Joy Richard v. Calcasieu Cameron Hospital Service D/B/A West Calcasieu Cameron Hospital

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

19-338

JOY RICHARD

VERSUS

CALCASIEU CAMERON HOSPITAL
SERVICE D/B/A WEST CALCASIEU
CAMERON HOSPITAL, ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 2015-1395
HONORABLE RONALD F. WARE, DISTRICT JUDGE

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PHYLLIS M. KEATY
JUDGE

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Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Phyllis M. Keaty, and
D. Kent Savoie, Judges.

AFFIRMED AS AMENDED.

Jack W. Caskey
704 Ryan Street
Lake Charles, Louisiana 70601
(337) 439-8854
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee:
Joy Richard

Robert W. Robison, Jr.
Shelby L. Giddings
Watson, Blanche, Wilson & Posner
Post Office Drawer 2995
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70821-2995
(225) 387-5511
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:
West Calcasieu Cameron Hospital

KEATY, Judge.

Joy Richard was injured in a trip and fall in the parking lot of Calcasieu

Cameron Hospital Service District d/b/a West Calcasieu Cameron Hospital

(WCCH). After a trial on the merits, judgment was rendered in favor of Richard and

against WCCH, awarding her general and special damages. WCCH appeals, and for

the following reasons, we amend the judgment and affirm as amended.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Richard tripped and fell in the parking lot of WCCH on the evening of July 7,

2014. Her adult daughter, Diana Piper, was an employee of the hospital, and Richard

had gone there to pick her up after her shift ended. Richard filed this suit against

WCCH to recover for the damages she allegedly sustained in the accident. The

matter proceeded to a one-day bench trial, following which the trial court issued an

oral ruling, finding that WCCH was negligent and 100% at fault for Richard’s

damages. Written judgment was signed on January 7, 2019, awarding Richard

$50,000.00 in general damages, $6,750.07 in medical special damages, and

$1,500.00 in expert witness fees.

On appeal, WCCH asserts that the trial court erred in finding that Richard met

her burden of proof under La.Civ.Code art. 2317.1; in awarding excessive damages

to Richard; in not assessing fault to Richard; and in awarding Richard special

damages over and above her general damages award as the parties stipulated to a

bench trial on the basis that her claims would not exceed $50,000.00.

DISCUSSION

Richard’s premise liability claims against WCCH are governed by

La.Civ.Code art. 2317.1,1 which provides:

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This court has held that hospitals do not come under the ambit of La.R.S. 9:2800.6, which
governs the liability of merchants. See Harkins v. Natchitoches Par. Hosp., 97-83 (La.App. 3 Cir.
5/7/97), 696 So.2d 19.

The owner or custodian of a thing is answerable for damage
occasioned by its ruin, vice, or defect, only upon a showing that he
knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known of the
ruin, vice, or defect which caused the damage, that the damage could
have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable care, and that he
failed to exercise such reasonable care.

To prevail under La.Civ.Code art. 2317.1, Richard had the burden of proving that:

(1) that the thing which caused the damage was in the defendant’s
custody or control, (2) that it had a vice or defect that presented an
unreasonable risk of harm, (3) that the defendant knew or should have
known of the vice or defect, (4) that the damage could have been
prevented by the exercise of reasonable care, and (5) that the defendant
failed to exercise such reasonable care.

Owens v. McIlhenny Co., 18-754, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/27/19), 269 So.3d 839, 842

(quoting Riggs v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp. Trust Auth., 08-591, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir.

11/5/08), 997 So.2d 814, 817).

Six witnesses testified at trial. Richard stated that she was seventy-five years

old at the time of trial. Richard explained that Piper worked the 2:30 p.m. to 11:00

p.m. shift at WCCH, and Richard routinely drove her to and from work. On the

night of the accident, Richard had arrived early in order to visit her granddaughter

who was a patient at Cornerstone, an acute-care facility within WCCH. Richard

parked in a handicap spot near the entrance to Cornerstone. She had some items for

her granddaughter which she took out of the back of her car before walking up a

handicap ramp and entering the facility. After Piper’s shift ended, she met Richard

in her daughter’s room, and they left the facility through the same door that Richard

had entered. Richard explained that it was “pitch dark,” and as she stepped down

into the parking lot in front of her car, her foot hit a concrete bar, she fell flat on her

face, and her “head bounced on the concrete.” She explained that “[t]here was a

light further off in the distance, but it did not light up that area” of the parking lot.

On cross-examination, Richard stated that she had been to the same parking

lot and had entered through the same door at WCCH when visiting her
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granddaughter before the night of the accident. She confirmed that when the hospital

door opened the night of the accident, “there was enough light for [her] to see[, b]ut

when [she] came out, the door was closed; and it was completely dark again.”

Richard acknowledged that she did not walk down the handicap ramp when she and

her daughter left the facility. Richard stated that because her daughter was walking

down the ramp to get to the passenger side of the car, she “just naturally walked to

the driver’s side.” When shown photographs that depicted the parking lot and

building where she fell at nighttime, Richard emphatically stated that on the evening

of her accident, there was no light on the corner of the building to the left of the

entrance, nor under the canopy covering the doorway where she entered and exited

the building.

Richard testified that after she fell, she screamed for her daughter to help her.

Piper ran back into the hospital to get assistance, and four people came out with a

wheelchair. They rolled Richard over onto a sheet, lifted her up into the wheelchair,

and rolled her to the Emergency Room (ER). After X-rays and a CAT scan were

taken, an ER employee gently cleaned her face, which was bleeding and “all skinned

up.” When a physician later came into her room and spoke to her about ordering

some diagnostic tests, Richard told him, “That’s already been done.” That doctor

wrote her prescriptions for antibiotics and pain pills and said he would return after

finding out the results of the X-rays and CAT scan. He never returned to Richard’s

room, however, and she was sent home that evening, never to learn the results of the

tests run in the ER of WCCH.

Richard said that the accident damaged the right side of her nose, explaining

that “[t]he cartilage was shoved over to where it’s almost completely closed.” As a

result, she “would literally panic because [she] wasn’t getting enough air.” Richard

stated that she had experienced trouble with her lungs and with breathing before the
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accident, but now she requires oxygen around the clock. With regard to her lungs,

Richard stated that she probably had issues with her lungs before she was aware of

them. She said that a Dr. Luke Williams had recently told her that “about 43 percent

of [her] lungs . . . work.” Richard went to Dr. Brad LeBert, a board-certified

otorhinolaryngologist, 2 approximately one month after the accident regarding

problems with her hearing.3 She told him about her difficulty breathing since the

accident, and he attempted to perform a surgery to “scrape that cartilage that’s

blocking this right side,” but when they tried to put her to sleep for the procedure,

her oxygen levels dropped dangerously low, and they could not proceed.

Richard described her pain level after her fall as excruciating. On a scale of

one to ten, she ranked it a twelve. Richard identified two pictures of herself that

were accepted into evidence. The first was taken by her daughter with her cellular

telephone on the night of the accident, and the second was her driver’s license

photograph taken some time later. Richard said she had facial bruising for several

months after the accident. She stated that she had fallen several times before the

subject accident but had never hit her face or nose in any of them. She also described

an incident that happened six months to one year after the subject accident in which

she passed out when driving and woke up in the WCCH Intensive Care Unit (ICU).

According to Richard, she did not injure her face or nose in that accident.

Piper testified that she was living with her mother at the time of the accident.

She did not have a car, so her mother drove her to and from her job as a housekeeper

at WCCH. Her mother usually dropped her off at the employee entrance that was

separate from, but in the same parking lot as, where this accident occurred. On the

day of the accident, Richard told Piper that she would be visiting her granddaughter

2
In layman’s terms, Dr. LeBert is an ear, nose, and throat surgeon.
3
Richard stated that her hearing problems were unrelated to the subject accident.
4

at Cornerstone before picking Piper up that evening. Therefore, Piper went to her

daughter’s room at the end of her shift. About ten minutes later, Piper and Richard

left to go home. Piper knew where Richard’s car was parked because she always

parked in that same handicap spot if she was coming inside rather than waiting in

the car for Piper to come out. Piper testified that she opened the door to exit the

building, and then she walked down the handicap ramp toward the passenger side,

and her mother walked on the sidewalk toward the driver’s side, of the car. As Piper

was opening the rear passenger door to put her bags into the car, she heard her mother

scream that she had fallen. She then ran around the back of the car and saw her

mother laying face down in the parking lot. No lights were on in the area where

Richard’s car was parked. Piper was shown photographs of the parking lot where

the accident took place, and she confirmed that the light fixture shown was not

working. According to Piper, there was a bench outside the exit she and Richard

used to leave the building where she and several other hospital employees would

smoke cigarettes because the light there “hardly ever worked.” Piper did not report

the light being out to anyone on the night of the accident.

Piper explained that her mother was mobile and “could drive and get around

by herself quite well” before the accident. Richard had experienced issues with her

lungs, but not with her nose, and she had never needed oxygen. Piper estimated that

her mother began needing oxygen within a year of the accident and has not been

without it since then. Piper is currently Richard’s full-time caretaker because of her

declining health.

Dr. Brad LeBert was recognized as an expert in the field of

otorhinolaryngology. He testified that he first saw Richard on August 6, 2014,

regarding her complaints of a “swooshing” sound in her right ear. Dr. LeBert stated

that “upon examination of her head and neck, we also noticed that her septum or the
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midline portion of her nose was deviated; and we began discussing her problems

with obstructive breathing.” He testified that he diagnosed Richard with deviated

nasal septum and that his notes indicated it occurred after she fell one month prior.

He suggested that she consider septoplasty, surgical correction of her deviated

septum, after getting her hearing problem resolved, which suggestion he reiterated

when he saw her on August 20, 2014, and November 6, 2014. According to his

notes from her November 2014 visit, they again discussed Richard having a

septoplasty to correct her nasal breathing, which he noted had begun after her July

2014 fall, along with a:

submucosal resection of her turbinates, which basically means
straightening the crooked portion of the nose and reducing some nasal
swelling in her nose; but I felt that we needed to obtain surgical
clearance from Dr. Kent Thomas, who was her primary medical doctor.
Because of her other comorbid medical conditions, I wanted to be sure
that she was a safe patient to be put to sleep in the operating room.

Dr. LeBert ordered a sleep study for Richard, which took place on December

5, 2014. Richard was diagnosed with sleep apnea but she “was unable to tolerate

her continuous positive airway pressure machine because she felt like she could not

get enough air through the right nostril, which is the side that the septum was

deviated to.” Dr. LeBert saw Richard twice in April 2015. By then, Dr. Thomas

had cleared her for a nasal surgery. However, after discussing “Richard’s overall

medical health” with her and Dr. Luke Williams, a pulmonologist, they “did not feel

like an elective surgery to repair a deviated septum was worth the risk to her life

because of her restrictive lung disease and cardiac issues.” Dr. LeBert explained

that Richard never embellished or exaggerated her condition. She simply said that

she “fell and hit her face,” and his clinical findings were consistent with the injury

as she explained it to him. Finally, he stated that Richard was scheduled to have

follow-up appointments with him.

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After Richard rested her case, WCCH moved for an involuntary dismissal on

the grounds that Richard failed to meet her burden of proving that the hospital knew

or should have known of an unreasonably dangerous condition that caused Richard’s

injuries. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant then called three witnesses

in its case on rebuttal.

Shelly Conner testified that she was employed at WCCH as an RN house

supervisor for the night shift at the time of Richard’s accident. Her duties included

receiving patient concerns or complaints. Conner wrote a report documenting

Richard’s accident after seeing Piper in the ER and recognizing her as a WCCH

employee. In the report, Conner stated that Richard “tripped on [a] yellow cement

rectangle block at the parking spot.” The report noted that Richard received

treatment at WCCH and that CT scans of her head and face revealed a nasal fracture.

According to Conner, neither Piper nor Richard mentioned anything about lighting

issues. She explained that had they done so, she would have noted it in her report

and that she would have reported it to the maintenance department. She also stated

that if she were to notice a light out outside of a hospital entrance, she would have

notified maintenance. Finally, she stated that during her ten-plus years at WCCH

she was unaware of anyone falling in the parking lot due to lighting issues or to

tripping over a parking “bumper.” On cross-examination, Conner confirmed that

she did not inspect the area where Richard fell.

David Cedars testified that he was the supervisor of plant operations at WCCH

when Richard’s accident occurred. His duties at that time included maintaining the

lighting in the Cornerstone parking area. When shown several pictures of where the

accident occurred, Cedars noted that his office was on the other side of the parking

lot, so he was familiar with the door where Richard entered and exited when she

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went to Cornerstone. He said that there were two lights for that door, and another at

the corner of the building, all of which come on automatically at night.

Cedars explained that the maintenance department did not have a policy to

monitor the lights, but it would receive a work order if someone reported that a light

needed to be fixed. He reviewed the work orders for June and July of 2014 and

found none concerning any lights where Richard’s accident occurred on July 7, 2014.

Cedars denied having knowledge of anyone other than Richard falling outside of the

Cornerstone entrance or of any dangerous condition existing at that location. On

cross-examination, he confirmed that he had no personal knowledge of whether the

lights at the Cornerstone exit were working or not working when Richard fell.

Kristine Lyons testified that she became the Chief Quality Transformation

officer at WCCH in September 2016. She is “in charge of quality, regulatory, safety,

patient safety, and risk management.” Lyons stated that she was familiar with the

Cornerstone entrance and area where Richard fell. She reviewed the records of

accidents occurring at WCCH and could find no record of anyone else ever falling

or of any problems with the lighting at that location.

Following the close of evidence, the parties’ attorneys presented closing

arguments. Afterward, the trial court then announced that it was ruling in favor of

Plaintiff before issuing oral reasons for judgment that provided as follows:

[F]irst of all, I note [Ms. Richard’s] credibility and Ms. Piper’s
credibility.

They answered the questions directly precisely, succinctly. They
didn’t elaborate, didn’t try to pause to try to think of something other
to say what they said. It was pretty spontaneous, and it made sense, and
it was consistent. And their testimony was consistent with - - the
testimonies were consistent between the two of them.

Now, why Ms. Richard chose not to use the ramp, that I can’t
hold that against her. I don’t think that she assumed the risk or she
contributed to the injuries or to the fall.

8

Based on the testimony of the witnesses and the lights that are
described under that canopy, under that awning, the eave or whatever
one projects, illuminates out, and one down. You can see from those
pictures that it would be that bumper, parking lot bumper, could be
easily obscured or - - not necessarily invisible but not capable of being
seen quite easily when that particular light is out.

That is not a - - it doesn’t take a far stretch of the imagination to
believe that. That bumper is close up against the curve and there’s a
little place between the curved sidewalk and that bumper. Looking at
the photograph, that is not a great distance. It’s probably less than a
foot. I’m not sure. But just looking at the photographs, I could easily
see how that could be concealed from sight in the darkness.

I believe the testimony of Ms. Richard and Ms. Piper. . . . I’m
curious as to why someone didn’t ask - - someone from the hospital to
go and check - - take a look at that location either when it happened or
the next day. No one did that.

I find in favor of Ms. Richard. Now, Ms. Richard had some
issues prior to this fall, significant issues, but not involving her nose or
- - I know there’s some difficulty breathing with respiratory problems,
but none involved the nasal passages prior to the event.

She’s got restricted lung disease. So she did have a pre-existing
condition in terms of the ability to breathe adequately and properly to
inhale the oxygen she needs to exist; but this was made worse.

This accident made it worse, and her condition deteriorated as a
result of that. It might have been in the natural process of getting worse,
but this accelerated that decline. So it did affect her breathing ability;
and you know, we take our victims as we find them.

She was not a proper candidate for surgery. She was adversely
affected by this injury in terms of her breathing capabilities.

We’re four years passed this event, and she has suffered. She has
endured pain and suffering, and a lack of enjoyment of life, a
deprivation of the enjoyment of life or alteration to her detriment in
terms of her general health condition.

I’m mindful of her general health condition prior to the accident.
I am mindful of that. Before the accident she was driving. I know that
she had another automobile accident where she passed out. I don’t
know if it can be attributed to a combination of this particular accident
on July 7th, 2014, and her overall health condition prior to and after that,
it could be a contributory cause of her not receiving proper oxygenation.

The fact is that her breathing was affected as a result of this
accident, and there were other problems caused as a result of that or
additional problems, breathing problems as a result of the accident. I
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was a little curious about when Ms. Richard went to see Dr. LeBert.
She didn’t bring it up, but he did because it was obvious to him that she
had some kind of disfigurement and issue with her nostrils.

She didn’t go out to try to make a case. It came up, and she did
the best that she could to try to address it, and it didn’t work as well as
she hoped or she wanted to, but that’s what we have.

So I find in her favor.

Liability

In its first assigned error, WCCH contends that the trial court erred in finding

it liable for Plaintiff’s injuries.

In Schindler Elevator Corp. v. Long Property Holdings, L.L.C., 50,199,

pp. 11-12 (La.App. 2 Cir. 11/18/15), 182 So.3d 233, 240, the appellate court

explained:

The trial court’s factual findings will not be disturbed on appeal
absent manifest error. Moreover, the trial court’s reasonable
evaluations of credibility and inferences of fact will not be disturbed on
review, even though the appellate court may believe its own evaluations
and inferences are as reasonable. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840
(La.1989); Monroe v. Physicians Behavioral Hosp., LLC, 49,248
(La.App.2d Cir.8/13/14), 147 So.3d 787. The trial court reconciles
conflicting evidence. The reviewing court does not determine whether
the trial court was right or wrong, but whether its factual conclusions
are reasonable in light of the record as a whole. Stobart v. State,
through DOTD, 617 So.2d 880 (La.1993).

“When findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses,

the manifest error—clearly wrong standard demands great deference to the trier of

fact’s findings; for only the factfinder can be aware of the variations in demeanor

and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener’s understanding and belief in

what is said.” Rosell, 549 So.2d at 844. The Louisiana Supreme Court has gone so

far as to declare that “[w]here the factfinder’s determination is based on its decision

to credit the testimony of one of two or more witnesses, that finding can virtually

never be manifestly erroneous.” Snider v. La. Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 14-1964, p. 5 (La.

5/5/15), 169 So.3d 319, 323.

10

The trial court found Richard and her daughter to be very credible. Both

testified that the light outside the Cornerstone door was not working and that the

area between that exit and where Richard’s car was parked was very dark. No

contradictory evidence was presented by WCCH. Neither Ms. Conner, Mr. Cedars,

nor Ms. Lyons inspected the area after Richard’s fall and none of them had personal

knowledge of whether the area was adequately illuminated when Richard fell. In

Wallace v. Slidell Mem’l Hosp., 509 So.2d 69, 72 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/27/87), the

appellate court affirmed the trial court’s finding that the hospital and a contractor

renovating the hospital were liable for the injuries that the plaintiff sustained in the

hospital parking lot where it found that “inadequate lighting made it impossible for

a potential victim to see the depressions, thus rendering the area unreasonably

dangerous.” We are convinced that the trial court’s finding that WCCH was liable

for Richard’s injuries is not manifestly erroneous. WCCH’s first assigned error has

no merit.

Fault Allocation

In its second assignment of error, WCCH submits that even if the trial court

did not err in finding that it was at fault in causing Richard’s injuries, it nonetheless

erred in failing to assess any comparative fault to her. WCCH cites Leonard v.

Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 05-775 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/21/06), 939 So.2d 401,

in support of its claim that Richard should have been assigned some fault because

she “made the conscious decision to step off the curb and not use the handicap ramp”

that she had used when she exited her car earlier that evening.

“Like all factual findings, the standard of review of comparative fault

allocations is that of manifest error. In determining fault, the trier of fact should

consider both the nature of the conduct of each party at fault and the extent of the

causal relation between the conduct and the damages claimed.” Dufrene v. Gautreau
11

Family, LLC, 07-467, pp. 17-18 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/22/08), 980 So.2d 68, 80 (citations

omitted), writs denied, 08-628, 08-629 (La. 5/9/08) 980 So.2d 694, 698.

In Leonard, 939 So.2d 401, the trial court assessed no fault to the elderly

plaintiff who fell in the restaurant parking lot after stepping onto a broken,

unanchored, and misaligned tire stop. The appellate court agreed that the tire stop

presented an unreasonable risk harm to the restaurant’s patrons but amended the

judgment to assess the plaintiff with ten percent fault because it found that she “was

in a position to avoid the accident” because she admitted that she “saw [the tire stop]

before she stepped on it.” In the instant case, Richard and her daughter testified that

the area where her car was parked was very dark and not illuminated by any lights

when they exited the hospital on the evening of July 7, 2014. The trial court stated

that it believed their testimony and that it was clear from the photographs accepted

into evidence that the “parking lot bumper[] could be easily obscured” because of

the inadequate lighting. We have reviewed those photographs and find no manifest

error in the trial court’s ruling. Moreover, unlike the plaintiff in Leonard, Richard

denied seeing the bumper before she fell.

Given the circumstances of Richard’s accident, we find Leonard

distinguishable from this matter. Accordingly, we find no manifest error in the trial

court’s failure to allocate fault to her. There is no merit to WCCH’s second

assignment of error.

Damage Award

WCCH next asserts that the trial court’s $50,000.00 general damage award

was excessive “considering [Richard’s] limited treatment and injuries.”

“In the assessment of damages in cases of offenses, quasi offenses, and quasi

contracts, much discretion must be left to the judge[.]” La.Civ.Code art. 2324.1.

“[E]ach award must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis to determine whether it is
12

adequate under the particular facts and circumstances presented by the case under

review. “ Dufrene, 980 So.2d at 82.

The initial inquiry, in reviewing an award of general damages, is
whether the trier of fact abused its discretion in assessing the amount of
damages. Only after a determination that the trier of fact has abused its
“much discretion” is a resort to prior awards appropriate and then only
for the purpose of determining the highest or lowest point which is
reasonably within that discretion.

Id. at 81 (citations omitted) (quoting Duncan v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 00-66, pp.

3-4 (La.10/30/00), 773 So.2d 670, 682-83).

The testimony and medical evidence indicate that Richard’s health and

lifestyle was inextricably changed for the worse after her fall in the WCCH parking

lot. She now requires oxygen around the clock as a result of the deviated septum

caused in this accident, and because she is not a candidate for surgery, her condition

will not improve. Thus, we find no abuse of discretion in the amount of general

damages the trial court awarded to Richard.

Does Damage Award Comport With Stipulation?

In its final assignment of error, WCCH contends that the trial court erred in

awarding Plaintiff the cost of her medical bills because it had entered into a

stipulation with Plaintiff prior to the commencement of trial, that Plaintiff’s damages

did not exceed $50,000.00. Richard does not dispute that she entered into the

foregoing stipulation.

In Miller v. LAMMICO, 07-1352, pp. 23-24 (La. 1/16/08), 973 So.2d 693,

708-09 (original footnotes omitted) (footnote added), the supreme court explained:

[W]e find the language of La. C.C.P. art. 5 instructive with respect to
stipulations entered into to avoid a jury trial. [4] La. C.C.P. article 5
provides that the plaintiff remits that portion of the claim not prayed for.
If a plaintiff alleges that the amount in dispute does not exceed the
4
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 5 provides: “When a plaintiff reduces his
claim on a single cause of action to bring it within the jurisdiction of a court and judgment is
rendered thereon, he remits the portion of his claim for which he did not pray for judgment, and is
precluded thereafter from demanding it judicially.”
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jurisdictional limit, the court is without jurisdiction to render a
judgment in excess of its jurisdictional limit. Similarly, a plaintiff’s
stipulation has the effect of a judicial admission or confession and binds
all parties and the court. Accordingly, it follows that any damages in
excess of the stipulated amount are remitted by the plaintiff’s voluntary
decision to enter into the stipulation, and thus in no instance could
damages exceed the stipulated amount.

See also Book v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 02-1348, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir.

4/2/03), 843 So.2d 515, 517-18, in which this court repeated footnote one from

Benoit v. Allstate Ins. Co., 00-424, p. 1 (La. 11/28/00), 773 So.2d 702, 703, wherein

the supreme court observed that:

Because La.Code Civ. Proc. art. 1732 provides the situations in
which a jury trial is not available, there is an awkward double negative
in the statement of the monetary threshold, which prohibits a jury trial
in ‘[a] suit where no individual petitioner’s cause of action exceeds fifty
thousand dollars exclusive of interest and costs.’ That threshold clearly
makes a jury unavailable unless the amount of at least one individual
petitioner’s cause of action exceeds $50,000.

In light of this jurisprudence, we conclude that the trial court erred in awarding

Richard damages in excess of $50,000.00. Accordingly, the judgment will be

amended to reduce Richard’s total damage award to $50,000.00.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we amend the trial court judgment to reduce

Richard’s total damage award to $50,000.00. In all other respects, the judgment is

affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed against Cameron Hospital Service

District d/b/a West Calcasieu Cameron Hospital.

AFFIRMED AS AMENDED.

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