Karl Jude Hensgens v. Alanna Wingate Hensgens

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

CA 19-485

KARL JUDE HENSGENS

VERSUS

ALANNA WINGATE HENSGENS

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ACADIA, NO. 2017-10204-M
HONORABLE CHARLES G. FITZGERALD, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

JOHN E. CONERY
JUDGE

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Court composed of John D. Saunders, Shannon J. Gremillion, and John E. Conery,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Jack Derrick Miller
(A Professional Law Corporation)
415 North Parkerson Avenue
Crowley, Louisiana 70527
(337) 788-0768
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:
Karl Jude Hensgens

Helen Popich Harris
Helen Popich Harris (APLC)
321 West Main Street, Suite 2-D
Lafayette, Louisiana 70501
(337) 291-6092
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Alanna Wingate Hensgens

CONERY, Judge.

Following the parties’ divorce, Defendant sought interim spousal support as

well as child support for the couple’s three minor children. Plaintiff cited a downturn

in his farming operation in reporting a period of negative income for calculation of

support. The trial court rejected that evidence after finding that Plaintiff’s

accounting methodology was inconsistent with La.R.S. 9:315(C)(3)(c). The trial

court instead relied upon the Defendant’s expert in accounting to shape orders of

both child and interim spousal support. Plaintiff appeals both awards.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The parties, Karl and Alanna Hensgens, were married in 2006. The couple

have three daughters. Karl filed a petition for divorce on March 7, 2017, which was

granted by a July 18, 2018 judgment of divorce. The judgment terminated the

community retroactive to the filing of the petition.

The trial court thereafter considered ancillary matters, 1 including Alanna’s

request for child support and interim spousal support. During a two-day hearing, the

parties presented expert testimony regarding Karl’s income as a rice and crawfish

farmer in support of their positions regarding issues of support. Karl relied on

calculations reflecting a negative income balance over a period of several years due

to difficulties experienced in that industry, including the 2016 flood event. He

explained that he had no more liquid assets and referenced a lawsuit pending against

the couple due to failure to repay farming loans.

Alanna on the other hand presented expert testimony drawn, in part, from the

couple’s income tax returns and which reported funds available for support. As

1
The trial court named Alanna the domiciliary parent. Custody issues are not at issue in
this proceeding.

discussed in more detail below, the parties differed on issues related to accounting

methodology as well as whether sources of income were recurring and whether

certain expenses were business related for purposes of calculating support.

The trial court ultimately rejected Karl’s assertion that he had negative income

as estimated by his expert through use of an accounting method that relied on

income/expenses related to the crop year. Citing La.R.S. 9:315(C)(3)(c), the trial

court instead favored Alanna’s expert’s use of cash basis accounting and explained

that choice in extensive written reasons. As a result, the trial court ordered Karl to

pay $2,897.70 per month in child support, a figure that included agreed upon sums

for private school tuition, associated fees, and costs. The trial court further ordered

Karl to pay Alanna interim spousal support of $3,085.00 per month.

Karl appeals, asserting that the trial court erred in:

1. Failing to average the farm income over a period of time, while
basing his opinion upon the farm income of a single, extremely atypical
year.

2. Failing to reduce Karl’s income by one-half of the farm income
for the 2017 crop year, which belonged to Alanna.

3. Failing to reduce Karl’s income by one-half of the government
payments for the 2017 crop year, which belonged to Alanna.

4. Failing to exclude, as income, the sale of farm equipment and
while including it failed to consider that one-half of the proceeds
belonged to Alanna.

5. Failing to reduce Karl’s income and/or deviate from the child
support guidelines relative to the debt owed to the Bank of Commerce
as set forth in the lawsuit marked as exhibit K-3.

6. Failing to attribute one-half of the revenue from crop sales,
government payments and the sale of farm equipment to Alanna.

2

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Child Support

Karl advances numerous arguments regarding the trial court’s calculation of

farming income for purposes of assessing support obligations. Karl testified that the

crawfish and rice farming operation has been sustained each year by farm loans and

by government farming assistance.2 He explained, however, that the operation “got

behind” and “was barely getting by” before the August 2016 flood “wiped out

everything.” He explained that the flooding affected both rice and crawfish crops.

After the Hensgens allegedly failed to pay several of their farm loans, the

lender, Bank of Commerce, filed suit against the couple in July 2018. The Bank’s

petition cited a balance due on promissory notes from March 2015 ($415,800), April

2016 ($486,750), and from August 2016 ($50,065). This difficult financial situation,

Karl suggests, undermines the trial court’s determinations regarding his income for

purposes of support.

In assessing Karl’s gross income, the trial court extensively referenced La.R.S.

9:315(C)(3)(c), which provides:

(3) “Gross income” means:

....

(c) Gross receipts minus ordinary and necessary expenses
required to produce income, for purposes of income from self-
employment, rent, royalties, proprietorship of a business, or joint
ownership or a partnership or closely held corporation. “Ordinary and
necessary expenses” shall not include amounts allowable by the

2
While there was not extensive testimony regarding the government assistance, Karl
explained the connection between the loans and assistance as follows:

[W]hen you sell your crop it will not pay back the loan and that’s why you have a
government payment. It’s supposed to offset that doesn’t come until after you sell
your crop is the bad part. So you don’t know if the government payment added
with your price of the rice is going to pay off the loan because it goes off the average
selling point.

3

Internal Revenue Service for the accelerated component of depreciation
expenses or investment tax credits or any other business expenses
determined by the court to be inappropriate for determining gross
income for purposes of calculating child support.

Id. (emphasis added).

This statute, the trial court determined, was consistent with the accounting

method relied upon by Alanna’s expert in accounting, Chris Rainey, C.P.A. Mr.

Rainey, who employed a cash method of accounting, reviewed, in part, the Hensgens’

tax returns for 2016 and 2017 for insight into the farm business’s “gross receipts

minus ordinary and necessary expenses required to produce income” for those years.

With those income/expense figures provided by the returns, Mr. Rainey explained

that he made “adjustments” to the return as required by La.R.S. 9:315(C)(3)(c).

Mr. Rainey distinguished the cash basis method from the accrual based

accounting method advanced by Karl’s expert, Steven Soileau, C.P.A. Cash basis,

Mr. Rainey explained, accounts for income when it is received and not earned,

whereas the accrual basis accounts for when it is earned and not received. The cash

basis method also accounts for expenses as they are actually paid. Mr. Rainey thus

reasoned that the former method better reflects income available for child support

on a year-to-year basis. Mr. Rainey’s calculations were presented to the trial court

through “Exhibit Wingate 1,” a spreadsheet reflecting gross monthly income of

$11,472 in 2016 and $16,572 in 2017.

Karl’s expert, Mr. Soileau, testified that although he prepared the Hensgens’

tax returns for the previous five years, the returns did not provide an accurate picture

of income. He reasoned instead that the cyclical nature of farming required that

expenses must be matched with corresponding revenue as expenses are often

incurred in one year, but crops may not be sold until the following year. On that

4

latter point, he explained that not all of a rice crop may be sold in the year in which

it is grown, but that it may be stored for some period in order to receive a better price

at a later time. Noting that farming expenses and revenue may vary widely on a

year-to-year basis, Mr. Soileau presented figures related to a five-year period

through the use of “Exhibit K-2”. Entitled “Profit per Crop Year 2013-2017,” the

document listed “Net farm income” of $38,266 in 2013 and negative income of

“($64,317),” ($202,630),” and ($217,744)” in 2014, 2015, and 2016, respectively.

Mr. Soileau identified nominal income of $1,587 for 2017. In contrast, Mr. Rainey

calculated gross annual income of $137,666 in 2016 and $198,867 in 2017.

The trial court determined that the cash basis method of accounting was

appropriate but concluded that Mr. Rainey’s 2016 calculations should not be

considered. Rather, a significant payment received by the Hensgens for damages

related to the BP oil spill3 rendered that year’s income an outlier. The trial court thus

established Karl’s gross monthly income based on figures from Mr. Rainey’s 2017

calculations alone. The court also adjusted several aspects of Mr. Rainey’s

calculations.4

3
Exhibit Wingate 1 indicates that the Hensgens received a $93,374 settlement related to
the oil spill in 2016.
4
For instance, Mr. Rainey reclassified Karl’s fuel and oil usage previously identified as a
business expense for tax purposes to fifty percent personal. The trial court instead attributed on
twenty-five percent to Karl’s personal use. He made several further adjustments to expenditures
for automobile insurance, telephone, and depreciation on the couple’s vehicles. The trial court
also identified a 2017 cash proceed from a life insurance policy as non-recurring and, therefore,
removed it from the calculation of gross income for 2017.

The trial court did not include Mr. Rainey’s estimates regarding potential income from
unreported crawfish sales. The trial court instead rejected that estimated income as “too
speculative.”

5

Standard of Review

Before turning to Karl’s specific arguments, we first note that “[w]e review

child support determinations using the manifest error standard of review and we will

not disturb the trial court’s order unless it committed manifest error or abuse of

discretion in its determination.” L.E.P.S. v. R.G.P., 10-1128, p. 8 (La.App. 3 Cir.

3/16/11), 59 So.3d 523, 528-29 (citing State, Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. L.T., 05-1965

(La. 7/6/06), 934 So.2d 687), writ denied, 11-0770 (La. 5/27/11), 63 So.3d 999.

Scope of Evidence

Karl first cites error in the trial court’s consideration of data from 2017 alone

in calculating gross income. He suggests that a longer time span must be considered,

giving farming’s fluctuations. He relies, instead, on Mr. Soileau’s calculations.

Karl’s argument, however, ignores the limited evidence found reliable by the trial

court.

In fact, the trial court specifically rejected Mr. Soileau’s methodology and,

correspondingly, his resulting calculations. Additionally, Mr. Rainey provided

details regarding income only from 2016 and 2017. With the trial court’s rejection

of the 2016 income due to its inclusion of the BP settlement, only data from 2017

remained. The trial court was thus left with limited evidence5 from which to draw

its own conclusions and calculations. That limitation was created by the parties’

evidentiary submissions, not by error on the trial court’s part. Given that limitation,

the trial court assessed Karl’s income under La.R.S. 9:315(C)(3)(c) in accord with

the evidence chosen by the parties.

5
The parties did not provide the trial court with the raw data, invoices, reports, and returns
on which the experts based their calculations. Instead, the parties presented the trial court with the
reports from which the experts testified.

6

To the extent Karl argues that the trial court erred in accepting Mr. Rainey’s

methodology over Mr. Soileau’s use of accrual based accounting, we leave that

finding undisturbed. In evaluating the expert opinions, the trial court remarked that:

The options I had on the evidence adduced were to accept negative
figures … and I went through all five years and averaged per month and
it came out to I believe negative $7000 each month or that’s option
one … based on expert testimony. Option two, based on the other
expert, Chris Rainey, to accept his conclusions of fact.

The trial court recognized the “commonsense problem” with the “negative versus

the positive” before pointing out the more “fundamental problem” of reliance on Mr.

Soileau’s calculation. Significantly, the trial court found that the cash basis

methodology presented by Mr. Rainey has a basis in law since La.R.S. 9:315(C)(3)(c)

is “written as cash basis[.]”

In particular, the statute defines “gross income” as “gross receipts minus

ordinary and necessary expenses required to produce income, for purposes of income

from self-employment, rent, royalties, proprietorship of a business, or joint

ownership or a partnership or closely held corporation.” Id. Karl’s suggestion that

the trial court erred in refusing to craft an income outside of the clear legislative

language is unpersuasive. Rather, La.R.S. 9:315(C)(3)(c) provides for “a very

straightforward accounting analysis[,]” requiring simple consideration of receipts

minus ordinary and necessary expenses as demonstrated by the controlling parent.

Scott v. Scott, 43,455, p. 7 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/13/08), 989 So.2d 290, 295.

While Karl maintains his argument that his declining farm practice and his

inability to secure farm loans commensurate with those in the past renders the figures

from 2017 unreliable, the trial court correctly recognized Karl’s stipulation to the

7

payment of private school tuition for the children. 6 Continuing, the trial court

explained:

The tuition you’re paying far exceeds the amount of child support that
I would be ordering under the accepted gross monthly income that
was … accepted into evidence by me, Mr. Hensgens, offered by your
expert. … Again, it doesn’t make common sense nor does it make legal
sense in an application of the law to the facts to come up with,
essentially, a negative $7000 per month[.]

Despite that stipulation, Karl presented no data beyond the calculations of negative

income from Mr. Soileau.

Having recognized both the trial court’s direct application of the limited

evidence presented to La.R.S. 9:315(C)(3)(c) and its observations regarding the

unworkable nature of Karl’s calculations, we find that the trial court’s ruling is

supported by the record.

Community Enterprise

A similar duality of argument is seen in three assignments that stem from

Karl’s contention that the trial court erred in not recognizing that the farming

operation was a “community enterprise.” Such a designation, he argues, requires

that one-half of the 2017 farm income be attributed to Alanna, as well as one-half of

the 2017 government payments and one-half of the sale of the proceeds from the

2017 sale of farm equipment.

6
The trial court restated the parties’ stipulation as:

The stipulation with respect to private school is this: That one, private
school as part and parcel of the child support obligation in calculating the total child
support obligation. Whether it is under [La.R.S. 9:]315.6. So one, private school
tuition it’s coming in for the purposes of calculating total child support ….

....

It is my understanding also in terms of the second stipulation of fact here is
that for purposes of – so, if I hear no other evidence what’s going to be included
under [La.R.S.]9:315.6 is the figure $1,419.75[.]

8

This argument conflates the concept of income for assessing child support

with that of ownership of property. See La.Civ.Code art. 2336. The distinction

between the two is readily seen on reference to jurisprudence advanced by Karl for

the proposition that he and Alanna operated a community enterprise. See Lanza v.

Lanza, 04-1314, 04-1756 (La. 3/2/05), 898 So.2d 280; Milton v. Milton, 10-1589

(La.App. 1 Cir. 5/9/11), 71 So.3d 326, writ denied, 11-1168 (La. 9/16/11), 69 So.3d

1150. Both cases addressed issues related to the partition of community property.

Neither matter involved assessment of “income” under La.R.S. 9:315(C)(3)(c).

Further, the parties’ stipulations are contrary to Karl’s argument on appeal

that one-half of the “income” generated through the receipt of government payments

and through the sale of farm equipment must be attributed to Alanna. The parties

stipulated that Alanna was not employed at the time suit was filed and that she was

earning no money until the couple’s youngest child turned five. At that point,

minimum wage would be imputed to Alanna. See La.R.S. 9:315.11. The trial court

accepted that stipulation.

Recurring Income

Karl next argues that the trial court erred in including the sale of farm

equipment in its calculation of income as “[t]he parties were not in the business of

selling farm equipment.” He suggests that as the evidence indicates that equipment

was sold only in 2016 and 2017, the sale was due only to the parties’ declining

circumstances and their inability to further borrow money.

In ruling, the trial court maintained Mr. Rainey’s inclusion of $23,000 from

the sale of farm equipment as an element of Karl’s 2017 income. Mr. Rainey noted

that the tax returns included a $27,685 gain from the sale of farm equipment in 2016

and a $23,000 gain in 2017. Mr. Rainey explained that he included that element “as

9

a recurring item because Mr. Hensgens does frequently sell farm equipment.” When

challenged on cross-examination, Mr. Rainey admitted that Karl was not in the

business of selling farm equipment but further explained that it was “part of his

business operation.” (Emphasis added.) He remarked that “[h]e buys equipment,

he claims depreciation on that equipment as a farming expense” and that “part of the

cycle is to sell older equipment when you replace it with newer equipment.” Mr.

Rainey explained that although he was unaware why the equipment was sold, “it

wouldn’t change [his] finding that he had these gains from the sale of equipment in

these two years.”

The trial court accepted Mr. Rainey’s testimony regarding the sale of

equipment as part and parcel of the farming operation, stating that “in terms of the

sale of farm equipment the testimony that was adduced there - - the benefit is having

accelerated depreciation. So if you have new equipment coming in and the older

equipment being sold it’s a tax benefit, there’s no longer a tax benefit then it should

come in, as income for purpose of this calculation[.]” We find no manifest error in

that determination. Notably, while Karl’s counsel speculates that the farming

equipment was sold in order to pay for farm expenses that Karl could not otherwise

meet, Karl did not testify regarding the sale of farming equipment or the motive

therefor.

Characterization of Expenses

Karl also questions the trial court’s determination that American Express

payments in the amount of $9,382.23 were personal in nature rather than business-

related. He contends that the trial court accepted Mr. Rainey’s testimony on this

point, despite the fact that the accountant had not “reviewed any documents to

10

determine whether the credit card payments were nonbusiness related.” Karl’s

argument mistakes the applicable burden of proof, however.

Gross income is calculated as “[g]ross receipts minus ordinary and necessary

expenses required to produce income …[.]” La.R.S. 9:315(C)(3)(c) (emphasis

added). “‘Ordinary and necessary expenses’ shall not include … business expenses

determined by the court to be inappropriate for determining gross income for

purposes of calculating child support.” Id. (emphasis added). See also Baggett v.

Baggett, 96-453 (La. 4/23/97), 693 So.2d 264.

The expenses challenged by Karl are payments made to the couple’s

American Express account in the amount of $9,382.23 and claimed as business

expenses on the 2017 income tax return. Mr. Rainey explained that: “In my

conversations with Alanna Hensgens and in my review of the documents these

expenses charged to American Express were not business expenses but were

personal expenses.” Without contrary evidence from Karl, the trial court was only

presented with evidence indicating that the American Express expenses were for

personal expenses.

Importantly, “[t]he court, of course, is not bound by the controlling parent’s

designation of which expenses are ‘ordinary and necessary,’ even if made in federal

tax returns.” Dejoie v. Guidry, 10-1542, p. 9 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/13/11), 71 So.3d

1111, 1118, writ denied, 11-1779 (La. 9/2/11), 68 So.3d 520. Rather, it is “the party

controlling the closely held corporation [who] must bear that burden.” Id. (citing

Scott v. Scott, 43,455 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/13/08), 989 So.2d 290). As Karl sought to

declare the American Express payment as a business-related expense required to

produce income, he had the burden of proving that classification. Based on the

record, a determination that he failed to do so is not manifestly erroneous.

11

Deviation from Guidelines

Moving from the calculation of his income, Karl next contends that the trial

court erred in failing to account for the parties’ debt to the “Bank of Commerce in

an amount of $656,215.92” as well as interest and attorney fees. Karl’s claim relates

to the Bank’s suit on three promissory notes issued in 2015 and 2016. Suit was

pending at the time of trial. Karl first claims that this debt should have been

considered by the trial court in its calculation of income. That argument, however,

is resolved by the above discussion finding no error in the trial court’s adherence to

La.R.S. 9:315(C)(3)(c).

By his remaining argument, Karl alternatively contends that the trial court

should have deviated from the guidelines for determination of child support. He

argues that the deviation is required due to both the unpaid debt and his reliance on

loans from his mother since the filing of the petition for divorce.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:315.1 permits a deviation from the guidelines as

follows:

A. The guidelines set forth in this Part are to be used in any
proceeding to establish or modify child support filed on or after October
1, 1989. There shall be a rebuttable presumption that the amount of
child support obtained by use of the guidelines set forth in this Part is
the proper amount of child support.

B. (1) The court may deviate from the guidelines set forth in this
Part if their application would not be in the best interest of the child or
would be inequitable to the parties. The court shall give specific oral or
written reasons for the deviation, including a finding as to the amount
of support that would have been required under a mechanical
application of the guidelines and the particular facts and circumstances
that warranted a deviation from the guidelines. The reasons shall be
made part of the record of the proceedings.

....

C. In determining whether to deviate from the guidelines, the
court’s considerations may include:

12

....

(5) An extraordinary community debt of the parties.

The supreme court explained in Guillot v. Munn, 99-2132, p. 9 (La. 3/24/00),

756 So.2d 290, 297, that since the child support guidelines are presumptively correct,

“the party advocating a deviation bears the burden of proving the guideline amount

is not in the best interest of the child or would be inequitable to the parties.” The

trial court cited Guillot for the proposition that deviations are warranted only in

limited circumstances so as to ensure the adequacy and consistency of child support

awards. Id.

Following review, we maintain the trial court’s determination that a deviation

as suggested by Karl was not demonstrated by competent evidence. Rather, the trial

court remarked on the ambiguity of circumstances surrounding the debt in rejecting

the request for deviation as follows:

So, deviation we have an amount that I calculated in terms of gross
monthly income. Deviations, when you look at the reported cases
especially the ones that talk about community obligation, the court will
find it was this, you will find, essentially, cases where during the
marriage - - let me give some easy examples, credit card debt $100,000,
expensive car notes, recurring monthly obligations that were paid
during the community or being paid after the community. All of a
sudden the parties split and you have one party paying all of it … and
it is an extraordinary amount. That is a ground in my opinion for a
deviation, a downward deviation. Why? Because you have proof that
it was paid during the marriage, then you have the physical separation,
the debt is still being maintained after. Here, what’s different is how
the loans on its face and what is in evidence it’s a lawsuit on three or
four, four promissory notes and the principle amounts are massive.
However, in terms of those notes back in 2015. The gross monthly
income again, was calculated by me really looking at 2017 I explained
yesterday why I cannot consider 2016 but it’s not an obligation that[’s]
currently being serviced. It’s there and it’s simply there but I’m just
distinguishing between the cases. I cannot predict the future. I cannot
predict what is going to happen with it. I have no idea what if a
settlement is reached on that lawsuit. I have no idea, but I know this, it
is inconsistent with, essentially, the cases for me to have a downward

13

deviation on those amounts that have been owed since the earliest was
2015, 2016, the principal balance was owed in 2017 then you have two
notes owed and I’m using the 2017 numbers to calculate gross monthly
income. Again, it’s not a case - - how do you even deviate? But you
have the amounts owed, these big principle amounts owed as reflected
in the evidence. They are paid not in installments so you get the loan
you don’t owe it for another year when the crop comes well, now, all
of a sudden you get the loan and then it’s satisfied when the crops comes
with one payment. So, one payment you pay off the balance of the loan.
Prepaid the totality of the principle and the interest. No payments were
evidently made and now, essentially, no payments were made and when
I calculated income, no income coming in so to downward deviate from
what? Downward deviation again, the best interest of the child or if
there’s an inequity I just - - it would be a pure guesstimate if I
downward deviate why? For what? Downward deviate to a thousand,
two thousand and it’s so speculative, essentially, again, it’s had no
effect on monthly income as calculated by me for all the years that those
notes have actually been outstanding or since the notes were actually
contracted, for all those reasons it’s just not a case where there is
sufficient evidence, sufficient, positive, competent evidence that would
be me a basis, an evidentiary basis to deviate with any sort of precision.
Very different situation when I’m looking at, essentially, community
obligations, the payor of child support but, again, essentially, huge
credit card debts, what if you were servicing these debts each month
and the note payments were massive? That is a little bit different story
because then you have a monthly recurring amount on the obligation
then I know, essentially, you can have more information to actually
make a considered and evidentiary based determination of to deviate
and how much to deviate but here I have nothing. Again, I’ve got
nothing.

The trial court accurately remarked on the state of the evidence surrounding

the claim on the purported community debt. Although the burden to prove the

claimed deviation was Karl’s, he presented the trial court only with information

surrounding his past income found to be inconsistent with La.R.S. 9:315(C)(3)(c)

and only general testimony regarding anticipated operations going forward. As the

trial court explained, future servicing of the debt or proceedings related to the

pending suit are speculative. In light of that absence of evidence, the trial court was

left with only the positive evidence of 2017 income as presented by Mr. Rainey for

application to the guidelines. This court has described those guidelines as mandatory.

14

See Lord v. Lord, 09-457 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/4/09), 22 So.3d 1134, writ denied, 09-

2634 (La. 2/12/10), 27 So.3d 849.

Accordingly, the trial court’s determination is supported by the record.

Imputed Income

In his final argument regarding child support, Karl again relates his poor

financial circumstances in arguing that the trial court’s assessment of $15,8874.47

gross monthly income was erroneous. He asserts in brief that, as many farmers

cannot repay their farm loans, some “fall into a category of businessmen who

continue farming and continue to accumulate debt to the bank. At some point they

will stop farming, get sued for the debts they owe, file bankruptcy, or a combination

of the foregoing.” He further maintains that “the parties’ farm netting any significant

revenue from crops is fantasy” and that this lack of revenue should have been

considered by the trial court in its shaping of gross monthly income. He suggests a

lesser income be imputed to him or that a remand would be appropriate for

consideration of the Louisiana Occupation Employment and Wage Survey.

This argument, however, operates outside of the legislation controlling the

court’s assessment of gross monthly income. Louisiana Revised Statutes

9:315(C)(3)(c) is specific to “income” rather than profit and is applicable to “income

from self-employment[.]” Notwithstanding Karl’s bleak farming projections, the

trial court correctly applied the statutory framework, albeit doing so on the

limitations of the parties’ evidence. The trial court simply determined that Karl’s

chosen evidence was unreliable for the type of deviation suggested. That decision

is supported by the record and is not manifestly erroneous.

15

Interim Spousal Support

In his final assignment of error, Karl questions the trial court’s assessment of

interim spousal support, in particular addressing the calculation of his net monthly

income in the amount of $14,0604.52. As above, he returns to what he describes as

the couple having lived off of “borrowed money” and having done so “well beyond

their means.” He also returns to his contention that the trial court should have

considered the parties’ income in terms of a community enterprise. We do not return

to either assertion as the trial court’s assessment of income and the inapplicability of

the community enterprise concept have been discussed at length above.

To the extent Karl argues that Alanna failed to meet her burden of proving

entitlement to support under La.Civ.Code arts. 111 and 112,7 we find no manifest

error in the trial court’s determination otherwise. In ruling, the trial court referenced

Alanna’s affidavit of income and expenses, making certain adjustments as it deemed

necessary following Alanna’s testimony. Those findings are supported by review of

the record, as is the trial court’s assessment of Karl’s ability to pay based upon his

income as calculated.

We find that this final assignment of error lacks merit.

7
Louisiana Civil Code Article 111 provides that:

In a proceeding for divorce or thereafter, the court may award interim
periodic support to a party or may award final periodic support to a party who is in
need of support and who is free from fault prior to the filing of a proceeding to
terminate the marriage in accordance with the following Articles.

Specific to interim spousal support, La.Civ.Code art. 113(A) provides, in part: “Upon
motion of a party, the court may award a party interim spousal support based on the needs of that
party, the ability of the other party to pay, any interim or final child support obligation, and the
standard of living of the parties during the marriage.”

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DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs

of this proceeding are assessed to Appellant, Karl Jude Hensgens.

AFFIRMED.

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