estate attorney, testified that the August 28, 2017 Notice of Lis

Pendens created a “potential cloud” on the title of the property. As a result, he would

have noted it on any title opinion that he prepared regarding the property, he would

have made his clients aware of it, and he would have investigated the status of its

effect on the title to the property.

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Given the foregoing testimony, I believe that the August 28, 2017 Notice of

Lis Pendens was sufficient to put third parties on notice of an adverse claim related

to the immovable property at issue. I also believe that a reasonably prudent closing

attorney and/or abstractor should have rechecked the mortgage records closer to the

September 13, 2017 act of sale of the property from Ms. Vanderwater to DeVos and

Martin. Accordingly, I would affirm the appealed judgment.

3