CA-0018-0750 Nonprecedential Affirmed Processed

Avanti Exploration, LLC v. Kimberly Robinson,secretary, Louisiana Department of Revenue

Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit · Filed April 17, 2019

Authorities cited

Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.

Opinion text

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

18-750

AVANTI EXPLORATION, LLC

VERSUS

KIMBERLY ROBINSON, SECRETARY, LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF
REVENUE

**********
APPEAL FROM THE
BOARD OF TAX APPEAL 3RD
PARISH OF BOARD OF TAX APPEAL 3RD, NO. BTA9608D
HONORABLE ANTHONY JOHN GRAPHIA, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX
CHIEF JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Billy Howard Ezell,
and John E. Conery, Judges.

AFFIRMED.
Eulis Simien, Jr.
Roy Bergeron, Jr.
Simien & Simien, L.L.C.
7908 Wrenwood Boulevard
Baton Rouge, LA 70809
Telephone: (225) 932-9221
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendant/Appellant - Kimberly Robinson, Secretary, Louisiana
Department of Revenue

James C. Exnicios
Cheryl Mollere Kornick
Randy J. Marse, Jr.
Liskow & Lewis, APLC
701 Poydras Street - 50th Floor
New Orleans, LA 70139
Telephone: (504) 581-7979
COUNSEL FOR:
Plaintiff/Appellee - Avanti Exploration, LLC

THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge.

In this tax case, the plaintiff taxpayer, Avanti Exploration, LLC

(Avanti), disputes additional severance taxes assessed against it by the defendant,

Kimberly Robinson, Secretary, Louisiana Department of Revenue (Department).

Avanti filed a petition with the Board of Tax Appeals (Board). Both Avanti and

the Department filed motions for summary judgment, and the Board found in favor

of Avanti. The Department now appeals the Board’s judgment granting summary

judgment to Avanti. Following our de novo review, we find no issue of material

fact and find that Avanti is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. We

affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I.

ISSUE

We must decide whether the Board erred in applying La.R.S.

47:633(7)(a) and applicable law in granting summary judgment to Avanti.

II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Avanti is engaged in the oil & gas production business in Louisiana,

operating various wells and producing oil from mineral leases in Beauregard

Parish. As a producer who severed the natural resource from the ground, Avanti

was subject to the Louisiana oil severance tax levied under La.R.S. 47:633(7). The

statute bases the tax on the value of the oil at the time and place of severance on

the lease in the field. The severance tax is calculated on the producer’s gross

receipts on sales or by the posted field price, whichever is higher. However, if a

producer incurs transportation costs in getting his product to market, to a point of

sale off the lease, he can subtract the transportation costs from his gross receipts

and calculate the severance tax on the reduced amount.

Avanti sold the oil produced from the leases pursuant to contracts

with buyers. The contracts obligated the initial buyer, the “first purchaser,” to take

title and delivery of the oil at the lease where production occurred. Therefore,

Avanti did not have to transport its oil to market, or to a point of sale off the lease,

and its severance tax payments should have been based upon its gross receipts,

without any reduction/deduction for transportation costs.

At issue in this case are Avanti’s contracts with two of its first

purchasers, Phillips 66 Company (Phillips), and Cokinos Energy Corporation

(Cokinos). Each contract contained a negotiated price formula to establish the

sales price to be paid to Avanti for the oil it conveyed to the buyer at the lease each

month during the term of the contract. The price formulas in Avanti’s contracts

with its buyers began with published, oil market center prices for the month of

production and made various positive and negative adjustments to arrive at a lower

price to be paid for the crude oil being sold at the lease.

Pursuant to the contracts and La.R.S. 47:638, the buyer was required

to calculate, deduct, and withhold from Avanti’s gross proceeds, the appropriate

amount of severance tax due under La.R.S. 47:633 before remitting payment to

Avanti, but the ultimate tax liability remained with Avanti under La.R.S. 47:637.

After withholding the severance tax, the buyer would then file the necessary

severance tax returns and remit the taxes to the Department. Following the

payment of taxes on Avanti’s behalf by its purchasers, Phillips and Cokinos, the

Department performed an audit of Avanti’s records and found that Avanti had

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impermissibly reduced its gross receipts, and its tax computation, by subtracting

transportation costs that were not allowed in its case since it sold its oil on the

lease.

The Department issued a notice of assessment to Avanti for additional

severance taxes for the tax period of January 1, 2012, through December 31, 2014.

The total assessment was $119,463.67, which included taxes in the amount of

$79,783.73, together with interest in the amount of $10,567.65 and penalties in the

amount of $29,112.29. Except for specific amounts that Avanti admitted to owing

because of well-classification errors and unfiled reports, Avanti disputed the

additional severance tax and filed a petition for redetermination of the assessment.

Subsequently, Avanti and the Department filed motions for summary judgment.

Following a hearing, the Board found in favor of Avanti, granting its

motion for summary judgment while denying the Department’s motion for

summary judgment. The Department brought this appeal. For the following

reasons, we affirm summary judgment in favor of Avanti.

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgments are reviewed de novo on appeal,
with the reviewing court using the same criteria that
govern the trial court’s determination of whether
summary judgment is appropriate; whether there is any
genuine issue of material fact, and whether the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La.Code Civ.P.
art. 966.

Smith v. Robinson, 18-728, p. 5 (La. 12/5/18), __So.3d __.

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IV.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Applicable Law

Louisiana imposes a severance tax on oil and other natural resources

as they are severed from the ground or water. Louisiana Constitution Article 7, §

4(B) (emphasis added) provides in pertinent part:

Severance Tax. Taxes may be levied on natural
resources severed from the soil or water, to be paid
proportionately by the owners thereof at the time of
severance. Natural resources may be classified for the
purpose of taxation. Such taxes may be predicated upon
either the quantity or value of the products at the time
and place of severance.

Accordingly, the Legislature enacted La.R.S. 47:631, which states:

Taxes as authorized by Article VII, Section 4 of
the Constitution of Louisiana are hereby levied upon all
natural resources severed from the soil or water,
including all forms of timber, including pulp woods,
turpentine, and other forest products; minerals such as
oil, gas, natural gasoline, distillate, condensate,
casinghead gasoline, sulphur, salt, coal, lignite, and ores;
marble, stone, sand, shells, and other natural deposits;
and the salt content in brine.

The severance tax on oil is based upon the value of the oil at the time

and place of severance, which means on the mineral lease in the field. However, if

the producer has to take the oil to market to perfect a sale, he can subtract that

transport cost from the higher sales price he receives there in the distant market,

and pay severance tax on the reduced amount. Louisiana Revised Statutes 47:633

(emphasis added) provides in pertinent part:

The taxes on natural resources severed from the
soil or water levied by R.S. 47:631 shall be predicated on
the quantity or value of the products or resources severed
and shall be paid at the following rates:

4

....

(7)(a) On oil twelve and one-half percentum of its
value at the time and place of severance. Such value
shall be the higher of (1) the gross receipts received from
the first purchaser, less charges for trucking, barging and
pipeline fees, or (2) the posted field price. In the absence
of an arms length transaction or a posted field price, the
value shall be the severer’s gross income from the
property as determined by R.S. 47:158(C).

Pursuant to authority granted to it by La.R.S. 47:1511, the Department

defines value and other terms from the statute in its own regulations:

Value⎯with respect to oil and/or condensate, the
value shall be the higher of the gross receipts received
from the first purchaser by the producer or the posted
field price.

a. Gross Receipts⎯the total amount of payment:

i. received from the first purchaser in an arm’s
length transaction[.]

b. Posted Field Price⎯a statement of crude oil
prices circulated among buyers and sellers of crude
petroleum and is generally known by buyers and sellers
within the field as being the posted price. The posted
field price is the actual price of crude petroleum
advertised for a field. The area price is a statement of
crude oil prices circulated among buyers and sellers of
crude petroleum listing prices for different areas of the
state, usually listed as north Louisiana and south
Louisiana, and generally known among buyers and
sellers within the area as the posted price. This area price
is the beginning price for crude petroleum of an area
before adjustments for kind and quality (including, but
not limited to, gravity adjustments) of the crude
petroleum. When no actual posted field price is
advertised or issued by a purchaser, the area price less
adjustments for kind or quality (including, but not limited
to, gravity adjustments) becomes the posted field price.

c. Arm’s Length Transaction⎯a contract or
agreement that has been arrived at in the open market
place between independent and nonaffiliated parties with
opposing economic interests.

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....

e. Value in Arm’s Length Transaction⎯in an
arm’s length transaction, the value shall be the gross
receipts of all things of value received directly or
indirectly by the producer.

....

h. Transportation Costs⎯there shall be deducted
from the value determined under the foregoing provisions
the charges for trucking, barging, and pipeline fees
actually charged the producer. In the event the producer
transports the oil and/or condensate by his own facilities,
$0.25 per barrel shall be deemed to be a reasonable
charge for transportation and may be deducted from the
value computed under the foregoing provisions. The
producer can deduct either the $0.25 per barrel or actual
transportation charges billed by third parties but not both.
Should it become apparent the $0.25 per barrel charge is
inequitable or unreasonable, the secretary may
prospectively redetermine the transportation charge to be
allowed when the producer transports the oil and/or
condensate in his own facilities.

La.Admin.Code 61:1.2903(A)––Definitions.

In the present case, there was no traditional posted price in the field,

which is apparently a practice that has been in disuse for many years. The

Department did not enter evidence of a posted field price and asserts that it

unquestionably did not use posted field price in calculating the tax deficiency.

There was, however, an arm’s length transaction, which is merely a contract

“arrived at in the open market place between independent and nonaffiliated parties

with opposing economic interests” instead of a contract between affiliated entities

such as parent and subsidiary. See La.Admin.Code 61:I.2903(A). Thus, the Board

found that Avanti’s gross receipts, or the total amount of payments received

pursuant to the contracts, determined the taxable value of the oil in the present

case. La.R.S. 47:633(7)(a); La.Admin.Code 61:I.2903(A).

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The Contractual Pricing Formula

The Department asserts that, instead of paying severance tax on its

gross receipts, Avanti first reduced its receipts by the producer’s transportation

deduction in La.R.S. 47:633(7)(a) and La.Admin.Code 61:I.2903(A) and paid tax

on the reduced amount. In support, the Department points to the price provisions

in Avanti’s buyer-seller contracts with Phillips and Cokinos.

The 2014 Phillips Contract provides (emphasis added):

3. PRICE

Phillips 66’s West Texas Intermediate sweet crude, oil
posted price deemed 40 degrees API gravity for pricing
purposes, for the month of delivery plus the mean of the
daily average of Platt’s posting plus WTI prices quoted in
Platt’s Oilgram from the 26th of the month two months
prior to the month of delivery through the 25th of the
month one month prior to delivery (excluding weekends
and holidays) plus/minus the mean of the Platt’s daily
average WTI Cushing versus Platt’s daily average LLS
differential for the same trading period (-) $2.25 per
barrel transportation differential.

Similarly, the 2012 Cokinos contract appends a pricing exhibit that

explains the above information in footnotes, stating that an average of three indices

was used to determine price, minus a per barrel cost that is not defined. Under the

heading of “Price Basis,” the Cokinos contract provides (emphasis added)

(footnotes omitted): “Phillips 66 WTI Posting plus Platts P.Plus plus Platts LLS

less $2.60/BBL.”

The Department contends that the per barrel price reduction in each

contract is, in effect, the transportation costs referenced in La.R.S. 47:633(7)(a)

and La.Admin.Code 61:I.2903(h). The Department further asserts that such a

“deduction” for transportation costs can only be taken by Avanti for costs it

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actually incurred in transporting the oil to a point of sale and delivery off of the

lease,1 but that Avanti did not incur such costs.

Title and Delivery

In support, the Department points to Avanti’s arms-length contract

provisions on title and delivery. Those provisions in essence state that the

purchaser takes ownership of the oil on the lease in the field before the oil is

transported away by the purchaser. The 2014 Phillips contract provides (emphasis

added):

9. DELIVERY

Title to all Production sold and delivered to Buyer shall
pass from Seller to Buyer as such Production passes the
outlet flange of Seller’s tankage on the lease or leases
from which such Production is being purchased. Buyer
agrees to promptly take delivery of the Production upon
availability from the Seller’s tanks or through a pipeline.
If Buyer takes delivery by a third party common carrier,
Buyer shall immediately notify Seller of the carrier’s
name and address.

The 2012 Cokinos contract provides (emphasis added): “Delivery:

Title and risk of loss shall pass from Seller to Buyer as the crude oil exits the

tankage of the respective lease and enters the trucks designated by Cokinos.”

While both contracts indicate that the oil is to be moved off the lease

by the purchaser, the Department found that Avanti took the producer’s

transportation deduction by hiding it in the pricing formula. Thus, the Department

asserts that, where Avanti incurred no transportation costs in order to sell its oil,

1
The Department’s legal support is its own 2008 Revenue Information Bulletin (RIB) 08-
815, which defines “transportation” as a “substantial movement of oil by truck, barge or pipeline
to a point of sale or delivery off the lease.” The RIB defines “transportation costs” as
“reasonable, actual costs incurred for moving the oil . . . to a point of sale or delivery off the
lease[.]” By its own terms, the RIB does not have the force and effect of law and is not binding
on the public or the Department.

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which it sold right out of the tank on the lease, per the contracts, Avanti’s taxable

gross receipts cannot be reduced by the $2.25 and $2.60 per barrel shown in the

respective contracts in order to pay lower taxes.

Evidence of Gross Receipts

Pursuant to our de novo review, the record reveals that Avanti paid

severance taxes on the full amount of the funds it received, according to statute,

and did not take a transportation deduction from these amounts before doing so.

While the differential in the pricing formula and in various e-mails between Avanti

and its purchasers is referred to as a “transportation differential,” or a “truck

deduct,” there is no evidence that Avanti took the deduction allowed under La.R.S.

47:633(7)(a) and La.Admin.Code 61:I.2903(h) when the producer actually does

incur transportation costs in getting his oil to market. To the extent that a

purchaser incurred a trucking expense and this became an element of the

negotiated price of the oil in an arm’s length transaction, that amount appears as

just another fluctuating overhead expense in the cost of doing business. The

question is whether the producer, Avanti, took the deduction, and the record shows

that it did not.

More specifically, the record contains check stubs showing payments

from Phillips to Avanti, and from Cokinos to Avanti. In both instances, the

purchasers withheld the severance taxes before remitting the remainder to Avanti,

and the math indicates that the correct amount was withheld and remitted. For

example, the December 19, 2013 check stub for the payment to Avanti in the total

amount of $165,284.92 indicates that Avanti had a working interest ownership

(coded “WI”) in each of the eight property leases listed, and that the tax withheld

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was a severance tax (coded “SV”; there are a total of eighteen tax codes listed in

the legend). The price per barrel was $94.02 that month, for all eight of the listed

leases, and the number of barrels and owner’s gross value (gross sale) was shown

for each lease. For example, on one of the leases, Avanti’s gross sale was

$40,920.55 (for production of 435 plus barrels of oil). From that amount, Cokinos

withheld $5,115.06 in severance taxes. Since 12.5% of $40,920.55 is $5,115.06,

the severance tax was calculated on the full and actual amount received by Avanti

for the sale of its oil on that lease on that date.

The severance tax withheld on five of the eight leases was calculated

at less than 12.5% (e.g., .031% or .062% or .082%) of the gross sale of oil from a

particular lease, due to the well’s classification and the statutorily reduced rate

associated with that classification. For example, La.R.S. 47:633(7)(c)(iv) taxes

formerly inactive or orphaned wells at ¼ or ½ of the 12.5% rate shown in

Paragraph (7)(a). Likewise, the statute provides numerous other reductions or

exemptions that may have resulted in lower severance tax rates on some of the

listed leases. To the extent that any rates used were incorrect because of well-

classification errors, Avanti agreed to pay those amounts early on in the litigation.

As to the gross receipts in the record, however, there is only evidence

that severance taxes were paid on the full amount actually received for the oil,

without any reduction or deduction for transportation costs. The Cokinos check

stubs, with their extensive legends, have sixteen “Deduct Codes” for items such as

“compression,” “processing,” “fuel,” “upstream,” “midstream,” “gathering,”

“marketing,” and two separate codes for “transportation.” None of those codes

were used to signal deductions, either before or after the severance tax was

calculated on the full amount of the sale from the lease. We note that one deduct

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code, “OR,” was used, signaling a small oilfield site restoration fee 2 which

amounted to $31.19 in total for all eight leases, all of which were subtracted from

Avanti’s payment only after the severance tax was calculated on the full amount of

the sale.

Here, the Department essentially contends that Avanti and its

purchasers conspired to manipulate Avanti’s tax liability by taking a producer’s

transportation deduction and hiding it in the pricing formula. The evidence it

placed in the record consists of selected statements made by John McIntyre,

President of Avanti which, when considered in total, show confusion about why

the Department disallowed a transportation deduction that the statutes appeared to

allow. This confusion is understandable; the statutes, regulations, and contracts at

issue are not exactly light reading and are quite soporific.

The Department also asserts that a Cokinos e-mail statement

regarding a necessary increase in the “truck deduct” because of increased fuel,

labor, and insurance costs, shows that a transportation cost was deducted by Avanti.

However, the record in total indicates that this and other terms like “marketing

adjustment” were all used to describe the elements of the pricing between Avanti

and its purchasers. Whatever expenses the purchaser and its designated trucking

company had, once they took possession of the oil and transported it to another

point of sale down the road, do not affect the value of the oil when it was first

severed from the ground, when that value was derived through arms-length

transactions in the open market, and there is no posted field price.

2
Louisiana Revised Statutes 30:87 imposes an oilfield site restoration fee on each barrel
of oil produced in this state, ranging from 1.5 cents to 4.5 cents per barrel, to be deposited into
the Oilfield Site Restoration Fund and used by the program for oilfield site restoration projects.

11

In a very similar case, the first circuit in Robinson v. Mantle Oil &

Gas, LLC, 17-894 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/29/10), 247 So.3d 738, writ denied, 18-852

(La. 9/28/18), 252 So.3d 922, found that the $1.80 per-barrel amount in the

purchase agreement was not a post-sale deduction as asserted by the Department,

and it could be used in the pricing formula to reduce the price of the oil:

We find that the statute is clear and unambiguous,
and it was properly applied in the manner that Mantle
paid its tax. Mantle computed its severance taxes on the
actual amounts it received from Central, i.e., “the gross
receipts received from the first purchaser.” See LSA–
R.S. 47:633(7)(a). The $1.80 per barrel amount in the
purchase agreement is not a post-sale “deduction” as
asserted by the Department. Rather, the contract price
paid by Central to Mantle was a negotiated price between
seller and purchaser, and, according to the price formula,
the $1.80 per barrel amount is included in the
calculations to determine the payment price due Mantle.
Mantle sold its oil in the field at the well, and the cost of
transportation was borne by Central. Mantle, as the
seller, did not take any transportation deduction in the
computation of its severance tax, as it did not transport
the oil to the purchaser.

Mantle properly computed its severance taxes on
the actual amounts that it received from Central, i.e., “the
gross receipts received from the first purchaser.”
Further, there is nothing to indicate that this was not an
arms-length transaction. Accordingly, we find no
genuine issue of material fact, and, under the plain
language of the severance tax statute, the gross receipts
received from Central equaled the amount actually paid
pursuant to the purchase agreement. Mantle paid oil
severance taxes based on the payments received from
Central, and the Department’s arguments regarding the
Dugas & LeBlanc Well are without merit.

Id. at 744-45 (footnote omitted).

Here, the Department has not entered a single piece of evidence to

show how it arrived at the figures upon which the Department valued the oil,

except that it added back the per-barrel pricing differential that each contract had

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subtracted to arrive at a negotiated price. Its attenuated argument that this add-on

was proper because under its regulations, the pricing differential was a thing of

value received by Avanti, is not supported or even logical, since Avanti suffered a

price reduction pursuant to the differential. Avanti asserted that the Department

used the large market center indices to calculate the severance tax, and this is a

price that Avanti never received. The Department’s response was only, no, that is

not what it used. But it entered no evidence of any of its calculations into the

record. If the Department added back the pricing differential to the market center

indices that Avanti used in its contracts, which the Department admits, then the

logical conclusion is that the Department did use the large market center indices to

calculate the severance tax owed.

The court in Mantle, which also addressed a second well, the Roberts

well, whose product was sold to a different purchaser, held that a market center

price for a field 130 miles away could not be used as a posted field price, as

asserted by the Department in that case, even though there was no written arms-

length contract for the Roberts well. Id. There, again, the court held that, where

there was no posted field price, Mantle’s calculation of severance taxes based upon

its gross receipts from the first purchaser pursuant to La.R.S. 47:633(7)(a) was

correct. Id.3

3
As to the Roberts well in Mantle, in the absence of a contract and a posted field price,
the Department calculated a posted field price, pursuant to its definition in La.Admin.Code
61:I.2903(A), allegedly using an area price. The Department’s area price was actually a market
center index price from Louisiana’s St. James Terminal. In rejecting the Department’s
calculations, the court articulated:

The Department further argues that, even when there is adequate
documentation of the price, the severance tax shall be calculated
based on the higher of gross receipts or the posted field price. See
LSA-R.S. 47:633(7)(a). It contends that since there was no
specific field price for this field, the area price became the posted
field price. In its audit, the Department identified Platts US Crude

13

Here, the Department argues that the Board should have stricken all of

Avanti’s references to market center prices, index prices, or posted field price

because the Department did not use any of those prices in its calculations. We

Wire-Oil index at LLS Oil Spot at St. James Terminal as the
posted field price applicable to the Roberts Well and adjusted the
reported value of the oil from the Roberts Well.

Upon our review of the evidence in support of and in
opposition to the motion for summary judgment, it is clear that
there was no posted field price in the LeBlanc Field in Allen Parish
where the Roberts well is located. However, rather than relying on
the second option under LSA-R.S. 47:633(7)(a) for gross receipts .
. . the Department chose instead to select another field
approximately 130 miles from where the well was located to use as
a posted field price, but only for those months that the St. James
Field posted price was higher than the gross receipts. Although the
Department acknowledges that the field price in St. James Parish is
not an actual posted price in the LeBlanc Field, it argues instead
that it is an “area price” that includes the LeBlanc Field and
therefore became the “posted field price.”

Mantle, 247 So.3d at 745.

After quoting the Department’s definition of posted field price and area price in its
regulation at La.Admin.Code 61:I.2903(A), the Mantle court found:

The Department offered no evidence to show that any
adjustments “for kind or quality (including, but not limited to,
gravity adjustments)” were made to the area price to establish a
posted field price. Further, according to the regulation, “the area
price is the beginning price for crude petroleum of an area before
adjustments ... of the crude petroleum.” We find that the
Department failed to establish the area field price less adjustments
and, accordingly, failed to establish that the field price in St. James
Parish was the actual posted price for the LeBlanc Field. Because
there was no posted field price, Mantle calculated the value of the
oil based on the “gross receipts received from the first purchaser”
pursuant to LSA-R.S. 47:633(7)(a). We find no error in this
determination.

There being no genuine issues of material fact, the trial
court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Mantle.
Mantle is entitled to a refund of the severance taxes paid under
protest in the amount of $73,461.31.

Id. at 746 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted).

Conversely, in the present case, the Department has not admitted to using or calculating a
posted field price but tries to create an issue of fact around what it might have been under
La.Admin.Code 61:I.2903(A). We disagree. Where there was no evidence of a posted field
price and the Department denies that it calculated one, we find no issue of material fact based
upon the record.

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must disagree. As stated, the Department admits that it added back the differential

to the pricing formula, and the only other elements in Avanti’s pricing formula

were the market center indices. We find that Avanti’s analysis of

La.R.S.47:633(7)(a) with its discussion of “posted field price” was also an

intertwined and integral part of its legal argument in its motion for summary

judgment. This is because La.R.S. 47:633(7)(a) requires that the higher of either

gross receipts or posted field price be used to calculate the severance tax. The

Department states that it did not use a posted field price in this case, and the record

reveals that there was no posted field price. Thus, Avanti’s gross receipts are

determinative of the severance tax.

Accordingly, Avanti has shown that it paid severance tax on the full

amount of its gross receipts in sales to Cokinos and Phillips, and there are no

material issues of fact or law preventing summary judgment in this case.

V.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, the judgment of the Board of Tax Appeals

is affirmed. Costs in the amount of $2,143.00 are assessed against the defendant,

Kimberly Robinson, Secretary, Louisiana Department of Revenue.

AFFIRMED.

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