St. Martin Parish Government v. Bryan Champagne

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

19-499

ST. MARTIN PARISH GOVERNMENT

VERSUS

BRYAN CHAMPAGNE, ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ST. MARTIN, NO. 83926
HONORABLE KEITH R.J. COMEAUX, DISTRICT JUDGE

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CANDYCE G. PERRET
JUDGE

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Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Elizabeth A. Pickett,
John E. Conery, Van H. Kyzar, and Candyce G. Perret, Judges.

Conery, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
Kyzar, J., dissents for the reasons assigned by Judge Conery.

MOTIONS TO DISMISS DENIED; EXCEPTION OF NO RIGHT OF
ACTION DENIED; JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

Allan L. Durand
235 La Rue France
Lafayette, LA 70508
(337) 237-8501
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:
St. Martin Parish Government

Gregory J. Logan
The Logan Law Firm
Post Office Box 52704
Lafayette, LA 70505
(337) 406-9685
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES:
Bryan Champagne
Champagne’s Cajun Swamp Tours, LLC
The Wharf on Lake Martin, LLC

Michael O. Adley
Gibson Law Partners, LLC
Post Office Box 52124
Lafayette, LA 70505
(337) 761-6023
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES:
Bryan Champagne
Champagne’s Cajun Swamp Tours, LLC
The Wharf on Lake Martin, LLC

PERRET, Judge.

St. Martin Parish Government (“Appellant”) appeals the dismissal of its

Petition for Injunctive Relief, with prejudice, in which it sought an injunction against

The Wharf on Lake Martin, LLC; Champagne’s Cajun Swamp Tours, LLC; and

Bryan Champagne (collectively referred to as “Appellees”) to: (1) prohibit

commercial and/or retail ventures and activity at 1076 Rookery Road, Breaux Bridge,

Louisiana, in violation of the W-2 zoning district, and (2) to remove all structures at

that location which infringe on the set-back restrictions set forth in the parish zoning

ordinance. Additionally, the trial court dismissed as moot Appellees’ reconventional

demand for damages if Appellant was successful in obtaining an injunction. The

trial court assessed costs of the proceedings to St. Martin Parish Government, but

failed to specify the exact amount of court costs in accordance with the requirement

of La.R.S. 13:5112. On appeal, Appellees have also filed two motions and

incorporated memoranda to dismiss appeal for lack of jurisdiction and an Exception

of No Right and Incorporated Memorandum. We deny Appellees’ motions to

dismiss appeal as well as the exception of no right and affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

On April 29, 2016, Appellant filed a Petition for Injunctive Relief asserting

that Appellees were in violation of the parish zoning ordinance. Specifically, that

Appellees’ premises are located within a W-2 zoning designation, which does not

permit commercial activity. Appellant asserted that Appellees’ commercial ventures

include the sale of food and drinks, marketing of fishing paraphernalia, kayak and

canoe rentals, and paid boat tours. Furthermore, Appellant’s petition asserts that

Appellees’ buildings violate the set-back mandates of the parish zoning ordinance.

Appellees filed an answer asserting that all building and activity was

conducted after obtaining the necessary parish permits and raised the defenses of

estoppel and Appellees’ vested rights and reliance on the permits. Additionally,

Appellees filed an Amended and Restated Answer to Petition for Injunctive Relief

and Reconventional Demand on August 31, 2018, which additionally alleged that

the zoning ordinance was vague, ambiguous, and unconstitutional and also sought

damages in the event that Appellant succeeded in obtaining the requested injunction.

Regarding the ordinance, Appellees assert that the ordinance was “unconstitutional

as it was haphazardly thrown together, is vague and ambiguous and incomplete

insofar as referenced map, policies and procedures outlined in the Ordinance were

never followed or performed.” Furthermore, Appellees assert that the police jury

failed to support the enactment of the ordinance with a vote of the people or an act

of the legislature.

A trial on the merits was held on April 8, 2019. At trial, the parties stipulated

to the following facts:

1. On May 23, 2011, St. Martin Parish Government issued
Commercial Building Permit number 006816-01 to Bryan Champagne
for the construction of a wood frame building with a designated
Construction Type as “Bait Shop” and Proposed Use as a “Grocery
Store”, at an address of 1076 Rookery Rd. 8 [sic], St. Martinville.

2. On April 22, 2013, St. Martin Parish Government issued
Commercial Building Permit number 010667-02 to The Warf [sic] on
Lake Martin for the construction of a wood frame construction with a
designated Construction Type as “Deck” and Proposed Use as
“Commercial”, at an address of 1076 Rookery Rd., St. Martinville.

3. On April 22, 2013, St. Martin Parish Government issued
Commercial Building Permit number 010778-01 to The Wark(sic) on
Lake Martin for the construction of a wood frame construction with a
designated Construction Type as “Commercial” and Proposed Use as
“Roof Over Deck”, at an address of 1076 Rookery Rd., St. Martinville.

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4. Pursuant to these permits, Bryan Champagne constructed
a building and wharf on the banks of Lake Martin from which he
operates boats in a tour guide business conducted in Lake Martin, as
well as selling food, drinks, bait, and other miscellaneous items from
the buildings constructed pursuant to the permit.

5. On June 28, 2011, Champagne received a President of
Parish Government Clearance in connection with a liquor/beer permit
issued to his business.

6. On June 22, 2011, Champagne received a Planning &
Zoning Clearance in connection with a liquor/beer permit issued to his
business.

7. On June 21, 2011, Champagne received a Health Unit
Clearance in connection with a liquor/beer permit issued to his business.

8. Bryan Champagne and/or The Wharf on Lake Martin have
continuously since 2011 operated a commercial tour guide service, as
well as selling food, drinks, bait, and other miscellaneous items, from
the building and wharf constructed pursuant to the permits referred to
above.

Additionally, the evidence submitted at trial included: the zoning ordinance

with appendices, building permits, inspections, a March 3, 2016 cease and desist

letter, St. Martin Parish E-911 Commission evidencing that Appellees secured an

address, certification of occupancy, liquor/beer permit, the deposition of Guy

Cormier (prior Parish President), and Appellant’s responses to discovery. Further

testifying at trial were Chester Cedars, current parish president and prior parish

counsel; Becky Patin, St. Martin Parish Clerk of Court; Bryan Champagne; and

Shani Dodge, who worked in the parish building permits section.

The trial testimony and evidence showed that Bryan Champagne went to the

parish and obtained all permits and inspections the parish required of him prior to

starting business at 1076 Rookery Lane, which he leased. Although Mr. Cedars

testified that Appellees’ business is located at 1075 Rookery Road, differing from

the permits, Mr. Champagne testified that the address was provided to him by 911

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and at no time was he informed that he had the wrong address. When Mr.

Champagne wished to add additional structures in 2013, he again obtained all

permits required by the parish. Additionally, prior to obtaining the 2013 permits,

Mr. Champagne testified that Mr. Cormier and Jacques Miguez, the Planning and

Zoning Coordinator, came out to Appellees’ premises before approving the permits.

Chester Cedars testified that he believes the permits were the result of an

administrative error. Mr. Cedars also explained that his understanding of the

ordinance is that, unless stated otherwise, zoning designations set forth in the

ordinance apply to both sides of the road and that a W-2 designation does not permit

an exception to the zoning designation.

As for the zoning ordinance at issue, signed on August 26, 1996, the ordinance

divides St. Martin Parish into sixteen types of districts, with W-2 referring to

“Woodland/Flood Plain – recreation/residential district.” The zoning ordinance

states:

[Article III] Sec. 2. Zoning district map (defined)

The boundaries of the said districts are as defined in the Zoning
District Identification File (Public Road Zoning Data File) which has
been properly attested and placed on file in the office of the St. Martin
Parish Clerk of Court. This Zoning District Identification File, together
with all maps, notations, references, and other information thereon, is
made part of this ordinance and has the same force and effect as if fully
set forth or described herein.

Sec. 3. Interpretation of district boundaries

Where uncertainty exists with respect to the boundaries of any of
the aforesaid districts as described, the following rules shall apply:

(a) Where district boundaries are indicated as following
streets, highways, or alleys, the center line of such streets, highways, or
alleys shall be construed to such boundaries.

(b) Where the land has been or may hereafter be divided into
blocks and lots and where district boundaries are so indicated that they

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approximately follow the lot lines, such lot lines shall be construed to
be said boundaries.

(c) In unsubdivided property, the district boundary lines on
the zoning district map shall be determined by the use of the scale
appearing on the map.
....

Sec. 4. Regulation of areas under water

All areas which are under water and not shown as included
within any district, shall be subject to all of the regulations of
Woodland/Flood Zone areas.

....

[Article IV] Sec. 1. Use of building or land

Except as hereinafter provided, no building or land shall
hereafter be used or occupied and no building or part thereof shall be
erected, moved, or altered unless in conformity with the regulations
herein specified for the district in which it is located.

....

[Article IX] Sec. 3. Function of Director of Planning and
Development

The Director of Planning and Development shall issue
development permits which are in accord with the provisions of this
ordinance, review plans for construction and installation of signs, issue
certificates of zoning compliance at the same time as he issues the
development permit providing the building or structure meets the
requirements of this ordinance, be responsible for the enforcement of
the ordinance, conduct inspections of construction to ensure that it
complies with the provisions of the ordinance, and maintain a set of
up-to-date zoning maps and zoning texts.

....

Sec. 7. Development permits

No building or structure shall be erected, altered, repaired, or
relocated until a permit therefore has been issued by the Director of
Planning and Development. The application for and issuance of such
permits shall be in accordance with the requirements of the
development code, except that no permit shall be issued until
application for a certificate of zoning compliance has been made
and approved.

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Sec. 8. Certificate of zoning compliance

No change in the use or occupancy of land or of an existing
building shall be made, nor shall any new building be used or changed
in use until a certificate of zoning compliance shall have been issued by
the Director of Planning and Development stating that the proposed
use of the building or land complies with the provisions of this
ordinance. Applications for a certificate of zoning compliance shall
be made coincident with the application for a development permit.
After determining that the proposed erection, alteration, repair,
relocation, or change in use is in compliance with the provisions of
this chapter, each such application shall be approved by the
Director of Planning and Development.

(Emphasis ours).

Attached to the zoning ordinance is Appendix A, Schedule of Zoning District

Regulations Land Use/Zoning Definitions; Appendix B, Land Use Suitability

Survey; and Appendix C, Parish Road/Land Use Suitability Listing. Appendix A

states that “[a]ll areas within a designated flood plain or flood zone are zoned as

‘Woodland / Flood Plain’ lands and must comply with the appropriate federal, state,

or parish regulatory uses[.]” The permitted uses of a W-2 district include: “Those

uses allowed in zoning districts W-1 . . . and R-2 . . .; Public and private camp sites;

temporary commercial amusement or recreational developments.” Additionally, the

lot requirements require a front yard of twenty feet. The permitted uses of a W-1

district include: “Wildlife refuge; public/private recreational boating, camping,

fishing, hiking, hunting, nature study, etc. area, oil and gas extraction, storage, and

transfer facilities; public and private boat launch ramps, temporary structures and

uses as authorized by custodial authority/owner.” Lastly, R-2 districts permit:

“Single family dwellings . . . parish parks and playgrounds and facilities in

conjunction therewith; libraries; museums; churches; public schools; private

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schools . . . private recreational uses; private gardens; private nurseries; private

garages; home occupations . . . duplexes . . . and mobile home subdivisions[.]”

Appendix C contains a list of streets in the parish and the zoning designation

of each road. Specifically, Appendix C states, “The zoning designation (LNDUSE)

collum (sic) indicates the predominate land use allowed along and adjacent to all

public roads in St. Martin Parish. Detailed zoning classifications are as indicated in

‘Appendix D.’ (Parish Road Zoning Data Sheets) of this ordinance.” Appendix C

lists Rookery Road as “W-2.” There is no “Appendix D” attached in the record.

At trial, Becky Patin, St Martin Parish Clerk of Court, testified that a plat with

the zoning districts was not on file with the clerk of court until April 4, 2019.

Additionally, despite the ordinance referencing a certificate of zoning compliance,

Appellant’s discovery responses indicate that the parish does not use a document

known as a “Certificate of Zoning Compliance.” This court notes that the parties

stipulated that Appellees received a President of Parish Government Clearance on

June 28, 2011, and a Planning & Zoning Clearance on June 22, 2011 in connection

with a liquor/beer permit issued.

At trial, Appellant’s counsel conceded, despite seeking the removal of any

structures which violate the front yard set-back requirements in its petition, that the

parish cannot make Mr. Champagne move his building because the parish issued the

permits. Counsel argued instead that “[t]he only question that we’re putting to the

Court is even though we did that in error and we can’t make him move his buildings,

is he allowed to continue to conduct a commercial activity in an area that it’s not

zoned for?”

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After providing oral reasons for ruling at trial, the trial court signed a judgment

on April 18, 2019, dismissing Appellant’s Petition for Injunctive Relief and finding

Appellees’ reconventional demand moot.

Appellant now appeals and presents four issues for review:

ISSUE #1: Did the SMPG [St. Martin Parish Government] Zoning
Ordinance prohibit commercial activity in the area in which
Champagne’s business was located?

ISSUE #2: Were the permits issued improperly because of the
prohibition of commercial activity in zone W-2?

ISSUE #3: Was SMPG arbitrary in attempting to enforce its zoning
ordinance in this case?

ISSUE #4: Does the “vested right” doctrine apply in a case in which
the issuing authority (SMPG) did not act arbitrarily?

Additionally, Appellees filed a Motion and Incorporated Memorandum to

Dismiss Appeal for Lack of Jurisdiction, which was referred to this court on the

merits.

MOTIONS TO DISMISS:

In both their first and second motions to dismiss, Appellees argue that

Appellant only appeals one of the grounds for the trial court’s ruling on appeal—the

vested rights issue. However, Appellees assert that the trial court also found the

ordinance is vague and unconstitutional. Thus, because the unconstitutional issue

was not appealed, a reversal by this court on the vested rights issue would not change

the outcome of the trial court due to the zoning ordinance being ineffective and,

therefore, there is no practical relief that this court can grant Appellant. Citing to

Felder v. Political Firm, L.L.C., 14-1266 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/24/15), 170 So.3d 1022,

Appellees conclude that the appeal should be dismissed for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction.

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The issue of the zoning ordinance being vague and unconstitutional was raised

as a defense in Appellees’ answer and also in Appellees’ amended answer and

reconventional demand. Appellees assert that the trial court agreed with Appellees

that the zoning ordinance was vague and ambiguous, and, therefore, unenforceable.

However, it is Appellant’s position that the judgment “contains no decretal

language declaring the SMPG zoning ordinance to be invalid or void,” and that the

trial court only based its ruling on the vested rights argument. Furthermore,

Appellant argues that Appellees’ attack on the zoning ordinance’s validity via an

answer to a petition for injunction is an unauthorized collateral attack on the

ordinance.

The trial court’s judgment does not indicate what grounds were used in

entering judgment in favor of Appellees and dismissing Appellant’s injunction.

Instead, the judgment merely states:

Considering the evidence presented and for the reasons orally
assigned, the Court enters Judgement in favor of Bryan Champagne,
The Wharf on Lake Martin, LLC and Champagne’s Cajun Swamp
Tours, LLC, dismissing the St. Martin Parish Government’s Petition for
Injunction, with prejudice. Furthermore, the Reconventional Demand
of Appellees is now moot and; therefore, hereby dismissed.

After summarizing the facts of this case as it understood them, the trial court

provided the following oral reasons for ruling:

The defendants have raised two exceptions to the zoning. Those
are the vested rights and the zoning ordinance being void and
ineffectual due to problems with the recordation and the adoption or
notice provisions under the zoning ordinance. The Court finds that both
are applicable. The Court finds that the estoppel and vested rights that
Mr. Champagne obtained by obtaining the proper permit that he feels
was needed and requested and the giving of those permits in effect
granted him a right to the occupancy of that land. He had no knowledge,
as he testified to, what he had to do in order to get the permit. The
parish government is under a duty to know the ordinances and know
what the regulations are. Had they told Mr. Champagne at that
particular time that he could not get a permit, certainly he would have

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either taken legal action or accepted it as it was. But he got the permit.
And now to come in five years later and say, no—not actually five years
later, eight years later, but the suit’s been going on for three years—say
no, we’re going to shut you down because we made a mistake, there’s
a certain operation in the law, detrimental reliance or estoppel.
Certainly Mr. Champagne has invested hard-earned money into his
business. He’s done what the parish has asked him to do as far as
permitting and operations. He has not violated any laws other than the
zoning ordinance, which the Parish condoned, initially. So, therefore,
the Court finds that the vested rights interests apply in this particular
case.

Mr. Durand did, in fact, point out that the cases cited by the
plaintiff were not cases of commercial litigation but were for residential
or a rental type litigation. I think there was one case cited by Mr.
Durand that involved a hotel with the operation or building or a
restaurant in the hotel and it didn’t comply with the zoning order. But,
as Mr. Adley adequately pointed out, that was done at the behest at the
beginning of the construction before significant time and effort had
been placed into the construction and the place being under operation.
In this case, we’re eight years down the road, where Mr. Champagne
has been operating his business to make it a successful business. The
parish government, in this particular case, is not coming in and trying
to shut it down because it made it [sic] a mistake, not Mr. Champagne.
So the Court finds that that vested rights interest, even though it’s not
been litigated in a commercial setting of this type, the Court finds that
it would be extended to this type of setting and finds that Mr.
Champagne’s rights would be violated if the injunction would be
enforced to shut him down.

The second thing though, also, that the Court finds is that the
zoning ordinance in this particular case is poor, at best. The map filed
of record that the Court has reviewed is a road map of the parish
government. It has no zones. It has no margins outside the roads to
connect the various zoning districts or zoning parts. Additionally, the
fact that Mr. Champagne applied at 1075 or 1076 Rookery Road is of
no consequence. Both of them are in the W-2 zone, so it would have
no bearing in this particular case.

I’ve been brought no evidence, other than Mr. Cedar’s esteemed
opinion, that the constitution of Louisiana has been violated. I’ve been
pointed to no law to say that the constitution of Louisiana has been
violated in this case. And the last thing is the zoning map was not filed
of record in the Clerk of Court’s Office until April 4th of 2019, some
eight years after Mr. Champagne obtained his first permit.

So therefore, based on these findings, the Court will deny the St.
Martin Parish Government’s request for an injunction. Costs will be
paid by St. Martin Parish Government.

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“A final appealable judgment must contain decretal language, and it must

name the party in favor of whom the ruling is ordered, the party against whom the

ruling is ordered, and the relief that is granted or denied.” Brooks v. Sibille, 12-1093,

12-1094, pp. 2-3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/30/13), 107 So.3d 826, 828 (quoting Gaten v.

Tangipahoa Par. Sch. Sys., 11-1133, p. 3 (La.App 1 Cir. 3/23/12), 91 So.3d 1073,

1074). Additionally, “[t]he relief granted or denied must be determinable from the

judgment itself without reference to an extrinsic source such as pleadings or reasons

for judgment.” Commodore v. City of New Orleans, 19-127, p. 6 (La.App. 4 Cir.

6/20/19), 275 So.3d 457, 463. See also Brooks, 107 So.3d 826.

An “ordinance remains valid until such time as it is judicially overturned.”

Priola v. Calcasieu Par. Police Jury, 97-161, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/4/97), 696 So.2d

183, 186 (quoting and adopting Op. Att’y Gen. No. 95-14, pp. 1209-1210 (January

27, 1995)), writ denied, 97-1693 (La. 10/13/97), 703 So.2d 613. The supreme court

has also stated that to invoke appellate review, an ordinance or law must be declared

unconstitutional in the judgment. See Barber v. La. Workforce Comm’n, 17-750 (La.

6/5/17), 221 So.3d 38; Meaux v. Galtier, 07-2474 (La. 1/25/08), 972 So.2d 1137;

and Burmaster v. Plaquemines Par. Gov’t, 07-1311 (La. 8/31/07), 963 So.2d 378.

In fact, the supreme court determined that, despite a discussion of a statute’s

constitutionality in the trial court’s reasons for judgment, “it is well-settled law that

the district court’s oral or written reasons form no part of the judgment. In the

absence of [a] declaration of unconstitutionality in the district court’s judgment, this

court lacks appellate jurisdiction.” Barber, 221 So.3d at 39.

Although the trial court stated in its oral reasons that it found both of

Appellees’ arguments applicable, the trial court did not state that the ordinance was

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unenforceable. Most importantly, the trial court’s judgment does not contain any

decretal language stating the ordinance is unenforceable, invalid, or unconstitutional.

Accordingly, we dismiss Appellees’ motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

EXCEPTION OF NO RIGHT OF ACTION:

Appellees also filed an exception of no right of action with this court on May

27, 2020, following this court’s request that certain documents be produced. On

April 14, 2020, this court requested that the parties produce certain maps of Lake

Martin and the “St. Martin-Lafayette Game and Fish Preserve” described by

applicable statutes, as well as Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries’

[LDWF] regulations “pertaining to the ‘St. Martin-Lafayette Game and Fish

Preserve’ and/or the enactment of 1950 La.Acts No. 337, La.R.S. 36:610 and/or

La.R.S. 56:801[.]” The parties were given a deadline of May 1, 2010 to produce the

documents.

Citing to Uniform Rules—Court of Appeal, 1-3, Appellees object to these

documents because they were not submitted as evidence to the trial court.

Furthermore, Appellees assert that Appellant has no right of action to maintain a suit

based on the requested maps and regulations, as that right belongs to LDWF.

This court’s majority opinion does not utilize the requested documents and

affirms the trial court’s judgment. Therefore, we deny the exception of no right of

action.

APPELLANT’S ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR:

The standard of review for the issuance of a permanent injunction
is the manifest error standard. The issuance of a permanent injunction
takes place only after a trial on the merits in which the burden of proof
is a preponderance of the evidence, but a preliminary injunction may
be issued on merely a prima facia showing by the plaintiff that he is
entitled to relief. Notably, parties may agree to consolidate trial on the

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merits of a permanent injunction with the judgment issuing a
preliminary injunction.

Mary Moe, L.L.C. v. La. Bd. of Ethics, 03-2220, pp. 9-10 (La. 4/14/04), 875 So.2d

22, 29 (citations omitted).

In Mary Moe, L.L.C., the trial court orally granted a preliminary injunction.

Thereafter the parties stipulated that “they would waive their right to a trial on the

merits and consent to entry of a final judgment and a permanent injunction[.]” Id.

at 26. In determining the standard of review, the supreme court stated:

In this case, the parties agreed to a consolidation of the trial on
the merits and the rule of the preliminary injunction. Under these
circumstances, the permanent injunction is not a result of a trial on the
merits, but is based on a prima facie showing by the plaintiff that he is
entitled to a preliminary injunction. Given the stipulation in this case,
the court of appeal determined the district court used the standard for
granting a preliminary injunction, i.e. a prima facie showing, instead of
a preponderance of the evidence standard. Thus, the court of appeal
held the standard of review for the conclusions made by the district
court based on its findings of fact were not subject to the higher burden
of proof and, therefore, should not be subject to the higher standard of
review. We agree[.]

Id. at 29.

In this case, the judgment appealed is one dismissing Appellant’s Petition for

Injunction with prejudice. Appellant’s petition requested that Appellees be

prohibited from conducting commercial activity and, originally, requested that any

buildings violating the setback ordinance be removed/moved. The petition also

specifically requested both preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. In

Appellees’ amended answer, they state, “Recently, counsel for Plaintiff has

requested consent of undersigned counsel to try both the preliminary and permanent

injunction at a consolidated trial on the merits.” The amended answer continues,

“Now that a permanent injunction is being brought before the Court, it is necessary

that defendants file their compulsory reconventional demand.” Similar to Mary Moe,

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L.L.C., the parties agreed to consolidate the preliminary injunction and permanent

injunction. However, unlike in Mary Moe, L.L.C., a trial with evidence and

testimony was held, resulting in the dismissal of St. Martin Parish Government’s

Petition for Injunction with prejudice. Although the trial court does not indicate

whether it used the standard for a preliminary or permanent injunction, because there

was a trial with evidence, we will use the standard of review applicable to permanent

injunctions—the manifest error standard of review. Mary Moe, L.L.C., 875 So.2d

22.

1. Did the SMPG Zoning Ordinance prohibit commercial activity in the
area in which Champagne’s business was located?

This issue was not specifically presented to the trial court, although the

determination of whether commercial activity is prohibited at Appellees’ location

would be a finding necessary to examining the vested rights issue because if

commercial activity is not prohibited at Appellees’ location, then there is no conflict.

Although the trial court found that the zoning map was poor and did not include

zoning designations, it also stated, “Both of them [the sides of the road] are in the

W-2 zone, so it would have no bearing in this particular case.” Therefore, it seems

that the trial court did conclude that the W-2 zone applies to Appellees’ location,

which, according to the ordinance in evidence, does not permit commercial activity.

Thus, we find no manifest error in the trial court’s oral finding that the W-2 zoning

designation applies.

2. Were the permits issued improperly because of the prohibition of
commercial activity in zone W-2?

The parish has readily admitted to issuing the permits despite the W-2 zoning

designation. Additionally, Appellant’s witness, Chester Cedars, testified that he

believes the permits were the result of an administrative error. The trial court

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concluded that Mr. Champagne obtained the necessary permits and built the building

“unbeknownst to him that it was zoned in a W-2 zone which probably would not

have allowed that building to be built.” Furthermore, the trial court stated, “The

parish government is under a duty to know the ordinances and know what the

regulations are. . . . But he got the permit.” The trial court continued, “The parish

government, in this particular case, is now coming in and trying to shut it down

because it made a mistake, not Mr. Champagne.”

The evidence also shows that Mr. Champagne was issued a permit for a

grocery/bait shop. As a grocery/bait shop would be in contravention of a W-2 zoning

district, we find no manifest error in the trial court’s factual finding, presented in its

oral reasons, that the parish improperly issued Appellees permits to build a

commercial building.

3. Was SMPG arbitrary in attempting to enforce its zoning ordinance in
this case and does the “vested right” doctrine apply in a case in which the
issuing authority (SMPG) did not act arbitrarily?

Although listed as separate issues, Appellant presents a joint argument in its

brief. Appellant argues that a vested right in a building permit does not equal a

vested right in the conduct conducted in that building. Further, Appellant argues

that when a permit is erroneously issued in contravention of zoning rules, no vested

right is acquired.

Appellant was the proper party to institute an action to restrain or correct any

ordinance violations. La.R.S. 33:4728.1 Appellant first attempts to distinguish cases

1
Louisiana Revised Statutes 33:4728 provides:

In case any building or structure is erected, structurally altered, or
maintained, or any building, structure or land is used in violation of R.S. 33:4721
through R.S. 33:4729 or of any ordinance or other regulation made under authority
conferred thereby, the proper local authorities of the municipality, in addition to
other remedies, may institute any appropriate action or proceedings to prevent such

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relied on by Appellees by asserting that those cases deal with revoking building

permits and the vested rights in the permit to build the structure. Appellant argues

that, in this case, the issue is whether Appellees have a vested right in the activity

being conducted in the building. However, we note that a determination that

Appellees can keep the building but may not run any commercial activities out of it

would render the building nugatory. The purpose of the building was to run

commercial activities and the Parish was put on notice of this intent when Mr.

Champagne applied for his first permit to construct a grocery/bait shop. Thus, we

find the cases dealing with vested rights in permits to build structures relevant.

Appellant cites to Nassau Realty Co., Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 221 So.2d

327 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1969), wherein the plaintiff permit owner sought a reversal of

the zoning board’s denial of his building permit variance application. Although

initially given a permit to begin residential construction, the city cancelled the permit

approximately two weeks later, after construction was begun, due to insufficient lot

area. The plaintiff sought a variance and was denied. The fourth circuit in Nassau,

221 So.2d at 330-31, stated (emphasis added):

If plaintiff has sustained a loss and has been subjected to undue
hardship through no fault of its own but as a result of the Director of
the Department of Safety and Permits having erroneously issued a
permit upon which it relied, it may have a just grievance against that
Department. However, we express no opinion with respect to that
aspect of the case. Whatever remedy it might have, however, does not
lie in any action which will merely pass the hardship on to its neighbors
whose property would be reduced in value by the granting of the
variance.

unlawful erection, structural alteration, maintenance, or use, to restrain, correct, or
abate such violation, to prevent the occupancy of the building, structure, or land, or
to prevent any illegal act, conduct, business, or use in or about such premises.

16

Unlike the current case, however, the court in Nassau found that any hardship

created was the fault of the plaintiff, who was “thoroughly acquainted with the

zoning regulations of that particular locality[,]” for failing to obtain a variance prior

to the purchase of the property. Id. at 330. Additionally, the court found no error in

the trial court’s finding that no evidence of the city’s arbitrariness was presented.

Thus, the trial court and zoning board’s decision was affirmed.

In Pailet v. City of New Orleans, Dep’t of Safety and Permits, 433 So.2d 1091

(La.App. 4 Cir.), writ denied, 440 So.2d 757 (La.1983), the appellate court

determined that the city’s stop work order was justified and that the plaintiffs had

not acquired vested rights in an erroneously issued building permit. The plaintiffs

were issued a stop work order after they purchased a residential property and

renovated it as a four-plex—a nonconforming use. The plaintiffs argued that they

had a vested right in a previously issued construction permit, which authorized

$5,000 in renovations. However, the permit was issued only after the city advised

the plaintiffs that they must submit proof that the property enjoyed a nonconforming

use status, which evidence they submitted, and the city erroneously reviewed. The

plaintiffs then began renovations and, ten months later, a stop work order was issued.

The fourth circuit concluded:

The Trial Judge held that Dr. and Mrs. Pailet had a vested right
in the permit, relying on Dunn v. Parish of Jefferson, supra, wherein
the Court held that a permittee had acquired a vested right because there
was no misrepresentation by the applicant to induce the issuance of the
permit. We do not believe that Dunn is controlling. In Dunn, this Court
found that the permit was properly issued, that the permittee was
justified in relying on it, and that the Jefferson Parish Council could not
revoke it. The instant case is clearly distinguishable because the permit
for the renovations was improperly issued. Additionally, we believe
that Dr. and Mrs. Pailet’s reliance on the issuance of the permit in
this case was unjustified because the evidence shows that they were
aware that the property had not been rented to anyone in 1977 and
certainly not since Mrs. Ponder’s departure in 1978. These facts

17

should have made them aware that the nonconforming status was
questionable. In fact, the nonconforming status was lost because the
nonconforming use was interrupted (suspended) for a period of more
than six months. See Art. 12, Sec. 2 of the Comprehensive Zoning
Ordinance of the City of New Orleans. Furthermore, even if we
found that Dr. and Mrs. Pailet could rely upon the permit, although
erroneously issued, they could not have relied upon a $5,000.00
permit as authorization for renovations that cost $50,000.00.

Id. at 1095-96 (emphasis added). Thus, the current case is factually distinct from

Pailet where the trial court found that the plaintiffs were unjustified in relying on the

issued permit where the plaintiffs should have known there was no nonconforming

use status.

Similarly, in Ellsworth v. City of New Orleans, 13-84 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/31/13),

120 So.3d 897, the fourth circuit found the vested rights doctrine inapplicable where

a homeowner’s request for a variance was denied. The home had a five-foot

encroachment on a setback requirement, but was considered an existing,

nonconforming use. The homeowner obtained a permit to conduct some renovation,

but the permit did not cover exterior or structural work or demolition. Despite this

fact, the homeowner demolished half of the structure, including the existing

encroachment on the setback requirement. Thereafter, the homeowner obtained a

second permit to construct an addition and porch. Several months later, the city

issued a stop work order, asserting that the homeowner exceeded the scope of the

permit and that the new structure encroached on the setback requirement. The

zoning authority thereafter denied her request for a variance, finding that the nine

variance criteria were not met. The homeowner appealed the variance denial and

raised, among other arguments, the argument that she detrimentally relied on the

permits issued. The district court found that she had a vested right in the permits.

In reversing, the appellate court concluded that the zoning authority was not arbitrary,

18

capricious, and that it did not abuse its discretion in denying the variance.

Additionally, the appellate court concluded that the homeowner was not justified in

relying on the permits after she failed to disclose information when obtaining the

permits and was issued multiple stop orders for exceeding the scope of the permits.

Specifically, the court stated:

In finding the vested rights doctrine inapplicable, we further note
that the doctrine “applies by its own terms only to arbitrary revocation
of a valid building permit,” and that “[n]othing in the record gives the
[property owner—here Ms. Ellsworth] the right to build a structure that
violates the City’s Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance.” St. Raymond [v.
City of New Orleans, 99-2438, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/17/00)], 769 So.2d
[562] at 569–70 (Waltzer, J., dissenting). . . . Accordingly, the district
court’s finding that Ms. Ellsworth justifiably relied on the permits
she was issued is not supported by the record; and the district court’s
reliance on the vested rights doctrine is misplaced.

Id. at 907 (emphasis added).

On the other hand, Appellees rely on the following cases, which resulted in

the property owner acquiring vested rights in the permits, and which we find

instructive.

In St. Raymond, 769 So.2d 562, the appellate court held that a developer had

a vested right in a building permit and issued a preliminary injunction preventing the

city from enforcing a stop work order. In reaching its decision, the fourth circuit

stated:

Relevant to this inquiry is the following language from 13 Am
Jur.2d Buildings § 10, adopted by this court in Dunn v. Jefferson Parish,
256 So.2d 664 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1972), writ denied, 260 La. 1137, 258
So.2d 382 (1972):

It has been generally held that a municipal building
permit or license may not arbitrarily be revoked by
municipal authorities, particularly where, on the faith of it,
the owner has incurred substantial expense. Such a
permit has been declared to be more than a mere license
revocable at the will of the licensor. When in reliance
thereon, work upon the building is actually commenced

19

and liabilities are incurred for work and material, the
owner acquires a vest property right to the protection of
which he is entitled.

Id. at 667 (emphasis added). Under the above principle, this court must
answer the following two questions in order to determine whether Mr.
St. Raymond is entitled to issuance of the preliminary injunction under
the exception to the “irreparable injury” requirement: (1) whether the
City’s decision to revoke the building permit was arbitrary, and (2)
whether, on the faith of the building permit, Mr. St. Raymond incurred
substantial expense. If the answer to those two questions is “yes,” Mr.
St. Raymond has acquired a constitutionally-protected vested right in
the building permit “of which [he] cannot now be deprived.” Id.

Id. at 565. Thereafter, the court determined that the city’s actions were arbitrary

because the city passed an ordinance “authorizing the conditional use of the property

for the construction of townhouses,” which had not lapsed, and then issued the

permits to the plaintiff. Id. The city issued a stop work order, but then lifted it,

before issuing a second stop work order. Importantly, the court noted,

This is not a case where the City issued a building permit, then found it
was invalid and revoked it; the City reviewed this building permit
several times, and yet never documented any defect in the permit itself.
The City’s documents reveal that the second Stop Work order was not
issued because the building permit was improperly issued; it was issued
because the City Council revoked the conditional use ordinance.

Id. at 565-66. Similarly, Appellant issued not one, but three building permits to

Appellees over the course of two years. Additionally, Appellant visited Appellees’

location before issuing the second and third permits. Furthermore, Appellees were

cleared for selling alcohol by the parish government and by planning and zoning.

Likewise, in Cuccia v. Board of Zoning Adjustments of/and the Parish of

Jefferson, 07-152 (La.App. 5 Cir. 7/30/07), 966 So.2d 611, the fifth circuit also

found that the plaintiff had a vested right in a structure for which he obtained a permit.

The set of facts are similar to the present case:

Jay Cuccia sought a permit to construct a two story accessory building
which included a garage and patio. DICE reviewed Mr. Cuccia’s plans

20

three times, requiring necessary changes. Mr. Cuccia made the
necessary changes each time and resubmitted the plans to assure
compliance with the building Code. When the building permit was
issued Mr. Cuccia began construction. He poured the slab, and roughed
in the plumbing. At the inspection which occurred at that point DICE
did not notify Mr. Cuccia that the permit was issued in error. Thereafter
Mr. Cuccia framed the building according to the original permit.
Apparently after the building was framed, various neighbors made
complaints that the building height did not comply with the Jefferson
Parish building code. At issue was a part of the second story nearest the
street which was measures 11 feet by 5 feet in dimension. The balance
of the second story is in code.

On March 22, 2005, thirty-seven days after the building permit
was issued and after the building had been framed, DICE informed Mr.
Cuccia by letter that the building permit was suspended because [it] had
been issued in error as the structure exceeded the maximum height
allowed of thirteen feet. The letter further instructed Mr. Cuccia to
either file for a variance of the code requirement, or submit drawings
that comply with the code. Mr. Cuccia became aware of this letter about
two weeks later when he returned from vacation. At that time he
telephoned the building permit office and was told the letter was not a
stop work order and that he could apply for a variance. Mr. Piglia, a
representative of DICE also told Mr. Cuccia that he could close up the
building in order to render it water tight. On May 16, 2005, a stop work
order was posted on Mr. Cuccia’s door. On the next day Mr. Cuccia
filed a request for a variance with the Board.

Id. at 612-13. Like Appellees’ argument, the plaintiff asserted that “he began

construction in good faith, relying on the fact that DICE [the code enforcement] had

reviewed the plans on more than one occasion, and had ultimately approved the

changes and issued a building permit.” Id. at 613-14. The plaintiff argued he had a

vested right in the building and that the board was arbitrary and capricious in denying

his variance request. The fifth circuit stated:

We are mindful that our jurisprudence holds that the mere fact
that a building permit was issued in error and contrary to the laws of
the city does not vest an irrevocable right to proceed under that permit
if there is subsequent action canceling the permission previously
granted. However, fairness and our jurisprudence confirms that when
a homeowner relies in good faith and to his detriment on a building
permit issued by DICE, and incurs expense as a result, he has a vested
right.

21

Id. at 614. The Cuccia decision differs slightly from the case at issue as the plaintiff

appealed the variance denial by the board—which is not the present situation.

Because Cuccia involved appealing a board decision, the board had to make factual

determinations and then “act in a manner that is legally permissible and not arbitrary

and capricious.” Sciortino v. La. State Bd. of Cosmetology, 194 So.2d 409, 411

(La.App. 4 Cir. 1967). Thus, the Cuccia court continued:

There is a prima facie presumption of validity which attaches to
zoning board action. To overcome that presumption, a plaintiff must
show the zoning board acted arbitrarily. The opponent must show that
the board’s action bears no relation to health, safety or the public’s
general welfare. The burden is on the appellant to affirmatively show
the board abused its discretion or its decision was in excess of its
jurisdiction or otherwise erroneous as a matter of law. A reviewing
court cannot substitute its own judgment or interfere absent a showing
by the appellant or relator that the Board was arbitrary and capricious
or abused its discretion.

Our review of the decision of the Board shows that it did not
consider Mr. Cuccia’s argument that he should have been allowed to
rely on the issuance of the building permit through which he acquired
a vested property right. . . .

Cuccia, 966 So.2d at 615 (footnotes omitted). Under the facts of the case, the Cuccia

court found that the board acted arbitrarily. Furthermore, the court concluded:

While we do not set a bright line standard that this occurs at a particular
point in time, certainly, when the home owner acts in good faith
reliance upon the building permit which was issued after multiple
occasions of interaction with the permitting authority, and that
homeowner has prepared the lot, poured the slab, roughed in the
plumbing, undergone a subsequent inspection and framed the structure,
that homeowner has gained that property right.

Id. at 616.

In the present case, the appeal does not stem from the parish’s decision to

deny a variance request. However, as in Cuccia, Appellees relied on the original

permit specifically indicating that it was for a “Grocery/Bait Shop” “Zone No. C”

for nearly five years before being notified that the permit was issued improperly.

22

Further, the parish president and the Planning and Zoning Coordinator visited

Appellees’ location prior to issuing the two 2013 permits. Appellees were also

approved for a liquor/beer permit, which was given Appellant’s clearance, signed by

then parish president, Guy Cormier, on June 28, 2011, as well as the “Planning and

Zoning Clearance” on June 22, 2011. Thus, as in Cuccia, Appellees had multiple

interactions with the parish throughout the process of obtaining the necessary

permits. Additionally, Appellees’ business is fully built and operational.

Thus, it was arbitrary for Appellant to enforce the ordinance after its multiple

interactions with Appellees, including the on-site visit and its approval of various

permits to operate the business. Under the facts of this case, Appellees relied in

good faith, to their detriment, on the permits issued by the parish and have incurred

expense as a result. Thus, Appellees have acquired a vested right. We find no

manifest error in the trial court’s judgment dismissing St. Martin Parish

Government’s petition for injunction.

DECREE:

For these reasons, Appellees’ motions to dismiss appeal are denied, Appellees’

exception of no right of action is denied, and the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

Each party is to bear the cost of their own appellate filing fees. Pursuant to La.Code

Civ.P. art. 2164 and Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 1-3, we tax Plaintiff-

Appellant, St. Martin Parish Government, with trial and appellate court costs

amounting to $9,000.05 ($335.50 appellate filing fee, $1889.50 cost for appeal,

$6,775.05 trial court costs), in accordance with La.R.S. 13:5112.

MOTIONS TO DISMISS DENIED; EXCEPTION OF NO RIGHT OF
ACTION DENIED; JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

23

24

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

NUMBER 19-499

ST. MARTIN PARISH GOVERNMENT

VERSUS

BRYAN CHAMPAGNE, ET AL.

CONERY, Judge, dissents and assigns reasons.

Bryan Champagne and his wholly owned companies applied for and obtained

building permits from St. Martin Parish Administrators allowing him to construct a

grocery/bait shop, and decks, piers, wharfs and docks from which he operates

commercial boat tours and canoe and kayak rentals on Rookery Road, a parish road

on Lake Martin not zoned for that purpose. Realizing it had mistakenly issued

permits to construct buildings and improvements on a statutorily created public lake

and protected game, fish and nature preserve,1 the Parish, using its zoning ordinance

and acting pursuant to the mandates of Article l, Section 9 of the Louisiana

Constitution, the Public Trust Doctrine, filed an injunction suit against Mr.

Champagne and his companies. The trial judge denied the injunction based on an

estoppel theory, the “Vested Rights” doctrine, holding that since Mr. Champagne

relied on erroneously issued permits and invested heavily in his commercial business

ventures, he had a “Vested Right” to continue his commercial business operations

and denied the injunction. The majority affirms his decision.

_______________
1
The American Standard Dictionary defines “preserve” as: “1. To maintain in safety from
injury, peril, or harm; protect; … 3. An area maintained for the protection of wildlife or natural
resources.”

I respectfully dissent. Mr. Champagne cannot acquire a “vested right” to

operate a commercial business from structures he built on Lake Martin, a statutorily

created and State controlled fish, game and nature preserve.

INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

In order to better understand the legal issues involved in this case, it is

important to examine the history of Lake Martin. Present day Lake Martin was

created by Legislative Act 337 in l9502 from existing lakes in St. Martin Parish, Lake

_______________
2
1950 La. Acts No. 337 provides in relevant part:

AN ACT

To establish the St. Martin-Lafayette Game and Fish Preserve out of Lakes Martin
in St. Martin Parish and Lake Charlo in Lafayette and St. Martin Parishes; creating
a Commission to administer and govern the same under the supervision of the
Department of Wild Life and Fisheries, and designating the domicile thereof; to
provide for the acquisition of additional lands or water bottoms by donation,
purchase or expropriation whenever necessary, to provide for the erection of levees,
dams, dykes, and drains, and the maintenance thereof; to provide that private
individuals may retain their mineral rights in, on or under any lands leased or upon
which a servitude has been granted to said Commission; to provide that all rules
and regulations of said Game Preserve shall be adopted and promulgated by the
Commission after first being approved by the Department of Wild Life and
Fisheries; and repealing all laws or parts of laws in conflict herewith.

Section 1. Be it enacted by the Legislature of Louisiana, that there
is hereby created the St. Martin-Lafayette Game and Fish Preserve out of
Lake Martin in the Parish of St. Martin, and Lake Charlo in the Parishes of
St. Martin and Lafayette; that the territory comprising said Preserve shall be
all that land below mean high water mark as shown on the meandering lines
of said Lakes Martin and Charlo on a survey by the Department of Public
Works, as now of record, until new lines and boundaries be defined by surveys
made by the Department of Public Works; and the Commission in charge of
the St. Martin-Lafayette Game and Fish Preserve shall have authority and
control extending one-half mile beyond such boundaries now established, or
that may be established. (Emphasis added.)

Section 2. That there is hereby created the St. Martin-Lafayette Game
and Fish Commission to be composed of nine members, to be named by the
Governor, and to serve each for a term of four years, after the first term, and the
first term of the members shall expire July 1st, 1952.

Section 3. That the domicile of said Commission shall be in Breaux
Bridge in the Parish of St. Martin. Under the supervision of the Department of
Wild Life and Fisheries, said Commission shall have the right to administer and
govern said Game and Fish Preserve, to adopt and promulgate rules and regulations

2

LaPointe and Lake Charlo, partially in Lafayette Parish. Both areas are located

within an area known as The Cypress Island Region situated between Lafayette and

Breaux Bridge and northwest of St. Martinville and Parks, Louisiana. “Cypress

Island” was so named because of the large stand of virgin cypress in the area and

was historically part of an expansive bottomland hardwood forest and cypress-tupelo

swamp.3

Act 337 of 1950 enabled the Louisiana Department of Public Works to

construct a levee around the low lying area containing Lake LaPointe resulting in

the formation of present day Lake Martin. The State constructed levee encircles

approximately 765 acres, and approximately 200 acres are open waters of what was

formerly Lake LaPointe, now part of Lake Martin.

Pursuant to the Act, the State was authorized to purchase property or obtain a

permanent servitude over all private lands within the State constructed levees. The

purpose was to create a game and fish preserve, originally managed by a special

commission formed by the St. Martin and Lafayette Parish Governments, with

regulations to be approved by the State “Department of Wild Life and Fisheries.”

Subsequent legislative acts transferred the local commission’s

responsibilities, along with management and control of Lake Martin, to the

Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (LDWF), which now maintains

_______________

which must first be approved by the Commissioner of Wild Life and Fisheries, and
to do all things necessary to the propagation and conservation of game and fish in
the preserve.
3
For a general overview of the history of the Lake Martin and Cypress Island area, see
NANCY CAMEL, THE NATURE OF THINGS AT LAKE MARTIN (2006). The book was published in
2006 and is cited for historical reference purposes only and not for the factual accuracy of anything
therein contained.

3

supervisory authority over Lake Martin. See La.R.S. 36:6104 and La.R.S. 56:801.5

See also La.R.S. 56:802.6

Part of the levee constructed by the State Department of Public Works

surrounding and impounding the Lake was used as a roadway to access the Lake,

_______________
4
Titled “Transfer of agencies and functions to Department of Wildlife and Fisheries,”
Louisiana Revised Statutes 36:610 provides, in pertinent part:

C. Notwithstanding any provisions of R.S. 56:801 to the contrary, the game
and fish commissions created by the following Acts, as amended, are hereby
abolished, and their powers, duties, functions, and responsibilities are transferred
to the secretary of the Department of Wildlife and Fisheries and hereafter shall be
exercised and performed as provided in Part IV of Chapter 22 of this Title, and the
game and fish preserves created by the following Acts, as amended, are hereby
placed within the Department of Wildlife and Fisheries and shall exercise and
perform their powers, duties, functions, and responsibilities as provided for
agencies transferred in accordance with the provisions of Part II of Chapter 22 of
this Title. Any parish or parishes, by formal resolution of the governing authority
of each parish affected, pursuant to R.S. 56:721 et seq., may appoint a game and
fish commission which may exercise those powers, duties, and functions provided
in R.S. 56:721 et seq. in relation to the game and fish preserves for which
commissions are hereby abolished.

....

(8) St. Martin-Lafayette Game and Fish Preserve (Act No. 337 of 1950
Regular Session, as amended).
5
Titled “Particular game and fish preserves and commissions recognized and continued,”
La.R.S. 56:801 provides, in pertinent part:

The following preserves and commissions created by the enumerated
special statutes, are continued in full force and effect within the Department of
Wildlife and Fisheries:

….

(20) St. Martin-Lafayette Game and Fish Commission (Acts 1950, No. 337;
Acts 1966, No. 455; Acts 1970, No. 390; Acts 1977, No. 222, § 1).
6
Titled “Responsibilities and duties,” La.R.S. 56:802 provides:

The department shall have the duty and responsibility for the management
of resources, including water level control, aquatic weed control, and maintenance
and repair of dams, control structures, and spillways within the territorial
jurisdiction of each commission established in R.S. 56:801, provided that no local
commission or authority is providing these services. The individual game and fish
preserves and commissions or local governing authorities shall have the duty and
responsibility for maintaining all support services within their territorial
jurisdiction, including parks, picnic areas, and concessions.

4

originally known as “Levee Road,” and that road was eventually accepted by St.

Martin Parish as a parish road.

The Nature Conservancy received donations of over two thousand acres of the

cypress-tupelo swamp area surrounding Lake Martin and purchased additional

acreage, creating what is today known as the “Cypress Island Preserve.”7 The Nature

Conservancy established a “rookery” on the property. Lake Martin has since

become one of the largest wading bird nesting areas in the country. The Parish

subsequently changed the name of “Levee Road” to “Rookery Road,” which is still

maintained by the Parish. The road does not completely encircle Lake Martin. The

remaining levee is used as a hiking/nature trail for enjoyment of nature, bird

watching, and for photographing the many birds and wildflowers at the lake and its

environs. Mr. Champagne’s commercial businesses were constructed on the Lake

Martin side of “Rookery Road,” within the boundaries of Lake Martin and the

preserve.

The Parish also has within its road system another parish road known as Lake

Martin Road, which connects to La. Highway 31 between the communities of Parks

and Breaux Bridge, ending at Rookery Road. Lake Martin Road provides easy

access to visitors to the lake and to boaters to access a public boat landing

constructed near the intersection of Lake Martin Road and Rookery Road on the lake

side of the levee, and is near Mr. Champagne’s business.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Turning to the history of the litigation between St. Martin Parish and Bryan

Champagne, testimony and evidence in the record shows that Mr. Champagne is a

_______________
7
See www.nature.org/en-us/get-involved/how-to-help/places-we-protect/cypress-island.

5

native and lifelong resident of St. Martin Parish and had worked at Martin Mills, a

local garment factory, for many years before it closed. When his job ended, Mr.

Champagne, who also owned a “crawfish skiff,” began using his skiff to take people

on boat tours of nearby Lake Martin. He had no commercial business location at the

lake and operated his business from his home for over fourteen years, meeting

customers at the Lake Martin Boat Landing. According to his trial testimony, Mr.

Champagne explained that Mr. Ronald Massicot, a landowner abutting Lake Martin,

offered to lease property to him from which he could expand his single boat tour

operation. The two came to terms and signed a ten (10) year lease with options to

renew. The lease is not in the record. From that point on, Mr. Champagne then

began building and expanding his businesses. The problem is Mr. Champagne

constructed his buildings and is operating his commercial business enterprise in a

legislatively created State owned and/or controlled fish, game and nature preserve

where no commercial businesses are allowed. There is nothing of record to allow

Mr. Champagne to lease that portion of the property on the lake side of the levee, all

of which is subject to the permanent servitude created by Act 337 and continued by

subsequent legislative acts noted infra. Likewise, there is nothing of record from

LDWF, the State entity that has legislatively delegated control over the lake, that

would allow commercial buildings as constructed and used by Mr. Champagne on

the lake side of the levee.

The record reflects that instead of consulting with LDWF, Mr. Champagne

went to the Parish Permit Office to obtain a building permit for a grocery/bait shop

he wanted to open and from which he would operate his commercial boat tour

business. Mr. Champagne gave the Parish permit department the wrong address for

his initial building permit, “1076 Rookery Road.” The addresses on Rookery Road

6

are on the land side of the levee. Anything on the Lake side of the levee is Lake

Martin and part of the State preserve. Notwithstanding the fact that Mr.

Champagne had operated his “crawfish skiff” boat tour business for fourteen (14)

years using the public boat landing, was intimately familiar with the lake and could

readily ascertain that there were no buildings or permanent structures on the lake

side of the levee, he gave the Parish the address 1076 Rookery Road, claiming that

was the address he obtained from the “911 Commission.” The Parish has taken the

position that there was nothing on the face of Mr. Champagne’s initial building

permit application to alert St. Martin officials that Mr. Champagne’s original

grocery/bait shop were going to be constructed on the lake side of the levee in a State

controlled fish, game, and nature preserve. The question of whether Mr. Champagne

was in good faith in requesting his building permit for “1076 Rookery Road,” or

intentionally misled the Parish, will be relegated to trial on his reconventional

demand for damages. As discussed below, that demand was severed from the trial

court’s consideration of the present issue of the Parish’s request for injunctive relief.

At this point, it should be noted that the “Lessor” of the property, Mr.

Massicot, had no legal right to lease property on the lake side of the levee, an area

totally within Lake Martin and part of the preserve owned and/or managed by the

LDWF.8

At the time Mr. Champagne first opened his grocery/bait shop, the Nature

Conservancy had by then established the Cypress Island Preserve, described infra.9

_______________
8
As previously indicated, a permanent servitude was created by legislative authority
pursuant to Act 337 of 1950, and continued in operation by La.R.S. 36:610 and La.R.S. 56:801.
See also La.R.S. 56:802.
9
See also CAMEL, THE NATURE OF THINGS AT LAKE MARTIN.

7

Mr. Champagne was able to capitalize on the many tourists and visitors who come

to Lake Martin to enjoy the birds, flowers, and beauty of nature at this lake, described

at trial by Parish President Cedars as one of the most significant natural areas in St.

Martin Parish.

After obtaining his initial grocery/bait shop permit, Mr. Champagne began to

rapidly expand his business operations. He built an outside deck, then a covered

deck, then a wharf. He also built boat docks and piers in the lake with numerous

boat slips on the lake from which he now operates four or five specially designed

tour boats, which Mr. Champagne described as “thirty foot long commercial boats.”

From pictures in evidence, it appears that each boat holds about seventeen (17)

people plus the tour boat operator. Mr. Champagne also rents canoes and kayaks.

He has a public website advertising his commercial business operations on Lake

Martin.10

From a very small “footprint” of using one small crawfish skiff to take a few

people on guided boat tours on Lake Martin using the public boat landing, Mr.

Champagne expanded his business such that he now has a virtual monopoly for the

operation of his boat tour and related businesses, all of which are operating on this

State controlled, ecologically significant public lake. The record reflects that no

further “permits” were issued by the Parish for any commercial business on the lake

to anyone else and none are reflected in the record of this case nor are any likely to

be issued. Likewise, no permits from LDWF are in the record.

_______________
10
See www.champagnesswamptours.com. Pictures from his website and Google Earth
were entered in evidence as Exhibits 14-16 and clearly show all of Mr. Champagne’s buildings,
docks, wharfs, roof, deck, and piers are on the lake side of the levee.

8

Because the State constructed levee encloses Lake Martin,11 the levee is the

“highwater mark” of the lake. Hence everything on the lake side of the levee is

part of Lake Martin and the Parish had no legal authority to issue a building

permit to Mr. Champagne on Lake Martin. Yet it did so with approval of the

then Parish President/Administrator.

How was this allowed to happen? The record is silent as to why the LDWF

has not acted independently and/or intervened to stop Mr. Champagne’s

commercialization of this ecologically significant State owned and/or managed

preserve. The record is also silent as to how Mr. Champagne was able to construct

a building, with public restrooms, wharfs, decks, docks and boat slips on Lake

Martin without appropriate permits from the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers. From

pictures in evidence and Mr. Champagne’s public website, Mr. Champagne also

appears to have a fuel tank on site from which he can provide fuel to his tour boats.

The record likewise does not show where or how effluent and wastewater from his

public restroom(s) are handled.

From materials submitted as part of Trial Exhibit 13, we learn that in 1999-

2000, long before Mr. Champagne applied for permits to construct his grocery/bait

shop on the Lake, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and St. Martin Parish

Government authorized a “master plan” for Lake Martin. The Corps, the Parish, the

LDWF, the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources (LDNR), and the Nature

Conservancy were to compile the master plan, referenced as the “Lake Martin

_______________
11
The Department of Public Works constructed the levee, additional pumping stations and
related items necessary to maintain the lake, and maps of the proposed construction and of the
completed Lake Martin are on file at the State Land Office pursuant to La.R.S. 41:1701.1.

9

Master Plan 2001.” That Master Plan is not in the record, so we have no way of

knowing whether it was adopted or exactly what each party’s responsibilities or

areas of concern may be.

However, the law gives the Corps the responsibility to review and issue

wetlands area permits for any permanent additions such as docks, decks, wharfs, and

piers in a wetlands area, pursuant to the Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. § 401, et

seq.

The Act provides for the U.S. Corps of Engineers regulation of structures over

navigable waters. Section 403 provides that:

The creation of any obstruction not affirmatively authorized by
Congress, to the navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United
States is prohibited; and it shall not be lawful to build or commence the
building of any wharf, pier, dolphin, boom, weir, breakwater, bulkhead,
jetty, or other structures in any port, roadstead, haven, harbor, canal,
navigable river, or other water of the United States, outside established
harbor lines, or where no harbor lines have been established, except on
plans recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the
Secretary of the Army; and it shall not be lawful to excavate or fill, or
in any manner to alter or modify the course, location, condition, or
capacity of, any port, roadstead, haven, harbor, canal, lake, harbor or
refuge, or inclosure within the limits of any breakwater, or of the
channel of any navigable water of the United States, unless the work
has been recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the
Secretary of the Army prior to beginning the same.

In addition, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 of the Clean Water Act regulates the discharge

of dredged or fill material into navigable waters, including, under certain

circumstances, those identified as wetlands. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of N.

Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 121 S.Ct. 675 (2001); U.S.

v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 106 S.Ct. 455 (1985).

Pertaining to what is commonly referred to as a Section 404 permit, 33 U.S.C.

§ 1344(a) states:

10

(a) Discharge into navigable waters at specified disposal sites

The Secretary may issue permits, after notice and opportunity for public
hearings for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable
waters at specified disposal sites. Not later than the fifteenth day after
the date an applicant submits all the information required to complete
an application for a permit under this subsection, the Secretary shall
publish the notice required by this subsection.

Absent a controlling agreement in the Master Plan or a waiver, Mr.

Champagne should have been required to obtain a Corps permit or permits before

building any structure on the Lake and before building wharfs, docks, decks,

and piers from which he now operates his motorized boat tour business and

other commercial business on the Lake, assuming he could do so with LDWF

approval. There is no permit from the Corps or LDWF in the record, nor is there a

waiver to show that Mr. Champagne had proper authorization to construct and

operate his commercial enterprises on the lake side of the levee.

But the record is not silent as to how Mr. Champagne obtained Parish

“building permits” to construct and expand his grocery/bait shop, and to build his

decks, roofs, docks, wharfs, and piers, and obtain his alcohol permits. He got those

permits directly from Administrators at St. Martin Parish Government through what

present Parish President Chester Cedars now labels “an administrative error.”

After obtaining his first building permit for his grocery/bait shop with the

wrong address listed, Mr. Champagne then applied for and obtained building permits

for his decks, roof, wharf, and boat dock expansions. According to his deposition

testimony, the then Parish President/Administrator actually visited Mr.

Champagne’s location personally, along with the then director of the permits section,

and gave the O.K. to issue the permits with the condition that Mr. Champagne “not

11

operate a bar” from this location. When asked why he had allowed the new permits

in the Lake, the then Parish President stated:

A …And I think as an effort of me as being a leader in this Parish
saying, If we can work with you to - - to keep your tour boat
operations going, they got - - he’s more than - - than him
operating tours out [of] that lake, we would, you know, we would
work with him to do that. I think that’s probably what my intent
was, to just help him to continue what he seemed to be - - it
almost sounded like, if I recall, like everything other than the tour
boat stuff was a problem for him. And so, I - - I think in an effort
to try to save the - - maybe we can work without you to keep your
tour - - tour boats going.

Q Okay.

A That’s what he started with anyway.

Q Correct.

A So that’s probably what my intents were when I said that.

Q Okay.

A And I - - I - - I came from business, so I’m a business friendly
guy. I’m always gonna try to work with you if you want to work
with us ….

Hence, Mr. Champagne is now claiming he has a “vested right” to operate since the

latter permits were issued after personal inspections by the then Parish

President/Administrator and permit director.

When interested citizens began to complain about Mr. Champagne’s business

expansion and resulting noise, traffic congestion, and other problems at Lake

Martin,12 the Parish legal advisor, then Mr. Chester Cedars, who is now Parish

President, determined that Mr. Champagne could not lawfully operate a commercial

business on the Lake Martin side of the levee based on St. Martin Parish Zoning

_______________
12
Many of the problems pertaining to Mr. Champagne’s operations are outlined in an
intervention filed by Friends of Lake Martin, a private non-profit group discussed more fully infra.

12

Ordinances. The W-2 zoning ordinance for “Rookery Road,” on file in the St. Martin

Parish Zoning Office, clearly prohibits commercial operations such as Mr.

Champagne’s. Mr. Cedars was given authority by the Parish council, acting as its

legal advisor, to issue a cease and desist order to Mr. Champagne, introduced at trial

as Exhibit 6, advising Mr. Champagne to immediately cease all commercial business

operations as he was in violation of the applicable St. Martin zoning ordinance,

which did not allow commercial structures or commercial business activity on

“Rookery Road”, the Parish road originally built by the State and maintained by the

Parish on a portion of the State constructed levee encircling Lake Martin. According

to Mr. Cedars, Mr. Champagne met with him and at first agreed. Mr. Champagne

obviously had second thoughts and refused to cease his commercial business

operations on the Lake, resulting in this litigation.

It is especially important to note at this juncture a critical legal issue not

discussed by the trial court or the majority. Zoning is a legislative function, and the

Executive Branch of Parish Government, which includes the Parish President and

Permit Administrator, do not have the authority to issue zoning variances or waivers.

See 33:4721. See also King v. Caddo Par. Comm’n, 97-1873 (La. 10/20/98), 719

So.2d 410 (citing St. Charles Gaming Co., Inc. v. Riverboat Gaming Comm’n, 94-

2697 (La. 1/17/95), 648 So.2d 1310); City of New Orleans v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 93-

690 (La. 7/5/94), 640 So.2d 237; Morton v. Jefferson Par. Council, 419 So.2d 431

(La.1982); Folsom Rd. Civic Ass’n v. Par. of St. Tammany, 407 So.2d 1219

(La.1981); Four States Realty Co., Inc. v. City of Baton Rouge, 309 So.2d 659

(La.1974)). The proper procedure would be for the person seeking a zoning variance

to apply to the St. Martin Parish Council. There is no dispute that Mr. Champagne’s

commercial businesses are in violation of the applicable parish zoning ordinances.

13

Unlike “building permits,” public hearings are required for a zoning

ordinance, variance, or rezoning. See La.R.S. 33:4724, et seq. After meeting with

Mr. Cedars, Mr. Champagne did request a zoning variance and a public hearing was

in fact conducted on May 5, 2016. The St. Martin Parish Council denied the variance

after a large and vocal group of St. Martin Parish residents voiced strong opposition,

many of whom, as shown by e-mails and letters in the record, focused on the many

problems Mr. Champagne’s commercial operations brought to this tranquil and

protected nature preserve.13 No appeal was taken from the council’s decision

representing the citizens of the Parish to deny the zoning variance.

When Mr. Champagne still would not cease and desist his commercial

business operations from structures he erected on Lake Martin, the Parish council

authorized then Parish Attorney Cedars to institute a suit for temporary and then

permanent injunction against Mr. Champagne. Mr. Champagne’s claim in his

_______________
13
“Friends of Lake Martin,” a private nonprofit consisting of a group of landowners
abutting Lake Martin and concerned citizens interested in preserving the Lake from commercial
exploitation, filed an intervention. The Petition of Intervention explains in part that:

The said violations of the Zoning Ordinance have caused the residents of
the Lake Martin area to suffer decreased property values and decreased enjoyment
of their property and have destroyed the bucolic tranquility of the Lake Martin area
generally, which the W-2 zoning districts was designed to preserve, and have
otherwise constituted a nuisance under LSA-C.C. art. 667, et seq.

Much background information about the lake and its formation and operation is contained
in their petition and filings included in this designated record. The answers to interrogatories and
deposition testimony of the Intervenors in the record highlighted serious concerns about Mr.
Champagne’s operations that were completely incompatible with a nature preserve and the
purposes for which Lake Martin was statutorily created. The allegations included everything from
cutting trees and allowing them to rot in the lake, to improper sewer dumping, installation of a
large commercial garbage bin, spillage from fuel tanks and pollutants from fueling and the washing
of his tour boats on the lake, loud bands playing on his wharf, night tours of the lake, tourists and
boat operators feeding and playing with alligators, including catching a baby alligator during a
boat tour, air boats and food trucks (since discontinued), improper parking and signage, noise, dust
and other problems related to cars, tour buses, and school buses parking on the narrow road clearly
not designed for such use. The record is silent as to why the Intervention was dismissed, but the
concerns expressed are in the record and are nonetheless relevant.

14

amended answer that the zoning ordinance was unconstitutional and his

Reconventional Demand for damages were severed by Motion and Order to Sever

Claims for Trial signed before trial on the injunction issue.

This case was eventually set for trial on the merits of the injunction issue only

on April 9, 2019. Following the presentation of evidence on the merits, the trial

court judge ruled from the bench and denied the injunction for oral reasons assigned.

This timely appeal followed. I address the Parish’s issues for review collectively.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“The standard of review for the issuance of a permanent injunction is the

manifest error standard of review.” Mary Moe, L.L.C. v. La. Bd. of Ethics, 03-2220,

p. 9 (La. 4/14/04), 875 So.2d 22, 29. In this case, I would suggest that the denial of

the requested injunction resulted from an error of law and would review this case de

novo. See O’Connor v. Grove Homeowner’s Ass’n., 19-676 (La.App. 3 Cir.

4/22/20), _ So.3d _ (2020 WL 1934785). Under either standard of review, I would

reverse. The trial judge and the majority failed to recognize the legal significance

of the difference between an erroneously issued building permit by the Parish

President/Administrator and the denial of a zoning variance by the legislative

branch, the Parish Council, from which denial Mr. Champagne did not appeal. That

legal error was compounded when the trial judge and majority failed to recognize

that, based on the administrative error of the then Parish President, Mr. Champagne

cannot acquire a “vested right” to operate a commercial business in this statutorily

created public fish, game and nature preserve controlled by LDWF.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

There is no dispute that Mr. Champagne’s commercial businesses on Lake

Martin are in violation of the Parish zoning ordinance. Rather, in his answer to the

15

original petition, Mr. Champagne claimed that St. Martin Parish could not enforce

its zoning ordinance in this case because Mr. Champagne had properly been issued

“building permits” for his commercial business operations with the knowledge and

approval of the then Parish President/Administrator and Administrator of the Permits

Section. His answer claimed that he, therefore, had a “Vested Right” to continue

operating his business as he applied for the permits “in good faith” and the permits

were “lawfully issued,” resulting in expenditure of time, effort and money to

construct the buildings, wharfs, docks, decks, roof and piers for the expansion and

operation of his commercial boat tour business and related enterprises.

Mr. Champagne cited Palermo Land Co., Inc. v. Planning Comm’n of

Calcasieu Par., 561 So.2d 482 (La.1990); St. Raymond v. City of New Orleans, 99-

2438 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/17/00), 769 So.2d 562; Cuccia v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustments

of/and Par. of Jefferson, 07-152 (La.App. 5 Cir. 7/30/97), 966 So.2d 611; and Dunn

v. Jefferson Par., 256 So.2d 664 (La.App. 4 Cir.), writ denied, 258 So.2d 382

(La.1972) in support of his vested rights argument.

Mr. Champagne references a footnote in Palermo, 561 So.2d 482 for the

proposition that the Louisiana Supreme Court has recognized the vested rights

doctrine. In his brief to this court, he asserts that the supreme court determined in

Palermo that “only three elements must be met: (1) the party has obtained a building

permit; (2) has begun construction; and (3) has become liable for work and

materials.” Mr. Champagne contends that because he met all three elements and did

so “in good faith reliance on the permits,” he had a “vested right” to continue his

operations.

The larger context of Palermo, however, does not support Mr. Champagne’s

conclusion. Instead, Palermo concerned a landowner’s assertion that Calcasieu

16

Parish was arbitrary and capricious in rezoning property that prevented further

expansion of a landfill, and that the Parish was equitably estopped from enforcing

its rezoning action due to the plaintiff’s reliance on representations from Parish

officials. The supreme court rejected both assertions. With regard to the estoppel

claim, the court found that the plaintiff did not prove justifiable reliance on

representations of Parish officials, explaining that “Plaintiffs’ familiarity … with the

changeability of zoning classifications, belies any assertion of justifiable reliance on

assumed or implied vested rights.” Id. at 487 n. 4. That factual distinction is

important when one refers to the larger Palermo footnote referenced by Mr.

Champagne, wherein the supreme court explained:

The only zoning cases in which vested rights are properly an issue are
those in which the opponent of the ordinance has obtained a building
permit, has begun construction, and has become liable for work and
materials. Dunn v. Parish of Jefferson, 256 So.2d 664, 667 (La.App. 4
Cir.), writ denied, 260 La. 1137, 258 So.2d 382 (1972). Presumably, it
would be possible for a zoning authority to “grandfather in” certain
properties when passing a new zoning ordinance, but such a measure is
certainly not necessary. Plaintiffs’ familiarity … with the changeability
of zoning classifications, belies any assertion of justifiable reliance on
assumed or implied vested rights. Furthermore, any reliance by
Palermo and Nelson cannot be considered detrimental, since neither has
expended funds toward the landfill expansion project.

Id. In contrast, Mr. Champagne does not allege there was a post-permitting change

to the St. Martin Zoning Ordinance. He instead asserts a vested right in the

erroneously issued building permits that without question contravene the existing

Parish ordinance. Again, Mr. Champagne applied for a variance and was denied,

from which denial no appeal was taken.

Additionally, reference to Dunn, 256 So.2d 664, indicates that the fourth

circuit in that case addressed an attempt to revoke a permit in an instance where the

court specifically found that “there was no error in fact or law, nor any

17

misrepresentation by the applicant which induced the issuance of the permit[.]” Id.

at 667. Again, the subject building permits in this case were erroneously issued and

were not lawfully issued since LDWF had been granted statutory authority over

operations at Lake Martin. The Parish had no legal authority to issue building

permits within the boundaries of Lake Martin.14

That distinction is apparent by reference to St. Raymond, 769 So.2d 562 as

well. In St. Raymond, the fourth circuit concluded that the City of New Orleans

acted arbitrarily in attempting to revoke a developer’s building permit after he

detrimentally relied on the permit to substantially complete the construction of a

dwelling. The fourth circuit explained that when a builder relies upon a lawfully

issued permit, has actually commenced work, and liabilities have been “incurred

for work and materials, the owner acquires a vest[ed] property right to the

protection of which he is entitled.” Id. at 565 (quoting Dunn, 256 So.2d at 667).

Important to the fourth circuit’s ruling in St. Raymond, however, was its

consideration of whether the City acted “arbitrarily” in revoking what it

foundationally deemed to be a valid building permit in which it had “never

documented any defect in the permit itself.” Id. at 566.

The same cannot be said in this case as the permit was very clearly issued in

error given the discrepancy in the address and the construction on the lake side of

the levee. Again, the Parish could not lawfully issue any building permits in this

statutorily created public lake. The Parish’s injunction suit to address its error and

enforce its zoning ordinance cannot be said to be arbitrary, especially considering its

obligation to enforce the Public Trust Doctrine, discussed more fully infra.

_______________
14
See 1950 La. Acts No. 337; La.R.S. 36:610; La.R.S. 56:801; La.R.S. 56:802.

18

Cuccia, 966 So.2d 611, is similarly distinguishable, both on its facts and on

the procedure under review. In that case, the fifth circuit addressed a situation in

which Jefferson Parish’s Department of Inspections and Code Enforcement (DICE)

issued a lawful building permit to the plaintiff following its review of plans and

specifications for construction of a two-story garage on privately owned property.

However, on closer inspection during construction, it was shown that a portion of

the proposed construction exceeded the height provided for by the pertinent parish

building code. As the project neared completion, DICE suspended the permit,

asking the plaintiff to either submit new plans or file for a variance. It did not issue

a stop work order, however. The homeowner’s request for a variance proceeded

before the Jefferson Parish Board of Zoning Adjustments, but the homeowner

continued work at the site. The Board ultimately denied the variance. It was that

denial that was at issue before the court in Cuccia not, as in the present case, an

action by the Parish attempting to interpret and enforce its own ordinance in

furtherance of its Public Trust responsibilities. Most importantly, the lawful

building permit in Cuccia was issued for work on a private residence on private

property, not on a public lake.

This case is also factually distinguishable from Cuccia as the plaintiff’s “good

faith” in his reliance on DICE’s representation appears to have been beyond

question. Although Mr. Champagne obviously relied on the subject permits, the

“good faith” aspect of the case is far from clear at this juncture. The Parish noted

that Mr. Champagne provided the wrong address to the Parish permit department at

the time he obtained his initial permit, citing the 911 Commission’s reference to the

property as 1076 Rookery Road. That location is on the land side of Rookery Road.

Mr. Champagne constructed all of his buildings on the Lake side of the road/levee,

19

an area designated as Lake Martin itself. Such a significant error on Mr.

Champagne’s part would seem to undermine his suggestion that he relied on the

permits “in good faith,” especially considering his fourteen (14) year experience

providing guide services in Lake Martin. All of his construction was not at the

address listed on the permits, but on the Lake side of the levee wholly within the

confines of Lake Martin and the statutorily created fish, game, and nature preserve

and in clear violation of the Parish zoning ordinance.

Like Cuccia, Mr. Champagne did seek a zoning variance from the St. Martin

Parish Council. After a public hearing at which numerous neighboring property

owners and interested parties voiced strong opposition to Mr. Champagne’s request,

citing by email, letters, and testimony numerous instances of Mr. Champagne’s

conduct impairing the peaceful utilization of the lake for purposes for which it was

intended. The Parish council denied the variance. Unlike Cuccia, Mr. Champagne

did not appeal their decision. Instead, he continued to operate his commercial

business activities on Lake Martin, prompting this litigation.

None of the cases cited by Mr. Champagne, or addressed by the majority,

involved a zoning complaint in a protected statutorily created nature, fish and game

preserve. Simply stated, one cannot acquire a “vested right” to operate a commercial

business in a statutorily created fish, game and nature preserve managed by LDWF.

The Parish cites in support of its position two cases that I would suggest are

especially applicable to the case at hand. In Nassau Realty Co. Inc. v. City of New

Orleans, 221 So.2d 327 (La.App. 4 Cir 1969), the plaintiff permit holder sought a

reversal of the denial by the zoning board of his application for a variance. The

plaintiff was given a permit to begin a residential construction, which was canceled

by the city two weeks later due to insufficient lot area. The plaintiff sought a

20

variance which was denied. Our sister circuit found that the hardship was the fault

of the plaintiff who was “thoroughly acquainted with the zoning regulations of that

particular locality[,]” for his failure to obtain a variance prior to the purchase of

the property. Nassau, 221 So.2d at 330 (emphasis added).

The same reasoning was evidenced in the case of Pailet v. City of New

Orleans, Dep’t of Safety & Permits, 433 So.2d 1091 (La.App. 4 Cir.), writ denied,

440 So.2d 757 (La.1983). In Pailet, the city’s stop work order was upheld after ten

months of construction, and the appellate court determined that the plaintiffs had not

acquired a vested right in an erroneously issued building permit. The court found

the plaintiff’s reliance on the building permit was unjustified because plaintiffs were

on notice that the property’s nonconforming status was questionable. In this case,

the public nature of Lake Martin was readily apparent, especially to Mr. Champagne

who had operated his crawfish skiff guiding customers on Lake Martin for fourteen

(14) years prior to obtaining his “permits” to expand his business on Lake Martin.

Shortly before trial, Mr. Champagne filed an amended answer and

reconventional demand claiming that the St. Martin Zoning Ordinance in question

was unconstitutionally vague. He repeated his “vested rights” defense, and, in the

alternative, claimed damages because of his alleged detrimental reliance on the

building permits he had been issued. By joint motion of the parties, approved by the

trial court, the Amended Answer and Reconventional Demand was severed from the

trial and the issues of the constitutionality of the Parish zoning ordinance and Mr.

Champagne’s claim for damages are not presently before us. It should also be noted

that the Louisiana Attorney General was not notified of the constitutionality issue

pertaining to the zoning ordinance raised in Mr. Champagne’s Amended Answer

21

and Reconventional Demand. On remand, the Attorney General must be properly

cited and notified. See La.Code Civ.P. art. 1880.

THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE

When this case did eventually proceed to trial after the severance of the

Amended Answer and Reconventional Demand, now Parish President Cedars

stressed in his testimony the important difference between this case and other

“zoning injunction” cases, and that is the application of the Public Trust Doctrine.

Mr. Cedars testified that the Parish had a public trust responsibility pursuant

to Article 9, Section 1 of the 1974 Constitution, which states:

The natural resources of the state, including air and water, and the
healthful, scenic, historic, and esthetic quality of the environment shall
be protected, conserved, and replenished insofar as possible and
consistent with the health, safety, and welfare of the people. The
legislature shall enact laws to implement this policy.[15]

The Louisiana Supreme Court, in Save Ourselves, Inc. v. La. Envtl. Control

Comm’n, 452 So.2d 1152, 1154 (La.1984) (footnotes omitted), stated with respect

to the Public Trust Doctrine:

It is the well settled law of this country that a state holds title to
land under navigable waters within its limits and that the title is held in
trust for the people of the state that they may enjoy and use the waters
free from obstruction or interference. Illinois Central R. Co. v.
Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 13 S.Ct. 110, 36 L.Ed. 1018 (1892). A public
trust for the protection, conservation and replenishment of all natural
resources of the state was recognized by art. VI § 1 of the 1921
Louisiana Constitution. The public trust doctrine was continued by the
1974 Louisiana Constitution, which specifically lists air and water as
natural resources, commands protection, conservation and
replenishment of them insofar as possible and consistent with health,
safety and welfare of the people, and mandates the legislature to enact
laws to implement this policy. La. Const. art. IX § 1; Cf. Id. art. IX §

_______________
15
For a historical discussion of the Public Trust Doctrine, see John Arnold & Andrew
Jacoby, Examining the Public Trust Doctrine’s Role in Conserving Natural Resources in
Louisiana’s Public Lands, 29 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 149 (2017).

22

3; Gulf Oil Corp. v. State Mineral Board, 317 So.2d 576, 580
(1975) (on rehearing).

In a recent opinion, a panel of our court applied the Public Trust Doctrine and

stated:

While there is no specific definition of the public trust doctrine
in Louisiana law, “[e]lements of the doctrine are scattered throughout
the Louisiana Civil Code, the Revised Statutes, the Louisiana
Constitution of 1974, and several Louisiana judicial decisions. No
single Louisiana law clearly defines the public trust doctrine and
delineates its elements.” Wilkins, James G., and Wascome, Michael,
“The Public Trust Doctrine in Louisiana,” 52 La.Law.Rev 861, 862
(1992). However, a national study of the doctrine by the Coastal States
Organization defined the public trust doctrine as follows:

The Public Trust Doctrine provides that public trust
lands, waters and living resources in a State are held by
the State in trust for the benefit of all of the people, and
establishes the right of the public to fully enjoy public trust
lands, waters and living resources for a wide variety of
recognized public uses. The Public Trust Doctrine is
applicable whenever navigable waters or the lands beneath
are altered, developed, conveyed, or otherwise managed
or preserved. It applies whether the trust lands are
publicly or privately owned. The doctrine articulates not
only the public rights in these lands and waters. It also sets
limitations on the States, the public, and private owners,
as well as establishing duties and responsibilities of the
States when managing these public trust assets. The Public
Trust Doctrine has been recognized and affirmed by the
United States Supreme Court, the lower federal courts and
State courts from the beginning days of this country to the
present.

Coastal States Organization, PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST
DOCTRINE TO WORK, at 3-4 (1990) (emphasis added).

State v. La. Land & Exploration Co., 19-248, p. 16 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/6/20), _ So.3d

_, _ (2020 WL 2187767).

Exercising its Public Trust responsibilities under Article 9, § 1 of the State

Constitution, the Parish used its power to enforce its zoning ordinances as a conduit

to enforce Act 337 of 1950, as continued through La.R.S. 36:610 and La.R.S.

23

56:801, and have Mr. Champagne cease his commercial activities and remove his

structures from the lake. See La.Const. art. 6, § 17; La.R.S. 33:4721; La.R.S.

33:4728. The Parish later withdrew its request to have Mr. Champagne remove all

of his structures as LDWF and/or the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers would be the

proper parties to make that demand.

As to the “vested rights” issue advanced by Mr. Champagne, when asked

about the Parish’s error in granting Mr. Champagne building permits to construct

his buildings and other structures on the Lake, Mr. Cedars testified at trial that:

Q. When you became involved as parish attorney in the matter that
resulted in this litigation, were you ever able to determine
whether the permit was issued, the initial permits, for the
construction were issued in error?

A. Yes, they were. No question in my mind of that.

Q. What was the error?

A. He shouldn’t have been given a permit to do any kind of
construction work, certainly on the lake side of the road, one;
secondly, to conduct no commercial type activity. That wasn’t
the proper zone to accommodate that, period. Plus there’s Article
9, Section 1 issues at play relative to any activity on the lake side
of Rookery Road, according to my research.

Q. Are you referring to Constitution Article 9, Section 1?

A. Yes.

Q. What does that provision provide?

A. Well, generally - - again, I haven’t read it in a while, but
generally it says that parish officials, local government,
government, period, local and state needs to adopt all steps to
protect the environment and to protect the character of facilities
and habitats like Lake Martin which is a natural preserve. Not
only is it a natural preserve, it’s a legislatively declared
preserve by the Louisiana state legislature.

Q. What is your conclusion after reading the ordinance - - what does
the ordinance provide as to the zoning for the area where Mr.
Champagne’s structures are?

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A. A strict reading of the ordinance would reflect that it’s W-2, at
best. I personally have an opinion that the proper zoning would
be W-1, as far as property on the lake side. But for purposes of
litigation, for purposes of addressing this matter, I adopted this
course of action that would give Mr. Champagne every benefit
of the doubt. So I felt, okay, let’s proceed with the litigation.
And by the way, as an aside, I prepared the original suit. Let’s
proceed with it being a W-2. A debate as to whether it’s W-1 or
W-2 is really superfluous, because under neither zoning
classification can any commercial activity be conducted.

(Emphasis added.)

On cross examination, counsel for Mr. Champagne inquired about the

difference in construction on either side of Rookery Road, following which Mr.

Cedars returned to the Parish’s Public Trust responsibilities as follows:

Q. You mentioned that a couple of times, but it’s St. Martin Parish
Government’s position that the entire road, either road, is zoned
W-2 and wouldn’t allow commercial operations. Is that correct?

A. For purposes of this litigation and for purposes of the petition
that was prepared in this case, that was the position that was
taken, yes. My personal opinion is a little bit different, quite
frankly.

Q. Whether it’s 1076 or 1075, St. Martin Parish Government’s
position, and I believe your position, too, is that a commercial
establishment would not be allowed?

A. It might be completely different and it does get into a different
more complex area when you talk about developments on the
lake side of Rookery Road, because that invites, directly, the
provisions of Article 9, Section 1 of the Louisiana constitution.
Let me tell you something. That is one of the - - Lake Martin
area is one of the most important habitats, in my opinion, in
St. Martin parish, equal to the Atchafalaya Basin, quite
frankly. It serves so many different functions and invites and
attracts so many different people that great care should be
taken by the administration of St. Martin Parish
Government to protect the nature of that preserve. It is a
legislatively declared preserve. And any activity, particularly
as it affects the lake side of Rookery Road, ought to be very
carefully scrutinized and every single effort should be make
[sic] to protect the integrity of that lake. And your client has
done anything but that, despite those permits ….

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....

Q. My question was, I’m talking about the local zoning ordinances.
Does it matter, for the local zoning ordinances, if he was at 1076
or 1075?

A. Yes. In my opinion, it would, for the reasons I’ve stated.
Because I believe that when you apply the zoning ordinance
in its totality, you cannot turn your nose up and you cannot
ignore the dictates of Article 9, Section 1 of the Louisiana
constitution that in the interpretation and application of the
zoning ordinance of this parish you should take into
consideration the activities of a preserve, and that is a
preserve. That is a body of water and the high water mark
of that body of water is indeed - - let me use your, is indeed
Rookery Road itself. And if you want to go to [Zoning
Ordinance] Article 3, you might need to look at Section 4,
regulation of Areas under Water, Page 16. “All areas which are
under water and not shown as included within any district
shall be subject to all of the regulations of woodland/flood
zone areas.” I believe when you apply the ordinance in its
totality, when you implement and insert and infuse in that
Article 9, Section 1, you necessarily have to give that zoning
classification for the lake side of Rookery Road the most
stringent restricted application possible, period ….

(Emphasis added.)

And, finally, on redirect examination, Mr. Cedars again replied as follows:

Q. Mr. Cedars, did I correctly understand your testimony in
response to one of Mr. Adley’s questions that it is the position of
St. Martin Parish Government that as a result of Article 9,
Section 1 of the Louisiana constitution St. Martin Parish
Government has [an] affirmative and mandatory duty with regard
to the enforcement of zoning in a wildlife preserve area that does
not exist with regard to commercial and residential areas? Did I
interpret you correctly?

A. I think so, yeah.

Q. Were you ever able to establish how the error occurred for the
issuance of the permits?

A. I think the permit from my discourse [with] members of my
office and based upon my discourse back in 2016 when I began
to examine this matter on behalf of the St. Martin Parish
Government, I think there was a misapplication of the zoning

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ordinance, whether its 1075 or 1076 Rookery Road that you’re
dealing with. I think there’s not any question that the permit was
improperly and inappropriately issued, period, and people make
mistakes.

Q. A mistake on the part of the government; is that correct?

A. That’s correct. I think it was an administrative error. I get what
the arguments of the defendant is in this case. I understand all
that. I embrace all that. But I think that at the end of the day,
especially since I’m looking at this with a different set of eyes
from a different perspective now that I’m Parish President, when
you look at all of this, you have to do what I think Article 9,
Section 1 dictates, is that we adopt any and all steps as
vigilantly as we possibl[y] can to protect the nature and
character of that preserve. It’s very important not only
environmentally but to the whole community. So you put all
that together and despite the fact an error may have been made,
although I don’t think it was made for 1075 Rookery Road, if an
error was made for 1076 or if you want to give 1075 a W-2
classification, you can’t change a legislative act by an
administrative error, period . . . .

(Emphasis added.)

In his testimony, Mr. Cedars stressed that the lake side of “Rookery Road,”

previously “Levee Road” built on a portion of the levee surrounding Lake Martin

pursuant to Act 337, should have been zoned W-1, wetlands, an even more restrictive

zoning. However using either the Parish’s W-1 or W-2 zoning ordinance, it is

uncontradicted that commercial activities such as being conducted by Mr.

Champagne and his businesses are not allowed on the lake side of Rookery Road,

especially when you also consider Article 3, Section 4 of the Zoning Ordinance16

and Article 9, Section 1 of the Constitution of 1974, the “Public Trust Doctrine.”

_______________
16
Titled “Regulation of areas under water,” Article 3, Section 4 provides: “All areas which
are under water and not shown as included within any district, shall be subject to all of the
regulations of Woodland/Flood Zone areas.” Reference to the Ordinance regulations for the
pertinent Woodland/Flood Zone areas, W-1 and W-2, indicates that the type of permanent,
commercial buildings constructed by Mr. Champagne are not “permitted uses” therein.

27

Simply stated, an “administrative error” by a Parish official cannot change the

nature of a statutorily created lake that is constitutionally protected under the Public

Trust Doctrine. I would reverse and issue the permanent injunction.

Mr. Champagne may have a remedy for damages as alleged in his severed

Reconventional Demand.17 Mr. Champagne may also have a right on remand to re-

urge his position that the St. Martin zoning ordinance is unconstitutional, since that

issue was also severed and was not properly before the trial court. Again, if Mr.

Champagne wishes to make that argument, the Attorney General must be notified of

the alleged constitutional challenge pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art. 1880.

_______________
17
The “Motion and Order to Sever Claims for Trial,” signed by the trial court on April 1,
2016 provides:

ON JOINT MOTION of Plaintiff, St. Martin Parish Government, and
Defendants, Bryan Champagne, et al., through their undersigned counsel, and on
suggesting to the Court that Defendants have filed a Reconventional Demand
seeking certain monetary damages from Plaintiff if Plaintiff is successful in its
claims against Defendants in this litigation, and further, the trial of such
Reconventional Demand will be lengthy, complex, and possibly involve the
testimony of expert witnesses, all of which will be moot and unnecessary if Plaintiff
fails to prevail on its claims, and therefore Plaintiff and Defendants desire to sever
the Reconventional Demand from the claims in Plaintiff’s original Petition for the
purposes of trial on the merits.

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the claims of
Defendants filed by Reconventional Demand in these proceedings be and the same
are severed for trial on the merits from the Plaintiff’s claims currently set for trial
on the merits for April 8, 2019.

28

NON-JOINDER OF NECESSARY AND INDISPENSABLE PARTIES

On remand, I would hold that additional parties should be added pursuant to

a Rule to Show Cause set by the trial court for that purpose. Although no exception

of non-joinder was filed in the district court, the trial court may take cognizance of

the lack of indispensable and necessary parties pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. arts. 927,

641 and 645.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 927 provides in pertinent part:

A. The objections which may be raised through the peremptory
exception include but are not limited to the following:

....

(4) Nonjoinder of a party under Articles 641 and 642.

....

B. The court may not supply the objection of prescription, which
shall be specially pleaded. The nonjoinder of a party … may be noticed
by either the trial or appellate court on its own motion.

Further, Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 641 states:

A person shall be joined as a party in the action when either:

(1) In his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among
those already parties.

(2) He claims an interest relating to the subject matter of the
action and is so situated that the adjudication of the action in his
absence may either:

(a) As a practical matter, impair or impede his ability to protect
that interest.

(b) Leave any of the persons already parties subject to a
substantial risk of incurring multiple or inconsistent obligations.

(Emphasis added.)

29

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 645 also states, “The failure to join

a party to an action may be pleaded in the peremptory exception, or may be noticed

by the trial or appellate court on its own motion.”

Two cases from this circuit explain the consequences of failing to join an

indispensable party. The first is Nicholas v Richardson, 573 So.2d 1317, 1318

(La.App. 3 Cir. 1991), which stated:

The failure to join an indispensable party to an action may be
noticed by a[n] appellate court on its own motion. LSA–C.C.P. arts.
645, 927. When an appellate court notices the absence of indispensable
parties to a suit on appeal, the appropriate remedy is to set aside the
judgment and remand the matter for joinder of the absent parties and
retrial. Horn v. Skelly Oil Co., 221 La. 626, 60 So.2d 65 (1952);
Edmonson v. Abell, 423 So.2d 100 (La.App. 1st Cir.1982).

In the more recent case of Suire v. Oleum Operating Co., 17-117, p. 17

(La.App. 3 Cir. 11/2/17), 235 So.3d 1215, 1228-29, writ denied, 18-271 (La. 4/6/18),

240 So.3d 184, writ denied, 18-279 (La. 4/6/18), 239 So.3d 827, this court cited

Nicholas in agreeing that remand was required:

In Louisiana, the failure to join an indispensable party to an action may
be noticed by an appellate court on its own motion. La.Code Civ.P. arts.
645, 927. “When an appellate court notices the absence of
indispensable parties to a suit on appeal, the appropriate remedy is to
set aside the judgment and remand the matter for joinder of the absent
parties and retrial.” Nicholas v. Richardson, 573 So.2d 1317, 1318
(La.App. 3 Cir. 1991).

In another recent case, Jamestown Forestland, LLC v. Setliff, 17-637 (La.App.

3 Cir. 12/28/17), 235 So.3d 1183, this court found that the trial court erred in

discussing the defendant’s argument based on acquisitive prescription and then

granting an exception of res judicata without joining the owner of the immovable

property, a necessary and indispensable party to the lawsuit. The court cited

La.Code Civ.P. art. 641, specifically Paragraph (2), which applies to the case at hand,

and provides in relevant part:

30

A person shall be added as a party in the action when either:

....

(2) He claims an interest relating to the subject matter of the
action and is so situated that the adjudication of the action in his
absence may either:

(a) As a practical matter, impair or impede his ability to protect
that interest.

(b) Leave any of the persons already parties subject to a
substantial risk of incurring multiple or inconsistent obligations.

(Emphasis added.)

The panel in Jamestown, 235 So.3d at 1186, further noted:
“It is well settled that the lack of an indispensable party to a proceeding
in the trial court is fatal to any adjudication of the dispute.” Shamieh v.
Liquid Transp. Corp., 07-1282, p. 6 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1/30/08), 975
So.2d 161, 164 (citations omitted). Further, “[a] party shall be deemed
necessary for just adjudication when that party’s presence is absolutely
necessary to protect its substantial rights.” Id. at 165 (citation omitted).
As stated in Stephenson v. Nations Credit Fin. Servs. Corp., 98–1688,
98-1689, p. 10 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/24/99), 754 So.2d 1011, 1019, “an
adjudication made without making a person described in Article 641 a
party to the litigation is an absolute nullity.”
Considering the statutes and cases cited, it is appropriate that for the foregoing

reasons the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (LDWF), the Louisiana

Department of Natural Resources (LDNR), the Nature Conservancy, and the U.S.

Army Corps of Engineers may be indispensable parties to a just and proper

resolution of this litigation. Consideration of whether these entities must be joined

as indispensable parties remains for the trial court’s determination by contradictory

hearing set for that purpose. See La.Code Civ.P. art. 641; La.Code Civ.P. art. 645.

These entities may also be allowed to join as intervenors or submit amicus briefs if

allowed to do so.

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ANCILLARY MATTERS

As for the remaining pleadings filed by Mr. Champagne with this Court on

appeal, I concur with the majority’s decision to deny Mr. Champagne’s motions to

dismiss and his exception of no right of action.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Bryan Champagne had no legal authority to construct commercial

buildings from which he conducts commercial activities on Lake Martin, a

statutorily created fish, game and nature preserve. See 1950 La. Acts No. 337.

The Parish properly exercised its Constitutional duty under the Public Trust

Doctrine to utilize its zoning ordinance and to seek to enjoin Mr. Champagne from

operating his commercial activities from buildings and structures he constructed on

Lake Martin, unquestionably in violation of the Parish zoning ordinances and wholly

within the boundaries of this protected, legislatively created State preserve. While

the Parish did erroneously issue building permits from the executive branch of the

Parish for Mr. Champagne to build commercial structures on the Lake, those permits

were issued through an administrative error, could not be lawfully issued in the

preserve, and cannot act to estop the Parish from enforcing its zoning ordinance

pursuant to its Public Trust responsibilities. Mr. Champagne did seek a variance

from the legislative body of St. Martin Parish to allow him to operate on the Lake

side of the Parish road in question, “Rookery Road,” but it was denied. He did not

appeal that ruling.

I would reverse the trial judge and issue the injunction requested by the Parish.

Mr. Champagne’s reconventional demand to have the Parish zoning ordinance

declared unconstitutional and his alternative claim for damages was severed and

should be remanded for decision by the trial court. I would order that potential

32

necessary and indispensable parties be notified and a hearing set by the trial court to

determine whether the LDWF, LDNR, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Nature

Conservancy and/or other interested parties should be added or allowed to intervene

and/or submit amicus briefs. I would assess costs of this appeal and the costs

associated with the injunction in the trial court to Bryan Champagne, individually

and as corporate representative for The Wharf on Lake Martin, LLC and

Champagne’s Cajun Swamp Tours, LLC.

33